民俗习惯对法官思维方式的影响及裁判路径——以民事案件的基层法官为视角

民俗习惯经常影响法官的审判思维方式和语言思维方式。从法理上分析,民俗习惯与法律是具有宗源性关系的,法律是经由民俗演化而来的,法律只不过是民俗的制度化部分。因之,在裁决中以可接受性标准为裁判路径是可行的,即法官要在法律内论证它的可接受性和在法律外（法律与社会之间）论证它的可接受性。     

麦考密克论融贯

麦考密克对规范性融贯和描述性融贯的区分，启示我们在司法裁判或证立过程中不但要重视规范要素的融贯、而且要重视事实要素的融贯，规范性融贯与描述性融贯密不可分，法律方法领域不应忽视对证据融贯性要求的研究。努力在法律体系内确保价值融贯的原则论证方式，不仅是对司法证立的一种形式要求，而且含有正当性要求，它把司法行为限制在合法范围内，在约束法官判决主观因素的同时，增加了司法行为的机动性。     

司法裁决的后果主义论证

后果主义论证是法律论证的一种形式,是实现合理的司法裁判和证成裁决结论的重要要素。司法中后果主义论证关注不同裁判方式所带来的可能后果,通过评判不同的后果来选择裁决结论。与一般情境中的后果论不同,司法裁决的后果主义论证主要出现在法官为正当化案件裁判所进行的二次证明中,它是基于可欲后果的证立,这种可欲后果是裁决的逻辑后果或一般后果。     

制定法框架下的判决论证模式

制定法框架下的判决论证其本质是法官适用制定法证立判决。其要义不在于创制一般法律规则,而在于将制定法应用于判决证立之中。法官承担依法裁判和公平、公正裁判的义务。但制定法是开放的、非协调的、不完全的法律体系,不可能为每个具体案件都准备好现成答案,法官不得不通过解释制定法以获取裁判理由。法官审判案件受制定法的约束,但法官对制定法具有广泛的解释权与酌处权,具体包括三个方面:一是澄清制定法含义;二是平衡制定法冲突;三是正当背离制定法。因此,制定法框架下的判决论证具有三种基本模式:涵摄模式、权衡与平衡模式、衡平模式。     

可能生活的证成与接受——司法判决可接受性的规范研究

判决结论宣告了一种对双方当事人的未来将会产生重大影响的可能生活。其中，应得可能生活体现了公平、正义等法律价值，因而是具有可接受性的可能生活。合理法律论证的四个构成要件是法官为当事人建构应得可能生活的法律依据、事实依据、逻辑依据和制度保障。能否满足当事人需要以及当事人需要是否具有正当性，分别是当事人和法律职业共同体、社会公众判断司法判决是否具有可接受性的标准。批判性检验可以帮助人们发现和排除司法判决中存在的各种形式谬误或实质谬误，降低当事人获得正义对运气的依赖，从而最大限度地保证被强制执行的司法判决同样具有可接受性。     

审判实践中法官的论证技艺

法官面对具体的案件必须作出裁决,其裁决具体体现在法官给出的裁决书、裁定书、决定书、调解书、通知书等司法文书之中(为了简便起见,往后我们将这类司法文书约定为"法官文书")。无论在英美法系还是大陆法系中,每一份法官文书中都包含着一个法律论证(同样为了简便,我们往后将这种论证称为"法官论证")。其裁决结果就是法律论证的结论,其裁决的法律依据便是法律论证的规范前提,     

司法裁决证立过程中的法律修辞——以“李庄案”判决书为素材

法律人孜孜以求的法治究竟如何实现？关注司法实践,从微观和方法层面对其进行反思、批判和改进,可能是迈向这一理想境界的重要途径。判决书为宣示法官依法解决纠纷的过程及其结果的公告,它所表达的内容只能是基于法治立场的合法性论证。该论证至少应当在形式上摒弃政治、经济、舆论、私人情感等法外因素的不当干扰,从法律规则和事实出发论证判决的正当性。为此,笔者以＂李庄案＂判决书为素材,基于某种法律方法论立场分析了司法裁决证立过程中的修辞现象,并对此进行了一些评价和反思,希望能够促使人们正确认识并认真对待这一判决正当化的有力工具,从而为趋近理想法治提供现实的方法支撑。     

司法三段论推理评价——以法律规范与案件事实的关系为视角

三段论分为三个部分,即两个前提和一个结论。司法三段论的应用是法官推理过程的体现,但是司法三段论并不等同于形式逻辑的三段论在法学领域中的简单应用,而是融入法律实质内容,推导出具有合法性、正当性的裁判结论的方法论工具。文章是便从法律规范与案件事实的关系的视角来探讨三段论推理评价。虽然当今的法学家对其提出了诸多批判,法律方法论亦由此从总体上实现了向法律论证理论的转换。但是,三段论推理本身的合理价值依然应当予以承认。在法律论证中,形式方法仍然具有无可替代的作用。法律论证的逻辑有效性对于实际的论证活动依然是个比较重要的评价标准,足见三段论推理在法律论证理论中具有重要意义。     

基于经验法则的法律论证

我国法官的裁判文书说理欲实现规范化,必须重视法律论证,为每个主张与判断提供充分的理由。最高人民法院的指导意见表明经验法则是法官进行法律论证的重要理由。经验法则作为一种实践描述能够推动法律论证填补规范缝隙。在事实认定的论证环节,经验法则既是证明规则与证据规则的形成背景,更是事实推定的直接依据。只有妥善把握经验法则的盖然性,才能规避逆谬误与后见偏差等认知陷阱,合理借助经验法则论证三段论中的小前提。在法律适用的论证环节,经验法则是类比过程中相似点与规范效果之间相关性的判断依据。法官可以借助经验法则论证立法理由与事物本质,进而根据法律目的判断相似点的相关性。基于经验法则的法律论证既能回应当下释法说理的需求,也是法律论证理论扎根中国司法土壤的尝试。     

