The Future Foretold: Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Congressional Support for Israel

Lyndon B. Johnson became a senator the year of Israel’s creation: 1948. Moral, political, and strategic considerations guided Johnson’s outspoken support for Israel from an early point in his political career. This analysis reveals that Johnson’s advocacy of Israel whilst a senator foreshadowed his policy as president of championing the Israeli-American military-strategic alliance. Beginning with his time in Congress, Johnson had many Jewish American friends supporting the establishment of a Jewish state and, due to the importance of Jewish-American backing of the Democratic Party, Johnson supported Israel for significant political reasons. From a moral and strategic perspective starting in the 1950s, Johnson believed that Israel served as a humanitarian refuge for Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust and, as a liberal democracy, was well suited to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence and communism in the Cold War Middle East. For these reasons, Johnson supported the initiation of American aid to Israel in the early 1950s, which would presage decisions to arm Israel with the first American tanks and fighter jets as president. As a senator, Johnson staunchly opposed President Dwight Eisenhower’s threat to impose sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from Egyptian territories occupied in the 1956 Suez crisis. Johnson’s stance on Suez – that Israel deserved greater security guarantees prior to withdrawal – would starkly parallel his policy following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.     

The 1945 Ethridge Mission to Bulgaria and Romania and the Origins of the Cold War in the Balkans

In autumn 1945, US Secretary of State James Byrnes deadlocked with Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov over the governments of Bulgaria and Romania. To escape, Byrnes dispatched Mark Ethridge, a liberal newspaperman, on a fact-finding mission. Contrary to Byrnes' hopes, Ethridge found conditions as bad as reported, and went to Moscow to convince the Soviet government to moderate Communist behavior. Ethridge's damning report on political repression had little effect on Byrnes, who grabbed a face-saving Soviet offer. President Harry Truman, though, read Ethridge's report and became convinced of the failure of Byrnes' soft-line and the need to stand up to the Soviet Union.     

The 1945 Ethridge Mission to Bulgaria and Romania and the Origins of the Cold War in the Balkans

In autumn 1945, US Secretary of State James Byrnes deadlocked with Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov over the governments of Bulgaria and Romania. To escape, Byrnes dispatched Mark Ethridge, a liberal newspaperman, on a fact-finding mission. Contrary to Byrnes’ hopes, Ethridge found conditions as bad as reported, and went to Moscow to convince the Soviet government to moderate Communist behavior. Ethridge’s damning report on political repression had little effect on Byrnes, who grabbed a face-saving Soviet offer. President Harry Truman, though, read Ethridge’s report and became convinced of the failure of Byrnes’ soft-line and the need to stand up to the Soviet Union.     

“Only the USSR Has… Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 2)

The second part of this two part essay focuses on the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow and the recently published journals of Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiskii. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives, and the standard document collections, including the American and German series. The Soviet Union did all that it could do, given Anglo-French abdication, to help the Czechoslovak goverment defend its independance against Nazi Germany. The British and French portrayed a manipulative Soviet Union, seeking to abandon treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia, while at the same time they fled from obligations to Prague and projected their own evasions onto Moscow. In spite of everything, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene?, might have held the fate of his country in his own hands. Would he do “something crazy”, would Czechoslovakia fight alone at the outset, hoping that public opinion would force France and Great Britain into war? Tragically, Bene? would not bid va banque and indeed was complicit in the Anglo-French abandonment of his country. By its reckoning, the Soviet Union escaped the crisis with “clean hands”, though a clear conscience was no consolation in Moscow, where the government had to contemplate the ruin of collective security and its own isolation in Europe.     

试析抗战后期苏联因素的影响

战略反攻阶段,苏联因素在国共两党的关系中作用日益增强,究其原因,主要有以下几个方面:苏联国际地位提高,在重大国际事务处理上举足轻重,这是苏联因素再度受到重视的最主要因素;蒋介石集团出于战略考量,主动改善与苏联的关系;美国的推动,也是促使苏联在中国政局再度受到关注的因素之一;就中国共产党而言,为抗衡英美对国民党的支持,中国共产党有必要保持同苏联的友好关系,这也是苏联作用增强的因素之一。在错综复杂的国际关系中,联合一切可以联合的力量,利用一切积极因素,有利于推进革命事业的发展,同时,在处理国内党派之争时应最大限度地避免外部消极因素的介入;处理国家间关系时,要时刻以国家利益为重,不应以意识形态和党派之间矛盾为重,这是历史给予我们的昭示。     

