Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical <Emphasis Type=Italic>Reductio</Emphasis>

How can hard determinism deal with the need to punish, when coupled with the obligation to be just? I argue that even though hard determinists might find it morally permissible to incarcerate wrongdoers apart from lawful society, they are committed to the punishment’s taking a very different form from common practice in contemporary Western societies. Hard determinists are in fact committed to what I will call funishment, instead of punishment. But, by its nature funishment is a practical reductio of hard determinism: it makes implementing hard determinism impossible to contemplate. Indeed, the social practices that hard determinism requires turn out to be morally bad even according to hard determinism itself. I conclude by briefly reflecting upon the implications.     

Paper Covers Rock: In Search of the <Emphasis Type=Italic>e</Emphasis>-record Model

In 1997 the FDA published a set of regulations for the pharmaceutical industry intended to establish controls over the use of computer technology. To briefly re-call this moment in history, the Electronic Records; Electronic Signature (ERES) regulation, 21CFR11 or Part 11, was introduced to provide criteria whereby electronic records (e.g., database information) would be considered ‘equivalent’ to paper records. The underlying motivation was a concern that technology could potentially invalidate the truth claim of an utterance (e.g., ‘this drug is effective’) by ‘scrambling’ the context of the utterance and by potentially falsifying the name (attributability) and the date (auditability). But this regulation was based on a premise, which I will argue, was founded on a metaphysical blind spot derived both from an underestimation of the difficulties inherent in the reconstitution of events (historiography), on the one hand, as well as an overestimation of the nefarious impact of technology, on the other. As a consequence, it is no surprise that the Part 11 narrative fell prey to an onto-theology of the worse kind, and as a consequence never uncovered the true essence of technology.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Peters Edition v. Batt</Emphasis>: The Intertextuality of Silence

The article deals, on the one hand, with a legal conflict between a musical performer/arranger, Mike Batt, and the estate of a composer of avant-garde music, John Cage, over copyright. It is also concerned with the field of intertextuality – how meaning is created in a text or in a work of art, whether it is visual, musical or verbal, through allusions and quotations to previous texts or works of art. The controversy, which did not reach the courts because of a pre-trial settlement, was over an author’s rights to silence, or, as in this case, a silent piece of music. The central issue discussed is the way in which silence may be considered – if at all, to be protectable.     

Defending <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">Law</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">Matters:</Emphasis> Responses to Commentaries

Why Law Matters examines various legal and political institutions and procedures and argues that the desirability of these institutions and procedures is not contingent and does not hinge (only) on the prospects that these institutions are conducive to the realization of valuable ends. Instead, various legal institutions and legal procedures that are often perceived as contingent means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends matter as such.     

Legal Culture and State Building: Liberal Constitutionalism and <Emphasis Type=Italic>Droit Administratif</Emphasis> in early Twentieth Century Argentina

This paper deals with the ways in which jurists and law professors applied transnational systems of public law, in particular US constitutionalism and French droit administratif, in their approaches to the state building process in late nineteenth century Argentina. In covering these movements of adaptation of a nascent legal culture to changing ideological and political circumstances, this article attempts to illuminate the strong links between the process of institutionalization of certain academic disciplines or forms of social knowledge, and modern state building in Latin America.     

Law,Fact and Narratives in Ancient Rhetoric: The Case of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">causa Curiana</Emphasis>

The present article examines the role of narratives in rhetoric and jurisprudence, trying to understand the ancient system of ‘issues’ (staseis), an essential part of the rhetorical curriculum in antiquity, with the help of some basic notions of legal semiotics. After a brief reconstruction of the doctrine, I argue that narratives are essential to classical rhetoric, that the basic types of issues correspond to particular stories in and of the trial, and finally that the system of ancient rhetorical theory is capable of giving an account of the narrativisation of the pragmatics of the trial. Then I turn to a cause célèbre of Roman law, the causa Curiana, trying to show that not only the trial itself but also subsequent (ancient and modern) debates concerning the case were shaped by some grand narratives, and that stories about the trial are likely to return to the court, where they may become part of the story of the trial.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ayam aham asmīti</Emphasis>: Self-consciousness and Identity in the Eighth Chapter of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Chāndogya Upanişad</Emphasis> vs. Śankara’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Bhāşya</Emphasis>

The article offers a close reading of the famous upanişadic story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upanişad versus Śankara’s bhāşya, with special reference to the notions of suşupti and turīya. That Śankara is not always loyal to the Upanişadic texts is a well-known fact. That the Upanişads are (too) often read through Śan-kara’s Advaitic eyes is also known. The following lines will not merely illustrate the gap between text and commentary but will also reveal an unexpected Upanişadic depiction of ‘dreamless sleep’ and ‘transcendental consciousness’. Suşupti is described here as ‘one step too far’, as a ‘break’ or discontinuity in one’s consciousness; whereas turīya is depicted positively, and surprisingly even in wordly terms. Unlike the third state of consciousness in which there is no ‘world’ nor ‘me’, and which is described through Indra’s character as ‘total destruction’ (vināśa); in turīya, the world ‘comes back’, or rather the ‘renouncer’ returns to the world. Sankara’s position, as far as the story under discussion is concerned, is radically different. For him, the Upanişadic story illustrates the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states is an error (adhyāsa) which causes suffering. Consciousness prevails even in suşupti, and turīya has nothing to do with ‘coming back to the world’, since there is nowhere to come back from or to. Turīya, as seen by the Advaitin, consists of all the other states of consciousness together, or as K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages’. The article is dedicated to Prof. Daya Krishna (1924-2007).     

Contempt of Court <Emphasis Type=Italic>In Facie Curiae</Emphasis>; Problems of Justification,Application and Control with Reference to the Situation in Botswana

The existence and exercise of the power to order summary punishment for contempt of court is a much contested terrain. Its antiquity and ubiquity pervade many states across the globe, and in particular in the Anglo-American legal system. This state of affairs has much to do with its very nature and justification. The procedure itself potentially compromises time honoured requirements and practices of due process of law, and also potentially sanctions the fusion of characteristics of an aggrieved person, prosecutor and judge in the same person. Notwithstanding these misgivings, it has continued to be practiced in many parts of the world. Given these exceptions to norms, its scope has been very difficult to delineate, to an extent that although attempts have been made to lay down general principles for its application, the range of conduct necessary for its invocation is so amorphous, malleable and indefinite as to present a difficulty in justification. This has raised many questions both as to its legality and or justification. This article is just but one attempt to answer the questions raised, to the extent possible, and later on to survey its exercise in the context of the jurisdiction of Botswana.     

Reflections on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Prince</Emphasis>, Public Welfare Offenses, <Emphasis Type="Italic">American Cyanamid</Emphasis>, and the Wisdom of the Common Law

The fundamental requirement of Anglo-American criminal law is that crime must consist of the concurrence of a guilty mind—a mens rea—with a guilty act—an actus reus. And yet, the criminal law is shot through with discordant lumps of strict liability—crimes for which no mens rea is required. Ignoring the conventional normative objections to this aberration, I distinguish two different types of strict criminal liability: the type that arose at common law and the type associated with the public welfare offenses that are the product of twentieth and twenty-first century legislation. Using famous cases as exemplars, I analyze the two types of strict liability, and then examine the purposes served and incentives created by subjecting individuals to strict liability. I conclude that common law strict liability is rational in that it advances the purposes of the criminal law, while the public welfare offenses are at best pointless and at worst counterproductive. I suggest that in this respect the common law contains more wisdom than the results of the legislative process.