The dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: the Tarasoff duty and the Jaffee footnote

With the U.S. Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, all U.S. jurisdictions have now adopted some form of evidentiary privilege for confidential statements by patients to psychotherapists for the purpose of seeking treatment. The majority of states, following the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, have also adopted some form of duty by psychotherapists to breach confidentiality and warn potential victims against foreseeable violence by their patients. Largely unresolved is whether there should be a dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary privilege parallel to the Tarasoff exception to confidentiality. This Article argues that exception to the evidentiary privilege should be evaluated separately from the exception to confidentiality. Whether or not a Tarasoff duty to warn existed at an earlier time, exception to the evidentiary privilege should be made only where psychotherapists' testimony is necessary to prevent future harm to patients or identified potential victims. Applying this standard, the dangerous patient exception generally would not apply in criminal actions against patients, but would apply only in proceedings for the purpose of protecting patients or third parties, such as restraining order hearings or proceedings to hospitalize patients.     

Tarasoff in Missouri: The jurisprudence of a mental health provider's duty to warn and protect non-patients of potential risks from patients

In 1976, the Supreme Court of California issued its well-known Tarasoff Principle. From this principle, other courts found a duty to warn, and some found more than just a duty to warn, a duty to protect. As courts in other states adopted a version of the Tarasoff Principle, they issued a wide variety of third-party liability rules. In light of the dynamic, everchanging Tarasoff jurisprudence in the United States and recent relevant appellate court opinion in Missouri, a timely updated summary and update of Tarasoff-related jurisprudence in Missouri is warranted. In the present analysis, we compiled the four appellate court decisions that pertained to the questions of Tarasoff-like third-party liability in the State of Missouri: Sherrill v. Wilson (1983), Matt v. Burrell (1995), Bradley v. Ray (1995), and Virgin v. Hopewell (2001). We reviewed all legal measures for clinicians to protect nonpatients in Missouri, not just those that relate to protecting nonpatients from violence as in a Tarasof-like scenario. Thus, this paper concisely provides a compendium of such options and allows for a meaningful comparison of which legal, protective measures are mandatory and which are permissive, thereby evoking the question of whether measures of protecting nonpatients from a patient's violent acts ought to be mandatory duties or permissive application of professional judgment.     

A Tarasoff for Europe? A European Human Rights perspective on the duty to protect

It has long been recognised by British courts that a psychiatrist can be permitted to depart from his/her duty of confidentiality, in order to issue a warning where a patient is deemed to present a real and serious threat to other parties. Until recently, however, it seemed that s/he would not be bound to give such a warning, or to take other steps to protect third parties. The approach adopted throughout much of the USA, and famously expounded in the Tarasoff judgment, appeared to have no relevance to British law. This article considers the possibility that the European Court of Human Rights' ruling in Osman v UK may be set to bring about a radical change in this respect, introducing something akin to the Tarasoff approach into the UK, and indeed throughout Europe. As well as the possible legal basis for such a duty, and the circumstances in which it would arise, it will consider how a psychiatrist might reconcile any such duty with other, more established, legal and ethical duties.     

United States v. Lyons: toward a new conception of legal insanity

In United States v. Lyons (1984), the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court altered its definition of legal insanity to conform with recent recommendations of the American Bar Association and the American Psychiatric Association. This paper briefly reviews the social and legal context of the Court's ruling. The author then discusses the insanity defense's rationale and suggests an interpretation of the Court's new definition that should guide psychiatric testimony.     

Injunctive relief in US patent practice

Legal context. Injunctive relief is available in civil actionsin the United States. Patent litigation is no exception andthe US patent statute explicitly permits it. Because it is aneffective remedy, injunctive relief is commonly sought togetherwith the monetary (legal) remedies which are available to patentowners when enforcing patent rights. Key points. On 15 May 2006 the US Supreme Court in eBay, Incet al v MercExchange, LLC altered the prevailing practice sayingthat ‘the decision whether to grant or deny injunctiverelief rests within the equitable discretion of the districtcourts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistentwith traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes noless than in other cases governed by such standards’. Practical significance. This article will focus on the availabilityof permanent injunctions in patent infringement actions in lightof the Supreme Court's recent ruling in eBay, Inc et al v MercExchange,LLC.     

Does Chevron Matter?

In this article we evaluate whether the Supreme Court's much-discussed decision in Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) signaled a lasting difference in how the justices decide administrative law cases, by comparing and testing the predictions of three distinct theories of Supreme Court behavior. The legal model predicts an increase in deference to administrative agencies. This prediction is shared by the jurisprudential regime model, which also predicts that the justices evaluate key case factors differently before and after Chevron . The attitudinal model predicts no change in the justices' behavior as a result of Chevron . Although we find that attitudes matter, the fact that we also find support for the legal and jurisprudential regime models undermines the assertion of the attitudinal model that law cannot explain Supreme Court votes on the merits.     

