The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion,the Separation of Powers,and the U.S. Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation

Numerous studies have found that elite and popular preferences influence decision making on the U.S. Supreme Court; yet, uncertainty remains about when, how, and why the Court is constrained by external pressure. I argue the justices are constrained, at least in part, because they fear nonimplementation of their decisions. I test this theory by utilizing a recent study of judicial power, which finds the Court enjoys greater implementation power in “vertical” cases (those involving criminal and civil liability) than in “lateral” cases (all others; e.g., those involving schools or government agencies). I find that Court constraint is strongest in important lateral cases—those cases in which implementation depends on support from nonjudicial actors. My findings suggest that Supreme Court constraint is driven by the justices' fear of nonimplementation and is, therefore, dependent on institutional context.     

Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies

There are two well-established empirical regularities about voters. First, they entertain systematically biased beliefs about how public policies affect economic outcomes. Second, voters vote retrospectively: they punish the incumbent for poor and reward him for good macroeconomic performance. Thus, political parties face a trade-off: offering popular yet economically harmful policies increases the chance of being elected today, but decreases the chance of re-election. We provide the first rigorous game-theoretical analysis of the trade-off. The model addresses two questions: How can biased beliefs and retrospective voting be explained consistently? What policy outcomes emerge in party competition? To micro-found persistently biased beliefs we introduce the psychological concept of mental models. Deviating from earlier studies, we allow parties to choose strategic mixtures of populist (i.e., bad yet popular) and good (but less popular) platforms. We show that retrospective voting provides a self-correction mechanism, so that parties offer strategic mixtures of policies in equilibrium rather than purely populist or purely good policy platforms. Thus, democracy is characterized by mediocre policy choices and half-hearted reforms. An incumbent bias or unclear responsibilities weaken the self-correction mechanism.     

Politicians in Television

ABSTRACT

Television viewers, journalists and social influence analysts often use the term “television character” or “media-savvy person” when referring to people (also to politicians) who draw the viewers' attention and interest (Reeves, Naas, 2000). The purpose of the research presented herein is to answer two questions: (1) what are the differences in social perception of five main personality dimensions (“the Big Five”: agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience [intellect]) of media-savvy politicians and those considered to belong to the non-media-savvy type; and (2) how traits attributed to media-savvy and media-un-savvy politicians remain connected with the viewers' political self-identification. A hundred journalism students, using an adjective list for “the Big Five” diagnosis (five dimensions of personality), were to identify their political beliefs as right wing, mixed, or left wing and to describe a politician they considered to be the most media-savvy and the least media-savvy person. Results indicate that media-avvy politicians are perceived to be more extrovert (dynamic), more open to experience, and more conscientious than their media-un-savvy counterparts; participants' (viewers') political beliefs reflect the importance of openness and conciliation in perception of media-savvy and non-media-savvy politicians.     

Trade unions,nonneutrality and stagflation

The claim that in policy games nonneutrality and a stagflation bias emerge in equilibrium if the unions care about inflation, per se, is discussed. This assumption is shown to be not necessary to obtain a stagflation bias; the same applies to nonneutrality if a government acts in the economy. The question of whether unions should be envisaged as “institutions” (i.e., interested in variables unrelated to wages and employment) is also addressed. Two model-based alternatives providing “microeconomic” foundations versus “macroeconomic” foundations to unions' behaviour are presented. The conclusion is that the modelling of unions remains an unsettled problem.     

When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions

An extensive literature addresses citizen ignorance, but very little research focuses on misperceptions. Can these false or unsubstantiated beliefs about politics be corrected? Previous studies have not tested the efficacy of corrections in a realistic format. We conducted four experiments in which subjects read mock news articles that included either a misleading claim from a politician, or a misleading claim and a correction. Results indicate that corrections frequently fail to reduce misperceptions among the targeted ideological group. We also document several instances of a “backfire effect” in which corrections actually increase misperceptions among the group in question.     

The glitterati government? Amateur celebrity candidates in American elections, 1928–2018

This paper examines amateur celebrity candidates in American elections from 1928 to 2018. Our central finding is that while not many celebrities run for public office, those who do usually win. We argue that the strategic-politician theory helps explain both why so few stars run for office and why those who do are generally successful. Besides name recognition, celebrities' most significant electoral advantage might be that they do not need a career in politics, which allows them to be picky about the races they enter. Although winning is not a foregone conclusion for celebrities, the most pertinent question seems to be not “can they win?” but “will they run?”     

The Interregional Incidence of Central Budgets in Federations: Some Evidence from Canada

We review the evidence on the regional incidence of federal budgets in Canada, considering both aggregate results and some specific federal expenditure programs as well as some relevant issues (e.g., the regional effect of some regulatory programs) not captured in fiscal flows. The regional distributional pattern revealed in this analysis is both robust to various reasonable adjustments and relatively stable over time. However, although such studies may provide a useful baseline for assessing performance in some respects, they cannot be used to demonstrate that one region is paying (or receiving) “too much” or “too little” in a meaningful sense.     

