Spurn Thy neighbour: Direct democracy and Swiss isolationism

In recent years, Switzerland has conspicuously distanced itself from the international community. It has rejected membership in the UN, the EEA treaty and participation in UN peacekeeping operations; and it remains outside the EU. After the year 2004, foreign freight lorries will no longer be allowed on Swiss highways. This starkly isolationist posture is not by government design; rather, these decisions are the product of Swiss direct democracy. In the past 11 years, Swiss voters have considered six ballot issues concerning international integration. In five of the six cases, they delivered a sharp rebuff to the international community and to their own government. This article examines the referendums in detail and offers several conclusions. Most importantly, a renewed linguistic cleavage between German speakers and French speakers has shaped the outcomes decisively. Also critical has been the desire of many voters to preserve a wide scope for Swiss direct democracy by rejecting binding international agreements. And finally, government campaign tactics have exacerbated popular opposition to international integration.     

Timing and targeting of state repression in authoritarian elections

Autocrats face a fundamental tension: how to make elections appear credible (maintaining legitimacy) without losing control over outcomes (losing power). In this context, we claim that incumbents choose the timing and targets of state repression strategically. We expect that before elections, regimes will moderate their use of violence against ordinary citizens, while simultaneously directing state-sponsored repression towards opposition elites. Ordinary citizens are likely to experience greater repression after the election. We test these expectations using unique events-based repression data, conducting cross-national analysis of all presidential elections in authoritarian regimes from 1990 to 2008 to understand the timing and targeting of repression around elections under authoritarian regimes. In keeping with our expectations, we find that in the months prior and during the election, opposition leaders experience greater rates of repression than voters. We suspect that incumbents find it more effective to repress electoral challengers, since these pose a direct threat to their victory. Conversely, incumbents resist repressing voters whose support they need at the polls to win and to legitimize the election itself.     

Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant

Many rational choice treatments of guerrilla insurgency have focused on the strategic calculus by which government and insurgent elites use the tactical weapons of coercion and benefits to win the support of nonelites. This paper uses Frohlich and Oppenheimer's model of the rational tax payer/tax evader to develop a model of the decision calculus by which nonelites respond to the tactical behavior of elites and thereby choose between supporting the incumbent regime, its insurgent opposition or neither. This model is then used to assess the likely impact of various insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics on nonelite support and loyalty.     

Nicaragua in crisis

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's political base has eroded, and he is likely to continue brutal authoritarian tactics against a discontented population. The organised internal opposition appears unable to mount effective armed resistance and international pressure so far has been light. In the short term, he will probably be able to maintain effective control over Nicaragua.     

Opposition party policy shifts in response to no‐confidence motions

No‐confidence motions (NCMs) are attempts by opposition parties to publicise the government's failings in a salient policy arena, and previous research has shown that they often negatively affect citizens' evaluations of governing parties' competence and damage their electoral prospects. Yet currently there is a lack of understanding of how opposition parties respond ideologically to these NCMs. It is argued in this article that opposition parties should distance themselves from the government challenged by NCMs to show that they are different from the incompetent government and to compete for the votes that the government is likely to lose. Using a sample of 19 advanced democracies from 1970–2007, empirical evidence is presented that NCMs encourage political parties to move their positions away from the government's position, especially in the presence of reinforcing negative signals about government performance. These results have important implications for our understanding of opposition party policy change, for the economic voting literature, and for the spatial and valence models of party competition.     

How economic crises affect political representation: declining party‒voter congruence in times of constrained government

How do economic crises affect political representation in times of constrained government? Our paper shows that among voters salience of economic issues increases during economically harsh times. However, parties respond only to a limited degree to economic shocks, with the result that congruence between parties and voters decreases. We theorise the incentives and disincentives different political parties have in choosing a saliency strategy and we provide evidence on the extent to which congruence depends on the severity of economic shocks and the government/opposition status of the party. We draw on cross-national data to measure issue salience for parties (CMP) and voters (CSES). While our findings clearly indicate a decline of congruence in times of economic crisis, we also find that it remains best for government and office-seeking opposition parties. We substantiate this finding by unpacking the ways in which incumbent and office-seeking opposition parties address the economy in their manifestos.     

