Seeking ontological security through the rise of China: New Zealand as a small trading nation

Maintaining global peace as China rises is a key strategic goal of Western liberal democracies. Compared to other western liberal democracies, New Zealand's response to the ‘rise of China’ is notable for its absence of security and political frictions and for the achievement of a series of diplomatic ‘firsts’. Can this be explained only by material concern over the national economic interest as China's role in the global economy increases or do ideational factors also underlay how New Zealand engages China? This paper employs the ontological security framework to demonstrate how New Zealand identity as a ‘small trading nation’ and ‘good international citizen’ has shaped its turn to Asia and response to the ‘rise of China'. It first analyses the origins of New Zealand's outward facing identity and resultant foreign policy positions long before China became an important aspect of New Zealand trade policy. It then shows how New Zealand seeks ontological security as a ‘small trading nation’ and ‘good international citizen’ in its relations with China and how China has responded to this type of engagement. The paper illustrates the importance of ideational factors in Western liberal democracies’ responses to the ‘rise of China’.     

China and Europe: engagement,multipolarity and strategy

Abstract

Ever closer relations between China and Europe over the last decade have sparked speculation about an emerging axis or balance of power vis-à-vis the United States. China, the European Union and its key member states have expressed a preference for a more balanced international order based on multilateral institutions. Despite a rapid and extensive expansion in economic and political relations between China and the European Union, there is no evidence for balancing against the United States in strategic areas. Rather, the variations in the positions of China, the European Union and the United States can more accurately be seen as policy or interest bargaining. Because the European Union does not share US security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the European Union and its key member states can seem at variance with the US position on China. Bargaining over the failed attempt to lift the European Union's arms embargo against China shows that the European Union and the United States are not so far apart on strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific.     

Small state or minor power? New Zealand’s Five Eyes membership,intelligence reforms,and Wellington’s response to China’s growing Pacific role

ABSTRACT

This article uses the lens of small state theory to assess New Zealand’s role in the Five Eyes Alliance and Wellington’s implementation of intelligence reforms in the last seven years that are intended to help the country deal with a transformed security environment. In this context, New Zealand decision-makers have become increasingly concerned about growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific region and in New Zealand itself. It is clear that the New Zealand’s response to these developments resembles that of a minor power rather than a classical small state.     

Chinese dilemmas in thinking about regional security architecture

From about the middle of the 1990s China's leaders began to articulate a new concept of security that they called ‘cooperative security’, which was seen as more appropriate to the post-Cold War era than the more traditional military alliance systems. It sought to promote mutual trust and consultation as a means of addressing security problems between states that were neither adversaries nor friends. The new approach was better suited to a China that felt more comfortable about itself and its growing integration into international society. It involved a more proactive approach that was ready to take initiatives for the first time in multilateral settings. It also reflected current Chinese interests by seeking to reassure neighbours that they had little to fear and much to gain by the rising China in their midst and by implicitly dissuading them from participating in any significant attempt to contain China. But the new approach is not without its problems. It will need to show a greater readiness to pay attention to the concerns of others, it will require greater transparency in the conduct of foreign policy and it will need to find a way of accommodating the American approach. But in itself most of the countries of the Asia-Pacific will find this a welcome development even though it does not as yet provide a satisfactory basis for erecting a new security architecture to supplant that established under the aegis of the United States.     

US–China dialogue and the tenuous bilateral relationship

Despite recent diplomatic efforts by Washington and Beijing to keep the bilateral relationship on an even keel, China has continued to behave assertively in the Asia-Pacific and Chinese President Xi Jinping has effectively promulgated his own vision for a regional and global order. In the absence of a robust or coherent US policy for the region, China appears to have gained the upper hand in terms of the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.     

The energy factor in China’s foreign policy

This paper argues that China’s foreign policy behavior has been influenced by growing energy dependence. As a major importer, China can pursue energy security through strategies that result in conflict; alternatively, energy vulnerability might lead it toward cooperation with rival oil consuming nations through participation in multilateral organizations and other forums. After outlining the argument for the strategic nature of energy, China’s increasing energy dependence is assessed, as are Beijing’s efforts to shift China’s energy balance. China’s energy diplomacy with the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America are examined, and Beijing’s efforts toward greater energy security through multilateral organizations are discussed. The evidence supports the liberal hypothesis that economic interdependence promotes international cooperation. Energy demands have accelerated China’s rise to global prominence, and appear to moderate conflictual aspects of Chinese foreign policy. He is co-editor of and contributor toRussia’s Far East: A Region at Risk (University of Washington Press, 2002), and author ofThe History of Russia (Greenwood, 1999),Foreign Policy and East Asia (Cambridge University Press, 1993), andEnvironmental Policy in the USSR (University of Massachusetts Press, 1987). His articles have appeared inProblems of Post-Communism, Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs, Comparative Politics, Political Science Quarterly, British Journal of Political Science, and many other journals and edited books. The author would like to thank Igor Danchenko for his able research assistance on this project.     

