Natural Liberation in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sāṃkhyakārikā</Emphasis> and Its Commentaries

The subject of this article is the concept of natural liberation in classical Sā?khya. On the basis of the Sā?khyakārikā by ī?varak???a and its traditional commentaries, I will attempt to demonstrate that liberation from suffering in Sā?khya is not the result of rational inquiry—the prevailing view among contemporary scholars. The Sā?khya does not necessarily prescribe yogic practice as argued by other scholars. Instead, I will defend a position expressed by K.C. Bhattacharyya and Frank R. Podgorski, according to which liberation in classical Sā?khya is a natural and spontaneous process of suffering transforming into its own cure. I will argue that although traditional authorities may disagree over the form the liberating process takes on the phenomenal level (as yogic practice, instruction from a teacher, etc.), there is a general agreement that the natural forces are the primary drives and agents of liberation.     

Some Reflections on the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sautrāntika</Emphasis> in Vinaya Context: <Emphasis Type="Italic">vinayadharaḥ sautrāntikaḥ</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra</Emphasis>

The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvā?a-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadhara? sautrāntika? appears.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> and the Revival of Brahmanism

There are good reasons to think that Brahmanism initially belonged to a geographically limited area, with its heartland in the middle and western parts of the Gangetic plain. It was in this region that Brahmanism was at that time the culture of a largely hereditary class of priests, the brahmins, who derived their livelihood and special position in society from their close association with the local rulers. This situation changed. The most plausible hypothesis as to the reasons of this change sees a link with the political unification of northern India, begun by the Nandas and continued by the Mauryas. Both the Nandas and the Mauryas had their home base in the region called Magadha and had no particular interest in brahmins and their sacrificial tradition. As a result Brahmanism as an institution was under threat; it either had to face disappearance, or reinvent itself. It did the latter. Brahmanism underwent a transformation that enabled it to survive and ultimately flourish in changed circumstances. This paper will argue that the Mahābhārata can be looked upon as an element in this Brahminical project. Far from being a mere collection of stories and general good advice, it was an instrument in the hands of a group of people who were determined to change the world in ways that suited them, and who to a considerable extent succeeded in doing so during the centuries that lay ahead.     

Does Early Yogācāra Have a Theory of Meaning? Sthiramati’s Arguments on Metaphor in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Triṃśikā-bhāṣya</Emphasis>

Can the early Yogācāra be said to present a systematic theory of meaning? The paper argues that Sthiramati’s bhā?ya on Vasubandhu’s Tri??ikā (Treatise in Thirty Verses), in which he argues that all language-use is metaphorical, indeed amounts to such a theory, both because of the text’s engagement with the wider Indian philosophical conversation about reference and meaning and by virtue of the questions it addresses and its motivations. Through a translation and analysis of key sections of Sthiramati’s commentary I present the main features of this theory of meaning and discuss the ways in which it is distinct from Vasubandhu’s ideas. I demonstrate how this theory of meaning enabled Sthiramati to present a unique understanding of discourse that distinguishes between varying levels of truth within the conventional realm. This understanding sat well with the Yogācāra soteriological and theoretical needs, and most importantly, enabled him to establish the meaningfulness of the school’s own metaphysical discourse. Securing this meaningfulness was especially important to Sthiramati in meeting the challenge posed by the radical conventionalism of the Madhyamaka, and his response as I interpret it suggests that one of the main disputes between the early Yogācāra with the Mādhyamika, at least as reflected in the Tri??ikā-bhā?ya, in fact turns on linguistic rather than ontological issues.     

Philosophy in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> and the History of Indian Philosophy

The study of philosophical terms and doctrines in the Mahābhārata touches not only on important aspects of the contents, composition and the historical contexts of the epic, but also on the historiography of Indian philosophy. General ideas about the textual history of the epic and the distinction between “didactic” and “narrative” parts have influenced the study of epic philosophy no less than academic discussions about what is philosophy in India and how it developed. This results in different evaluations of the place of philosophical texts in the epic and their relationship to the history of Indian philosophy. While some scholars have suggested that there is a “philosophy of the epic” its composers wished to propagate, others have argued that “philosophy” is included in the epic either in a “proto” form or in a variety of doctrines (often presented is “mixed” or “unsystematic” ways) they deemed relevant. The article discusses these views and some of the heuristic assumptions on which they are based. It proposes to widen the scope of analysis by paying more attention to the interplay of narrative and didactic passages, the various ways in which philosophy is presented in the epic, and its connection to a larger spectrum of the reception of philosophy in textual genres and by audiences outside the expert circles of the philosophical schools.     

Svabhāvavāda and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata: A Historical Overview

svabh??va (own being) and yad?chh?? (chance, accident) are named as two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatk??ra?a) in the ?vUp. But in later works, such as A?vagho?a??s poems, svabh??va is synonymous with yad?chh?? and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabh??va is said to be inhering in the Lok??yata materialist system, although in which sense??cosmic order or accident??is not always clearly mentioned. Svabh??va is also a part of the S???khya doctrine and is mentioned in the medical compilations. It is proposed that the idea of svabh??va as cosmic order became a part of Lok??yata between the sixth and the eighth century ce and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so that in the fourteenth century S??ya?a-M??dhava aka Vidy??ra?ya could categorically declare that the C??rv??ka/Lok??yata upheld causality, not chance. But the other meaning of svabh??va, identical with yad?chh??, continued to circulate along with k??la, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of svabh??va continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another domain, that of daiva (fate) vis-à-vis puru?ak??ra (manliness or human endeavour).     