Partisanship,attribution and approval in a public health shock

Political scientists have long agreed that partisanship can bias how voters evaluate government performance and attribute responsibility. However, less is known about how – and to what extent – these biases work across different types of voters, or how they respond to positive or non-partisan policy outcomes. In this research note we address these questions, focusing on how voters respond to a positive, non-partisan public health shock: the successful early rollout of Covid-19 vaccinations in England. Through a pre-registered information experiment embedded in the British Election Study (N > 6000), we test how voters respond to claims that the quasi-independent National Health Service, rather than the government, deserved credit for the success of the programme. On average, subjects do attribute less responsibility to government, but this has no downstream effect on general approval. Exploratory heterogeneity analyses suggest that government and opposition supporters, as well as historic swing voters, respond homogeneously to our intervention. Our findings are not fully explained by rational or selective frameworks of responsibility attribution, and add nuance to existing experimental work on the political effects of the pandemic.     

Portfolio Saliency and Ministerial Turnover: Dynamics in Scandinavian Postwar Cabinets

Why do certain ministers remain in their post for years while others have their time in office cut short? Drawing on the broader literature on portfolio allocation, this article argues that the saliency of individual portfolios shapes ministerial turnover. The main argument is that ministerial dismissals are less likely to occur the higher the saliency attributed to the ministerial portfolio since ministers appointed to important posts are more likely to have been through extensive screening before appointment. Importantly, it is also posited in the article that the effect of portfolio salience is conditioned by government approval ratings: when government ratings are on the decline, prime ministers are less likely to reshuffle or fire important ministers than when approval ratings are improving. To test these claims, Cox proportional hazards models are applied to a new dataset on ministerial turnover in Scandinavia during the postwar period. The results strongly support the proposition that portfolio saliency matters for ministerial survival, and that this effect is moderated by government popularity.     

Provoking a civil war

Nondemocratic governments under the rule of weak institutions use repression against the opposition to remain in power. Repression both muffles the opposition’s voice and strengthens the government’s supporters. Nevertheless, when repression becomes strong enough, it becomes intolerable to its victims who revolt and initiate a civil war. The government is aware of the mechanism and determines the level of repression accordingly. This paper studies the circumstances in which the ruler’s best alternative is to intensify repression to the point of provoking civil war. Although the model is abstract, its implications are discussed using the recent civil war in the Ivory Coast as a case study.     

Opposition Policy Influence through Agenda‐setting: The Environment in Denmark, 1993–2009

This article addresses the opportunities that the opposition has to influence policy – a topic that has been neglected in existing party policy research. The idea that is developed is applied to a remarkable environmental policy development during the Danish right‐wing government in the 2000s. Contrary to its position when it took office in 2001, the right‐wing government turned green and adopted a series of green policy initiatives. It is argued in this article that vehement and persistent criticism from the left‐wing opposition provides an explanation for this turn. Taking media coverage, public opinion, carbon dioxide emissions and the government's approval ratings into account, the empirical estimation based on unique quarterly data shows that opposition criticism had a systematic impact on the government's pro‐environmental policy development. The implications for party policy research are important. If the aim is to understand how parties matter to policy, the opposition should be taken more seriously.     

Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance,Leadership Change,and Support for Violent Groups in Iraq

The “hearts and minds” model of combating rebellions holds that civilians are less likely to support violent opposition groups if the government provides public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision increases support for the government and decreases sympathy for violent opposition groups. To test this argument, we leverage a unique research design opportunity that stems from the unforeseen announcement of the resignation of Iraq's divisive prime minister in August 2014 while an original survey was being administered across the country. We show that the leadership transition led Iraq's displeased Sunni Arab minority to shift support from the violent opposition to the government. In line with our argument, this realignment was due to rising optimism among Sunni Arabs that the new government would provide services and public goods—specifically security, electricity, and jobs.     

