Liberalism and geopolitics in EU–Russia relations: rereading the “Baltic factor”

Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink.     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。     

Globalization,Integration, and the European Welfare State

This paper considers three challenges to the mature European welfare states posed by economic and social integration, demographic changes, and the alleged decline of state capacity in the form of fiscal extraction in an era of globalization. I argue that the experiences of the older member states in the European Union are difficult to reconcile with the common assertions that globalization necessarily leads to a “race to the bottom” where welfare spending is downsized to the lowest common denominator. I develop a set of hypotheses on plausible linkages between demographic challenges, globalization, political capacity, and welfare spending, and test the propositions in an empirical analysis of 14 European Union member states from 1983 to 1998. My empirical results suggest that economic integration does not pose a threat to European welfare states. Rather, demographic changes such as low fertility rates and the aging of the population and their political implications for political leaders’ incentives are more serious challenges for the continuation of the welfare state in Europe.     

NATO,the EEC,Gibraltar, North Africa: Overlapping issues for Spain

Reversing the retreat of the Yeltsin era, Russia has returned to Central Asia proactively. Its presence is increasingly felt in the traditional–that is, security–field and in new fields of engagement, such as strategically-placed investment or construction of regionalism. The cultural and “civilisational” role has also gained more prominence. Moscow's policy reflects pragmatic opportunism, aimed at getting the utmost benefits for Russia from a region in which it holds many assets rather than at a revival of the former empire. There are limits however as to how far its engagement can go due to constraints posed by Central Asian realities and Russian domestic developments. So far, the advance has been greatly facilitated by the West's retreat, giving rise to perceptions of an unfolding “great game”, while in reality a record of both competition and cooperation between Russia, China and the West is a normal state of affairs. Although Central Asian elites find it easier to deal with Moscow in the current political climate, they view its assertive role with caution and may turn to a rival suitor should the price for the relationship with Russia become too high.     

The Baltic predicament in the shadow of Russia’s war in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has once again reinvigorated the debate about the likelihood of conflict spreading into NATO’s frontline states, namely the Baltic republics. This article argues that somewhat paradoxically, the Baltics currently find themselves in both the best of times and the worst of times. On the one hand, with each “turn of the screw”—Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and 2022—Moscow has ensured a greater allied presence across the Baltics. Still, despite this and Russia’s substantial losses incurred in the war, the Baltic lawmakers will not write off Russia as a military threat any time soon.     

The EU,Russia and the Manichean Trap

Conceptualizing the EU as a postmodern cooperative power that “transcends realism” provides ideological scaffolding for an exclusive conception of “Europe” and veils a zero-sum geopolitical project as “European integration”. Neoclassical realism considers assigning morally opposite political identities to the EU and Russia to be “rational” to the extent it strengthens internal cohesion and mobilizes resources to enhance security in accordance with the balance of power logic. Yet, the artificial binary construction can also produce a Manichean Trap when compromises required to enhance security are depicted as a betrayal of indispensable virtues and “Europe”. The ability to harmonize competing security interests diminishes as the conceptual space for comparing the EU and Russia is de-constructed. Competition is framed in uncompromising terms as “European integration” versus Russian “spheres of influence” and democracy versus authoritarianism.     

Urban Irregular Warfare and Violence Against Civilians: Evidence From a Colombian City

Defining terrorism and explaining how it occurs remains a contentious issue. This article attempts to generate new understandings on these topics by applying the work of Ehud Sprinzak's delegitimatization model to the Sea Shepherds. Evidence presented in the article suggests that the Sea Shepherd's present level of political violence passed through gradual phases. In this respect, it is possible to suggest that Sprinzak's model has applicability for maritime organizations, as well as terrestrial based groups. However, we also note that on the one hand, it may be possible to argue that in some respects the Sea Shepherds may constitute either a “blind spot” in the literature on terrorism and political violence, because its actions could in some circumstances be considered activism, militant direct action, piracy, vigilantism, terrorism, or eco-defense, which makes it very difficult to classify. On the other hand, that both the Sea Shepherds and the whalers may both engage in illegal activities, but are not prosecuted, may indicate that states and the international community may have neither the will nor the means to enforce laws against them. Therefore, they may be turning a blind eye to their actions. Throughout the article we maintain that the Sea Shepherds constitute an example of a gray area phenomenon. Despite the ambiguity surrounding their legal status and academic interpretations of their actions, the results of nearly three decades of the organization's activities, including its 2007 campaign to disrupt Japanese Antarctic Whaling, suggest that the Sea Shepherds may be best categorized as a vigilante group, because they claim they are seeking to enforce a legal status quo because of states' and the international community's inabilities or unwillingness to do so.     