哈尔滨犹太宗教公会的兴衰

19世纪末，伴随着沙俄的排犹政策和中东铁路的修筑，大批俄国犹太人来到哈尔滨这个新的“避难所”定居。他们在哈尔滨建立了犹太会堂、银行、学校、医院，还创办了犹太人自己的社团，形成了较完整的犹太社区体系，当时的哈尔滨已成为东亚地区犹太人最大的活动中心之一。通过研究发现，哈尔滨犹太宗教公会在哈尔滨犹太人社区中处于领导核心的地位。通过犹太宗教公会的组织活动，维护犹太人的利益，使在哈尔滨的犹太人同欧美、苏俄、中东地区的犹太人保持了密切的联系。     

Securing the State: From Zionist Ideology to Israeli Statehood

Between early 1947 and May 1948, the Zionist movement went from being a non-state actor representing the minority population within the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine to establishing the State of Israel, which would be recognised almost instantaneously by the world's two Superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a result, however, was never a given. What processes allowed a non-state actor, the Zionist movement, to secure international acceptance for the creation of a Jewish state in highly ambiguous circumstances? This analysis explores the dual-track adopted by the Zionist movement, whereby it worked to create facts on the ground within Palestine whilst securing support for its state-building project at the international level. By establishing state-like institutions in Palestine whilst building international support, the Jewish Agency was able to secure for itself a unique place from which to declare statehood.     

“Only the USSR Has … Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 1)

The first part of this two part essay is a re-examination of the Czechoslovak crisis (1934–1938) based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives and the standard published collections, including the American and German series. It is about the development and conduct of Soviet collective security policy in the key years leading to the “Munich crisis” in September 1938. Evidence from the Moscow archives demonstrates that the Soviet government was serious about collective security and that it was ready to participate in an anti-Nazi alliance. Its initiatives were repeatedly rebuffed in Europe, notably in Paris and London. Even in Prague, the Czechoslovak president, Eduard Bene?, was an undependable ally. These rebuffs led the Soviet government to be cautious during the Munich crisis. The Soviet Union would not act unilaterally, but what it actually did do was intended to defend Czechoslovak security within the constraints of Anglo–French abandonment in which Bene?? himself was complicit.     

苏联对意大利和东欧政策研究（1943—1947年）

在意大利战后安排问题上,苏联同美英两国的争斗早在二战后期就已经开始。意大利问题主要是战前殖民地等问题。出于利用英美矛盾为自己谋利的目的,苏联并不打算削弱意大利。由于英美两国在处理意大利问题上具有优先权,只允许苏联名义上参与意大利事务,并没有实际发言权,导致苏联在意大利问题上的变化以及在东欧问题上的强硬,美苏矛盾趋于尖锐化。苏联战后安全带政策目的是将东欧纳入自己的势力范围。苏联对意大利政策与对东欧政策是紧密联系在一起的。苏联从起初的不打算削弱意大利转变为不过分削弱意大利的政策,正是用来控制东欧并使其成为自己势力范围的政治筹码。这也成为美苏冷战的起源之一。     

Ethics,terrorism and counter‐terrorism

Traditionally, the Talmudic Orthodoxy always postulated the reestablishing of a Jewish state only by an act of God's grace at messianic times. The establishment of Israel by secular Jews thus caused real consternation among Orthodox sects. Ultra Orthodox sects did not even recognize Israel as a Jewish entity. However, the occupation of the West Bank, the site of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, in 1967 was seen by many Orthodox Jews as a sign of redemption and also an opportunity to take an active, even a leading, role in a “true Zionist” enterprise of fulfilling God's promise to Abraham that the whole land will belong to his offspring. The settling of the West Bank was congruent with the government's political aims. This led the government to provide deep financial and massive military support to settlers, both the religious population that follows a radical nationalistic policy enveloped with messianic motifs, and other settlers, attracted by the substantial perks. The violent conduct of the militant religious sector among the settlers provides a radical threat to Israel's character, and even its existence. Above and beyond that provided by the military and economic burden of the West Bank settlements themselves.     

