The Motivated Processing of Political Arguments

We report the results of an experiment designed to replicate and extend recent findings on motivated political reasoning. In particular, we are interested in disconfirmation biases—the tendency to counter-argue or discount information with which one disagrees—in the processing of political arguments on policy issues. Our experiment examines 8 issues, including some of local relevance and some of national relevance, and manipulates the presentation format of the policy arguments. We find strong support for our basic disconfirmation hypothesis: people seem unable to ignore their prior beliefs when processing arguments or evidence. We also find that this bias is moderated by political sophistication and strength of prior attitude. We do not find, however, that argument type matters, suggesting that motivated biases are quite robust to changes in argument format. Finally, we find strong support for the polarization of attitudes as a consequence of biased processing.

Motivated Reasoning and Political Parties: Evidence for Increased Processing in the Face of Party Cues

Extant research in political science has demonstrated that citizens’ opinions on policies are influenced by their attachment to the party sponsoring them. At the same time, little evidence exists illuminating the psychological processes through which such party cues are filtered. From the psychological literature on source cues, we derive two possible hypotheses: (1) party cues activate heuristic processing aimed at minimizing the processing effort during opinion formation, and (2) party cues activate group motivational processes that compel citizens to support the position of their party. As part of the latter processes, the presence of party cues would make individuals engage in effortful motivated reasoning to produce arguments for the correctness of their party’s position. Following psychological research, we use response latency to measure processing effort and, in support of the motivated reasoning hypothesis, demonstrate that across student and nationally representative samples, the presence of party cues increases processing effort.     

Conspiracy Endorsement as Motivated Reasoning: The Moderating Roles of Political Knowledge and Trust

Given the potential political and social significance of conspiracy beliefs, a substantial and growing body of work examines the individual‐level correlates of belief in conspiracy theories and general conspiratorial predispositions. However, although we know much about the psychological antecedents of conspiracy endorsement, we know less about the individual‐level political causes of these prevalent and consequential beliefs. Our work draws from the extant literature to posit that endorsement of conspiracy theories is a motivated process that serves both ideological and psychological needs. In doing so, we develop a theory that identifies a particular type of person—one who is both highly knowledgeable about politics and lacking in trust—who is most susceptible to ideologically motivated conspiracy endorsement. Further, we demonstrate that the moderators of belief in conspiracy theories are strikingly different for conservatives and liberals.     

Ideology Justifies Morality: Political Beliefs Predict Moral Foundations

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) is employed as a causal explanation of ideology that posits political attitudes are products of moral intuitions. Prior theoretical models, however, suggest the opposite causal path, that is, that moral judgments are driven by political beliefs. In both instances, however, extant research has assumed rather than explicitly tested for causality. So do moral intuitions drive political beliefs or do political beliefs drive moral intuitions? We empirically address this question using data from two panel studies and one nationally representative study, and find consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that ideology predicts moral intuitions. The findings have significant implications for MFT as a theory of ideology, and also about the consequences of political beliefs for shaping how individuals rationalize what is right and what is wrong.     

笛卡尔普遍怀疑的意义

本文分析考察了笛卡尔普遍怀疑的过程、缘由、依据和目的 ,认为笛卡尔把“清晰明确”作为知识的基础和接受事实的原则 ,揭示了人类思维的基本特征。在知识、信息急剧膨胀的时代 ,对于个人有限的大脑潜力而言 ,或许不必刻意追逐快速增长的知识进程 ,在掌握一定基本知识的基础上 ,拿出怀疑主义的勇气 ,清除心中的一切成见、偏见、疑虑和外来的干扰信息 ,使思维达到清晰明确的豁然状态 ,似乎更益于激发智慧的火花。     

Re-centring British Government: Beliefs, Traditions and Dilemmas in Political Science

Bevir and Rhodes have offered a useful addition to the tools of political scientists by developing an interpretivist approach to political science. Interpretation is a crucial mechanism for understanding the social world but one that has been underused in political analysis. This article welcomes Bevir and Rhodes' emphasis on interpretivism but suggests that there are a number of problems in the way they use the approach. In particular: they use a narrow definition of interpretivism; they caricature the nature of existing work in political science; the concept of tradition does too much work; and they pay insufficient attention to power and power relations.     

Motivated Responding in Studies of Factual Learning

Large partisan gaps in reports of factual beliefs have fueled concerns about citizens’ competence and ability to hold representatives accountable. In three separate studies, we reconsider the evidence for one prominent explanation of these gaps—motivated learning. We extend a recent study on motivated learning that asks respondents to deduce the conclusion supported by numerical data. We offer a random set of respondents a small financial incentive to accurately report what they have learned. We find that a portion of what is taken as motivated learning is instead motivated responding. That is, without incentives, some respondents give incorrect but congenial answers when they have correct but uncongenial information. Relatedly, respondents exhibit little bias in recalling the data. However, incentivizing people to faithfully report uncongenial facts increases bias in their judgments of the credibility of what they have learned. In all, our findings suggest that motivated learning is less common than what the literature suggests, but also that there is a whack-a-mole nature to bias, with reduction in bias in one place being offset by increase in another place.     

Political Information, Political Involvement, and Reliance on Ideology in Political Evaluation

Many studies have focused on the relationship between political information and the use of ideology. Here, we argue that two “evaluative motivations”—general investment of the self in politics and extremity of partisanship—serve as moderators of this relationship. Specifically, we use data from two recent national surveys to test whether the possession of information is more strongly associated with a tendency to approach politics in an ideological fashion among individuals high in both types of evaluative motivation. Results supported this hypothesis, revealing that information was more strongly associated with ideological constraint and with a tendency to give polarized evaluations of conservatives and liberals among those who highly invest the self in politics and those with more extreme partisanship. As such, this study suggests that information and involvement interact to shape the use of ideology.     