我国民事判决书功能分析

一、民事判决书的制作者——法官:昭示审判智慧(一)证明裁判具有正当性、合法性在复杂的法律制度中.有许多方法把法律行为与更高权威联系起来,法律论证是这种方法中最强有力、最重要的方法之一.公开判决理由论证过程不仅表明法院裁决因与更高权威或更高合法性之间的某种联系而取得派生的合法性.而     

麦考密克法律论辩理论的经济学解读

麦考密克描述阐释了司法审判中主要的法律论辩形式，包括演绎性证明，后果主义论辩，协调性论辩及一致性论辩。通过对此理论的经济分析，发现论辩主体为什么会采用这些论辩方式、应该如何运用及它们的功能为何，最终都立基于经济学的逻辑。     

法律论证理论中的证明证据和证成

法律论证理论是实践论辩理论的一个局域性的论证类型。法律论证的实质是论辩。法律论证中的证明和证据概念强调合法性。法律论证的一个重要概念是证成,它分为内部证成和外部证成两种证成形式,这些证成是由若干规则、公式和原则来构成的,用以在法律论证中获得健全的实践理性。     

法学方法论视野中的法官说理

法院应是人们讲理的场所,法官应该说理,通过说理以增强判决的说服力与可接受性。法官不说理导致判决的可接受性低,当前申诉、上访、执行难等现象就是明证。为此,研究法官说理方法成为加强法官说理必然途径。研究法律解释、法律推理、法律论证等法学方法有助于完善法官说理的方法,有助于从法官说理能力、说理权责、说理激励等方面构建法官说理机制。     

Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation

The fields of linguistic pragmatics and legal interpretation are deeply interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to show how pragmatics and the developments in argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on legal interpretation. The relation between the pragmatic maxims and the presumptions underlying the legal canons are brought to light, unveiling the principles that underlie the types of argument usually used to justify a construction. The Gricean maxims and the arguments of legal interpretation are regarded as presumptions subject to default used to justify an interpretation. This approach can allow one to trace the different legal interpretive arguments back to their basic underlying presumptions, so that they can be compared, ordered, and assessed according to their defeasibility conditions. This approach allows one to understand the difference between various types of interpretive canons, and their strength in justifying an interpretation.     

Implementing Prior Judicial Decisions as Precedents: The Context of Application and Justification

The paper concerns the conditions and methods of using previous judicial decisions as a kind of precedents in the processes of application of law within the statutory legal order. The use of such decisions, not announced by the legislator, depends on the courts, undertaking such actions on the grounds of similarity of cases or of decisional processes. Such decisions do not become an exclusive validation argument and may create a situation of their potential conflict with legal regulations as well as an inferential supplementation of their content. Dissemination of such activity of the courts leads to the development of precedential practice (relevant to the statutory legal order), though, its actual jurisdictional role depends on proper justification of decisions, within which reference to these decisions should be adaptive (in relation to the elements of the current case), generalizing (forming elements of ratio decidendi) as well as argumentative and discursive (in respect of the way in which the decisional reasoning and arguments expressed in the prior justification are used).

     

原则理论与法概念争议

法理学中法概念之争的中心议题在于法律和道德在概念上是否存在必然联系,或者说法律效力和道德正确性之间是否存在必然联系。为了证立联系命题,阿列克西在其早先的原则理论的基础上提出了原则论据,后者包括安置命题、道德命题与正确性命题。在逐一检讨了这三个命题的恰当性以及其与联系命题间的关联度后可以认为,原则论据无法用来证立联系命题。但这并不表示联系命题就必然失败,因为原则理论可以别的方式来证明它。法概念的争议是有关法律效力判准的争议,最终是政治哲学上的争议。     

The Burden of Argumentation in Legal Disputes

Abstract. Juristic argumentation must in normal cases lead to a positive conclusion. The adoption of the rules of the burden of argumentation is, therefore, necessary. It is the task of the normative theory of juristic argumentation to formulate and to justify these rules., The rules of the burden of argumentation are constitutive rules. They do not impose duties or obligations to justify, but they state under what conditions a thesis counts as justified. The basic problem lies in the second-order justification, that is, in the justification of the rules of the burden of argumentation. Their rational justification is a precondition for rational juristic discourse.     

A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation

Abstract . The paper gives a formal reconstruction of some fundamental patterns of legal reasoning, intended to reconcile symbolic logic and argumentation theory. Legal norms are represented as unidirectional inference rules which can be combined into arguments. The value of each argument (its qualification as justified, defensible, or defeated) is determined by the importance of the rules it contains. Applicability arguments, intended to contest or support the applicability of norms, preference arguments, purporting to establish preference relations among norms, and interpretative arguments are also formalised. All those argument types are connected in a unitary model, which relates legal reasoning to the indeterminacy of legal systems, intended as the possibility to develop incompatible defensible arguments. The model is applied to permissive norms and normative hierarchies, and is implemented in a Prolog program.     

Considering Capital Punishment as a Human Interaction

This paper contributes to the normative debate over capital punishment by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. The answer to the latter question turns on the kind of justification the agent can give for what she does in carrying out the role. So our inquiry concerns whether the justifications available to an executioner could provide him with the kind of justification necessary for him to take pride in what he does. If they cannot, I argue, this sheds some light on their adequacy as justifications. The main argument of the paper is that social control arguments for the death penalty fail to provide an adequate justification. I also give some consideration to retributive justifications. The argument is developed through close attention to the depiction of Albert Pierrepoint in the film, Pierrepoint: The Last Hangman.