A Brief Survey of Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy

Democracy promotion has been a centerpiece of US foreign policy for over half a century. This article explores the evolution of democracy promotion in US foreign relations from 1821 to 2014. While the quantity and quality of US democracy promotion policy evolved in a nonlinear fashion, US presidents varied the ways and means of democracy promotion as a way to achieve national security objectives. There is signification variation among US presidents on the specific linkages between democracy and security, resulting in divergent policy applications and technical approaches.     

US rebalance: potential and limits in Southeast Asia

A central theme of US policy towards Asia during 2012 has been the strengthening of America's military deployments, political relationships and economic partnerships in Southeast Asia. It is evident that China's growing power and assertiveness have provided an important stimulus for renewed US policy activism in a sub-region towards which some observers had detected neglect by Washington over the previous decade. But while Southeast Asian states may take advantage of renewed American interest to hedge against China's rise, most of them will keep their strategic options open.     

India going nuclear: A bomb against China?

As China and India were gradually repairing their relations since the late 1980s, India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 caused a major setback for the improvement of the bilateral relationship. By discussing the question whether New Delhi is developing the bomb against China or not, this article attempts to shed some light on the strategic fallouts of the Indian nuclear tests for Sino-Indian relations and South Asian security. It is argued that despite measurable improvements in Sino-Indian relations in recent years, the two nations still view each other as geo-strategic rivals. The major motivation for New Delhi’s bomb decision was that it had felt increasingly uncomfortable with the power asymmetry between India and China and it wanted to sit as equal as China at the table of world powers by declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. His teaching and research interests include East Asian international relations, Chinese foreign policy and national security.     

Neoconservatism,US–China conflict,and Australia's ‘great and powerful friends’ dilemma

Abstract

Following its time-honoured ‘great and powerful friends’ foreign policy tradition, Australia has been cultivating close ties simultaneously with the United States and China. Yet, as a rivalry between the two powers apparently looms large, Australia faces an acute dilemma. While the rise of China and the question of Taiwan are often cited as main causes of US–China discord, this article argues that the American neoconservative policy on China, underpinned by a belief in both military strength and moral clarity, is integral to this growing competition and is, by extension, partly responsible for the emergence of Australia's predicament. To avoid such a difficult choice, the article suggests that Australia should strive to curb the policy influence of neoconservatism both in the United States and at home by pursuing a more independent foreign policy, making clear its strategic postures on US–China relations, and helping establish a trilateral strategic forum between Australia, the United States, and China.     

Indonesian perceptions of the rise of China: dare you,dare you not

The fall of Suharto's regime brought substantial changes in relations between Indonesia and China, and unleashed diverse perceptions of China. Reasons for these changes include the changing nature of Indonesian politics, Indonesia's position in between the US and China, and the direct results of China's policy and behaviour. In turn, sectors of Indonesian society, Indonesian business communities and the government have reacted differently and at different times to China and its growing influence. This article explores the inherent variability of Indonesia's relationship with China over the last fifteen years, which has emanated from different perceptions of Indonesian stakeholders toward China's rise.     

Shinzo Abe's security legislation reform and peacebuilding in Mindanao

Recent literature on Japanese foreign policy has focused on analysing the implications of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's security legislation reform for the bilateral security alliance relationship with the US amidst a rising China and the right to collective self-defence. Its impact on Japan's multilateral security policy, in particular, peacebuilding, has so far received little attention. In what ways and to what extent does Japan play a peacebuilding role under this change? This article examines key implications of the security legislation reform, along with the renewal of Japan's Official Development Assistance charter, for its peacebuilding efforts. By taking Mindanao, the Philippines, as a case study, it argues that Abe focuses on taking a foreign aid-centred approach while showing little interest in sending Japanese Self-Defence Force. This article provides a counter-narrative to the claim that Japan is taking a more assertive approach to international security. Abe is more risk-averse as far as his approach to peacebuilding is concerned.     

Trading with the enemy? The futility of US commercial countermeasures against the Chinese challenge

This paper examines whether the US is in a position to adopt restrictive commercial measures against China in order to complement military balancing. It focuses on the necessary condition for serious economic measures against an adversary: the state needs to be sure that it can effectively diminish the adversary's economic performance more than its own. This essay suggests that Washington cannot ascertain that this necessary condition is met in its relations with China. Thus, it might be better for the US to avoid restricting trade with China in any meaningful way, even though bilateral security rivalry intensifies.     

