Two Grades of Non-consequentialism

In this paper, I explore how to accommodate non-consequentialist constraints with a broadly value-based conception of reasons for action. It turns out that there are two grades of non-consequentialist constraints. The first grade involves attaching ethical importance to such distinctions as the doing/allowing distinction, and the distinction between intended and unintended consequences that is central to the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, at least within the value-based framework, this first grade is insufficient to explain rights, which ground weighty reasons against infringing those rights that need not be outweighed even when infringing those rights is necessary for preventing a larger number of people from having their rights infringed in the same way. Such rights form a second grade of non-consequentialist constraints: within the value-based framework, this second grade is best explained in terms of the intrinsically relational values and disvalues of interpersonal interactions and relationships.     

Śrīharṣa on Knowledge and Justification

In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of ?rīhar?a can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in ?rīhar?a’s masterpiece, the Kha??anakha??a-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification (pramā?a) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting ?rīhar?a’s polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that ?rīhar?a is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing ?rīhar?a’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of ?rīhar?a’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants.     

The Particularities of Legitimacy: John Simmons on Political Obligation

In this paper, I examine the terms on which John Simmons rejects all arguments for a moral obligation to obey the law and so defends “philosophical anarchism.” Although I accept his rejection of several criteria on which others might and often do insist, I criticize his reliance on the conditions of “generality” and “particularity.” In doing so, I propose an alternative to his influential conception of legitimacy.     

Blacks,self-esteem,and delinquency: It's time for a new approach

For decades, sociology and social psychology has debated the nature of self-esteem and its role in determining behavior. More recently, race has been added to the mixture, as social scientists have sought to explain black self-esteem and the involvement of black youth in delinquency. The article reviews a number of studies to explore the relative importance of race as an explanatory factory. Questions of the validity of prior measures of self-esteem are raised, especially where racial comparisons of self-esteem and delinquency were made. This article identifies various conceptual and methodological problems inherent to studies of race, self-esteem, and delinquency. In doing so, distinctions are made among personal and group identity measures of self-esteem in an effort to further the cause of research in this area.     

Justification as a Process of Discovery

Legal decision-making interests theoreticians in our discipline largely in terms of how a legal decision is justified. In his book, Bruce Anderson (1996) has posited a distinction between how a decision is arrived at, on one hand, and how it is justified, on the other. Anderson seems to be suggesting that legal theory should set out to continue the work of the American realists, that is, to develop legal decision-making as a process of discovery towards a solution. In my presentation, I will be looking at legal decision-making as a process of finding or discovering knowledge. What I mean by "discovery," however, is the discovery of new scientific knowledge. (The theory of science draws a distinction between proving and discovering knowledge.) I submit that for a justification to be valid the arguments comprising it ought to fulfill the logical conditions stipulated for the discovery of knowledge. In the present paper, I also hope to share with you the main ideas of a book I am currently writing on the subject.     

Who’s Afraid of Property Rights? Rights as Core Concepts,Coherent, Prima Facie,Situated and Specified

Natural property rights are widely viewed as anathema to welfarist taxation, and are pictured as non-contextual, non-relational and resistant to regulation. Here, I argue that many of the major arguments for such views are flawed. Such arguments trade on an ambiguity in the term ‘right’ that makes it possible to conflate the core concept of a right with a situated or specified right from which one can read off people’s actual legal entitlements and duties. I marshal several arguments demonstrating this conflation. In particular, I examine the right to free speech, where contextualization and responsiveness to the requirements of other rights are assumed as a matter of course. I conclude that the existence of one natural right does not foreclose the existence of other natural rights. Arguments for or against welfare rights must be assessed, at least to some extent, independently of the assertion of a natural property right.     

The Legality of Law

Abstract. In this paper I outline various different objects of investigation that may be picked out by word “law” (or its cognates). All of these objects must be investigated in an integrated way before one can provide a complete philosophical explanation of the nature of law. I begin with the distinction between laws (artefacts) and law (the genre to which the artefacts belong). This leads me to the distinction between the law (of a particular legal system) and law (the genre of artefacts). Then I discuss the contrast between law (the genre of artefacts) and law (the practice). Finally I comment on legality as the name of an ideal for laws and legal systems to live up to. I commend H. L. A. Hart's explanation of the nature of law for investigating these various objects in an integraed way, while nevertheless respecting the distinctions among them. I also criticise some of R. M. Dworkin's work for failing to respect the same distinctions.     

