The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis

The "new" institutionalisms" in rational choice and historical analysis are being applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy to the study of European Community governance. The basic premise of such institutional approaches is that EC institutions, once created, "take on a life of their own," acting as independent or intervening variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other. The challenge for institutionalist theory consists in constructing a precise analytical tool-box that will allow us to make specific predictions about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, EC institutions may exert such an independent causal influence. EC institutions matter, I suggest, insofar as they: lend stability to an existing institutional structure; shape any subsequent amendment of those institutions; allow individual member governments to be outvoted by qualified majority; cause member states to lose control of events through lock-ins; and subject member governments to the actions of supranational agents whose behavior they can control only imperfectly.     

IMF Conditionality,Government Partisanship,and the Progress of Economic Reforms

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality—linking financial support to borrowing governments' commitment to policy reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects of stricter IMF conditionality depend on domestic partisan politics. More IMF conditions can pressure left‐wing governments into undertaking more ambitious reforms with little resistance from partisan rivals on the right; under right governments, however, more conditions hinder reform implementation by heightening resistance from the left while simultaneously reducing leaders' ability to win their support through concessions or compromise. Using data on post‐communist IMF programs for the period 1994–2010, we find robust evidence supporting these claims, even after addressing the endogeneity of IMF programs via instrumental variables analysis.     

Why do central states accept holding independence referendums? Analyzing the role of state peripheries

Why do central states accept holding independence referendums if they could lose a part of their territory during this process? Several variables have been proposed to explain this contradiction, but the most robust one has proved to be the competition-proximity model formulated by Qvortrup (2014). This paper challenges this theory by stressing the role of state peripheries. According to our approach, central governments are more likely to risk losing poor and isolated territories if they represent a cost for the host state. Drawing on an updated version of the contested sovereignty data set (1776–2019) by Mendez and Germann (2018), this paper demonstrates statistically that the “peripheriness” variables related to the economy and – especially – location are significant. Consequently, the competition-proximity model remains the best-fitted scheme for explaining central governments’ decision-making, but it can be amended slightly by taking into account the peripheral nature of separatist regions.     

CENTRAL AGENCIES AND THE COORDINATION PRINCIPLE*

Abstract: Resource scarcity and social and economic complexity have prompted a growing focus by governments on coordination. New roles for central agencies in Australian State and Federal governments have emerged. An evaluation of these functions is undertaken, starting from the distinction drawn by Leon Peres between "principle" and "interest" as forces in the machinery of government. It is argued that this distinction has deficiencies for the purpose of determining central agency functions, and that the focus should be on procedural values or "rules of the game" that these agencies promote and defend. Added to the procedural values of efficiency, economy and propriety there is now a growing focus on the "coordination principle". That principle, which central agencies should promote, concerns processes of conflict management in the policy process within the context of general purpose rather than sectorally fragmented policy-making. Policy coordination as an objective, associated with central planning and hierarchical control, is rejected in favour of this view of central agency involvement in a multi-organizational governmental setting. The role of cabinet is stressed, with the caveat that cabinet processes do not always entail coordination processes. In conclusion, there is a warning about the growing power of central agencies and concomitant temptations for them to interfere constantly in sectoral or departmental detail, possibly to the detriment of the coordination principle.     

Vetoing and inaugurating policy like others do: evidence on spatial interactions in voter initiatives

A sizeable literature studies strategic interactions between governments. In this paper, we ask whether, in the presence of direct democratic institutions, voters’ actions in vetoing a decision or inaugurating a policy by a binding initiative in their jurisdiction have spillover effects on the actions of voters in neighboring jurisdictions. We collect (and make available) data on 3300 initiatives in German towns from 2002 to 2014 and match these to panel data on the towns’ sociodemographic and fiscal characteristics. We apply an instrumental variables approach and find that a jurisdiction’s probability of hosting an initiative is positively driven by the neighbors’ direct democratic activity. The size of the estimated average effect peaks around a 20 km neighborhood—where a standard deviation change of neighbors’ activity increases the probability of hosting an initiative by 5 percentage points—then gradually declines and fades away after around 60 km. This effect is driven by spillovers in similar policy areas and by successful initiatives, and is stronger in towns with relatively more information flows (measured by newspaper consumption and commuter flows).     

Bureaucrats and Politicians in Britain

The distinctive relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in Britain has been much noted around the world and often used a model by reformers. However, both Conservative and Labour governments have displayed dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy and have made important changes in the "Whitehall model." Some of these changes have reduced the degree to which British politicians have been unusually dependent on a career bureaucracy that is insulated from partisan politics.     

