From Combined Arms to Combined Intelligence: Philosophy,Doctrine and Operations

‘Combined arms’ operations have been a central tenet of military planning for nearly a century. They call for the integration of land, air and sea forces to achieve battlefield synergies. This philosophy has equal application to intelligence. The article advances the combined arms concept as a way to foster synergies across the intelligence disciplines – geospatial, signals, measures and signals, human, and most recently open source intelligence. It describes the strengths and weaknesses of each discipline in forming an analytical foundation for such a ‘combined intelligence’ and calls for developing theory to integrate the intelligence disciplines. The authors suggest that combined intelligence would confer several benefits, including more effective collection efforts and stronger countermeasures against adversary denial and deception. The article closes by calling for development of concepts and doctrine to put combined intelligence into practice.     

The CIA in Western Europe and the abuse of human rights

Covert action by the CIA and other intelligence services is designed to remain secret. Academics and the public at large therefore to this very day face great difficulties in answering two specific questions: What covert action has the CIA carried out in Europe during its almost 60 years of existence? Did CIA covert action violate human rights in Europe? Some operations, however, have become known and are now in the public research domain. Among them are the clandestine anti-communist stay-behind networks set up by the CIA in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. As the details of the operation emerge only gradually some sources suggest that the stay-behind network was linked to terrorist groups, adding further interest to this largely unknown research subject at a time when the so called ‘war on terrorism’ has forced academics to examine present and historical terrorism data once again.     

Spying on chaos: the Somali model of intelligence on failed states

Failed states pose ongoing strategic challenges for governments concerned with terrorism, poverty and uncontrolled migration. Policy approaches to failed states have ranged from state-building efforts to humanitarian debacles, and outright inaction. This article approaches failed states primarily as intelligence challenges, and uses Somalia as a model of targeting intelligence collection for failed states. This model demonstrates that economic activity offers an approach to intelligence gathering in such environments. In tracing Somalia’s economic successes from the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, this research shows how the business activity produces the needed intelligence opportunities that a strategy for a failed state requires.     

British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898–1906

This article examines British intelligence efforts in Turkish Arabia at the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that intelligence collection was really three separate efforts, carried out by the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Government of India, and it reflected concerns about British decline, the problems experienced during the Boer War, as well as an effort to penetrate the ‘information order’ of India's sub-empire. Although intelligence efforts suffered from bureaucratic disharmony in Whitehall, and between London and the Government of India, valuable contributions were nevertheless made to Britain's knowledge of Turkish Arabia.     

The Malayan special branch on the Malayan–Thai frontier during the Malayan emergency (1948–60)

The Malayan Special Branch was the main intelligence agency of the Malayan government during the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60. It was a critical determinant in the government's efforts to defeat the determined attempts of the Malayan Communist Party (CPM) and its guerrilla army, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), to overthrow the Malayan government and establish a Socialist People's Republic of Malaya. This paper examines the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Malayan Special Branch in southern Thailand as part of the Emergency, and the establishment of a Special Branch Border Section in Penang and a joint regional Malayan–Thai Special Branch office in Songkhla, southern Thailand, to coordinate intelligence operations against the communist insurgents.     

Counter-Intelligence for counter-revolutionary warfare: The South African police security branch 1979–1990

In counter-revolutionary warfare strategy, political action forms the overwhelming part; however, also central as an off-shoot of the tenets of counter-revolutionary warfare is the elimination of insurgent structures – generally a euphemism for assassination. In reality, assassination is a subset of covert paramilitary action, implemented as a consequence of counter-intelligence or even counter-terrorism. South Africa's Security Branch presents one of the best recent examples of the use of counter-intelligence techniques for counter-revolutionary warfare. While politico-constitutional intelligence was gathered by the National Intelligence Service to support constitutional efforts to achieve a settlement of the conflict and bring about a new political dispensation in South Africa, the apartheid government relied on the covert operational capabilities of the security forces (especially the Security Branch) to not only halt the ‘Revolutionary Onslaught’ of the liberation movements, but to eliminate them as a viable political and revolutionary force. In attempting to support an unwinnable political objective, the ultimate corruption of the intelligence process and the reliance of individuals overseeing it far and away on the covert operational intelligence capabilities of the state, the apartheid government brought about its own downfall. The Security Branch was at the heart of these efforts.     

‘Toys’ and ‘Whispers’ in ‘16‐land’: SOE and Ireland, 1940–1942

This article explores SOE plans to organise stay behind parties in neutral Ireland in cooperation with Irish army officers, in anticipation of a successful German invasion, as well as efforts to prepare for sabotage operations and to plant rumours through its agent Roddy Keith, and later through the British press attache John Betjeman. SOE's ambitions were opposed both by MI5 and SIS. MI5 wished to protect its own links with Irish intelligence, while SIS feared for the security of its covert Irish networks (which in fact were already penetrated). The consequent rows drew in C, Sir Frank Nelson, and other senior figures. They were resolved by Churchill, who felt that to provide the Irish with war material would only encourage them in their neutrality policy. His verdict was taken as an instruction to SOE to quit Ireland.     