It’s all ‘bad’ news! Voters’ perception of macroeconomic policy competence

The purpose of the present paper is to consider how voters form perceptions about macroeconomic policy competence by focusing on the role of recent macroeconomic news: Do their perceived views of good news matter as much as bad news when they form beliefs about the incumbent government’s competence in managing the macroeconomy, in particular, with regard to their ability to control inflation and unemployment? We find that ‘bad’ news about unemployment persists when households are forming their perceived competence, whereas “good” news does not. That is, voters tend to display pessimistic bias when forming perceptions about the incumbent government’s competence.     

What's in a word?

In this paper, we argue that citizens' views about the personality characteristics of their political leaders are subject to systematic bias, motivated by the desire to maintain existing impressions. We report two studies designed to explore how such trait biases, involving judgments of real politicians, are manifested. Drawing on work in social psychology (John, Hampson, and Goldberg, 1991), we hypothesize, and demonstrate experimentally, that traitbreadth plays a critical role in the judgment process. Specifically, people tend to select broad positive traits (e.g., kind) and narrower negative traits (gullible) to describe politicians that they like; conversely, people tend to select broad negative traits (unintelligent) and narrower positive traits (soft-hearted) to describe politicians that they dislike. This trait breadth attribution bias was much stronger among those who had a positive, rather than negative, impression of the politician, a result we discuss in the context of related evidence of affective asymmetries in political judgment (e.g., Kinder, 1986; Marcus and Mackuen, 1993). More generally, these studies illustrate the potential associated with integrating cognitive, affective, and motivational factors in the service of fully understanding political judgment and choice.     

Language Shapes People's Time Perspective and Support for Future‐Oriented Policies

Can the way we speak affect the way we perceive time and think about politics? Languages vary by how much they require speakers to grammatically encode temporal differences. Futureless tongues (e.g., Estonian) do not oblige speakers to distinguish between the present and future tense, whereas futured tongues do (e.g., Russian). By grammatically conflating “today” and “tomorrow,” we hypothesize that speakers of futureless tongues will view the future as temporally closer to the present, causing them to discount the future less and support future‐oriented policies more. Using an original survey experiment that randomly assigned the interview language to Estonian/Russian bilinguals, we find support for this proposition and document the absence of this language effect when a policy has no obvious time referent. We then replicate and extend our principal result through a cross‐national analysis of survey data. Our results imply that language may have significant consequences for mass opinion.     

Understanding Street‐Level Bureaucrats' Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program

Personal interactions between clients and street‐level bureaucrats are significant in explaining why street‐level bureaucrats behave as they do. Not all bureaucracies that apply program rules to individuals, however, engage face‐to‐face with their clientele. As more intake procedures are automated, such “one‐on‐one” encounters decrease. The author generates and tests hypotheses about frontline bureaucratic decision making in the Social Security Disability program, by applying bounded rationality theory. The findings show that eligibility decisions by street‐level bureaucrats are affected by their adherence to subsets of agency goals and perceptions of others in the governance system. How quickly they make decisions also has an impact. There is no evidence that the way in which bureaucrats evaluate clients explains their decisions when they lack face‐to‐face contact.     

Norms and rage: Gender and social media in the 2018 U.S. mid-term elections

Previous research shows women candidates face double-standard with regard to fitness for office: women ought to be kind but leaders ought to be aggressive and agentic. At the same time, there is traditional division of what constitutes “women’s” issues (e.g. health-care) vs “male” (e.g. economy). Do these norms about what women politicians ought to be and talk about hurt or help them during elections? We investigate the case of U.S. 2018 mid-term elections on Twitter. Our findings suggest that engaging with “women’s” issues by female candidates as well as tweeting angrily is associated with higher likelihood of being elected. However, women candidates who use angry speech on Twitter, are more likely to also receive tweets with abusive language, in particular by other women. Thus, we show that social media could help female candidates to break stereotypes, and present themselves as nuanced candidates who can both stand for women’s issues but also be aggressive and leader-like.     

Turnout as a Habit

It is conventional to speak of voting as “habitual.” But what does this mean? In psychology, habits are cognitive associations between repeated responses and stable features of the performance context. Thus, “turnout habit” is best measured by an index of repeated behavior and a consistent performance setting. Once habit associations form, the response can be cued even in the absence of supporting beliefs and motivations. Therefore, variables that form part of the standard cognitive-based accounts of turnout should be more weakly related to turnout among those with a strong habit. We draw evidence from a large array of ANES surveys to test these hypotheses and find strong support.     