论最高人民检察院司法解释的实质合理性

最高人民检察院在司法实践中根据检察工作的实际需要不间断地制定司法解释,对检察工作中具体应用法律问题进行解释,为我国法治建设、社会治理做出了应有的贡献.最高人民检察院司法解释的合理性为保障法律统一、正确适用发挥法律监督作用;为填补法律条文的不完善作了积极贡献;为解决司法中新情况新问题提供司法依据等.这些合理性因素充分体现了最高人民检察院司法解释的价值所在.面对当前学界和社会部分人士对最高人民检察院司法解释的实质合理性的种种质疑,需要从检察价值合理性、检察目的合理性、检察实践合理性三方面进行论证,以期待人们正确认识最高人民检察院司法解释的实质合理性.     

美国企业法人的言论自由权与竞选资金规制

竞选资金规制是20世纪70年代以来美国言论自由诉讼的三个焦点问题之一。2010年的“联合公民案”提出了公司法人的言论自由权问题，其核心在于：竞选资金是否是言论？公司法人是否是言论自由权的主体？本文分析议会与最高法院在公司法人的竞选资金规制问题上的分歧，对“联合公民案”中的法律争议进行评析，并在此基础上探析公司法人言论自由权法律争议的深层次原因。     

Special report on labor and employment. Supreme Court upholds NLRB bargaining units rule

Providers should expect the number of union organizing campaigns to rise quickly in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in AHA v. NLRB. Despite this increased activity, providers that offer good working conditions and maintain open lines of communication between employees and management, and that understand their legal rights in connection with such situations, will be much more likely to be effective in responding to union organizing activities.     

Good cop, bad cop: federal prosecution of state-legalized medical marijuana use after United States v. Lopez

The Supreme Court's recent decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison articulate a vision of federalism under which Congress's regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause is severely limited in favor of returning traditional areas of state concern, particularly criminal law enforcement, to local or state control. The Court's decisions in these cases coincide with ballot initiatives legalizing the medical use of marijuana garnering a majority of the vote in California, Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Maine, and Washington D.C. Those who use marijuana for medical purposes under sanction of state law, however, still face the threat of federal prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act. Medical marijuana proponents have traditionally, and unsuccessfully, contested federal prosecution using individual rights arguments under theories of equal protection or substantive due process. This Comment argues that after Lopez and Morrison, the federal government's authority to regulate intrastate use of marijuana for medicinal purposes is not the foregone conclusion it once was. The author suggests that proponents of medical marijuana use should invoke the federalism arguments of Lopez and Morrison and argue for state legislative independence from the federal government on this issue.     

建立和完善案例指导制度的几个问题

第一个问题,我觉得在谈案例指导制度的时候,应当弄清楚什么是案例制度,也就是案例制度的概念,我个人理解。最高人民法院“二五”改革纲要里面讲的案例是经最高人民法院认可,并且在最高人民法院公报上发布的、对审理同类案件具有参照借鉴作用的、已经发生法律效力的判决。     

"Pro-life" absolutes, feminist challenges: the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law 1986-1992

This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992 (Attorney General v.X). The author argues that this case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court overturn that decision and recognize the young woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The feminist critique of that law needs to consider its particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom. The author argues that a fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the "unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v. X.     

Regulation, risk assessment, and the Supreme Court: the case of OSHA's cancer policy

As a case study of policy distortion in the legal and regulatory processes, this article first establishes the incongruities among the political, scientific, and legal issues surrounding OSHA's Cancer Policy and then examines the political consequences of ignoring these incongruities in judicial and administrative decisions about that policy. By delineating the political, scientific, and legal issues involved, we develop a basis for assessing the Supreme Court's difficulties in reviewing the Cancer Policy. These difficulties are related to the issue of regulatory reform, as indicated by the subsequent fate of OSHA's Cancer Policy under the Reagan administration. This article concludes with reflections upon regulatory reform in the light of the current status of OSHA's regulation of workplace carcinogens.     

Abortion legislation after Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: model statutes and commentaries

The following Article analyzes the United States Supreme Court's examination of abortion rights in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. The Article then proposes model statutes restricting abortion in light of the Webster decision. The Cumberland Law Review invites and encourages commentary on both sides of the issue.     