Beliefs in Government

This article conveys the general findings of the multi-national, multi-volume Beliefs in Government research project, perhaps the most exhaustive analysis of mass beliefs and attitudes conducted in the west. In spite of considerable socio–economic change in recent decades, the study provides evidence of political stability, continuity and adaptability in west European countries. This suggests that political scientists should pay more attention than hitherto to pressures for inertia and continuity in western democracies.     

Not by Twins Alone: Using the Extended Family Design to Investigate Genetic Influence on Political Beliefs

Variance components estimates of political and social attitudes suggest a substantial level of genetic influence, but the results have been challenged because they rely on data from twins only. In this analysis, we include responses from parents and nontwin full siblings of twins, account for measurement error by using a panel design, and estimate genetic and environmental variance by maximum‐likelihood structural equation modeling. By doing so, we address the central concerns of critics, including that the twin‐only design offers no verification of either the equal environments or random mating assumptions. Moving beyond the twin‐only design leads to the conclusion that for most political and social attitudes, genetic influences account for an even greater proportion of individual differences than reported by studies using more limited data and more elementary estimation techniques. These findings make it increasingly difficult to deny that—however indirectly—genetics plays a role in the formation of political and social attitudes.     

Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition

Truth commissions have become so fashionable in times of transitionthat one can readily recognize what might be called a ‘truthcascade.’ The commissions, and the reports they produce,are reputed to promote many of the goals at the heart of thetransitional justice project: helping victims to heal, promotingaccountability, drawing a bright line between the past and thepresent, promoting reconciliation and so forth. And yet, a closerlook at the truth-seeking enterprise suggests that it may notbe able to deliver on these promises. This article exploresboth the intrinsic and instrumental reasons why truth commissionsmay not be effective in promoting the goals attributed to them.The article does not argue that transitional governments shouldnot pursue the truth, but it does urge governments to use cautionand careful planning when they do so.     

我国政绩考评制度的结构性偏失及其矫正

我国政绩考评存在着结构性偏失,其具体表现是:在政府自我评价和社会公众评价之间偏向政府自我评价,尤其偏向上级领导评价;在经济绩效评价和非经济绩效评价之间偏向经济绩效评价;在数量指标评价和民心向背评价之间偏向数量指标评价。重构科学的政绩考评制度,应把握以下三点:明确科学政绩考评的三个逻辑前提;确立政绩考评的整体结构;以行政结果作为政绩考评的侧重项。     

The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion

Political parties play a vital role in democracies by linking citizens to their representatives. Nonetheless, a longstanding concern is that partisan identification slants decision-making. Citizens may support (oppose) policies that they would otherwise oppose (support) in the absence of an endorsement from a political party—this is due in large part to what is called partisan motivated reasoning where individuals interpret information through the lens of their party commitment. We explore partisan motivated reasoning in a survey experiment focusing on support for an energy law. We identify two politically relevant factors that condition partisan motivated reasoning: (1) an explicit inducement to form an “accurate” opinion, and (2) cross-partisan, but not consensus, bipartisan support for the law. We further provide evidence of how partisan motivated reasoning works psychologically and affects opinion strength. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for understanding opinion formation and the overall quality of citizens’ opinions.     

Endogenous Beliefs in Models of Politics

In the standard rational choice model, actors have exogenously given beliefs that perfectly match objective probabilities. As such, these beliefs cannot be optimistic or motivated by preferences, even though substantial empirical evidence indicates that human beliefs routinely satisfy neither of these criteria. I present a tractable Endogenous Beliefs Model and apply it to three different political environments from across the subfields of political science. In the model, players form beliefs that maximize a utility function that represents preferences over outcomes and the anticipatory experience of uncertainty. Applications include voter turnout, taxation and collective choice, and crisis bargaining. The model captures the empirical evidence about belief formation much better than the standard model. Moreover, these applications show how rigidly insisting on the standard rational choice model rejects otherwise reasonable explanations by fiat, precisely because of its implausible assumptions about beliefs.     

How Getting the Facts Right Can Fuel Partisan‐Motivated Reasoning

Scholars often evaluate citizens' democratic competence by focusing on their ability to get relevant facts right. In this article, I show why this approach can yield misleading conclusions about citizen competence. I argue that although citizens with strong partisan loyalties might be forced to accept the same facts, they find alternative ways to rationalize reality. One such way, I show, is through the selective attribution of credit and blame. With four randomized experiments, conducted in diverse national settings and containing closed‐ as well as open‐ended questions, I find that as partisans correctly updated economic beliefs to reflect new facts, they conversely attributed responsibility in a highly selective fashion. Although partisans might acknowledge the same facts, they are apt in seizing on and producing attributional arguments that fit their preferred worldviews.     

The Distortion of Related Beliefs

When forming beliefs about themselves, politics, and how the world works more generally, people often face a tension between conclusions they inherently wish to reach and those which are plausible. And the likelihood of beliefs about one variable (e.g., the performance of a favored politician) depends on beliefs about other, related variables (e.g., the quality and bias of newspapers reporting on the politician). I propose a formal approach to combine these two forces, creating a tractable way to study the distortion of related beliefs. The approach unifies several central ideas from psychology (e.g., motivated reasoning, attribution) that have been applied heavily to political science. Concrete applications shed light on why successful individuals sometimes attribute their performance to luck (“imposter syndrome”), why those from advantaged groups believe they in fact face high levels of discrimination (the “persecution complex”), and why partisans disagree about the accuracy and bias of news sources.