Electoral system innovation: A comparison of the lower saxony electoral laws of 1946 and 1977, their origins and effects

This study is concerned with two electoral laws introduced in Lower Saxony for local government elections: the first post-war law (1946) introduced by the British occupation authorities, and the most recent (1977) law, the product of the CDU-FDP coalition in Lower Saxony, used for the 1981 local government elections. The background to each of these laws is presented, with emphasis on their political context and the goals sought by the authorities of the time. The article then examines the actual effects of each law, and explores some of the unintentional effects that emerged. The conclusion sets the problem of electoral-system innovation in the wider context of the relationship between electoral change and political behaviour.     

Drivers of political parties’ voting behaviour in European economic governance: the ultimate decline of the economic cleavage?

The article examines the factors that determined the attitude of parliamentary parties towards eurozone anti-crisis measures. Using a statistical logit model, it demonstrates that, while all governing parties supported such measures, opposition parties were divided. The support of the former is explicable in terms of international obligations. The positions of opposition parties reflected their attitude towards European integration: Eurosceptic parties tended to oppose anti-crisis measures. Furthermore, whereas negative votes were less likely in countries marked by higher levels of popular trust in government and satisfaction with the problem-solving capacity of the EU, the likelihood of no votes increased as a function of the level of trust in national parliaments. The policy preferences of opposition parties, measured on the economic left–right scale, did not provide significant explanatory potential; nor did an additional test measuring the impact of extreme left?right positions.     

Approval regulation and endogenous consumer confidence: Theory and analogies to licensing,safety, and financial regulation

Safety regulation – in the form of pre-market approval, licensure, screening, and product entry limitations – governs numerous market realms, including consumer finance. In this article, we ask whether the effects of safety regulation go beyond safety and affect consumers' beliefs about the distribution of products they can use. We model “approval regulation,” where a government regulator must approve the market entry of a product based upon observable, unbiased, and non-anticipable experiments. We show that even if regulator and firm disagree about only quality standards, the disagreement induces the firm to provide more information about its product than it would in the absence of regulation. Put differently, purely first-order disagreements in regulation generate second-order consequences (more certainty about product quality). These second-order consequences of regulation are sufficient to generate first-order effects among end-users (more consumption of superior products), even when users are risk-neutral. In other words, even if approval regulation produces little or no improvement in safety or quality, it still aggregates information useful to “downstream” product users; these users will exhibit higher consumption and will more readily switch to superior products. In contrast with libertarian analyses of entry regulation and licensure, the model predicts that entry restrictions may be associated with greater product or service utilization (consumption) as well as with greater price sensitivity among consumers. Because contemporary cost–benefit analyses ignore these second-order effects, they are unlikely to capture the possible confidence effects of approval regulation.     

Repression,spontaneity, and collective action: the 2013 Turkish Gezi protests

Scholars have identified various conditions that influence the formation of spontaneous collective action. Certain types of opposition strategies and geographic conditions make it likelier for protesters to be able to overcome reactive repression and keep mobilizing after experiencing state violence. As such, it is still unclear why a small protest sometimes diffuses into an unforeseen mass wave of dissent. Through examination of Turkish civil society, this study introduces a framework to explain the emergence of the 2013 Gezi protest, which was the largest in the Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) government-led era of Turkish politics. A sequence of mechanisms including viral diffusion, elite updating/cover-up, public outrage, and coordination are categorized and linked to previously identified antecedent conditions as well as Twitter activity of social movement organizations which took part in the protests. The framework advances our knowledge of repression backfire by identifying its causal mechanisms and classifying a configuration of conditions under which the phenomenon is likely to empirically take place.     