Sunset over the swamp – the independence and dependence of Belarus

The Federal Republic of Germany has since the end of the Cold War been at a crossroad in defining its role in European security. On the one hand, its contribution to democratic reform and economic stabilization in North Central Europe has enhanced enormously the prospects of representative government there; on the other, Germany remains wed to an outdated concept of military security and is reluctant to commit either the fiscal resources or the political capital to assume a role commensurate with Germany's importance in the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. Moreover, Bonn's precipitous diplomacy in the recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia betrays a willingness to permit Germany's allies to assume the less profitable burdens of hard security.     

Nicaragua's Sandinista project: Ideology,power building,and social manipulation

This paper examines the ideology of the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) through an evaluation of official declarations, published objectives and analyses, stated objectives, and programs pursued. Since its seizure of power in 1979, the FSLN's efforts to “Leninize” the country have occurred gradually and often have been camouflaged. For example, the FSLN has promoted a ‘'people's church” to capitalize on the strong Nicaraguan religious sentiment while extending countrol over public life and undermining the official church. The paper describes the Sandinistas’ use of “magnet” and “salami” tactics to attract useful collaborators and restrict the influence of rival political organizations. While the FSLN ostensibly has tolerated other parties’ participation in the National Assembly, the Sandinistas in reality have required support for FSLN programs and have increased their own numbers in the assembly and gained control of the top positions in all state institutions, ministries, and the executive and legislative branches of government. Organizational changes have been geared toward centralization and hierarchization. As a result, the Nicaraguan state has been fully subordinated to the FSLN. Although the Sandinistas officially espouse a “mixed” economy with some room for a private agricultural sector as well as token political opposition, the author concludes that they are likely to continue on their course of increasing centralized control of virtually all aspects of public life, Leninizing of political structures, extending and consolidating the party's powers, and creating socialized economic patterns.     

奠基早期美俄关系的《美俄商约》与詹姆斯·布坎南

1832年詹姆斯·布坎南作为美国驻俄公使来到圣彼得堡,并首度主持、签署了与俄国的《商贸与航海条约》。此前十余年美俄两国处于相互戒备状态。此约是美俄关系史上的第一份官方贸易条约,并一直持续到1912年,长期规范着美俄贸易,也引领了美俄早期商务关系,影响了两国的早期外交关系,甚至也影响了此后美国对俄长期的外交政策。詹姆斯·布坎南为此发挥了特殊作用。本文依据历史文献揭示了这段鲜为人知的历史进程及其演进的原因。     

With Friends Like These: Brinkmanship and Chain-Ganging in Russia's Near Abroad

Unrecognized statelets may be forming in the Eastern Donbas region of Ukraine under the aegis of Russian protection—a “frozen conflict.” Georgia's past provides a useful cautionary tale in reference to Ukraine's probable future. The very same conceptual debates that are currently underway in the West with respect to Ukraine—“credibility of great-power security guarantees versus chain-ganging”—have, over the past twenty years, generated policies that facilitated the rise of political coalitions within Georgia that prefer war with Russia to any other outcome.     

The advantages of complementarity: US and European policies towards the middle east peace process

Russia-related problems remain prominent in the European security debate. While a minimalist goal would be to reduce mutual antagonism in the Russia--European security area, a more ambitious mission would be to make Europe part of the eventual solution of Russia's problems, and vice versa. Moscow's draft of a European security treaty was not met with overwhelming enthusiasm. But engaging in a serious re-thinking and re-building of the Euro--Atlantic security architecture seems to be increasingly perceived as a worthy endeavour. What is needed is an entire network of instruments for governance and joint actions, both in “traditional” security areas and in new ones. Some of these tools could appear within the framework of existing multilateral institutions or in conjunction with them, others could emerge from their reform (or, conversely, stimulate it), while certain structures would require a new basis. Within such an agenda, Russia's involvement in the Euro--Atlantic area as a respectable and responsible actor would be an essential factor in promoting security in it.     

Normative Power and the Liberal Peace: A Rejoinder to John O'Brennan

This rejoinder to John O'Brennan reasserts the case that the EU enlargement process has a depoliticising effect, which weakens the connections between Western Balkan states and their societies. It suggests that O'Brennan's response is more apologia than analysis; evading issues raised by asymmetrical relations of power between the EU and Western Balkans states. Here the EU is idealised, with the ascribed status of a “normative actor” projecting power merely through “soft power” mechanisms. The points raised in rejoinder seek to clarify that the more “muscular” use of conditionality and direct management of policy reforms inevitably limit the possibilities for public and political debate and consensus-making. Moreover, they distance political elites from their societies. In particular, the use of political conditionality is highlighted, to demonstrate that whether “hard” powers of imposition or “soft” powers of conditionality are used matters less to those on the receiving end of external imposition than to the EU itself, which has attempted to distance itself from its use of executive powers in the region.     