A tale of targeted violence in Hashimpura: the Delhi High Court on recognition,relations and responses

On 31 October 2018, Justice Dr S Muralidhar (then) at the Delhi High Court convicted 16 members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) for, inter alia, the murder of 38 Muslim residents of Hashimpura, a neighbourhood in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh in the summer of 1987. In so doing, he described the events that unfolded in Hashimpura as the ‘targeted killing’ of ‘members of a particular minority community.’ The judicial recognition of targeted violence in contemporary Indian society forms the focus of the present article. The article contends that Muralidhar J’s reference to targeted violence paves way for the recognition of an important juridical concept that warrants further academic and legal engagement. By adopting a relational approach, I argue that the conceptual utility of the category of targeted violence lies in its ability to unmask the social relations that it implicates. Targeted violence is not aimed at individual actors, but social relations between perpetrators, individual victims and those who share the victims’ minority identity. Committed to the legal recognition of social experiences, I demonstrate how the category of targeted violence accurately reflects the experiences of and relations between different social actors. I further build a case for why and how legal and judicial responses to targeted violence ought to be informed and shaped by a recognition of its relational harms.

     

THE TRUE VALUE OF LAMBDA WOULD APPEAR TO BE ZERO: AN ESSAY ON CAREER CRIMINALS,CRIMINAL CAREERS,SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION,COHORT STUDIES,AND RELATED TOPICS*

The idea of selective incapacitation and the distinction between prevalence and incidence (participation and lambda) justify the search for a group of offenders whose criminality does not decline with age and who may be identified solely on the basis of legally relevant variables. This paper questions such research, arguing that the decline in age with crime characterizes even the most active offenders. and that the distinction between incidence and prevalence does not deserve the theoretical, research, or policy attention it has been claimed to merit (Farrington, 1985; Blumstein and Graddy, 1981–1982). In doing so, it relies on research results widely accepted in criminology. Thus, the current focus of criminological research on the “career criminal,” on selective incapacitation, and on longitudinal research remains unjustified.     

Criminalization,Legitimacy, and Welfare

A standard view about criminal law distinguishes between two kinds of offenses, “mala in se” and “mala prohibita.” This view also corresponds to a distinction between two bases for criminalization: certain acts should be criminalized because they are moral wrongs; other acts may be criminalized for the sake of promoting overall welfare. This paper aims to show two things: first, that allowing for criminalization for the sake of promoting welfare renders the category of wrongfulness crimes largely redundant. Second, and more importantly, accepting welfare as a legitimate ground for criminalization implies a certain view about legitimate state action, which makes criminalization for wrongfulness more difficult to justify. If I am right, the view that keeps the two categories of criminalization as largely separate is untenable. I conclude with some remarks about the advantages of welfare (and not wrongfulness) as the basis for criminalization.     

The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Impossibility Arguments

This article considers whether English law should allow a director to argue that if the company is unable to exploit a corporate opportunity, the director should be free to exploit it personally. The article supports the view of the Company Law Review Steering Group that the answer should remain no. In so doing it analyses US practice to show that, even where such arguments are recognised, they are difficult to prove and their potential application is curtailed through the development of satellite rules. Indeed, in practical terms there may be no significant difference between the Steering Group's recommendations and the position towards which US law appears to be moving.     

Two kinds of rule regulating human subjects research

Alan Wertheimer argues that before we promulgate some rule regarding the conduct of research on human subjects we ethically ought to consider the consequences of the rule being followed. This ethical requirement has an exception, though, Wertheimer maintains: it doesn''t apply to rules that are not motivated by considerations of outcome. I agree that there is an exception to be made to Wertheimer''s proposed ethical requirement, but not Wertheimer''s exception. The important distinction is not that between rules motivated by considerations of outcome and rules motivated otherwise, but between rules designed to enforce ethics and rules not so designed. Before we promulgate the latter kind of rule, we are ethically required to consider the consequences of doing so. This is not so for the former kind of rule. My exception, unlike Wertheimer''s, yields the conclusion that we should promulgate, regardless of the consequences of doing so, a rule requiring that the potential benefit to the subject of participation in a study outweigh the risks. This rule is motivated by considerations of outcome, so it would land on the wrong side of Wertheimer''s divide. But it''s also designed to enforce ethics, so it lands on the correct side of my divide.     

