The Effects of Limiting Punitive Damage Awards

In response to concerns that jury awards in tort cases are excessive and unpredictable, nearly every state legislature has enacted some version of tort reform that is intended to curb extravagant damage awards. One of the most important and controversial reforms involves capping (or limiting) the maximum punitive damage award. We conducted a jury analogue study to assess the impact of this reform. In particular, we examined the possibility that capping punitive awards would cause jurors to inflate their compensatory awards to satisfy their desires to punish the defendant, particularly in situations where the defendant's conduct was highly reprehensible. Relative to a condition in which punitive damages were unlimited, caps on punitive damages did not result in inflation of compensatory awards. However, jurors who had no option to award punitive damages assessed compensatory damages at a significantly higher level than did jurors who had the opportunity to do so. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.     

Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary?

Critics of the civil jury have proposed several procedural reforms to address the concern that damage awards are capricious and unpredictable. One such reform is the bifurcation or separation of various phases of a trial that involves multiple claims for damages. The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of bifurcating the compensatory and punitive damages phases of a civil tort trial. We manipulated the wealth of the defendant and the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct (both sets of evidence theoretically related to punitive but not to compensatory damages) across three cases in a jury analog study. We wondered whether jurors would misuse the punitive damages evidence in fixing compensatory damages and whether bifurcation would effectively undo this practice. Our findings indicated that mock jurors did not improperly consider punitive damages evidence in their decisions about compensation. Moreover, bifurcation had the unexpected effect of augmenting punitive damage awards. These findings raise questions about the merits of bifurcation in cases that involve multiple claims for damages.     

Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages

Responding to the perception that civil damage awards are out of control, courts and legislatures have pursued tort reform efforts largely aimed at reigning in damage awards by juries. One proposed method for reigning in civil juries is to limit, or cap, the amount that can be awarded for punitive damages. Despite significant controversy over damage awards and the civil litigation system, there has been little research focusing on the process by which juries determine damages. In particular, there is a paucity of research on the possible effects of placing caps on punitive damages. The present research examines punitive damage caps and reveals an anchoring effect of the caps on both compensatory and punitive damages. A second experiment replicates this effect and examines the moderating effect of bifurcating the compensatory and punitive damage decisions.     

Separating Compensatory and Punitive Damage Award Decisions by Trial Bifurcation

In a simulated products liability trial, we tested the effects of bifurcating decisions regarding compensatory and punitive damage awards. Fifty-nine groups of 5-7 jurors heard evidence in a unitary or bifurcated format, deliberated about the case to a unanimous decision, and awarded damages. Trial bifurcation decreased variability in compensatory damage awards across juries hearing the same case, and also decreased the tendency for juries to award extremely high compensatory damages. In addition, deliberation led to lower compensatory awards in the low injury severity condition and higher awards in the high injury severity condition. Jurors reported that they were using evidence more appropriately when the decisions were bifurcated. Implications of evidence bifurcation in civil trials are discussed.     

Punitive Damage Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges

Some states have allocated the authority to determine the amount of punitive damages to judges rather than to juries. This study explored the determination of damages by jury-eligible citizens and trial court judges. The punitive damage awards of both groups were of similar magnitude and variability. The compensatory damages of jurors were marginally lower but, in some conditions, were more variable than the compensatory damage awards of judges. Both groups appropriately utilized information about both the actual and potential severity of the harm to the plaintiff in determining punitive damages and used only the actual severity of the injury in determining compensatory damages. The punitive damage awards of both groups were influenced by the wealth of the defendant, but the compensatory damage awards of judges were marginally more influenced by defendant wealth than those of citizens. The results are discussed in the context of proposals for punitive damages reform.     

