Justifying the Distinction Between Justifications and Power (Justifications vs. Power)

The paper suggests that there are two different ways in which a legal system restricts an individual’s rights. It can either grant a power that revokes the legal protection of the right or it can acknowledge the infringement of a legal right and yet justify such an infringement by means of a criminal law justification. The distinction proposed by the paper has both expressive and practical implications and is useful in solving dilemmas arising in emergencies when constitutional constraints make it impossible to grant the power to revoke legal protection of a basic right. In some of these situations a criminal law justification might support infringement of such a right. This claim is demonstrated by analyzing the ruling of the German Constitutional Court concerning the shooting down of a hijacked airplane in circumstances similar to those of September 11.     

ECJ provides further guidance on the ambit of database right

Following on from the European Court of Justice's ruling on database right in the Directmedia case, the Court has looked in more detail at the protection afforded by database right, and provided further clarification of the meaning of ‘extraction’ and ‘substantial’, particularly in relation to modular databases comprised of several sections. The ECJ's ruling is positive for database owners for the most part, bolstering its previous broad interpretation of the acts of ‘extraction’ that can infringe and considering in more detail other points touched on in the Directmedia, British Horseracing Board and Fixtures Marketing cases. This article discusses the outcome and implications of the ruling.     

The European Court of Justice in Bolagsupplysningen: The Brussels I Recast Regulation's jurisdictional rules for online infringement of personality rights further clarified

In the European Union the Brussels Ibis Regulation governs the jurisdiction of Member State courts in civil and commercial matters. The reference for a preliminary ruling coming from the Estonian Supreme Court in the Bolagsupplysningen case offered the European Court of Justice another opportunity to develop its interpretation of the special ground for non-contractual obligations (article 7.2). The European Court of Justice's Grand Chamber ruled that legal persons, like natural persons, have the option of bringing a claim based on the infringement of personality rights by an online publication before the courts of the Member State where their centre of interests is located. It laid down that the centre of interests of a legal person pursuing an economic activity is determined by reference to the place where the company carries out the main part of its economic activities. The victim of a tortious internet publication can only seek an order for rectification and removal of the incorrect information in the courts that have jurisdiction over the entirety of the harm sustained and not before the courts that only enjoy jurisdiction with regard to the damage suffered in their territory.     

Investors’ Rights in (Crypto) Custodial Holdings: Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation)

Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation) is a landmark decision of the New Zealand High Court that considers for the first time in a comprehensive way whether cryptocurrencies are property at common law and to what extent account holders’ (interests in) cryptocurrencies are protected from the claims of the insolvent crypto‐exchange's creditors. The ruling relies on a body of case law from various common law jurisdictions and, to a significant extent, on the findings of the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts. In tackling complex areas of legal uncertainty, it provides an authoritative conceptual benchmark for future court decisions and normative initiatives.     

Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual controversy

The existence of a fundamental right to the protection of personal data in European Union (EU) law is nowadays undisputed. Established in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, it is increasingly permeating EU secondary law, and is expected to play a key role in the future EU personal data protection landscape. The right's reinforced visibility has rendered manifest the co-existence of two possible and contrasting interpretations as to what it come to mean. If some envision it as a primarily permissive right, enabling the processing of such data under certain conditions, others picture it as having a prohibitive nature, implying that any processing of data is a limitation of the right, be it legitimate or illegitimate. This paper investigates existing tensions between different understandings of the right to the protection of personal data, and explores the assumptions and conceptual legacies underlying both approaches. It traces their historical lineages, and, focusing on the right to personal data protection as established by the EU Charter, analyses the different arguments that can ground contrasted readings of its Article 8. It also reviews the conceptualisations of personal data protection as present in the literature, and finally contrasts all these perspectives with the construal of the right by the EU Court of Justice.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Is there an EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An Empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice

The Court of Justice of the European Union has seen a dramatic and controversial increase in copyright cases during the last decade. This study investigates empirically two claims: (i) that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological interpretation of European law). We analyse the allocation of copyright and database right cases by Chambers of the Court, Advocate General (AG) and Reporting Judge, and investigate the biographical background of the Judges and AGs sitting. We trace patterns of reasoning in the Court's approach through quantitative content analysis. Legal topoi that are employed in the opinions and decisions are linked to the outcomes of each case.     

