The crisis of the state in Russia

President Dmitry Medvedev is neither a “liberal” nor a “puppet” of his mentor, Vladimir Putin. He is a capable politician, who appears genuinely to believe in the rule of law. Yet his formative policy experience has been overwhelmingly dirigiste, the approach that is unlikely to change fundamentally under his presidency. Medvedev's personal preferences in foreign policy are largely in line with the policies initiated by Putin, although his rhetoric and style will likely be more conciliatory. He will inherit a plethora of problems created by Russia's assertive policy, both in its near and far abroad. Moreover, the institutional constraints and informal rules within which Medvedev will have to operate make policy continuity more likely than policy reversal.     

Russia's Artificial Intelligence Strategy: The Role of State-Owned Firms

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that whichever country becomes the leader in artificial intelligence (AI) “will become the ruler of the world.” Yet Russia lags competitors like China and the United States substantially in AI capabilities. What is Russia's strategy for boosting development of AI technologies, and what role do groups within the Russian elite play in shaping this strategy? Russia's AI development strategy is unique in that it is led not by the government, nor by the private sector, but by state-owned firms. The government's distrust of Russia's largest tech firm, Yandex, has sidelined the company from national AI planning. Meanwhile, Russia's defense conglomerate Rostec publicly appears to focus less on artificial intelligence than on other high-tech priorities. As a result, Russia's AI development has been left to a state-owned bank, Sberbank, which has taken the lead in devising plans for government-backed investment in AI.     

Beijing's March West: Opportunities and Challenges for China's Eurasian Pivot

China's Eurasian frontiers have emerged as a major factor in Beijing's foreign policy through President Xi Jinping's “One Belt, One Road” strategy. The article argues that this strategy has been given impetus by the shifting geopolitical landscape in Central Asia resulting from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia's relative decline, and Beijing's quest for stability in its restive province of Xinjiang.     

Untimely Russia: Hysteresis in Russian-Western Relations over the Past Millennium

This article draws on Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to explain how a lack of fit between a repertoire of bodily practices accumulated through history, on the one hand, (here, Russian habitus) and the field in which it is employed, on the other, (here, diplomacy) can take shape in world politics. Such “hysteresis” provides a longue durée reading that challenges both the realist idea that similar outcomes are due to invariant structures and the constructivist idea that structures “socialize” states. Social stability stems from agency, more specifically, from habitus. Our empirical examples are breaking points in Russian relations with neighbors: the Rus’ and the Eurasian steppe empires (ca. 800–1500), Muscovy's diplomatic interactions with Europe, and Russia's bid to join European international society and situation during the twentieth century. In each case, Moscow's relentless quest for equal status prompted quixotic practices that were often dismissed by Western countries and hampered the security of both parties.     

The advantages of complementarity: US and European policies towards the middle east peace process

Russia-related problems remain prominent in the European security debate. While a minimalist goal would be to reduce mutual antagonism in the Russia--European security area, a more ambitious mission would be to make Europe part of the eventual solution of Russia's problems, and vice versa. Moscow's draft of a European security treaty was not met with overwhelming enthusiasm. But engaging in a serious re-thinking and re-building of the Euro--Atlantic security architecture seems to be increasingly perceived as a worthy endeavour. What is needed is an entire network of instruments for governance and joint actions, both in “traditional” security areas and in new ones. Some of these tools could appear within the framework of existing multilateral institutions or in conjunction with them, others could emerge from their reform (or, conversely, stimulate it), while certain structures would require a new basis. Within such an agenda, Russia's involvement in the Euro--Atlantic area as a respectable and responsible actor would be an essential factor in promoting security in it.     

Retaliation in Rebellion: The Missing Link to Explaining Insurgent Violence in Dagestan

This article posits that the remnants of archaic sociocultural norms, particularly the honour-imposed custom of retaliation, play a crucial role in the process of insurgent engagement in Russia's autonomous republic of Dagestan. Through a series of interviews with former insurgents, this study outlines two retaliation-centred mechanisms: “individual retaliation” and “spiritual retaliation” in order to explain the microcosm of motives behind insurgent activity in Dagestan. In doing so, this study problematizes the role of Salafi/Jihadist ideology as the main impetus for insurgent violence. Reversing the traditional causal link between violence and religion, this study also demonstrates that the development of Jihadist ideology is a by-product of insurgent mobilization rather than its cause.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

No Return to the Past for Russia

Russian society is awakening and issues of domestic political and economic performance have come under closer scrutiny. To respond to the change, the Kremlin has moved to modify its method of governance – and strengthen its instruments of control – but there can be no return to the past. How the political process will evolve, and what the results will be, is impossible to predict, but the change will impact on Russia's domestic and foreign policies. In the meantime, Russia's international partners will have to deal with a familiar set of policies aimed at balancing between Moscow's real needs, its views of Russia's role and the opportunities which present themselves.     

