To marry a thief? Crime type as a deterrent to cohabitation

Objectives

Using a vignette study, we investigated the relative attractiveness as cohabitation partners of five different types of offenders, male as well as female.

Methods

Respondents advised a hypothetical person whether he or she should start cohabiting with his or her partner who had offended once. Gender and type of offence were systematically varied.

Results

Our findings suggest that violent offenders are equally attractive as serious property offenders. Against expectation, perpetrators of relational violence are not rated as less attractive than other violent offenders, even if they are male, and also when females are the raters. Male violent offenders are rated as less attractive cohabitation partners than female violent offenders. Sex offenders are the least attractive cohabitation partners, particularly those who had offended against a child.

Conclusions

Crime type matters: sex offending impacted consistently negatively on cohabitation advice. This effect may be partly due to the fact that many regard sex offenders as incurable and ‘deviant.’ Violent offending did not elicit markedly negative advice. Perhaps it was considered less of a risk because of the message in the vignette that the prospective cohabitants had a good relationship. It may also be that many young people have been in a fight or have slapped someone in their lives, and, therefore, downplay the seriousness of this offence.

     

Litigation: a threat to obstetric practice?

Claims that the practice of obstetrics is in crisis appear regularly in the media, but evidence for the claims is scarce. This article examines a range of evidence from Australia and overseas and explores the relationship between obstetric practice and litigation. While anecdotal evidence abounds, there is no hard evidence to confirm that litigation is the threat to obstetric practice that many practitioners strongly believe it is. It is likely that such practitioners respond by practising defensive medicine but this is very difficult to measure.     

Is there only One Correct Legal Answer to a Question of Fact? Three Talmudic Answers to a Jurisprudential Dilemma

This article focuses on questions of pure fact‐of‐the‐matter and asks whether two omniscient judges (or jurists or scholars) may disagree over the legal answer to a straightforward question of a matter of fact. There are approaches to legal theory among some western and Jewish philosophers of law whereby at least superficially it is possible that two or more contradictory legal statements regarding a given reality can be equally correct. The article provides a critical analysis of three different models derived from the Jewish legal literature, and reviews the contributions of Jewish sources to the understanding of the phenomenon of disagreements concerning matters of fact.     

Is it acceptable for a psychiatrist to break confidentiality to prevent spousal violence?

Study questionWhen is it acceptable for a psychiatrist to break confidentiality to protect the wife of a potentially violent patient?Methods153 lay persons, 13 nursing personnel, 10 physicians, and 10 psychologists in France indicated this acceptability in 48 scenarios. The scenarios were all combinations of 5 factors: gravity of threat (death or beating), certainty of mental illness (certain or not), time spent talking with patient (considerable or little), his attitude toward psychotherapy (rejection, indecision, or acceptance), and whether the physician consulted an expert.ResultsLay people favored breaking confidentiality more than did nursing personnel or psychologists. Consulting an expert had greatest impact. Lay participants were composed of groups that found breaking confidentiality “always acceptable” (22 participants), “depending on many circumstances” (106), requiring “consultation with an expert” (31), and “never acceptable” (27).ConclusionLay people in France are influenced by situational factors when deciding if a psychiatrist should break confidentiality to protect a patient's wife.     

The right to be forgotten – a Dutch perspective

This paper will be investigate to what extent the right to be forgotten as proposed by the European Commission is already recognized in Dutch tort law. The focus of this paper will be on the existence and the desirability of such a right and not on questions of enforcement. It is submitted that although Dutch law does not recognize the right to be forgotten as such, several judicial decisions can be identified that afford protection to interests that are also protected by the proposed right to be forgotten. This indicates that in the Netherlands a right to be forgotten in some form or another might have developed over time but this would have been a lengthy affair. A more precise formulation of this right by the legislator is therefore welcomed. It has been remarked that the name ‘right to be forgotten’ may give rise to unrealistic expectations but the Dutch experience shows that people do not seem to be very aware of their rights. ‘A right to be forgotten’ – however imprecise from a legal viewpoint – might be catchy enough to remedy this.     

What Happens to Law in a Refugee Camp?

How do people living in a refugee camp engage with legal practices, discourses, and institutions? Critics argue that refugee camps leave people in “legal limbo” depriving them of the “right to have rights” despite the presence of international humanitarian actors and the entitlements enshrined in international law. For that reason, refugee camps have become a highly visible symbol of failed human rights campaigns. In contrast, I found in an ethnography of the Buduburam Refugee Camp in Ghana, West Africa, that although people living as refugees faced chronic insecurity and injustice, they engaged extensively with several different facets of the law. I illuminate three interrelated dimensions of their experiences: (1) their development as international legal subjects; (2) their alienation from domestic legal institutions; and (3) their agency within the legal field. The article contributes to the research agenda on law in humanitarian settings an empirically grounded account of the subjective dimensions of legal alienation and mobilization in a refugee camp. More broadly, it contributes to international human rights debates by theorizing a mixed outcome of international human rights campaigns: the emergence of wards of international law, people deeply embedded in the international legal system, but alienated from local law.     

Why is it a Crime to be Poor?

This article considers the historical development of certain aspects of poor relief in England and Wales and their connection with the treatment of vagrants. It will argue that it is the historical link between early statutes controlling both the movement of labourers and the destitute in the fourteenth century and the later parochial responsibility for the relief of poverty which led both to the inclusion of vagrancy provisions within the 1601 Poor Relief Act, and the continuing quasi-legal connection between vagrancy provisions and the relief of poverty. A nexus of punishment was created within the operation of the poor law by the two-fold role of justices of the peace; these officials not only adjudicated the settlement laws, but were also responsible for the legal control of vagrancy. The article will argue that this contributed to the harshness of the 1834 poor law reforms, and continues with contemporary approaches to the relief of poverty via Social Security legislation which prioritises the control of claimant fraud above the rights of the individual to relief from want. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.