Electronic databases: Protecting your investment – An analysis of the legal rights in electronic databases under UK law

Electronic databases are an important part of the information economy. They are now one of the key platforms for the distribution of information and other contents. The European Court of Justice, in November 2004, gave its first rulings on the scope of database right, introduced by Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases. These rulings significantly curtail the scope of that right, and limit the protection afforded to database producers under that Directive. The UK courts, in January of last year, handed down a judgment which has important implications for the copyright protection afforded database structures and to “look and feel” elements of database application software, and the scope of Section 50D of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (which sets out certain statutory permitted acts in relation to database use). This article looks at the implications of these judgments, it analyses some of the key legal rights that can apply to electronic databases, and the increased importance that rights of confidentiality and contract are likely to have on the commercialisation of electronic databases in light of these rulings.     

Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt

In Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United States passed down its most important decision on abortion for just under a decade. By a majority of 5‐3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women's health were constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment delineates the key ways in which the Court's application of the standard of constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women's health’ justifications should not pass constitutional review where those justifications lack a credible factual basis.     

The right to minority language public school education as a function of the equality guarantee: a reanalysis of the Gosselin Supreme Court of Canada Charter case

This paper concerns a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision dealing ostensibly with the protection of language minority rights. The case, in fact, however, concerns the Court imposing statutory limits on constitutionally guaranteed equality and liberty rights. The Court in the instant case held as constitutional Quebec legislation permitting access to English language schools only to children who have received, or are receiving the majority of their instruction in English in Canada, or whose parents received the majority of their instruction in English in Canada at the primary school level. The appellants, members of the French majority in Quebec, could not meet those eligibility criteria. Therefore, they were held to have no right to access English language public schools for their children. The ruling, as discussed, is inconsistent with the equality and liberty guarantees as well as the minority language protection clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.     

Control over Personal Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez

In the Google Spain judgment, the Grand Chamber of the EU Court of Justice determined the circumstances in which a search engine is obliged to remove links to data pertaining to an individual from the results displayed. The Court also considered the material and territorial scope of the EU data protection rules. This note argues that the Court's findings, which have been heavily criticised, are normatively coherent. The broad scope of application of data protection rules and the right of individuals to have their data deleted when certain conditions are fulfilled both play a part in granting individuals effective control over their personal data – an objective of EU data protection law.     

The “process” of patenting: Why should we care about a potential U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Doll?

In Bilski v. Doll, the U.S. Supreme Court is called to define one of the categories of patent-eligible subject matter, “process” patents. In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the category has a narrow meaning, and that to be eligible for a process patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the invention must involve a machine or apparatus or involve a transformation to a different state or thing, ultimately rejecting the patent application as unpatentable subject matter. The patent applicants have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to determine two issues: first, the meaning of “process” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the lower court properly relied on a “machine-or-transformation” test, and second, the test's potential conflict with 35 U.S.C. § 273, which provides protection for “method[s] of doing or conducting business.” The Court's decision could change the way that research and business are done, and patent protection for such investments. Parts 1 and 2 of this article address Bilski directly and what is and is not in dispute. Part 3 addresses the “machine-or-transformation” test, while Parts 4 and 5 address reasons not to adopt such a test.     

The Bermuda Islands blow ‘sweet & sour’ on employers’ liability for Internet libel

The Bermudian Supreme Court (at first instance) recently ruled in Bermuda Restaurants Limited (t/a “Chopsticks”) v. Jonathan Daspin and ConvergEx Global Markets Ltd. (Civil Jurisdiction 2008: No. 134 (to be reported)) on the issue of whether an employer (here, a company) should be held liable for an allegedly libellous email publication by its employee, the managing director. The Judge was asked by the employer company to determine two issues of law which exposed the company and which centred on its vicarious liability for its employee's actions, including whether the use of the company's email system, during working hours, made it complicit in the publication. The Court held, applying principles of English and Canadian law, that the company was not vicariously liable and by extension that it was not the email's publisher.     

How to control interception-does the UK strike the right balance?

