Testing the China Threat paradigm: China's high-speed railway diplomacy in Southeast Asia

Vying for high-speed railway projects overseas has become a prominent feature of China's diplomacy in recent years, including in Southeast Asia. These efforts have been widely depicted within the premises of the China Threat narrative – as a part of Beijing's agenda to alter the power balance in Southeast Asia at the expense of the economic, political, and security well-being of countries in the region. This paper challenges such interpretations and concludes that these projects do not have either the intention or capacity to facilitate such a hostile and far-reaching agenda toward the region.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

The rise of China as a constructed narrative: Southeast Asia's response to Asia's power shift

This article examines the rise of China from the perspective of three selected countries – the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia – in Southeast Asia. I argue that their perceptions of China's rise are political constructs: while the objective reality may be an increasingly powerful China, their responses have been far from uniform. They vary in ways that are shaped by their domestic politics. These constructed narratives serve their respective political agenda, from leadership legitimacy to the supremacy of a party faction. Since theories of international relations tend to fixate on power politics between great powers, this article explains how and why small regional powers add to the process of understanding China's rise. In short, regional states’ domestic politics affect their narratives of China, and therefore affect how China's rise is being understood in the region and beyond.     

China–ASEAN economic relations after establishment of free trade area*

This paper aims to contribute to an understanding about the major changes in China–ASEAN economic relations after establishment of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 2010. First, China's merchandize trade balance with ASEAN has shifted from deficit to surplus since 2012. This reflects China's improving comparative advantage in manufacturing production vis-à-vis ASEAN as a whole. Second, with China's wage hike, ASEAN investors can no longer take advantage of China's cheap labor force. Concurrently, China's investment in ASEAN has been increasing and become more diversified, ranging from energy to manufacturing and services. Singapore has remained the most important investment destination for Chinese investors and the largest foreign investor in China among ASEAN countries. Third, China has comparative advantages in providing construction, telecommunications, computer and information services and other business services to ASEAN. On the other hand, ASEAN, led by Singapore, has opportunities in the financial services and tourism markets in China. Finally, the development of economic regionalism, notably the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership, will remain critical for the CAFTA's relevance in regional economic integration, as well as China–ASEAN relations in the future.     

Beijing and the Myanmar problem

Abstract

The re-emergence of China as a major economic and political power has drawn attention to the role it might play in solving regional problems. Prominent among many Asian issues on Beijing's agenda is its southwestern neighbour, Myanmar, and in particular the military machine that has long ruled the country with an iron fist. The junta in place today is both acknowledged as problematic by policymakers in Beijing, and seen by the wider world as a regional challenge on which China should take the lead. However, there is little agreement on ways forward. To determine how Beijing might handle the Myanmar problem, this article first examines the concept of intervention, reviewing the manifold modes found in the contemporary world and drawing up a typology. Then it surveys arguments about intervention, focusing on perspectives that are relevant in this context. Next it presents arguments about intervention in Myanmar, and follows up by looking in some detail at China's current low-level engagement. Finally it considers where Beijing might go from here in dealing with Myanmar. The argument pulled together in the conclusion is that while nobody has a full solution to the Myanmar problem, a case for enhancement of China's role can be grounded not only in its global obligations, but also in precepts found deep in its national tradition. It is here that efforts to boost Beijing's engagement should be directed.     

A harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory typologies of ASEAN countries’ strategies to the rise of China

Abstract

In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as ‘hedging’. In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT–NE situation will balance against China; those in the LT–PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT–PE or LT–NE situations will hedge against China. Hypotheses are supported by three case studies, Vietnam–China (HT–NE), Cambodia–China (LT–PE) and Singapore–China (HT–PE) relations.     

Washington's perceptions and misperceptions of Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) ‘strategy’: implications for military escalation control and strategic stability

Washington has become increasingly concerned that Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) capabilities will put at risk US military assets and forward forces operating in the Western Pacific region, enabling China to deter, delay and deny US intervention in future regional conflict and crisis. US defence analysts in their assessments have frequently, and often erroneously, conflated a Chinese operational capability with an underlying strategic intention that conceptualises the United States as its primary (if not sole) target. The central argument this article proffers is that US perceptions of A2-AD have been framed by specific analytical baselines that have overlooked the evolution of Chinese operational and doctrinal preferences, and over-reliant upon military material-based assessments to determine Beijing's strategic intentions, and formulate US military countervails. The article concludes that the strategic ambiguities and opacity associated with Chinese A2-AD capabilities and its ‘active defence’ concept reinforced Washington's reliance upon capacity-based assessments that in turn, exacerbated misperceptions confounded by cognitive bias of Chinese strategic intentions. The critical framing assumptions of this article draw heavily upon the ideas and rationale associated with the international relations ‘Security Dilemma’ concept.     