Boldness or caution? Dilemmas in the European Community's Ostpolitik

In the 1990s the European Community is confronted with a dilemma: further economic, monetary and political integration of the Twelve will only be successful in the context of a stable European continent; economic and political cooperation between Brussels and Central Europe is therefore imperative. The recently signed association agreements are only the first, tentative steps of the EC to foster closer cooperation, whereby the issues of Central European market access and future entry into the Community will remain major irritants. Brussels seems unable to choose between the “widening” and the “deepening” of the Community. This article argues that both options will be extremely difficult to combine. The EC will need lavish financial resources as well as abundant political statesmanship when it will handle further West European integration and the inclusion of Central Europe in the “new European architecture” simultaneously.     

俄罗斯新版国家安全战略评析

2021年7月2日,俄出台新版《俄罗斯联邦国家安全战略》,其中有许多新变化值得关注.俄认为,当前国际形势动荡不安,地缘政治紧张局势日益加剧,武力仍是解决国家间冲突矛盾的重要手段.俄当前国家安全面临的主要威胁是美西方针对其进行的"混合战争",具体包括军事威胁、经济制裁和政治施压.为此,新战略提出的基本战略目标是维护国内、...     

Liberation movements and stalled democratic transitions: reproducing power in Rwanda and South Africa through productive liminality

The lack of convergence towards liberal democracy in some African countries reflects neither a permanent state of political aberration, nor necessarily a prolonged transitional phase through which countries pass once the “right” conditions are met. Examining the cases of two ruling parties, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the African National Congress in South Africa, we develop the concept of productive liminality to explain countries suspended (potentially indefinitely) in a status “betwixt and between” mass violence, authoritarianism, and democracy. On the one hand, their societies are in a liminal status wherein a transition to democracy and socio-economic “revolution” remains forestalled; on the other hand, this liminality is instrumentalized to justify the party’s extraordinary mandate characterized by: (a) an idea of an incomplete project of liberation that the party alone is mandated to fulfil through an authoritarian social contract, and (b) the claim that this unfulfilled revolution is continuously under threat by a coterie of malevolent forces, which the party alone is mandated to identify and appropriately sanction.     

Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements.     

Conservative Internationalism and the Trump Administration?

This article outlines the principles of a new conservative internationalism for the Trump era, and discusses how well the administration's actions and words fit this paradigm. In order for Republicans and conservatives to reclaim their reputation as the party of strong national defense and competent foreign policy, current and future policymakers need to blend some traditional principles of conservative internationalist foreign policy with new adaptations required by challenging international security developments on the one hand, and changes in the domestic political views of right-leaning American voters on the other. A year into the Trump administration, there are some signs that the administration is indeed attempting to adjust slightly rather than replace the traditional principles of conservative Republican foreign policy, and therefore the “America First” grand strategy framework might become much more traditional in its actual policy decisions than in some of its rhetoric.     

The EU and the Gulf monarchies: normative power Europe in search of a strategy for engagement

The Persian Gulf region is of strategic importance to the European Union (EU). Yet, different political realities of authoritarian government in the Gulf challenge crucial parts of EU foreign policy that are based on normative power Europe concepts. Cooperation with the ruling dynasties appears beneficial for EU decision-makers if one looks at the comprehensive agenda of common interests in the Gulf region. In 2004, the EU aimed to build a strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East; in this the EU emphasized its commitment to advancing its partnership with the Gulf countries. Yet, from the perspective of 2012 the results are bleak. Despite some signs of improvement in deepening the political, economic and security interactions with the region, there is still no concerted EU policy in the Gulf beyond the thriving bilateral activities of some EU member states. The events of the Arab Spring have increased the challenges even further. The EU, on the one hand, is trying to support forces of liberal and democratic reform in some neighbouring countries. On the other hand, it seeks close partnerships with authoritarian family dynasties in those Gulf countries in which a democratic opening is not around the corner. This article suggests an alternative explanation for this dichotomy. While there is an inherent tension between the EU's reformist agenda and its own interests, whether security or trade interests, this article argues that much of the EU's relationship with the Gulf countries can be explained through a misperception of the specific settings of government in the region. Despite a substantial agenda of interests on both sides in areas such as trade, energy, regional security, terrorism and irregular migration, the EU's foreign policy outputs remain rather limited.