This Article critically analyses the regime for intercepting the content of communications under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the light of the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Kennedy v the UK. It looks at the safeguards for privacy protection provided such as the requirement for a warrant and the roles of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Interception of Communications Commissioner and whether these safeguards are compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.     

Legal Subjectivity and the ‘Right to be Forgotten’: A Rancièrean Analysis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Google</Emphasis>

This article discusses the right to be forgotten. The landmark Google ruling of the European Court of Justice gave this ambiguous right new weight and raised several urgent questions. This article considers what kind of person is presupposed and constructed when somebody invokes their right to be forgotten. The aim is to engage in an experimental reading of the ruling in the framework of contemporary political theory, namely, the philosophy of Jacques Rancière. The analysis shows that even though the right to be forgotten is a new legal and rhetorical instrument, there are good grounds for being critical of its underlying logic and sceptical of the novelty thereof. The judgment can be understood as a reiteration and consolidation of the same impotent human rights thinking that law often seems forced to contend itself with, no matter how radical our intentions may be.     

“Our People in General Have a High Degree of Freedom”

This article considers the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent Business et al v Sebelius, which questioned the constitutionality of President Obama’s signature healthcare reforms of 2009, which have become colloquially known as ‘Obamacare’. Although the Supreme Court upheld the Act as constitutional, this article contends that the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be read as another battle in the long-standing debate in American politics over the correct size and limits of the Federal Government. In upholding the healthcare reforms as a tax, rather than under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has endorsed a view of limited government in line with the principles of classical liberalism. This has the potential to greatly restrict the scope of the Federal Government to pursue large scale expansive social welfare programmes in the future.     

Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner's Error in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

In March, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a 5-4 vote, handed down Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a sweeping ruling providing more protection for corporate political media spending as First Amendment “speech” than ever before. This article demonstrates that Citizens United nullified a century of democratic will by representing First Amendment protection for such spending to be part of nature rather than a legal construct. If Cass Sunstein's influential assessment is correct that the lesson of Lochner v. New York is the judicial error inherent in imposing such artificial baselines to measure the constitutionality of government regulation, then Citizens United can be understood to repeat that error.     

Workplace Monitoring and the Right to Private Life at Work

In Barbulescu v Romania, the European Court of Human Rights clarified the application of the Article 8 right to private life in the workplace, and the extent of the state's positive obligations to protect the right against workplace monitoring. The decision establishes that there is an irreducible core to the right to private life at work that does not depend on an employee's reasonable expectations of privacy, and sets out clear principles for striking a fair balance between Article 8 and the employer's interests in the context of workplace monitoring. This article considers the nature of states’ positive obligation to protect human rights at work, the scope of the right to private life, and the impact of the decision on domestic law of unfair dismissal.     

隐私权的判定——“合理隐私期待标准”的确立与适用

隐私权存在与否的判定问题是隐私侵权责任承担的关键所在。而美国联邦最高法院在1967年Katz v.United States案中确立的"合理的隐私期待"标准,在世界多个国家的适用已被证明是比较可行的隐私权的判定方法。我国隐私权司法实践在吸收、借鉴"合理的隐私期待"标准时应明确"私人事实"、"法律规定"、"社会习俗"和"利益平衡"四种隐私期待的客观判断要素,实现判决结果的一致性,及对他人隐私利益最大程度的保护。     

Dolly and Alice

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re Roslin Institute, rejecting patent claims to mammals cloned from somatic cells, was rendered about a month before the United States Supreme Court''s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Alice opinion explicitly sets out the standard for determining whether an invention falls within statutory patentable subject matter. Thus one is thus left to wonder what the Roslin opinion might have looked like had it been decided only a few weeks later, after the Alice decision was published, with the benefit of the Supreme Court''s further direction on patentable subject matter. In this essay I explore whether in hindsight the Alice standard might have dictated a different outcome in Roslin, suggesting how the two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Alice might apply to a ‘products of nature’ analysis for cloned mammals. Drawing on that analysis, I then use the Roslin case as a vehicle to highlight certain issues with the Supreme Court''s current subject matter jurisprudence as applied to biotechnology. By juxtaposing Dolly with Alice, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has revivified a number of dormant biotechnology patent problems in the guise of subject matter analysis.