Witness testimony from the Church Committee hearings on covert action, 1975

One of the most controversial uses of intelligence by the United States is covert action – secret efforts to change the course of history by intervening secretly into the affairs of other nations or factions. In 1975, the Church Committee held hearings on this subject – a rarity – and four expert witnesses laid out for the panel their recommendations for changes in the conduct of covert action. This dip into the intelligence archives by Intelligence and National Security reveals that much has changed in the world of covert action since 1975, with some of the witness recommendations coming to fruition and others widely ignored.     

Spycatcher’s little sister: the Thatcher government and the Panorama affair, 1980–1981

This article investigates the Thatcher government’s attempts to suppress or censor reporting on secret intelligence issues in the early 1980s. It examines official reactions to a BBC intrusion into the secret world, as the long-running Panorama documentary strand analysed the role and accountability of Britain’s clandestine services. It also assesses the extent of collusion between the government and the BBC’s senior management. The Panorama affair was an important waypoint on the journey towards the dramatic Spycatcher episode of the mid-1980s. The key players on the government side – Thatcher and Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong – failed to learn the lessons of the 1980–81 affair, that it was often more dangerous to attempt suppression than to simply let events run their course.     

Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance

After major intelligence failures it is often asked why intelligence and security officials failed to heed the many ‘wake-up calls’ that had been provided by earlier failures and surprises. This article addresses this question by examining intelligence failures as ‘focusing events’, which is a concept used in the literature on government policy making to explain how disasters and crises can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn. It argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance – to be a true wake-up call – that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to increased intelligence collection and greater receptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers.     

Creating a commonwealth intelligence culture: the view from Central Africa 1945–1965

This article examines attempts by the British intelligence community to improve the security arrangements of members of both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Commonwealth in the post-war era. The process was regarded not only as a means of countering Communist subversion and protecting Britain's key relationship with the United States, but also as a way of entrenching British influence, particularly in countries nearing independence. The result of this process was a complex network of intelligence contacts reaching across the Commonwealth. Viewing this network from the perspective of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB), the intelligence organization of the Central African Federation, the article suggests that it offered both opportunities and dangers. It provided a potential channel for covert diplomacy. Yet it also threatened to undermine the credibility of Commonwealth intelligence chiefs whose links with the United Kingdom were perceived as being excessively close.     

‘In the way’: intelligence,Eden, and British foreign policy towards Italy, 1937–38*

In 1937–1938 a divide emerged over Italian appeasement between Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden. Chamberlain wanted to appease Mussolini with de jure recognition of his Ethiopian conquest. Eden disagreed and even resigned over the matter. Historians have struggled to define clearly Eden’s resistance. The intelligence archive allows for a reassessment of British policy towards Italy and Eden’s resignation. It shows that secret intelligence was central to Eden’s decisions and demonstrates the importance of intelligence in diplomatic history. It shows that Eden, almost alone, correctly read ambiguous intelligence on Mussolini and recognized him as an enemy of Britain.     

Favorite INTs: how they develop,why they matter

Collection of important information is a critical part of the intelligence business. Less recognized and studied is the differential use of types of intelligence information based on personal and organizational preferences for, and biases against, specific intelligence collection disciplines, or ‘INTs’. This article presents a framework for assessing the implications of ‘favorite INTs’ for policy-making, policy implementation, and intelligence analysis. The record shows that favorite INTs negatively influence analysts and the use of intelligence by senior political leaders and military commanders. Practitioners can improve intelligence support and scholars can better understand how intelligence influences decision-making by appreciating how and why favorite INTs develop and influence decision-makers and analysts.     

Geospatial intelligence and the U.S. Exploring Expedition (1838–1842): reframing the history of U.S. Naval Intelligence

This paper reframes the U.S. Exploring Expedition (USEE, 1838–1842) as a naval/geospatial intelligence collection activity. By charting the Pacific, the USEE furthered U.S. commercial interests, while also building a picture of the ‘maritime operational environment’ on which all other forms of intelligence were (and are) based. Viewing the USEE in this light broadens the opportunities open to historians of U.S. Naval Intelligence and historicizes contemporary concerns about climate change and resource scarcity. It suggests that ‘knowledge of the environment’ has long coexisted with ‘knowledge of the enemy’ as a priority for the U.S. Navy.     