Reading Non-Dualism in Śivādvaita Vedānta: An Argument from the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Śivādvaitanirṇaya</Emphasis> in Light of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Śivārkamaṇidīpikā</Emphasis>

This article examines Appaya Dīk?ita’s intellectual affiliation to ?ivādvaita Vedānta in light of his well-known commitment to Advaita Vedānta. Attention will be given to his ?ivādvaitanir?aya, a short work expounding the nature of the ?ivādvaita doctrine taught by ?rīka??ha in his ?aiva-leaning commentary on the Brahmasūtra. It will be shown how Appaya strategically interprets ?rīka??ha’s views on the relationship between ?iva (i.e., Brahman), its power of consciousness (cicchakti) and the individual self (jīva), along the lines of pure non-dualism (?uddhādvaita). In this context, the hermeneutical role of the daharavidyā doctrine will be considered with reference to Appaya’s ?ivādvaita magnum opus, the ?ivārkama?idīpikā.     

Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

Rāmānuja's theory of Karman

Conclusion Performance of duty [dharma], without attachment to results, eradicates evil action [karman] and thus promotes the growth ofbhakti, which is the sole means of attainingmoksa. Although associated with such internal (mental or intellectual) activity asdhyna, jñna, vedana andvidy, bhakti nevertheless demands the external practice of daily and occasional activity —karman — prescribed by Scripture. If one neglects to perform thekarman enjoined for one's caste and stage of life, one's mind will be corrupted and will be incapable of attaining knowledge (meditation) of the personalbrahman. If one'skarman is associated withbhakti, one can attain the Lord through His grace. In Rmnuja's scheme,karman is thus not only a prerequisite for the origination of meditation on the Lord, but also for acquisition of perfect knowledge (para-bhakti) of Him. Obviously,karman, unlikebhakti, is not a direct means of salvation: it is only an auxiliary. Rmnuja, however, emphasizes thatkarman should be continued as long as one lives. Rmnuja's discussion ofkarman thus provides a theoretical foundation to his position that the karma-mmmsa — the philosophical study and interpretation of ritual activity — is indispensable to the inquiry intobrahman.     

Yogācāra Substrata? Precedent Frames for Yogācāra Thought Among Third-Century Yoga Practitioners in Greater Gandhāra

The connection between early yogācāras, or practitioners of yoga, and later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda philosophy has long preoccupied scholars. But these connections remain obscure. This article suggests that a text that has received little attention in modern scholarship, the Saddharmasm?tyupasthānasūtra, may shed light on aspects of early yogācāra contemplative cultures that gave rise to some of the formative dynamics of Yogācāra-vijñānavāda thought. I show how traditional Buddhist meditative practice and engagement with Abhidharma theoretics come together in the Saddharmasm?tyuasthānasūtra to produce a novel theory of mind that mirrors many of the philosophical problematics that early and late Yogācāra-vijñānavādins confronted and attempted to work out in ?āstric detail.     

Narrating Sāṃkhya Philosophy: Bhīṣma,Janaka and Pañcaśikha at <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> 12.211–12

The account of the conversation between King Janaka and the ??i Pañca?ikha on the fate of the individual after death is one of the philosophical texts that are included in the Mok?adharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata. There are different scholarly views on the history and composition of the text as well as the philosophical teachings propagated by Pañca?ikha. In contrast to earlier studies this paper not only analyzes the whole text, but also pays attention to the narrative framework in which the philosophical discourse is embedded. In the text Bhī?ma functions as an external narrator, who relates and interprets the conversation as well as characterizes the protagonists and thereby influences the ways in which text is received by the audience. It is argued that it is important to deal with the interplay between the narrative and the philosophical discourse that is narrated, when analysing the philosophical positions that are either refuted or accepted in the text. 12.211–12 is not only a philosophical text, but also a tale about philosophical discourse in general and about how Sā?khya philosophy is taught to a non-expert audience. Seen from this perspective the text is significant for the way in which philosophical terms and issues are dealt with in the epic and adjacent non-expert texts, such as the Purā?as.     

How to Deal with Future Existence: <Emphasis Type="Italic">sarvāstivāda</Emphasis>, Yogic Perception,and Causality

This paper mainly addresses the following issues: how Buddhists deal with future existence, the difference between yogic perception and the cognition of ordinary people with regard to future entities, and how Buddhists resolve the contradiction between the theory of momentariness and that of action and its fruit. According to the Sarvāstivādins, a future entity exists in reality as long as there is cognition that has this entity as its object. According to the Sautrāntikas, however, that theory does not hold true. A future entity is just what will occur hereafter, and it is never the case that such an entity exists at present. ?āntarak?ita and Kamala?īla do not directly negate an opponent’s argument that the distinction between past and future entities is made by yogic perception, but implicitly accept it. They state that because a future entity is situated in a causal stream (sa?tāna), yogis can cognize it through purified worldly cognition (?uddhalaukikajñāna). As for an effect that will occur in the future, Buddhists do not seem to follow the model that one and the same agent of action will necessarily receive the fruit of past action, which is often seen in other schools such as the Naiyāyikas and Mīmā?sakas. Rather, Buddhists adopt the theory of the uninterrupted succession of cause and effect.     

The Three Natures and the Path to Liberation in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Thought

This paper provides a new interpretation of the three natures theory of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thought by means of an examination of the path theory associated with it, which has not been previously examined in scholarly literature. The paper first examines this path theory in a number of foundational texts to show that the widely accepted pivotal model is not in fact the three natures model that predominates in foundational Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda literature. Second, the paper offers a new interpretation of the three natures theory as providing a new causal model of the arising of suffering, and a corresponding theory of its cessation. This new causal model both makes possible the continued use of the kind of dharma analysis that Abhidharma thought employs to provide a causal analysis of the arising of suffering, and also couches such dharma analysis within the Mahāyāna framework of the emptiness of dharmas.