Legal Hypocrisy

Accusations of hypocrisy in law and politics typically invoke hypocrisy as a personal failing. This locution misses the much more dangerous way laws and legal institutions themselves can be hypocritical. Hypocrisy can be equally revealed when an institution not only deceives another but acts against its avowed values or does not act in ways required by the values professed. Thus, legal actors, institutions, and norms can, in their institutional role, act against the values they avow, displaying legal hypocrisy. By avowing attractive values while acting in ways that undermine those values, laws and legal institutions victimize citizens to achieve goals that could not be openly justified. In doing so, hypocritical laws not only harm their victims but, by obscuring the injury, undermine the victim’s ability to call the law into account. Hypocrisy is important to highlight precisely because it suffocates the voice of its victims. Because hypocrisy takes advantage of a person while only pretending to justify one’s actions, hypocrisy not only harms citizens but treats them with a form of contempt. The vicious irony is that hypocrisy in the law not only harms its “direct victims” but ultimately undermines the very rule of law.     

Private Law Exceptionalism? Part I: A Basic Difficulty with the Structural Arguments from Bipolarity and Civil Recourse

Contemporary discussions of private law theory have sought to divine the deep structure and content of private law by reference to two key distinctions. First, the distinction between private and criminal law has been utilized to flesh out the distinctively bipolar structure of private law (and its various departments, namely, property, contract, torts, and unjust enrichment). Second, the distinction between formal and distributive equality has served to highlight the special terms of interaction established in private law. In these pages, I take up the former distinction, arguing that its theoretical significance is overdrawn. I argue that it does not succeed in identifying private law’s precise nature.     

Giovanni Battista Ratti's Critique of Principles Theory

Ratti has attacked principles theory in two respects. The first is that it is impossible to distinguish between rules and principles. The second is that the main thesis of principles theory, which says that balancing is the specific way of applying principles, is wrong. The result of Ratti's critique is his thesis that principles theory founders on a contradiction or, as Ratti calls it, an antinomy. All of this is based on two arguments: Ratti's disapplication argument and his law of concretization. I attempt to reject this analysis, for it is incomplete. It claims to be an analysis of balancing, but it misses the decisive point of balancing. Informed by this background, I defend the distinction between rules and principles as a distinction of the real and the ideal “ought.”     

‘Won’t Somebody Please Think of the Children?’ Hate Speech,Harm, and Childhood

Some authors claim that hate speech plays a key role in perpetuating unjust social hierarchy. One prima facie plausible hypothesis about how this occurs is that hate speech has a pernicious influence on the attitudes of children. Here I argue that this hypothesis has an important part to play in the formulation of an especially robust case for general legal prohibitions on hate speech. If our account of the mechanism via which hate speech effects its harms is built around claims about hate speech’s influence on children, then we will be better placed to acquire evidence that demonstrates the processes posited in our account, and better placed to ascribe responsibility for these harms to individuals who engage in hate speech. I briefly suggest some policy implications that come with developing an account of the harm of hate speech along these lines.

     

Conflict of laws issues associated with an action for interference with privacy

Recent developments indicate that Australia may be ready to recognise an action for interference with privacy. Similar progress can be seen in some other countries. When such a action is recognised, whether in the form of a new tort or in the form of a statutory action, it will doubtlessly give rise to conflict of laws questions. A person in one state will perceive that her/his right to privacy has been violated by a person or organisation in another state, and questions as to where she/he can sue the other party, and which law will be applicable, will become relevant. Such scenarios are particularly likely to occur in the Internet context. This article examines those, and related, questions. In doing so, focus is placed on Australian law and particular emphasis is placed on the action's application in relation to Internet conduct.     

Proportionality, Territorial Occupation, and Enabled Terrorism

Some collateral harms affecting enemy civilians during a war are agentially mediated – for example, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 sparked an insurgency which killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. I call these ‘collaterally enabled harms.’ Intuitively, we ought to discount the weight that these harms receive in the ‘costs’ column of our ad bellum proportionality calculation. But I argue that an occupying military force with de facto political authority has a special obligation to provide minimal protection to the civilian population. As a result, when an occupying military force collaterally enables a harm affecting the civilian population, the weight that the harm ought to receive in the ad bellum proportionality calculation is unaffected by the fact that the harm is agentially mediated – it ought to be weighed at least as heavily as those harms that the occupying force collaterally commits directly. As a result, satisfying the ad bellum proportionality constraint in wars of territorial occupation is more difficult than it has been thought.     

The Regular Practice of Morality in Law

Abstract. This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or not, remain arguments about the modification of law.     

What is the Harm Principle For?

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between ‘the harms’ and ‘the wrongs’ of the authors’ title. I begin by comparing the authors’ version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors’ account of ‘harm’ is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one’s character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors’ account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence.