Mixed-member electoral systems,best loser rules,and the descriptive representation of women

Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are commonly considered more advantageous for the election of women compared to majoritarian electoral systems. In mixed electoral systems, female candidates are often more likely to be elected through the PR tier compared to women running in single-member district races. While most mixed systems employ a closed-list, a number of legislatures use a best loser provision whereby losing district candidates are ordered on the PR list based on their performance in single-member districts. This paper examines the extent to which best loser laws impact the election of women using candidate data from sub-national legislatures in Mexico and Germany and Japan's House of Representatives. We find the contamination of PR lists by single-member district results reduces the advantage women candidates have in the PR tier. Best loser limits the ability of political parties to use PR to represent groups underrepresented in single-member district elections.     

Towards a Gender-Equal Bundestag? The Impact of Electoral Rules on Women’s Representation

Cross-sectional research designs show that proportional representation (PR) tends to produce more equitable outcomes in terms of gender representation. While existing research provides valuable insights into the covariates of gender representation, such cross-sectional designs fail to provide a definitive test of the influence of electoral rules both over time and in the case of mixed systems. Addressing this gap, this article proposes a longitudinal research design using the case of Germany, because half the Bundestag’s seats are allotted through majoritarian first-past-the-post methods, while the other half are allotted through proportional methods. The main findings point towards heavy interaction between the two electoral tiers that becomes visible in party quotas, double nominations and increased competitiveness of female candidates.     

Young adults' under-representation in elections to the U.S. House of Representatives

The U.S. House of Representatives has one of the oldest pools of politicians in the world today: the average member of the House is 58 years at the time of their election, which is about 20 years older than the average American. But why are younger adults scarce among these representatives? Here we trace the relative absence of youth in both the primary and general elections of 2020 using a supply and demand framework. Our study finds that (1) the average candidate is much older than the average citizen and (2) young candidates perform less well than older candidates in both primaries and general elections. These results suggest that youth are disadvantaged because the two main parties do not nominate enough younger adults as candidates for winnable and safe seats. Young adults also seem to be disadvantaged indirectly at the electoral stage because they lack electoral capital (experience in running for and holding office) and tend to suffer strongly from the incumbency advantage of their opponents. We infer from these findings that barring reforms to rules governing minimum candidate ages and term limits, the under-representation of youth in U.S. national-level politics will continue for the foreseeable future.     

The Cube Rule in a Mixed Electoral System: Disproportionality in German Bundestag Elections

In the German mixed electoral system the PR tier is generally perceived as fully compensating for any disproportionality in the vote–seat translation generated by the plurality tier. However, as this article shows, the PR tier can itself increase disproportionality. In a mixed electoral system, small parties enter (hopeless) district races with the hope of boosting their PR vote share. But with a high number of district parties, parties may win districts at levels way below the usual 50 per cent vote share threshold. Looking at all 16 Bundestag elections from 1953 to 2009, the article identifies the effective number of district parties as a very strong predictor for the disproportional translation of votes into seats in the plurality tier of Germany's mixed electoral system. The article points to consequences for the internal composition of parliamentary parties, for parties' nomination strategies and for the occurrence of so-called overhang mandates.     

Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules

Recent studies on strategic voting and entry in elections that combine plurality or majority and proportional representation (PR) have found candidate placement in single-member district (SMD) races to improve a party's PR performance. The primary implication of the existence of "contamination effects" is that parties have an incentive to nominate candidates in as many single-member districts as possible. Pre-electoral coordination in the majoritarian component of mixed electoral systems, however, is far from uncommon. In this article, we identify a number of institutional incentives that induce political parties to form pre-electoral alliances in spite of contamination effects. By identifying institutions that favor and hamper coordination, we seek to advance the understanding of PR-SMD interactions and to assess their implications for the design, classification, and empirical analysis of mixed electoral rules. Our statistical tests evaluate strategic entry in a diverse sample of countries.     

Why Geographically-Targeted Spending Under Closed-List Proportional Representation Favors Marginal Districts

Research on geographically-targeted spending under closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) is characterized by debate over whether ruling parties target core supporters or swing voters. We show that when CLPR is used in multiple districts and separate competitions are conducted in each, parties can reverse the formula through which votes are converted into seats to calculate how many additional votes they need to capture an additional seat. This enables parties to rank districts according to how close they are to winning an additional seat. We then show that under divisor-based formulae, parties will find they need fewer additional votes to capture another seat in districts where they captured fewer seats (‘marginal districts’). We posit that in these systems, ruling parties will steer geographically-targeted spending toward marginal PR districts and we present evidence of this from Japan.     

The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low‐Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems

Can electoral rules be designed to achieve political ideals such as accurate representation of voter preferences and accountable governments? The academic literature commonly divides electoral systems into two types, majoritarian and proportional, and implies a straightforward trade‐off by which having more of an ideal that a majoritarian system provides means giving up an equal measure of what proportional representation (PR) delivers. We posit that these trade‐offs are better characterized as nonlinear and that one can gain most of the advantages attributed to PR, while sacrificing less of those attributed to majoritarian elections, by maintaining district magnitudes in the low to moderate range. We test this intuition against data from 609 elections in 81 countries between 1945 and 2006. Electoral systems that use low‐magnitude multimember districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions.     

The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power: Measuring the Mechanical Effect of a Political Institution

Recent discussions of Swedish political change have focused on the decline of Social Democratic 'hegemony' and on the end of the 'Swedish model'. In contrast to preference– or interest –driven explanations for these developments, this paper investigates the impact of constitutional changes made in 1969 in Sweden, which included the elimination of the Upper House or First Chamber of the Swedish parliament and the introduction of a more directly proportional electoral system. Using a simulation model, the actual electoral results from 1969 through 1994 were plugged into the formulas set forth by the old constitutional rules, in order to generate the number of parliamentary seats each party would have received under the old system. This simulation shows that the Social Democratic Party would have received a significantly larger share of parliamentary seats under the old constitutional rules than under the current constitution. Thus one can conclude that the new constitution decreased Social Democratic power in Sweden.     

The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?

If voters are biased against female candidates, only the most talented, hardest working female candidates will succeed in the electoral process. Furthermore, if women perceive there to be sex discrimination in the electoral process, or if they underestimate their qualifications for office, then only the most qualified, politically ambitious females will emerge as candidates. We argue that when either or both forms of sex‐based selection are present, the women who are elected to office will perform better, on average, than their male counterparts. We test this central implication of our theory by studying the relative success of men and women in delivering federal spending to their districts and in sponsoring legislation. Analyzing changes within districts over time, we find that congresswomen secure roughly 9% more spending from federal discretionary programs than congressmen. Women also sponsor and cosponsor significantly more bills than their male colleagues.     

A spatial analysis of candidate competition in dual member districts: The 1989 Chilean senatorial elections

This study uses empirical spatial theory to evaluate candidate and voter behavior in senate elections contested during the 1989 Chilean general election. The study evaluates whether senatorial candidates competing in dual member districts under Chilean d'Hondt locate near the periphery or interior of the electoral space. Spatial analyses demonstrate the Chilean senatorial electoral system is characterized by centrifugal forces. In particular, candidates of the right locate on the periphery of the space and face few incentives to pursue moderate electoral strategies. The study also characterizes bases of party and candidate support and the underlying dimensions of political competition. Spatial analysis reveals both change and continuity in the pre- and post-authoritarian electoral universes.     

