The Horizons of the Constitution: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Politeia</Emphasis>, the Political Regime and the Good

How do we think about the word politeia when this involves a reaching back to the past? The response, pursued in this paper, is that in the classical understanding of politeia there is a significant connection between the question of the ‘good’ and the constitution; a connection which has become occluded or obscured by modern constitutional thought. In support of this understanding of politeia it must be acknowledged that what is meant, in this paper, by ‘good’ is very different from that conventionally found in contemporary constitutional, legal or political theory. In an effort to disclose how politeia unravels this novel sense of ‘the good’ the paper will closely consider the philosophical work of Hans-Georg Gadamer on Plato. The paper claims that this largely neglected work is of importance to contemporary constitutional philosophy, particularly in so far as it focuses, as in this paper, on classical traditions or origins within constitutional thought.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Understanding Transnational Policy Flows in Security and Justice

This article examines the contribution of scholarly work on ‘policy transfer’ and related concepts to our knowledge of how far, and in what ways, particular policy ‘models’ of security and justice travel across national boundaries, and what might explain this phenomenon. The article begins by summarizing the key findings of extant empirical studies of cross‐national policy movement in the fields of crime, security, and justice. It then considers the normative dimension to debates about policy transfer, observing that much of the literature adopts a pessimistic position about the problematic nature of international policy movement in security and justice, and discusses some of the reasons for such pessimism. The article then reflects on ways in which normative principles could be applied to considerations of prospective policy transfer, and the implications for the broader possibilities for ‘progressive’ policy transfer in relation to crime, security, and justice.     

Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis

This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro‐crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self‐determination. In the context of the EU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms to EU law and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand‐alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long‐term stability and legitimacy of the EU project.     

不动产财产权的自由与限制——以台湾地区的法制为中心

不动产财产权自由尽管有不完美之处,但其仍然是一项原则,对其的限制应视为例外。简单地说,只有在不动产财产权自由无法达到福祉最大时,才会思考对其限制与否。不动产财产权自由的不完美并不当然意味着对其应予以限制,只有认定限制所带来的福祉高于限制的成本时,才有限制的必要。对不动产财产权的限制必须符合正当法律程序,才符合宪法保障财产权的精神,并求得不动产财产权自由与限制的平衡。     

The grammar of administrative justice values

The debate concerning administrative justice in the UK often involves reliance upon a certain set of values. Examples of such values include openness, confidentiality, timeliness, transparency, secrecy, fairness, efficiency, accountability, user-friendliness, consistency, participation, rationality and equal treatment. These values are often deployed, both in academic and policy contexts, without much precision. This produces confusion which can hamper debate. This article therefore argues there is a need to reflect on how these oft-used values are deployed, and consider the particular concerns which underlie them. In this sense, this article suggests there is a need to refine the grammar of administrative justice. This argument is demonstrated through an extended analysis of the value of ‘user-friendliness’: a site of emerging disagreement in recent years. It proposes that an important distinction must be drawn between two understandings of the value: the ‘accessibility’ and ‘consumerist’ understandings. This article concludes by suggesting that, going forward, it is important to consider whether the use of abstractions is helpful at all in administrative law and justice debates.     

Winnowing the chaff out of the grains: the intermixture of customary law and spiritualism in Ghana

Belief in the supernatural runs so deep in the cultural lives of Ghanaians that customary law – ‘the rules of law, which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana’ – has not been spared its influence. This article asserts that state sanctioned enforcement of superstition inspired customs violates the fundamental constitutional value of freedom of conscience relative to persons who do not subscribe to such beliefs in the supernatural. But in order to accommodate the twin state interests of preserving customary laws and respecting the freedom of conscience, this article proposes the development of a body of customary laws devoid of superstition. It sets out to discuss why this idea is imperative and how it can be achieved.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

“Experts by Experience”: The Involvement of Service Users and Families in Designing and Implementing Innovations in Family Justice

Drawing on international research, policy, and practice, this article explores what is meant by service user involvement, how it has developed, and how it has been implemented across different areas of practice. Using examples from across the health and social care fields, it reflects on how the learning from other areas of practice in which service user involvement has been successful may be applied to the family justice field. The arguments presented highlight the value of taking a bottom‐up approach in designing and implementing innovations in family justice, which would embrace the views of family members, including children, as ‘service users.’ It is important, however, to balance both the challenges and the opportunities offered by involving those who are ‘experts by experience’ in the family justice processes, in order to lead to improved services and experiences.     