The Foreign Relations of European Regions: Competences and Strategies

The article traces the foreign relations of 81 European regions by looking first at the constitutional competences which these regions enjoy within their nation-states. We discover that the regions in federal states have expanded their competences in two directions: conducting autonomous foreign activities and influencing national foreign policy. How far the Belgian regions, as well as the German and the Austrian Länder go in both directions depends very much on the scope of their competences in domestic politics. In non-federal states (France, GB, Italy), regionalisation brought rather more leeway to conduct a certain level of autonomous foreign activity than regional influence in national foreign policy. When we – in a second step – trace the strategies or directions of international activities which the regions pursue it becomes obvious that setting up an office in Brussels in order to adapt to political integration is very common among West European regions. In contrast, much more variety can be observed when examining the regions' strategies to adapt to fundamental economic and cultural transformations. Some European regions invest heavily in economic promotion offices and in transnational partnerships while others lack the motivation or ability to invest in these forms of foreign relations.     

Environmental protection and US–Asia relations: a policy of disconnect

Despite the post-September 11 focus on regional security and the continued emphasis on regional economic cooperation, environmental degradation should not be overlooked as an important issue for US policy in and relationship with the Asia-Pacific. It is an important issue in its own right, presenting the countries of the region with ecological, economic and social (human security) challenges. There are both ethical and instrumental impulses for the United States, as a rich indus­trialised country and as a disproportionate consumer of resources and polluter of global waste, to provide environmental assistance to the Asia-Pacific. Despite global demands that the ‘new’ new world (environmental) order should be based on solidarity and collective responsibility, neither US environmental policy towards the region nor the regional consequences of its international environmental policy more generally meet this test. The US is fundamentally self-regarding rather than other-regarding in the various dimensions of its environmental relationship with the region. The consequences for both the region and for the US may be substantial. Continued environmental degradation in the region has the potential to undermine other US policy goals, in terms of its reputation, it economic objectives and even its more orthodox geopolitical security objectives.     

The Problems of Policy Coordination: The New Zealand Experience

The problems of coordinating the development and implementation of public policy are legion. While such problems are most commonly associated with large federal systems, they can arise with equal force and complexity in small, highly centralized, unitary states such as New Zealand. This article has four main purposes. First, it briefly surveys some of the recent literature on the nature of coordination and the mechanisms for enhancing policy coordination in government. Second, it outlines the nature and causes of the coordination difficulties that have been encountered in recent years in New Zealand. Third, it explores the various attempts which the Labour government (1984–90) and the National government (1990–present) have made to overcome these difficulties. Finally, the article considers some of the lessons which emerge from New Zealand's recent experience.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it.     

Weapon of Mass Distraction: New Zealand’s National Security System

The New Zealand’s National Security System (NSS) document is presented as the central framework for New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security and crisis management. This article asserts that the NSS fails to be the central framework it purports to be and proposes the true objective of the NSS is to establish clear lines of authority within New Zealand’s national security architecture. The New Zealand government’s exercise of political authority within the security sector aligns with Weber’s theory of “charisma of office” for public acceptance. Using the legitimacy of charisma of office, the New Zealand prime minister can exert significant influence over New Zealand’s national security discourse and blur the lines of it liberal democratic institutions.     

Generational change: regional security and Australian engagement with Asia

The rhetoric of US foreign policy since the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001, would suggest that there has been a fundamental shift in US foreign relations. This is often summarised as a shift from multilateralism to unilateralism and, in the context of the war on terrorism, concomitantly a shift from geo-economic to geopolitical priorities. The rhetoric of the fight against the ‘axis of evil’, however, may simply cloud underlying continuities in US relations with Asia. Nevertheless the process of coalition-building by the Bush administration in the ‘War on Terrorism’ has impacted on the distance Asian countries have been able to maintain in relation to the United States. The case studies presented in this special issue raise a number of important issues concerning perceptions and the practice of US hegemony and the complex links between leadership and ‘followership’ at the inter-state level. They also draw out the impacts engendered by US–Asia relations on the wider phenomenon of regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific region.     

The uneven playing field of school choice: Evidence from new zealand

New Zealand's 10‐year experience with self‐governing schools operating in a competitive environment provides new insights into school choice initiatives now being hotly debated in the United States with limited evidence. This article examines how New Zealand's system of parental choice of schools played out in that country's three major urban areas with particular emphasis on the sorting of students by ethnic and socioeconomic status. The analysis documents that schools with large initial proportions of minorities (Maori and Pacific Island students in the New Zealand context) were at a clear disadvantage in the educational market place relative to other schools and that the effect was to generate a system in which gaps between the “successful” and the “unsuccessful” schools became wider. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.