Voter turnout and district-level competitiveness in mixed-member electoral systems

It has been suggested that one of the reasons why majoritarian electoral systems are associated with lower voter turnout in comparison to proportional electoral systems is that citizens in uncompetitive districts (“safe seats”) are not motivated to vote. This study brings this thesis into a new context and tests it with unique data. Mixed-member electoral systems have both majoritarian and proportional components. The relative importance of these components differs between mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. I argue that, due to this difference, the impact of district-level competitiveness on turnout is stronger in MMM than in MMP. An analysis of district-level electoral data from four countries confirms this hypothesis. Findings from this study advance our theoretical understanding of voter participation and also of the functioning of mixed-member electoral systems.     

Assessing the psychological and mechanical impact of electoral rules: A quasi-experiment

The paper assesses the influence of electoral rules on vote choice and election outcomes using a quasi-experiment conducted during a recent Canadian provincial election. Respondents were invited to vote under three voting systems (first past the post, alternative voting and proportional representation) and to answer a short questionnaire. We examine how the distribution of votes and seats is affected, and we ascertain how much of the total difference is due to psychological and mechanical effects. We find that a PR system would have increased legislative fractionalization by the equivalent of one effective party and that the mechanical effect is much more important than the psychological effect. As for AV, its mechanical and psychological effects act in opposite directions.     

An integrated perspective on the three potential sources of partisan bias: Malapportionment, turnout differences, and the geographic distribution of party vote shares

Partisan bias refers to an asymmetry in the way party vote share is translated into seats, i.e., a situation where some parties are able to win a given share of seats with a lesser (share of the) vote than is true for other parties. Any districted system is potentially subject to partisan biases. We show that there are three potential sources of partisan bias: (1) differences in the nature of the vote shares of the winning candidates of different parties that give rise to differences in the proportion of each party's votes that come to be ‘wasted’—differences which arise because of the nature of the geographic distribution of partisan support; (2) turnout rate differences across districts that are linked to the partisan vote shares in those districts, such that certain parties are more likely to have ‘cheap seats’ vis-à-vis turnout; and (3) malapportionment. In the context of two-party competition over single-member districts we provide a simple formulation to calculate the independent effect of each of these three factors. We illustrate our analysis with a calculation of the magnitude and direction of effects of the three determinants of partisan bias in elections to the US House and the US Senate in 1984, 1986 and 1988; then we consider how to extend the approach to a system with a mix of single- and multi-member districts or to a weighted voting system such as the US electoral college. We then apply the method to calculate the nature and sources of partisan bias in the 1984 and 1988 US presidential elections.     

Electoral contexts that impede voter coordination

An electorate can effectively coordinate on the viable parties in its district, or a relatively large proportion of its voters may “waste” their votes on parties that fail to obtain office. Avoiding wasted votes can be more or less difficult depending on several characteristics of the electoral context. Unfortunately, many of the features of electoral contexts hypothesized to cause vote wastage have been tested piecemeal on only a handful of (non-random) cases and/or with data inappropriately aggregated to the national, rather than the district, level. Based on results from 2007 districts in 183 lower chamber elections across 21 countries, we find evidence that new electoral rules, the entry of new parties, past electoral volatility, and high district magnitudes are all likely to make coordination a challenge, with entry by new parties having the largest, most consistent effect.     

The 2015 National Elections in Switzerland: Renewed Polarization and Shift to the Right

The 2015 election to the Swiss Parliament marks a return to an already observed trend that was only interrupted in 2011: a shift to the right and an increase in polarization. The vote share of the nationalist-conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) has now reached a historical height of 29.4% (+2.8). This note discusses why cantons matter in the Swiss national elections, and to what degree elections have become nationalized. Institutionally, the 26 cantons serve as electoral districts. This leads to a highly disproportional electoral system and has magnified the minor vote shifts to a slightly more pronounced shift in seats, with the right now holding a tiny majority of 101 of 200 seats in the first chamber. The two winners, the SVP and the Liberals, also had most campaign funds at their disposal. They were able to guide an extensive nationwide campaign in which they advocated their core issues instead of candidates. Other parties only advertised at the cantonal level.     