Double Discounting: The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making

Two experiments were conducted to ascertain the effects of comparative negligence on damage awards. Participants awarded damages for a mock medical malpractice case in which the level of the plaintiff's negligence was varied. Both experiments showed that damage awards were doubly discounted for partially negligent plaintiffs. Experiment 1 also found that the responses of college students did not differ from those of people who had been called for jury duty. Experiment 2 examined four components of the damage award and showed that the reduction due to the level of the plaintiff's negligence occurred only in damages for bodily harm. Implications for the judicial system are discussed.     

Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Recent tort reform debates have been hindered by a lack of knowledge of how jurors assess damages. Two studies investigated whether jurors are able to appropriately compartmentalize compensatory and punitive damages. In Study 1, mock jurors read a trial summary and were asked to assess compensatory and punitive damages in one of three conditions: (a) compensatory damages only, (b) punitive damages for the plaintiff, or (c) punitive damages for the state treasury. Results suggest that jurors who did not have the option to award punitive damages inflated compensatory damages via pain and suffering awards. Jurors were marginally more likely to award punitive damages when the plaintiff was the recipient. Mock jurors in Study 2 read a similar case summary and were asked to assess compensatory and punitive damages. Two factors were varied in Study 2: (a) egregiousness of the defendant's conduct, and (b) the recipient of any punitive damages (the plaintiff vs. a consortium of state funds). Jurors were more likely to award punitive damages when the defendant's conduct was more egregious and when the plaintiff was the recipient. The results suggest leakage between compensatory and punitive damage judgments, contrary to the law's mandate.     

An experimental investigation of procedural issues in complex tort trials

An investigation of the impact of innovations in civil trial procedure manipulated trial structure (unitary vs. separated trial issues), order of decisions (liability or causation first), and number of decisions made (one to four) in a simulated toxic tort trial. Juries gave verdicts and damage awards. Recordings were made of the juries' deliberations. The results showed significantly more verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs in unitary trials (causation, liability, and damages heard together) as opposed to separated trials. However, average damage awards were higher in the separated than in the unitary trial conditions. Juries assigned more responsibility to the defendant in the unitary trial. Juries also used the totality of the evidence to decide all issues, especially general causation, which contained the most ambiguous testimony. The performance of these simulated juries in complex litigation was discussed in terms of group and individual cognitive factors.     

A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages

A study was conducted to investigate civil juries' decisions concerning defendants' liability for punitive damages in tort cases. A total of 121 six-member mock juries composed of jury-service-eligible citizens were presented summaries of previously decided cases and given a comprehensive instruction on the defendant's liability for punitive damages. Most of the mock juries decided that the consideration of punitive damages was warranted, although appellate and trial judges had concluded that they were not warranted. The tendency to find the defendant liable was partly due to jurors' failure systematically to consider the full set of legally necessary conditions for the verdicts they rendered. Individual differences in the jurors' backgrounds were not strongly related to their verdicts; income and ethnicity were weakly related to judgments. The social processes in deliberation on civil juries were similar to the dynamics of deliberation that have been observed in criminal juries.     

What are Tort Awards Really Like? The Untold Story from the State Courts*

The popular press frequently reports exorbitant money damage awards by juries. These stories cause paroxysms in the business community because juries are viewed as favoring plaintiffs over corporations. A growing body of literature has examined aspects of this complex issue, but within a limited framework. Prior studies, which are based on data from the early 1980s or before, tend to focus on federal court cases, primarily product liability and medical malpractice torts, only jury verdicts, and single jurisdictions when state courts are included. The objective of this article is to contribute to the literature by examining all tort cases reaching either a bench or a jury trial verdict during a sample period in 1989 in twenty-seven general jurisdiction trial courts. Research is organized around three basic questions. What do torts look like? Do particular types of plaintiffs/defendants gain a higher percent of favorable verdicts? When plaintiffs are awarded money damages, what is the importance of litigant status, while controlling for other factors, in influencing the size of the awards? The article begins by describing the landscape of torts - the typical configurations of the contending litigants, the composition of torts by area of law, the types of trials, verdict patterns, and the average size of awards. Basic contours of the landscape reflect the elemental facts that individuals generally are plaintiffs in these cases and the opposite tendency of corporations, insurance companies, and governments to appear as defendants. Next a model is outlined and tested to determine how strongly different possible determinants shape the size of tort awards in the twenty-seven state trial courts. Does the size of the award depend on the configuration of the parties after taking into account the type of tort, the type of trial, the length of disposition time, and the state in which the court is located? The results indicate that the group of variables representing the various pairing of litigants accounts for most of the explained variation in award size. These findings support the notion that the status of the litigants is an important factor in influencing awards. Because the variables representing some of the individual states are also significant, the evidence also suggests no single, uniform pattern applies across all the courts. Instead, the state context shapes the basic parameters of plaintiff and defendant success.     