The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the Legacy of Fear – or Reproducing It?

Abstract

Drawing on the constructivist concept of ‘securitisation’, this article analyses Russia's perceptions of, and responses to, Norway's Svalbard policy in the 1990s and 2000s. The analysis focuses on three policy issues which have figured prominently on Russia's arctic security agenda in recent years: (1) the establishment and use of civilian radars and satellite ground stations on the archipelago, (2) the adoption of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act, and (3) the Norwegian Coast Guard's fishery enforcement measures in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. The article concludes that despite the changes that have taken place in the Euro-Arctic region after the Cold War, Svalbard has not ceased to be a security concern for Russia.     

Russia's Attempts to Undermine Democracy in the West: Effects and Causes

By exploiting pre-existing divisions in Western societies and attempting to sway elections toward candidates palatable to the Kremlin, the Russian Federation has had some success in eroding social cohesion and confidence in the institutions of democracy. But pulling the West down has not improved Russia's position in the world. Russia today is less well-regarded, less prosperous, and less secure than it was before it began its campaign of sowing disorder. Since the Kremlin sees its actions as justified responses to the West's alleged attempts to undermine Russia, this is a price it is willing to pay. Rather than trying to convince Russia to cease its malign activities, Western societies need to look inward. We need to eliminate the societal divisions that Russia exploits rather than try to convince Russia not to exploit them, denying it fertile ground on which to scatter its seeds of disinformation and propaganda. Only then will we solve the “Russia problem.”     

BORROKA—The Legitimation of Street Violence in the Political Discourse of Radical Basque Nationalists

The present article analyzes the discourse employed by the left-wing nationalist movement in Spain's Basque Country to legitimize the use of street violence for political ends. I distinguish four “faces” of legitimation (“ex ante” vs. “ex post,” “for us” vs. “for others”) and argue that in a situation of radicalization of politically inspired (terrorist) violence, the discourse developed to justify violent action is principally meant for the organization's own following, and less to communicate with the outside world. Basque militants claimed that their strategy of political and military radicalization in the 1990s had been responsible for recent political successes of their movement.     

Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697–98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697–98 as the high point of Russia's 18‐month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo‐Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow‐up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo‐Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.     

(En)gendered Security? The Complexities of Women's Inclusion in Peace Processes

As peacebuilding discourses increasingly stress the importance of including women, to what degree have security-related practices taken heed? It has been over 10 years since the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, yet it remains a “confused and confusing” tool for scholars and practitioners in assessing women's inclusion in peacebuilding. This article adds to our understanding on women and peacebuilding by engaging 1325 as an operationalizable concept and then applying it to peace agreements to understand how women's security is addressed as part of formal peace processes. Given previous difficulties in operationalizing 1325’s mandate, this article engages it as a three-level concept useful for studying the ways in which women are “brought into” security, called (en)gendered security. Using this concept of (en)gendered security, I assess intrastate peace agreements between 1991 and 2010 to elucidate where and how women are included in peace processes. This article illustrates the potential of a systematized and practical approach to security embodied in 1325 and a preliminary discussion of what accounts for better approaches to (en)gendered security during peacebuilding.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

The Russia–EU Energy Relationship: Getting it Right

The problems of Russia's energy sector, the part of the economy most broadly linked with Russia's prosperity and revived international influence, have been emphasized by the global financial crisis. Yet it remains an open question whether this, as well as various other factors, including the beginning of a genuine gas market and China's methodical advances in Central Asia, could encourage Russia to take the difficult decisions needed to make the energy sector more responsive and competitive. For its part, the EU has the potential to influence Russia, but if it continues to define itself by its divisions, it will not be able to use the influence it has gained. Without a strategic and coordinated approach, the EU is unlikely to be able to overcome its security dilemma and could find that the future is determined by other actors.     

Intersectionality – A challenge for development research and practice?