Ma Ying-jeou's re-election: implications for Taiwan and East Asia

Abstract

Ma Ying-jeou's re-election means that there will not be a leadership change in Taiwan, but it still has significant implications. It forces the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to work out a succession for itself and confront the political reality that it must now persuade voters in Taiwan that it can manage relations with mainland China effectively in order to win the presidency again. It also requires Ma to define clearly the limits of his mainland policy in order to minimize Beijing's expectations of his second term, as no president of Taiwan can agree to move towards political integration without a popular mandate. On its part, Beijing has taken on board the significance of Taiwan's electoral cycle for managing cross-Strait ties and will put pressure on Ma to move forward over political integration and thus reduce the scope for a future DPP administration to reverse course. This notwithstanding, Beijing's Taiwan policy will ultimately be determined more by the result of the leadership succession in mainland China itself in the autumn of 2012. For USA and East Asia, Ma's re-election is a positive development as it minimizes the risk of a confrontation or a crisis across the Taiwan Strait. But it will not remove the main problems they have with China that are Taiwan related. For USA, arms sales to Taiwan will still be needed and will remain a source of tension with Beijing. For Southeast Asia, stability across the Taiwan Strait implies that Beijing can devote more attention and resources to the South China Sea territorial disputes and that it is likely to behave in a more assertive way.     

Who's socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN relations

Abstract

This article draws on constructivist approaches to explore processes of socialization in the context of evolving relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Constructivist discussions have challenged traditional accounts of socialization; however, left under-examined are the processes by which social learning and social change take place. This article contributes to the theoretical discussion with its examination of ASEAN's regional engagement processes. It treats ASEAN states' ‘complex engagement’ of China as an exercise in argumentative persuasion, which seeks common agreement via a deliberative, non-coercive process. In contrasting ASEAN's particular style of engagement with other models that emphasize more coercive and utilitarian strategies of persuasion, the article draws attention to how particular kinds of interaction may facilitate social learning, as well as the conditions that may make social learning more likely. Particular attention is paid to the roles played by power asymmetries, uncertainty, and different kinds of engagement (mutual and interactive versus closed and unidirectional) in social learning, as well as the importance of viewing socialization as a process that involves different stages.     

Leadership,regime security,and China's policy toward Taiwan: prospect theory and Taiwan crises

Abstract

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US–China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait.     

Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010

Abstract

This study is based upon two premises: (1) the available literature, though voluminous, fails to provide systematic understandings of the complex and evolving relations between China and North Korea; and (2) China and North Korea had been short of being trusted allies bound in blood and belief even before the launch of post-Mao reforms and the normalization of Beijing–Seoul relations. This article dissects this curious relationship into four questions: (1) What does history inform us about China's relations with (North) Korea? (2) Has China communicated effectively with North Korea? (3) Have China and North Korea been ‘trusted allies’? (4) How effective has China been in inducing North Korea to comply with its demands over the years? The authors argue that, geo-strategically, China can hardly afford to put North Korea in an adversarial position. Furthermore, residues of the Factional Incident of 1956 and North Korea's deep-rooted suspicion of China still linger on. These have been the sources of Beijing's dilemma in consistently opting for ‘soft’ measures despite that North Korea's provocative acts and nuclear weapons programs have negatively affected China's interests. From the outset, China and North Korea had been more uncertain allies who had to cooperate with each other under the ideological and geopolitical imperatives of the difficult times. The authors also suggest that it would be misleading to put Sino–North Korean dynamics in a usual category of big power–small nation relations where power asymmetry generally works against the latter. North Korea has undoubtedly been an atypical ‘small nation’. It is due to these limitations that China's pressurizing has not been always effective and that Beijing's reactions have been continuously cyclical. This cyclical trend is not likely to be broken since the upcoming drama of Sino–American rivalry is bound to close the window of such opportunities for China, which will nevertheless regard North Korea increasingly as a liability, if not uncomfortable neighbor.     

The United States,Japan, and the European Union: comparing political economy approaches to China

Abstract

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US–Japan and US–EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US–Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.     