More than the sum of its parts? Itemizing impairment in civil cases

Purpose. The purpose of the present study is to determine whether making multiple damage awards influenced civil mock jurors' assessments of those damage awards. Specifically, how does making one decision for pain and suffering damage awards versus two decisions (one for mental pain and suffering and physical pain and suffering) versus four decisions (one for loss of enjoyment of life, mental anguish, disfigurement, and physical disability/impairment) influence overall non‐economic damage awards. Methods. One hundred twenty undergraduates from a psychology participant pool read a case vignette that included information regarding four types of injuries that the plaintiff endured: loss of enjoyment of life, mental anguish, disfigurement, and physical disability/impairment. Participants were randomly assigned to render either one award for pain and suffering, two awards (one for physical pain and suffering and one for mental pain and suffering), or four awards (one for each pain and suffering element). Results. Results indicated that participants who rendered four awards provided significantly higher overall non‐economic damage awards than participants who provided one overall award. The variability of damage awards also increased as the number of damage awards increased. Conclusions. Itemizing non‐economic damage awards into distinct injury categories can lead to an increase in overall non‐economic awards. Members of the legal arena should be cautioned against itemizing damages to prevent variability in non‐economic awards.     

从比较法的角度看我国惩罚性赔偿制度的必要性

惩罚性赔偿金是英美法上的一项重要制度,具有损害填补、惩罚被告的作用,而德、法等大陆法系国家奉行单纯的补偿性民事责任制度,排斥对于惩罚性赔偿金合法性的认同。我国最早在《消费者权益保护》第49条对其加以规定,取得较好的社会效果,然而2009年颁布的《侵权责任法》并未将惩罚性赔偿原则写入总则,而是局限于产品责任之中。因此,完善惩罚性赔偿金制度有其必要性,通过对惩罚性赔偿制度的介绍以及英美法规定的研习,对我国惩罚性赔偿制度提出建议。     

论惩罚性赔偿的证明标准

不遵守填平原则的惩罚性赔偿与民事程序存在着一定的冲突。从最佳威慑与彻底威慑的角度看,惩罚性赔偿实质上处于民事责任与刑罚之间,甚至有时与罚金刑无异,故需要提高对被告人的程序保护,其证明标准应当具有中间性,适用明确而令人信服的证明标准。从诉求正确的可能性、举证成本、风险收益的角度看,反映行为人主观过错程度的侵权行为的异常性的证明负担应当分配给原告。     

Plaintiff injury and defendant reprehensibility: Implications for compensatory and punitive damage awards

A criticism of the civil jury is that jurors' decisions about damages are capricious and arbitrary. In particular, critics point to the skyrocketing nature of punitive damage assessments as evidence of a system run amok. The purpose of this study was to examine the factors that influence jurors' decisions about compensatory and punitive awards. We assess whether, as the law intends, jurors' decisions about compensation are influenced by the severity of the plaintiff's injury but not by the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, and whether assessments of punitive damages are related to the defendant's conduct but not to the plaintiff's injury. Across three cases, mock jurors generally utilized relevant information and ignored irrelevant factors in their decisions about damages. Results are discussed in terms of the extent to which juror decision making comports with legal doctrine.     