An Interpretation of Max Weber's Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional Law

Among legal scholars, Anthony T. Kronman and David M. Trubek have provided the leading interpretations of Weber's theory of law. Kronman and Trubek agree on two important points: Weber's theory is fundamentally contradictory, and Weber's theory relates primarily to private law subjects such as contracts. This article contests both of these points. Building on a foundation of Weber's neo-Kantian metaphysics and his sociological categories of economic action, this article shows that Weber's theory of law is not fundamentally inconsistent; rather it explores the inconsistencies that are inherent within Western society itself, including its legal systems. Furthermore, Weber's insights can be applied to modern constitutional jurisprudence. Weberian theory reveals that modern constitutional law is riddled with irreconcilable tensions between process and substance—between formal and substantive rationality. In the context of racial discrimination cases involving equal protection and the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's acceptance of John Hart Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement demonstrates the Court's resolute pursuit of formal rationality, which insures that the substantive values and needs of minorities will remain unsatisfied.     

Lochner redeemed: family privacy after Troxel and Carhart

At least since its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court has differentiated its review of abortion laws from its scrutiny of other intrusions on family privacy. Whereas abortion restrictions are reviewed under the middling "undue burden" standard, incursions on other family-related liberties, including marriage, kinship, and child rearing are said to be subject to the strict scrutiny ordinarily employed in the defense of fundamental rights. This Article contends that the Court's most recent decisions in this context give reason to reconsider both sides of that equation. Stenberg v. Carhart, striking down Nebraska's ban on "partial-birth" abortions, suggests that the Court's scrutiny in the abortion context will be more aggressive and rigid than most had supposed. At the same time, its decision in Troxel v. Granville, limiting states' authority to order grandparent visitation over the objects of a parent, suggest that there is more fluidity in the Court's review of other family liberties than is conventionally assumed. Together the cases signal a convergence in both sorts of family-privacy controversies toward a common standard of "reasonableness." That standard bears, for many, an uncomfortable association with the much-maligned "natural law-due process formula" of the Lochner era, but Professor Meyer argues that it is precisely the right approach in the context of family privacy. Although more rigid doctrinal formulae are sometimes preferred on the ground that they constrain judicial judgment, here they are undesirable precisely because they obscure the value judgments that are inevitably at the core of every family-privacy decision.     

HIV-positive person who did not disclose status convicted of attempted aggravated assault

On 18 September 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada released its unanimous decision in Williams. This is the first case on the issue of criminal liability for HIV exposure decided by the court since its 1998 decision in the Cuerrier case. Williams raised the issue of whether persons with HIV who have unprotected sexual intercourse without disclosing their status to a sexual partner who might already have been infected with the virus, can be convicted of aggravated assault or attempted aggravated assault. The Supreme Court decided that only a charge of attempted aggravated assault could stand. The decision is also significant because the Supreme Court's comments on two ancillary issues may lead to a significant extension of the criminal law related to HIV transmission or exposure.     

Battle in the name of privacy and security: A comment on Tencent vs. Qihoo (Supreme People's Court of China 2014)

One strategy for companies competing in Internet industries is to attack the privacy and security problems of products or services provided by a competitor and then to deliver remedial software to attract consumers. The recent ruling of the Supreme People's Court of China (SPC) establishes legal constraints on this strategy, recognising that a company owes a high duty of care when criticising the privacy and security policies of its competitors and identifying the line between legal technological innovation and unfair interference with the business of competitors. This article provides a summary of the background, facts and court conclusions as well as relevant comments on the impact of this judgement and identifies the issues that require further clarification.     

Pegram v. Herdrich: On peritonitis, preemption, and the elusive goal of managed care accountability

Managed care presents the paradox of organizations having real power over people's lives without there being clear or consistent means of ensuring accountability. In Pegram v. Herdrich, the United States Supreme Court struggled with whether "fiduciary duties" under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) could be used to counterbalance the incentives that HMOs have to deny necessary care. Given press coverage of the case, however, it was easy to get the impression that the managed care industry itself was on trial in Pegram. This report examines the political and legal forces underlying the dispute and analyzes the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection of the notion of federally imposed duties for HMOs. In the absence of ERISA fiduciary obligations, attention must now shift to developments in state tort law, the scope of federal ERISA preemption, and the prospect of legislative reform. The report concludes with an exploration of how the elusive goal of managed care accountability might be pursued in the wake of Pegram.     

Constructing Kinds of Persons in 1886: Corporate and Criminal

This essay is about the United States Supreme Court's discursive creation of two kinds of persons, one corporate the other criminal, during its 1886 term. The aim is to contrast the Supreme Court's construction of corporate personhood in County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad with its view of the criminal's body in Ex parte Royall, a habeas corpus case. The Court's purpose in deciding these two cases was to design a way to disperse newly emergent and conflicting interests in particular directions within the judicial apparatus. The result is that both criminal and corporate bodies come to be understood through discourse, not outside of it. So the body which is being introduced can be described as a discursive body, not as an anatomical given. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.