Citizen satisfaction under changing political leadership: The role of partisan motivated reasoning

There exists a gap in our understanding of what citizen satisfaction evaluations actually represent. While recent years have witnessed a move away from performance‐based models to cognitive‐implicit models of citizen satisfaction, the inherent political nature of government, its institutions, and services has been largely ignored. Drawing on the functional responsibility chain between political principals and governmental, public‐service‐delivering institutions, we outline a theory of citizen satisfaction that accounts for the political nature of these institutions. In the context of two consecutive general elections, we find a partisan bias in citizen satisfaction with government and the legislative branch, but not for institutions that are more clearly separated from national government. These mixed findings are suggestive of a dispersion effect of the partisan bias in citizen satisfaction, namely, that citizens are less likely to use their partisan lenses in cases where the responsibility of political principals is dispersed across multiple actors.     

A worldwide consensus on nudging? Not quite,but almost

Nudges are choice‐preserving interventions that steer people's behavior in specific directions while still allowing them to go their own way. Some nudges have been controversial, because they are seen as objectionably paternalistic. This study reports on nationally representative surveys in eight diverse countries, investigating what people actually think about nudges and nudging. The study covers Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Africa, and South Korea. Generally, we find strong majority support for nudges in all countries, with the important exception of Japan, and with spectacularly high approval rates in China and South Korea. We connect the findings here to earlier studies involving Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Our primary conclusion is that while citizens generally approve of health and safety nudges, the nations of the world appear to fall into three distinct categories: (i) a group of nations, mostly liberal democracies, where strong majorities approve of nudges whenever they (a) are seen to fit with the interests and values of most citizens and (b) do not have illicit purposes; (ii) a group of nations where overwhelming majorities approve of nearly all nudges; and (iii) a group of nations that usually show majority approval, but markedly reduced approval rates. We offer some speculations about the relationship between approval rates and trust.     

Output of the Spanish Cortes (1979–2000): A case of adaptation to party government

Abstract.  This article considers the activity of the Spanish Cortes in law production and the control of the executive during the six parliaments of the democratic government. It mainly examines the output of the lower chamber due to the asymmetrical bicameralism and weak status of the Senate. In Spain, the legislative output has been dependent on different situations of party government. In general terms, the Cortes have been always very active in controlling the executive and its participation in law-making was highly relevant when there was a minority government. Because parties are central actors in parliament and due to the strong party discipline in the Spanish case, the author mainly studied parliament output from the viewpoint of strategies of opposition parties. Sometimes parties behaved in parliament procedures in a competitive way, while in others they behave cooperatively. There was a great variety of patterns of strategic behaviour on account of the different situations of party government and the diverse opposition parties. Half of the parliaments had minority governments in which minority parties played a very important role by supporting the government in parliament; however, the main opposition party was never the same since there were two changes of government.     

Developmental states,civil society,and public health: Patent regulation for HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals in India and Brazil

While both India and Brazil are seriously affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, each country has chosen a different approach to providing affordable pharmaceutical treatment. Whereas the Indian government has paved the way for market-driven solutions, Brazilian public authorities are strongly involved in the research and production of HIV/AIDS medication. Brazilian regulations permit comprehensive and free provision of HIV/AIDS drugs, whereas the majority of the affected population in India does not receive adequate pharmaceutical treatment. To explain the different policy outputs, we draw on the developmental state literature. Efficient decisionmaking structures, a devoted bureaucracy, and effective policy instruments enable public authorities to provide public goods even in the context of relative scarcity. We show that the assumptions of developmental state theory have to be complemented by the assessment of civil society actors' potential to trigger governmental interventions in the market.     

Initiatives and government expenditures

This paper demonstrates that provisions for initiatives have important effects on government spending. Provisions for initiatives encourage legislatures to approve any proposal which might attract substantial popular support. If these proposals are more likely to advocate increases than reductions in expenditures, the presence of initiative provisions will increase total expenditures. Direct government expenditures per capita are significantly higher in both states and municipalities which permit initiatives.The Project in State and Local Government Finance of the National Bureau of Economic Research supported the research presented in this paper. Only I am responsible for the content.