“Intersectionality” as a concept is increasingly finding its way into development work. In order to develop an understanding of the concept, this article shows how intersectionality can be used as a conceptual framework to analyse identity-based development claims. The article builds on qualitative research with people living in the countryside in northwest Pakistan to develop an intersectional methodology to engage with development claims. It uses a three-step analytical model to identify subject positions from which different people negotiate “eligibility for development'' and ‘‘responsibility to develop”. The paper shows how frequently used categorisations such as gender and class should be complicated by development practitioners and worked with in a more nuanced way.     

The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad

Russia's recent actions in its neighbourhood have not only upset Western policies but have also reinvigorated arguments that Russia may be promoting autocracy to counteract democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States. They have also underlined a broader problem: that of how illiberal powers may react to democracy promotion, especially when their strategic interests are at stake. This article investigates these issues by studying Russia's interactions with the countries in its neighbourhood and democracy promoters. First, the article argues that even if Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization and ineffectiveness of democracy promotion in its neighbourhood, its actions do not constitute autocracy promotion and largely lack ideological underpinnings. Second, Russia's counteraction to democracy promotion stems from its ambitions of restoring its great power status, maintaining its regional influence, and perceiving Western policies as a threat to its interests. Third, when it considers its strategic interests undermined, Russia employs economic and military threats (sometimes incentives) against its neighbourhood countries to make the compliance with Western policies less preferable.     

The future of the United States as a European power: The case of NATO enlargement

Abstract

European Union enlargement has left Russia on the margins of European political processes and led to widespread suspicion in the Moscow foreign policy establishment of European motives. This has resulted in, first, increasing resistance to the imposition of European norms and, second, a more assertive policy, particularly in the EU's and Russia's ‘overlapping neighbourhoods’. Although Moscow is likely to continue the strategy of engagement initiated under Putin, Brussels must radically rethink the nature and extent of Russia's ‘Europeanisation’. Russia's drive for modernisation will coexist with the strengthening of sovereignty and the power of the state, seen by the Putin administration as key to external and internal security. The EU will have to limit its ambition and work within this ‘window’—wider or narrower depending on state of play—of policy possibilities.     

The discourse of “development” and why the concept should be abandoned

This paper discusses the discourse of “development” and its effects. It argues that there are good reasons for giving up the concept of development and replacing it with various other concepts. Practices that aim at improving the human condition need not be identified with the term “development”. Numerous practices which have not improved the human condition have been carried out in the name of “development”. These should not be seen as an abuse of a positive concept, but as linked to certain Eurocentric, depoliticising, and authoritarian implications of the concept of “development”.

Le discours de « développement » et pourquoi le concept devrait être abandonné

Cet article traite du discours sur le « développement » et de ses effets. L'auteur soutient qu'il y a de bonnes raisons d'abandonner le concept du développement pour le remplacer par plusieurs autres concepts. Les pratiques qui visent à améliorer la condition humaine n'ont pas besoin d’être identifiées par le terme « développement ». De nombreuses pratiques qui n'ont en rien amélioré la condition humaine ont été mises en ?uvre au nom du développement. Elles ne devraient pas être perçues comme un abus d'un concept positif, mais comme étant liées à certaines implications eurocentriques, dépolitisantes et autoritaires du concept de « développement ».

El discurso del “desarrollo” y por qué el concepto debe ser abandonado

Este artículo analiza el discurso sobre el “desarrollo” y sus efectos. En este sentido, sostiene que existen buenas razones para abandonar el concepto de desarrollo y reemplazarlo por otros conceptos. Parte de la noción de que las acciones dirigidas a mejorar la condición humana no necesitan un asidero en el concepto de desarrollo, en tanto toma en cuenta que numerosas acciones realizadas en nombre del “desarrollo” no mejoraron la condición humana. Tales acciones no deben considerarse como abusos de un concepto positivo, sino el resultado de que el concepto de “desarrollo” haya sido viciado por sesgos eurocéntricos, depolitizantes y autoritarios.

O discurso do “desenvolvimento” e por que o conceito deve ser abandonada

Este artigo discute o discurso de “desenvolvimento” e seus efeitos. Ele argumenta que há boas razões para se abandonar o conceito de desenvolvimento e substituí-lo por vários outros conceitos. As práticas que visam melhorar a condição humana não necessitam ser identificadas com o termo “desenvolvimento”. Várias práticas que não têm melhorado a condição humana têm sido implementadas em nome do desenvolvimento. Estas práticas não devem ser vistas como um abuso de um conceito positivo, mas sim como sendo ligadas a certas implicações Eurocêntricas, despolitizantes e autoritárias do conceito de “desenvolvimento”.