俄罗斯人口危机与移民政策透视

地广人稀的俄罗斯在21世纪面临人口锐减和欧亚两部分人口分布失衡的压力,而强国富民战略的实施势必关涉劳动力资源配置,从西部、原苏联加盟共和国或邻国引入必要的人口是东部地区发展的先决条件。     

苏联民族联邦制浅析

民族联邦制是苏联的国家结构形式,它在社会基础、制度资源方面存在先天不足并与联邦制的逻辑内涵存在抵触。由于苏联党政领导人在民族问题上的错误政策和行为,民族联邦制失去本来的合法化基础。苏联共产党的意识形态成为民族联邦制和整个政治体制的合法化基础。民族联邦制的异化成为苏联解体的重要原因之一。     

苏维埃政权初期列宁的基层党组织建设理论与实践

十月革命胜利后,布尔什维克党掌握了国家政权,成为执政党。列宁在执政党基层组织建设中,坚持民主集中制,将共产党基层组织活动与工会、青年团等组织结合起来,由党领导其他群众组织共同发挥作用,这些理论和实践活动对苏联共产党的建设产生了深远影响。     

The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

The United Nations Plan to Establish an Armed Jewish Force to Implement the Partition Plan (United Nations Resolution 181)

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two independent states, Jewish and Arab, with Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under international control. The General Assembly then established the United Nations Palestine Commission to implement partition. Amongst other things, the Commission was to establish “armed militias” under UN supervision to help realise the plan. The analysis examines various aspects of the sequence of events related to this idea, from its conception in the General Assembly to its death in February 1948. It demonstrates that under the militia clause, the United Nations intended to rely on the Jews’ main military organisation – the Haganah – to establish the Jewish state and shows how and why this plan went awry despite the converging interests of the Jews and the United Nations.     

Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration

When President Gerald Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break by continuing the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. Nixon had given the Shah of Iran a “blank cheque” to purchase whatever American arms he desired—short of nuclear weapons. Although Ford’s authority would be challenged by members of his own Administration and a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority, the need to support allies in the Middle East against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount.     

EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia's Expectations,Responses and Options for the Future1

Abstract

For Russian policymakers no events in the post-Cold War period have had more momentous consequences or received greater public commentary, both before and after they occurred, than the almost simultaneous enlargement of NATO and the EU that took place in 2004. The most sensitive aspect of this ‘dual enlargement’ for the Russian Federation was the extension of these two organisations into the Baltic States, which had been part of the Soviet Union itself. Despite some uneasiness, Moscow anticipated that the extension of the EU into the former Soviet sphere, even into the former Soviet Union itself, would constitute a generally positive development, while NATO penetration of that sphere would be extremely harmful. Accordingly, Russia voiced little opposition to the EU's plans and made only limited efforts to insure that its major interests would be protected, while it actively sought to forestall the NATO project, especially with regard to the Baltics. As it turned out, however, most of Russia's expectations regarding the impact of these processes were mistaken, and Russia's interests were poorly served by its prior and subsequent responses.     

Globalization,governance and democracy in post‐communist Romania

Post‐communist transition in Romania has witnessed an accelerated globalization in the country. Global (understood here as supraterritorial) relations have altered many communication networks, forms of organization, production processes, markets, monetary and financial flows, ecological conditions, and patterns of social consciousness. Although the extent of globalization in Romania should not be exaggerated, the recent rapid spread of supraterritoriality has pulled the country out of the preceding era of territorialist politics. The Romanian state can no longer realize its claims to sovereignty and has become oriented to transborder as well as territorial constituencies. At the same time, globalization has stimulated greater involvement of transworld and regional agencies in governance. The rise of supraterritoriality has also encouraged some devolution and some privatization of regulatory authority in Romania. Singly and together, these developments pose substantial challenges for democracy. True, certain transborder initiatives have modestly promoted post‐communist democratization in Romania. On the whole, however, Romanians have obtained insufficient participation, consultation, representation, transparency and accountability in respect of the multi‐layered and fragmented governance that is emerging in the context of globalization.     

New Complexities in the Middle East since 9.11

The Middle East has been a hot spot in international politics since the mid-20th century owing to its special geostrategic position and its abundant resources of oil and natural gas. These contributes have made it an area of contention for any state with a global overview. During the Cold War,the sharp differences between two superpowers,the U.S. and the Soviet Union,could have brought the situation to the brink of a third world war. After the Cold War,the U.S. became the dominant power in the Middle East. ...     

A Soviet Eye on France from the rue de Grenelle in Paris, 1924–1940

The present article is about Soviet perceptions of French politics and society as reported by the five Soviet ambassadors in Paris between 1924 and 1940, and about how their reports influenced Soviet policy making in Moscow. This article is based largely upon unpublished documents from the Soviet foreign policy archives in Moscow (AVPRF), specifically opened to researchers in the 1990s. It contends that these Soviet ambassadors established effective relationships with French counterparts and that they were pragmatic, non-ideological realists trying unsuccessfully to improve Soviet relations with France. The narrative is about the failure of these efforts over a period of sixteen years and ultimately about the failure of the Soviet Union and France to form anti-Nazi alliance during the 1930s.