民事调解书的检察监督

对民事调解书进行检察监督是2012年民事诉讼法的新规定,也是我国检察机关的新任务。对调解书的监督与对判决、裁定的监督存在多方面的差异,只有充分认知和把握两者的区别,对民事调解书的检察监督才能顺利进行。民事诉讼法第208条中的"调解书",解释上应包括调解笔录、司法确认裁定书,但不包括仲裁调解书。对调解书的监督,应当采用依职权监督的方式。授权检察机关对损害国家利益、社会公共利益的调解书进行监督的规定属于法律中的一般性条款,检察机关正确实施监督的关键在于恰当界定调解书是否损害这两种利益。对国家利益、社会公共利益应当采用目的性扩张的解释方法,调解书违反法律的禁止性规定、严重违背社会公德、损害集体经济组织利益、损害社会弱势群体利益的,也应当视为损害国家利益、社会公共利益。损害案外人利益的虚假诉讼的调解书,也应成为监督的对象。适用民事诉讼法第208条时,还应注意国家利益与社会公共利益在一些情况下难以精确地界定和区分。     

PUNITIVE DAMAGES,CHINESE TORT LAW,AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

In a country such as China, with abundant consumer products and the inevitability of product defects, claims for punitive damages are sure to arise under Article 47 of the new Chinese Tort Law. Article 47 provides that “(w)hereany producer or seller knowingly produces or sells defective products, causing death or serious damage to the health of others, the injured party may request appropriate punitive damages.” As Chinese jurists and scholars interpret Article 47, they may wish to consider whether lessons can be drawn from the American experience. During the past two decades, few areas of American law have changed more radically than the law on punitive damages. While there were once few restraints on the ability of a judge or jury to impose punitive damages in a case involving egregious conduct, today there are a host of limitations embodied in American state and federal law. In many American states, statutes or judicial decisions restrict the ability of a court to award punitive damages by narrowly defining the types of conduct that will justify a punitive award, raising the standard of proof, capping the amount of punitive damages, requiring a portion of a punitive award to be forfeited to the state, or limiting vicarious liability for punitive damages. In addition, under federal constitutional law, the principle of due process limits the imposition of punitive damages by scrutinizing the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages and prohibiting an award to be based on harm to persons other than the plaintiff. An examination of these developments from a comparative law perspective may prove useful to the implementation of Article 47.     

Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation under Strict Liability

This article examines a model of strict liability with costlylitigation and presents conditions under which (1) potentialinjurers take optimal precautions, (2) increasing the cost oflitigation enhances precaution and social welfare, (3) the optimallevel of liability exceeds the compensatory level, and (4) increasingthe rate of settlement enhances social welfare. The resultshave implications for controversies surrounding fee shifting,optimal damage awards (e.g., punitive damages), and the socialdesirability of settlement. The most striking implication isthat fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs is sociallydesirable in low-transaction-cost settings.     

The effects of outlier presence,plaintiff population size,and aggregation of plaintiffs on simulated civil jury decisions

An experiment was performed to determine the effects of the size of the plaintiff population, the presence or absence of an outlier, defined as a plaintiff whose injuries were significantly more severe than other plaintiffs, and whether plaintiffs were tried individually or were aggregated in a group. Sixty-six person juries were assigned to one of eleven experimental conditions, listened to a 4-h toxic tort tria, and after deliberating, delivered verdicts on liability, and damage awards. The verdicts were increased significantly by the presence of an outlier and by an increase in the plaintiff population. While the punitive awards were higher in the outlier condition, there was also a tendency for juries to find the company not liable.The meaning of the above findings, as well as the fact that juries exhibited great variability in their verdicts was discussed. Evidence as to the decision-making process of the juries was also gathered and discussed.This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES 860 9892 and by a University of Toledo College of Arts and Sciences Faculty Development Grant. Special thanks to members of the Toledo Repertoire Theatre and University of Toledo Theatre Department for their assistance in preparing the materials for this study.