Placing Racial Stereotypes in Context: Social Desirability and the Politics of Racial Hostility

Past research indicates that diversity at the level of larger geographic units (e.g., counties) is linked to white racial hostility. However, research has not addressed whether diverse local contexts may strengthen or weaken the relationship between racial stereotypes and policy attitudes. In a statewide opinion survey, we find that black‐white racial diversity at the zip‐code level strengthens the connection between racial stereotypes and race‐related policy attitudes among whites. Moreover, this effect is most pronounced among low self‐monitors, individuals who are relatively immune to the effects of egalitarian social norms likely to develop within a racially diverse local area. We find that this racializing effect is most evident for stereotypes (e.g., African Americans are “violent”) that are “relevant” to a given policy (e.g., capital punishment). Our findings lend nuance to research on the political effects of racial attitudes and confirm the racializing political effects of diverse residential settings on white Americans.     

People Power or a One‐Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a crucial question is whether popular protest is now likely to be a permanent part of Middle Eastern politics or if the protests that have taken place over the past two years are more likely to be a “one‐shot deal.” We consider this question from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the relationship between the consequences of protests in one period and the incentives to protest in the future. The model provides numerous predictions for why we might observe a phenomenon that we call the “one‐shot deal”: when protest occurs at one time but not in the future despite an intervening period of bad governance. The analysis focuses on the learning process of citizens. We suggest that citizens may not only be discovering the type or quality of their new government—as most previous models of adverse selection assume—but rather citizens may also be learning about the universe of potential governments in their country. In this way, bad performance by one government induces some pessimism about possible replacements. This modeling approach expands the formal literature on adverse selection in elections in two ways: it takes seriously the fact that removing governments can be costly, and it explores the relevance of allowing the citizen/principal to face uncertainty about the underlying distribution from which possible government/agent types are drawn.     

Human Interest or Hard Numbers? Experiments on Citizens’ Selection,Exposure, and Recall of Performance Information

The abundance of quantitative performance information has motivated multiple studies about how citizens make sense of “hard” performance data. However, research in psychology emphasizes that episodic information (e.g., case stories) often leaves a greater mark on citizens. This contradiction is tested using multiple experiments embedded in a large, nationally representative sample of Danish citizens. The results stress three differences between statistical and episodic data. Citizens have strong preferences for statistical data when asked to evaluate an organization. However, episodic information has in some instances a stronger impact on citizens’ evaluations of an organization and often is more emotionally engaging than statistics. Finally, when asked to immediately recall recent performance information about public services, citizens report more elaborate information about personalized stories and experiences than about statistics. Overall, the results raise questions about the ability of hard performance data to dominate and crowd out episodic performance information.     

Fired Up,Ready to Go: The Impact of Age,Campaign Enthusiasm,and Civic Duty on African American Voting

Political Behavior - Does the decision to vote signify that African Americans are “fired up” (i.e., that they are excited about the election), or is it a function of Blacks’...     

Perceived Relative Deprivation and Risk: An Aspiration-Based Model of Human Trafficking Vulnerability

While human trafficking often conjures up images of victims being taken by force, in reality, a minority of today’s slave population are physically abducted. Rather, a significant share of human trafficking victims are “pushed” (e.g., trying to escape crisis conditions) or “pulled” (e.g., pursuing the prospect of economic opportunities) into situations of high risk. This study focuses on those who are “pulled” into risky scenarios, assessing when individuals make decisions that may put themselves at risk. I assume that individuals are boundedly rational, and propose an aspiration-based model of decision-making, which predicts that increased salience in relative deprivation can lead individuals to be more risk-seeking, putting themselves and their children at greater risk for exploitation. Using both an original survey experiment and nationally-representative data in Nepal, I find that consistent with the theoretical model, perceptions of relative deprivation induce more risk-seeking behavior. This result speaks to the interaction between inequality and risk tolerance, and how economic and social forces that alter perceived relative deprivation can increase vulnerability to exploitation.     

Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993

When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician “selling” influence while cheating involves a politician “buying” votes. Individual‐level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating.     

Begging and belonging in the city: a semiotic approach

Citizens develop routine spatial enunciations through which they “domesticate” both the intensity of transition and the extension of distance implied by moving across a city and smooth out the frontiers between environments of belonging (e.g. home) and environments of non-belonging (e.g. the streets). Yet urban “accidents” constantly threaten the impermeability of such routine spatial enunciations. Beggars represent, from the point of view of citizens, an instance of such urban “accidents”. The primary goal of urban beggars is to intercept the routine spatial enunciations of citizens, stop them, and convince them to donate part of their money. In order to achieve these goals, beggars develop a series of micro-strategies that can be analyzed as both semiotic practices and urban performances. At the same time, citizens constantly reabsorb these micro-strategies in their routine spatial enunciations, pushing beggars to the elaboration of new strategies, and so on and so forth, in a continuous struggle between the citizens’ desire to protect their feeling of sedentary belonging and the beggars’ need to invade it. From this point of view, routines of sedentary belonging are a manifestation of power. But why are citizens willing to have their routine spatial enunciations through the city be stopped by all sorts of agencies (for instance, the commercial agency of advertisement), whereas they cannot wait to expel beggars from the urban landscape? Perhaps this discrepancy depends on the elimination of the spiritual discourse of charity from the urban arena?