Evaluation lokaler Verwaltungspolitik: Umsetzung und Wirksamkeit des Neuen Steuerungsmodells in den deutschen Kommunen

The article aims at an evaluation of the New Public Management-inspired reform in German local governments which under the heading of the “New Steering Model (NSM)” spread over the municipalities like a “bush fire”. Since the research on Public Sector Reforms has so far largely been concentrated on institutional and instrumental change in Public Administrations there is now as ever only little empirical evidence concerning the actual changes and results of reform initiatives. Against this background, in the following article the attempt will finally be made to focus on results and effects of the local governments’ reform activities which have been achieved after 10 years of NSM-modernization and, thus, to outline perspectives for institutional-ortiented evaluations in the future.     

Neo-conservative regimes and convergence in telecommunications policy

Abstract. Starting from the proposition that neo-conservative governments would wish to increase competition in the telecommunications market and that socialist governments would wish to retain a network monopoly which protects small consumers, this paper explores telecommunications policy in a number of industrialised countries. It argues that there is little convergence between policies adopted by neo-conservative regimes and that socialist governments are as likely to liberalise or privatise the telecommunications monopoly. A number of explanatory variables are explored, including federalism, trade union strength and industrial policy goals. The article concludes that the conjuncture of political and economic interests in any one country is likely to be different from that in any other. These conjunctures determine outcomes in policy terms and no country is likely to follow closely American experience in liberalisation.     

Building Green: Local Political Leadership Addressing Climate Change

Municipal agreements have been instrumental in communicating commitment to addressing climate change at the local level. However, what is the practical implication of this potentially symbolic decision? This study examines the power of mayoral participation in climate change agreements in driving the proliferation of sustainable or “green” building in a city as a mechanism to reach its climate change goals. In addition, mayors can localize what is otherwise a public good by framing green buildings as having other tangible impacts on a community. We analyze the impact of political leadership on green building projects in 591 cities in 50 U.S. states, controlling for a variety of city‐ and state‐level variables. Hierarchical models indicate that mayoral leadership in climate change policy fosters green building, while state‐level predictors are not as important as city policy in creating green buildings. Our research concludes that local governments can be a very effective venue in addressing broad climate change goals.     

Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Readers’ Guide

The use of instrumental variables regression in political science has evolved from an obscure technique to a staple of the political science tool kit. Yet the surge of interest in the instrumental variables method has led to implementation of uneven quality. After providing a brief overview of the method and the assumptions on which it rests, we chart the ways in which these assumptions are invoked in practice in political science. We review more than 100 articles published in the American Journal of Political Science, the American Political Science Review, and World Politics over a 24‐year span. We discuss in detail two noteworthy applications of instrumental variables regression, calling attention to the statistical assumptions that each invokes. The concluding section proposes reporting standards and provides a checklist for readers to consider as they evaluate applications of this method.     

Political interest and the decision to vote: a self-selection problem

ABSTRACT

Political interest is frequently considered as one of the most important driving factors of voter turnout. This article uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to investigate the causal relationship between political interest and the decision to vote. It introduces a recursive simultaneous equation model which is estimated via bivariate probit regression and thus avoids major drawbacks of the method of instrumental variables. The results suggest that the effect of political interest on the decision to vote is not causal, but rather results from self-selection.     

Public housing,health, and health behaviors: Is there a connection?

This paper explores the relationship between public housing, health outcomes, and health behaviors among low-income housing residents. While public housing can be a dangerous and unhealthy environment in which to live, the subsidized rent may free up resources for nutritious food and health care. In addition, public housing may be of higher quality than the available alternatives, it may provide easier access to health clinics willing to serve the poor, and it may link residents to social support networks, which can improve mental health and the ability to access higher-quality grocery stores. To test whether there is a "back-door" health benefit to the public housing program, we analyze data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. We minimize the effects of selection into public housing with controls and instrumental variables estimation and find that the results are somewhat sensitive to the instrumental variable used, and thus, we conclude that we are unable to detect a robust health benefit from public housing for our measures of health. However, we do find some evidence that public housing residency has mixed effects on domestic violence, increases obesity, and worsens mothers' overall health status.     

从GDP锦标赛到二元竞争:中国地方政府行为变迁的逻辑——基于1998—2006年中国省级面板数据的实证研究

在中国经济持续30多年高速发展中,地方政府是发展的主要动力,但从上世纪90年代末以来,地方政府在发展经济中所产生的负面效果越来越明显,中央出台了一系列政策去调整和引导地方政府行为,促使地方政府增加社会保障开支以促进社会公平。采用1998—2006年中国省级面板数据进行定量分析以考察地方政府行为的影响因素和变化。研究显示,地方政府在社会保障的财政开支上主要受当地经济发展状况和中央政府的重视程度影响;地方政府在回应中央政府政策调整的过程中,其行为并不同于"晋升锦标赛"所归纳的以GDP增长为主要目标的一元竞争模式,而是演变为在社会公平和经济发展的双重目标下,地方政府分别参与不同目标竞争的二元竞争模式。在既往对中国地方政府行为考察的政治激励和财政激励基础上提出了影响地方政府行为的激励结构、中央与地方的互动关系和地方所处的社会经济情况的分析框架,通过对地方政府行为变化的分析提出二元竞争模式以弥补"GDP晋升锦标赛模式"对地方政府行为解释力的不足。     

Voter response to congressional campaigns: new?techniques for analyzing aggregate electoral behavior

Scholarship on congressional elections typically analyzes either the sum or the division of the major party vote at the district level. Our main innovation is to model the votes received by each candidate as a separate dependent variable, utilizing statistical methods developed to analyze multiparty elections. Because we are dealing with a substantive area in which endogeneity problems are rampant, we synthesize an instrumental variables approach with a “compositional data” model. This approach allows one to study the mobilizing and persuasive effects of congressional campaigns at the aggregate level.     