The Worst of All Worlds? Electoral Reform and Britain's 2009 European Elections

At the 2009 European elections, Britain again elected its MEPs under the 'closed list' system of proportional representation (PR)—the third time it had done so since 1999. This article looks at claims that these elections vindicated PR by producing a 'fairer' relationship between the parties' share of votes and their share of seats, a truer reflection of diverse political allegiance in modern Britain, and (thanks to multi-member constituencies) a more efficient and sensitive system for representing voters. However, the article will also inspect the idea that the case for electoral reform was gravely weakened by the 2009 Euro elections. It will recall how PR again failed to boost turnout, again employed a method of counting that most voters did not understand, and again involved constituencies too large for meaningful representation. Furthermore, it will recall that PR allowed the election of two MEPs from the far-right British National Party. (With just 6% of votes, it is unlikely that the BNP would have secured seats under Britain's traditional electoral system.) The article will argue that, as a result, PR has had a centrifugal effect on the British party system and, potentially, a polarising effect on our political culture. Consequently, the article will assert that, owing to the success of the BNP in 2009, arguments about PR for Westminster have been 'ideologically neutralised'. The article will thus suggest that we can now take a more objective view of hung Parliaments and coalitions (the likely effects of PR at general elections), free from the assumption that they entrench centrist governments and progressive politics.     

When Is a Gerrymander Not a Gerrymander: Who Benefits and Who Loses from the Changed Rules for Defining Parliamentary Constituencies?

Members of the British Labour party have, not for the first time, criticised the Boundary Commissions’ proposals for new constituency boundaries as gerrymandering. This represents a misuse of the term: the Commissions have produced recommended constituencies in the context of new rules for such redistributions that give precedence to equality of electorates across all seats and the boundaries of those constituencies have been defined without any reference to the likely electoral consequences. The Conservatives, who were responsible for the change in the rules to emphasise electoral equality, wanted to remove a decades‐long Labour advantage in the translation of votes into seats because of variations in constituency size, and the Commissions’ implementation of those rules has achieved that. A Labour advantage has been removed but not replaced by a Conservative advantage: in terms of electoral equality between the two, the playing field has been levelled. Labour's claim to have been disadvantaged by decisions on the electoral register is also examined; the disadvantage is probably only small.     

How to lose a majority: The competition in single-member districts

Few observers expected that the 1966 elections in Italy would yield a clear-cut outcome. Even fewer people expected that, after the disastrous results of the previous elections, the centre-left coalition would be able to gain a majority of seats in both branches of Parliament. Yet this is precisely what happened on 21 April 1996. This article tries to explain the comeback of the 1994 losers by focusing on three factors which have changed the electoral balance between the two major coalitions in the single-member districts. The first factor was the ability of the centre-left coalition (Ulivo-RC) to broaden its range while its major rival (the Polo) lost key allies. The result has been a more competitive stand of centre-left candidates, particularly in the North. The Polo lost the support of the Lega Nord and suffered the split of the Movimento Sociale on its right. These defections, along with others, led to the loss of a considerable number of seats. Finally, the Polo also suffered from the defection of a considerable number of its voters who voted for one of the parties of the centre-right coalition in the proportional arena, but refused to vote for the Polo candidate in the single-member districts. We conclude by suggesting a number of hypotheses that could explain this split-ticket phenomenon.     

Electoral reform and the mirror image of inter-party and intra-party competition: The adoption of party lists in Colombia

The Colombian case offers a rare opportunity to observe effects of electoral reform where districting remains constant. Only the formula changed, from extremely ‘personalized’ (seats allocated solely on candidate votes) to ‘listized’: seats are allocated to party lists, which may be either open or closed. Electoral reform has effects on both the inter-party dimension (the number of parties competing) and the intra-party dimension (the extent of competition within parties). Consistent with theoretical expectations, the inter-party dimension features an increased number of parties in the low-magnitude districts and a decrease in the high-magnitude districts. On the intra-party dimension, the impact “mirrors” the inter-party: less competition in smaller districts, yet more in larger districts.