The truth and the trial: victim participation,restorative justice,and the International Criminal Court

In the field of international criminal justice, the international criminal court (ICC) has been lauded for its integration of victim participants into its legal proceedings. In particular, the ICC’s framework of victim participation has been understood to figure as a balance between retributive and restorative justice as it enables the actual voices of the victims to be heard. However, there has been little research that considers how victim participation works in practice as a form of truth-telling. In order to begin to address this gap, the integration of the ‘voices of the victims’ into the proceedings and outcome of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is explored. The forms of harms and experiences that comprise the truth of the events under adjudication put forward by the victim participants are considered, and then how the truth-telling functions of the ICC represent these states of injury. While the ICC’s legal proceedings enable victims to speak of their harms and experiences, their ‘voices’ are largely absent from its judgment. To address this issue, the ICC needs to develop and maintain a level of ‘restorative justice coherence’ to manage victims’ expectations of its justice approaches.     

Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the EU: Towards ‘Individual’, ‘Constitutional’ or ‘Institutional’ Justice?

Abstract: The European Convention on Human Rights, promulgated by the Council of Europe in 1950, is widely regarded as the world's most successful experiment in the trans‐national judicial protection of human rights. The EU's much more recent judicial and political interest in human rights has also been widely welcomed. Yet, while the crisis currently afflicting the Convention system has not gone unnoticed, the same cannot equally be said of the difficulties presented by the increasing interpenetration of the two systems. Amongst the few who have shown some interest in these problems, the dominant view is that good will and common sense will provide adequate solutions. We disagree. Instead, we detect a gathering crisis which, unless properly analysed and effectively tackled, will only deepen as the EU's interest in human rights develops further. In our view, the problem is essentially conceptual and that, ultimately, it boils down to a much‐neglected question, simple to state but not so easy to answer: is the trans‐national protection of human rights in Europe a matter of ‘individual’, ‘constitutional’ or ‘institutional’ justice?     

Political Liberalism, Ethos Justice, and Gender Equality

Susan Okin criticizes John Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ because it does not apply principles of justice directly to gender relations within households. We explain how one can be a ‘political liberal feminist’ by distinguishing between two kinds of justice: the first we call ‘legitimacy justice’, conceptions of which apply to the ‘legally coercive structure’ of society; the second we call ‘ethos justice’, conceptions of which apply to citizens’ ‘non-coercive’ relations. We agree with Okin that a society in which most persons act in accordance with ‘gender equal’ ethos justice is morally superior to one in which most persons do not. A shared commitment to a particular conception of ethos justice, however, cannot be required by a conception of legitimacy justice. A political liberal feminist is committed to promoting gender equality with respect to both legitimacy justice and ethos justice, but recognizes that different means are necessary to do so.     

以实质公平理念规制契约自由——以格式合同为例证

吉尔莫所谓的契约之死,无非是契约自由的丧失,也即和契约正义"合体"的契约自由的丧失。契约自由与契约正义由"合体"走向背离,是因着"主体平等"和"完全自由市场"在垄断的语境下不复存在。格式合同的出现成了契约自由背离契约正义的典型例证。在格式合同中,合意和选择失去了意义,契约自由背离了契约正义从而走向了形式正义的泥沼。将实质公平理念引入契约自由原则,或许能带来契约的再生。以实质公平理念规制格式合同,通过国家干预性质的立法、司法和行政手段实现格式合同中自由与正义的"合体"。本文以格式合同的典型司法案例为例证,研究了如何将经济法关于实质公平的价值理念引入格式合同的民商事审判,以探索一条如何达致契约自由与契约正义新的"合体"以及契约自由再生的司法实践路径。     

A European Constitution in a Multinational Europe or a Multinational Constitution for Europe?