Indian spies inside Pakistan: South Asian human intelligence across borders

This article examines India’s historical efforts to spy inside Pakistan from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. It draws from memoirs of notable Indian spies who were jailed for espionage in Pakistan and spy ‘fiction’ written by former Indian intelligence and military officers who allege their writing is based on actual cases. The article highlights commonalities among Indian spies using the words of Indian officers to better understand human intelligence efforts inside Pakistan. It finds that Indian spies in these books have initially been Hindus or from multi-religious families, from the Indian-Pakistan border and have been poorly treated by the Indian government and its intelligence services.     

British Intelligence and the ‘Fifth’ Occupying Power: The Secret Struggle to Prevent Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine

At the end of the Second World War, British intelligence struggled to enforce strict limits imposed on Jewish immigration to Palestine. Holocaust survivors and Jews wishing to escape communism in Eastern Europe flooded the western Zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, while the Zionist movement worked to bring them to Palestine. Illegal immigration to Palestine was the key policy dispute between Britain and the Zionist movement, and a focus for British intelligence. Britain sought both overt and covert means to prevent the boarding of ships at European ports which were destined for Palestine, and even to prevent the entry of Jewish refugees into the American zones. This article highlights Britain's secret intelligence-gathering efforts as well as its covert action aimed to prevent this movement. It highlights a peculiar episode in the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States, during which cooperation and partnership was lacking. British intelligence promoted a rumour that Soviet agents were using Jewish escape lines to penetrate Western Europe and the Middle East in order to persuade American authorities to prevent the movement of Jewish refugees. Instead, this article argues, American intelligence secretly cooperated with the Zionist organizers of the escape routes so to expose Soviet agents. Britain's attempt at deception backfired, and provided effective cover for the movement of hundreds of thousands of Jews during a critical period. Meanwhile its intelligence had dramatically improved, but policymakers failed to reassess Britain's ability to sustain immigration restrictions and the indefinite detention of tens of thousands of illegal migrants.     

Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956–61

During the Algerian war of independence (1954–62), Federal Germany became the theatre of a series of unexplained bombings and shootings that targeted Algerian nationalists and German arms dealers. At the time, these crimes were attributed to the Red Hand, a counter-terrorist organization or parallel secret service with a mission to defeat the enemies of l’Algérie française. This article argues that the attacks on West German territory were executed neither by vigilantes nor by renegade agents. Instead, they were carried out by the French foreign intelligence service SDECE with the full approval of the highest political authorities in Paris. Using the case of Federal Germany as an example, this article seeks to reveal how and why covert action – including state-sanctioned murder – became an integral and important part of the Algerian war, particularly of France's campaign to undermine the Algerian rebels' efforts to procure military and non-military supplies. The article will show that the Red Hand served merely as a cover to detract from the state's resort to such violent and criminal means.     

British Intelligence and Propaganda during the 'Confrontation', 1963-1966

This study examines the importance of British intelligence and propaganda in the Confrontation with Indonesia. It shows that Britain had access to human and signals intelligence on Indonesia, which influenced British policy and strategy in several ways. In particular, signals intelligence gave London the confidence to launch 'Claret' cross border raids against Indonesia from 1965. The study also reveals that Britain mounted an aggressive propaganda campaign against Indonesia during the Confrontation and especially after an abortive coup attempt in 1965. British propaganda successfully encouraged the army to destroy the Indonesian communist party, remove President Sukarno from power and end the Confrontation.     

‘It takes a Russian to beat a Russian’: the National Union of Labor Solidarists,nationalism, and human intelligence operations in the Cold War

This article reconstructs the CIA’s exploitation of the Natsional’no Trudovoi Soyuz, a right-wing Russian nationalist organization, as a part of ‘rollback’ and ‘stay-behind’ covert operations against the Soviet Union during the 1950s. Operations such as these relied on the notion that far-right nationalism presented a potent counter to international communism. The article explores postwar ties between American intelligence and the NTS in a shared effort to ‘roll back’ the borders of communism. It likewise discusses the ability of Soviet counterintelligence to intercept, penetrate, and sabotage nationalist networks and their operations backed by Western governments.     

A double agent down under: Australian security and the infiltration of the left

Because of its clandestine character, the world of the undercover agent has remained murky. This article attempts to illuminate this shadowy feature of intelligence operations. It examines the activities of one double agent, the Czech-born Maximilian Wechsler, who in the early 1970s successfully infiltrated two socialist organizations. Wechsler was engaged by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. However, he was ‘unreliable’: he came in from the cold and went public. The article uses his exposés to recreate his undercover role. It seeks to throw some light on the recruitment methods of ASIO, on the techniques of infiltration, on the relationship between ASIO and the Liberal Party during a period of political volatility in Australia, and on the contradictory position of the Labor Government towards the security services.