Innovation and Implementation in the Public Sector: An Examination of Public Entrepreneurship

This article develops an empirical measure of public entrepreneurship and uses it to discover the correlates that distinguish between those participants in a policy domain who are seen as more or less important in the entrepreneurial process. Looking at two rural regions dealing with telemedicine technologies, the authors examine the role of personal attributes and situational attributes in predicting who will emerge as the most mentioned public entrepreneurs on these issues in their community. Status in the local community, membership in the health professions, and strong local focus and ties are the most instrumental variables in distinguishing between those in a policy domain who are more likely to be identified as entrepreneurial. The authors provide an empirical test that can, for the first time, identify in a comparative context the traits that distinguish more entrepreneurial individuals from less entrepreneurial ones (or nonentrepreneurial ones) participating in the same policy domain.     

Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition

Truth commissions have become so fashionable in times of transitionthat one can readily recognize what might be called a ‘truthcascade.’ The commissions, and the reports they produce,are reputed to promote many of the goals at the heart of thetransitional justice project: helping victims to heal, promotingaccountability, drawing a bright line between the past and thepresent, promoting reconciliation and so forth. And yet, a closerlook at the truth-seeking enterprise suggests that it may notbe able to deliver on these promises. This article exploresboth the intrinsic and instrumental reasons why truth commissionsmay not be effective in promoting the goals attributed to them.The article does not argue that transitional governments shouldnot pursue the truth, but it does urge governments to use cautionand careful planning when they do so.     

Do Policy Horizons Structure the Formation of Parliamentary Governments?: The Evidence from an Expert Survey

This article tests the hypothesis that parties in West European parliamentary systems operate under the constraint of "policy horizons," that is, limits or bounds on the extent to which they can compromise on policy for the purpose of entering coalition governments. The test is based on a new expert survey covering thirteen West European parliamentary democracies in which respondents were asked not only to locate party positions on a number of policy dimensions, but also to estimate the parties' limits of acceptable compromise on each dimension. The survey data are first analyzed using a new computer program, Horizons 3D, to determine which parties have intersecting horizons in these systems—and hence the ability to form coalition governments under the hypothesis. These calculations are then employed to assess whether policy horizons structure the choice of governing coalition beyond any effect conveyed by the policy distances among parties. Although the potential for error in these data is considerable, the estimated horizons, with few exceptions, appear to play the role hypothesized for them .     

The Politics of Administrative Reform in East and Southeast Asia: From Gridlock to Continuous Self‐Improvement?

This article compares patterns and outcomes of administrative reform in four countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. It focuses on the supply side, that is, on reform implementation. It is assumed that bureaucrats, upon whom implementation depends, have an interest in controlling the process. A distinction is made between two types of bureaucratic systems—autonomous and instrumental—according to structural features that increase the potential to block reforms. Four possible patterns of administrative reform are distinguished according to whether demand is high or low, and whether the bureaucracy can be classed as autonomous or instrumental. More broadly, it is argued that supply will be lower in autonomous bureaucratic systems. A comparative case study method is applied to test this model, and the proposition is not disconfirmed. Malaysia and Singapore, both classed as instrumental bureaucracies, demonstrate a predictable style of "continuous administrative self-improvement." The status of the bureaucracy in Thailand and Taiwan is in transition, and the model is used to analyze changes in reform patterns over time and to suggest future trajectories.     

Are Leftist Governments More Generous Toward Public Sector Employees? Evidence From Canada, 1967–1984

This article tests the hypothesis that leftist governments concede higher wage increases to their public sector employees than right-wing governments. Leftist governments are expected to be more generous toward public sector employees because of their commitment to public sector intervention, and because of the heavy representation of the public sector among leftist party elite and clientele. The study examines all major wage settlements signed between 1967 and 1984 in the Canadian provincial public sector and finds that, everything else being equal, wage increases are 10% higher under leftist governments. The standard economic variables (labor demand, expected inflation and spillover from previous contracts) that have been shown to affect wage increases in the private sector also emerge as significant. Finally, the data indicate that the greater the public debt the more constrained governments feel to negotiate minimal wage increases. These findings establish that a proper understanding of public sector labor relations requires a consideration of political as well as economic variables.