Abstract: What is the role of the nation‐state in the process of European constitutional integration? How can we transcend our divisions without marginalising those who believe in them? This article critically analyses the theoretical bases of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and tries to explain why its ratification is so problematic. Authors such as Habermas have argued that a new European model of social cohesion is needed, and Habermas suggests that the sense of ‘community’ in a democratic Europe should be founded exclusively on the acceptance of a patriotic constitution. However, this view is criticised by authors such as Weiler and MacCormick. In this article, I explain the limits of these theoretical analyses. I will argue that a European constitutional project can be more than formally legal only if two normative conditions are satisfied: it is the result of public debate and the European Constitution includes the procedures for the recognition of European national diversity. I suggest that a theory of constitutional multinationalism, similar to the one proposed by Tully, might provide an attractive model for a European social integration. The article is divided in two parts. In the first, I explain why Habermas’ constitutional patriotism or MacCormick's states based Europe cannot provide a convincing theoretical model for a socially and constitutionally integrated Europe. In the second part, I will give an outline of Tully's idea of multinational democracy as a model for a European constitutional integration.     

The European Judicial Organisation in a New Paradigm: The Influence of Principles of ‘New Public Management’ on the Organisation of the European Courts

Recent reforms regarding the European Courts raise the question in which way do ‘new public management’ principles influence the European judicial organisation and how is a balance struck between these principles and classic ‘rule of law’ principles? The article first presents a classification of these types of principles in the framework for discussion regarding the European judicial organisation. Starting out from two paradigms, an inquiry is made into the status of the two sets of principles in the present‐day European ‘constitutional’ framework. Second, the interaction of principles is investigated with regard to a number of current dilemmas, including the demarcation of the judicial domain, the management of the Courts and the distribution of judicial competences.     

法律监督机关的宪法内涵

现行宪法关于"法律监督机关"(第134条)与"检察权"(第136条)之规定呈现出机关定位与权力定性的非对应性,此迥异于"一府一委两院"之其他国家机关,凸显了检察院的独特宪法地位,其蕴含的是法律监督机关的多重宪制功能。法律监督机关之宪法定位规约了检察权行使方式和检察制度的变革路径,检察权行使方式和检察制度的变革丰富了法律监督的内涵进而强化了法律监督机关的宪法定位。检察机关正是在这一良性互动中走上独具中国特色的实行法律监督之路。新时代法律监督机关应在其宪制功能与规范内涵指引下,全面维护国家法制统一,提升对行政权监督的质效,在法律监督新格局中切实捍卫社会的公平正义,进而推动中国特色社会主义检察制度行稳致远。     

Democratic Legitimacy in the Bund or ‘Federation of States’: the Cases of Belgium and the EU

Carl Schmitt developed the concept of the ‘federation of states’ (Bund) in order to characterise intermediate constitutional systems which are integrated beyond the level of a confederation (Staatenbund) without, however, acquiring the level of integration of an actual federal state (Bundesstaat). In this paper we analyse the constitutional specificity of the ‘federation of states’ and present three normative principles for assessing the democratic legitimacy of the decision‐making procedures within such a federation. We argue that both the European Union and Belgium can be analysed as instances of such a federation of states and show how this characterisation improves our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of both polities and the constitutional and democratic challenges they are facing.     

公平视野下的德国简化税法改革方案——基于保罗·基尔希霍夫教授税收正义理论的公法学思考

保罗·基尔希霍夫教授提出的税制改革方案主要借助取消不必要的类型化区分、确立中立法律形式下的课税表达、对婚姻和家庭的特别保护、减少例外规则以及简化税收程序等来实现税收正义。税收不仅仅是政治上的现实,其改革思路的起点恰在于税收背后的宪法理念:宪政体制下的租税国家、人格图像并函摄了基本权利主客观面向的理论基础,即对国家共同体及任务有着共同价值观的自由而有个性的人必然要求处于国家所保障的自由经济体制下的税收法律予以相匹配的规制,它具体表现为以减少纳税人税收形成可能性为目标,保障国家对个人经济成果最温和分享以及减少例外的原则。     

符合法律的宪法解释与宪法发展

符合法律的宪法解释是在宪法有复数解释时以法律为准据而选择宪法解释的方法,与合宪性解释的方向恰恰相反。在我国宪法实践上,全国人大常委会曾经将《宪法》第40条上的公安机关解释为涵盖国家安全机关,这是较为典型的符合法律的宪法解释。从理论上说,为化解违宪疑虑,也可以通过这种解释方法将《宪法》第40条上的通信解释为排除通讯记录,而将检察机关解释为涵盖监察机关在内。与合宪性解释不同的是,符合法律的宪法解释属于逆向的"以宪就法",因此通过这种方法得出的结论须接受宪法上的再审查。这种解释方法既能维持宪法的最高性,恪守宪法与法律之间的界分,同时又能容纳宪法含义新的发展。