Examining the immanent dilemma of small states in the Asia-Pacific: the strategic triangle between New Zealand,the US and China

ABSTRACT

Small states throughout the Asia-Pacific are confronted by a growing dilemma over how to balance their traditional security ties with the US and rapidly growing trade with China. This gives Washington and Beijing potential leverage over small states to use within their competition with one another. This article explores the implications of this for New Zealand – a small South Pacific state that prides itself on maintaining an independent foreign policy. Situated within the small state literature, it utilises a material-based strategic triangle to illustrate the fundamental facets of New Zealand's position. Relatedly, the article examines how Wellington has managed its burgeoning relations with China and the US over the past decade and critically considers New Zealand's independent foreign policy. It finds that New Zealand has adopted a mixed set of strategies to manage its position between the US and China, closely aligning itself with Washington while remaining nonaligned on some key security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand has certainly not opted for neutrality. The article concludes that New Zealand and other small states must remain vigilant, may want to consider alternative strategies of alignment, and outlines a number of areas where additional research could prove fruitful.     

Towards naval normalcy: 'open seas protection' and Sino-US maritime relations

On May 26th, 2015, China published its 10th Defense White Paper which integrated 'open seas protection', along with 'offshore waters defense', into its naval strategy. This shift in naval strategy, albeit largely anticipated, raises a series of important questions about China's maritime ambitions. This article seeks to analyze the causes, nature and challenges of China's latest shift in naval strategy, and its implications for Sino-US maritime relations. The article argues that China's latest shift in naval strategy is a logical corollary of the tension between China's expanding global interests and its asymmetric approach to sea power, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the necessary stimulus and justification for such a shift. China's new naval strategy, the paper contends, denotes that it will develop a Mahanian blue-water navy and a basic network of overseas bases in the years ahead. Those two developments are expected to pose a series of significant challenges for China's foreign policy. The article argues that China's new naval strategy presents both challenges and opportunities for China and the world. To accomplish 'open seas protection', China will probably have to modify its policies on a range of issues, and moderate its competitive stance in the near seas. Although China's new naval strategy need not be interpreted in a competitive framework, it does present China with a stark choice: either it pursues more friendly attitudes towards its maritime ambitions by modifying its current policy, or it will be increasingly confronted by a coalition of hostile states.     

ASEAN and human rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?

Abstract

Observers of Southeast Asian affairs commonly assume that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are reluctant to pursue liberal agendas, and that their main concern is to resist pressure from Western powers to improve their human rights practice. This article, however, argues that such a conventional view is too simplistic. The Southeast Asian countries have voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries – advanced countries with legitimate international status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberal agendas, for the same reason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines and newly-independent countries institute national flags. Yet it should be noted that the progress of ASEAN's liberal reform has been modest. A conventional strategy for facilitating this reform would be to put more pressure on the members of ASEAN; however, the usefulness of such a strategy is diminishing. The development of an East Asian community, the core component of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for the Western powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries. Hence, as an alternative strategy, this article proposes that ASEAN's external partners should ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal reform, by openly assessing its human rights record in global settings, with the aim of boosting the concern of its members for ASEAN's international standing.     

The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced interaction: Intramural challenges to the ‘ASEAN way’

Abstract

This article examines the challenges to the diplomatic and security culture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as posed by Thailand's spurned proposal for ‘flexible engagement’ and the pursuit of ‘enhanced interaction’ by some ASEAN members in intramural relations. It asks whether these challenges should be understood as turning points in the way in which regional leaderships in Southeast Asia interact. The article argues that while the ‘ASEAN way’ is indeed changing, this change, at least for the moment, focuses mainly on extending the range of issues and contexts traditionally defined as internal affairs in which other ASEAN governments may now legitimately become involved. Considerations about ASEAN cohesion, regime security and regional influence do not suggest an imminent or complete abandonment of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. The likelihood that enhanced interaction will continue to be pursued by ASEAN leaderships should therefore not be seen to imply that principles such as quiet diplomacy or restraint have already become obsolete.     

The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses on the ASEAN Norms

Has the ‘ASEAN Way’ – a set of rules of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centered on the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making – really established its position as an ASEAN norm? This paper aims to analyze the discourses of each ASEAN country and empirically explain their attitudes toward the norm. Specifically, I review various documentations to examine how various ASEAN diplomats have used the term ‘ASEAN Way.’ How did they come to call the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making ‘ASEAN Way’ in the early 1990s? Why have they begun using the term negatively, as something to be reformed, in recent years? By describing the discourses on the ‘ASEAN Way’ and their changes over the years, I show that the rationality of non-interference and consensus decision-making has changed over time and shifted the positioning of the ‘ASEAN way’ as a symbol. This presents a new and empirical interpretation of the changes in ASEAN Norms.     

ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: understanding ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific order

This paper analyses ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia and the Asia-pacific through the lens of social role negotiation. It argues that ASEAN has negotiated legitimate social roles as the ‘primary manager’ in Southeast Asia and the ‘regional conductor’ of the Asia-Pacific order. It develops an English School-inspired role negotiation framework and applies it to three periods: 1954–1975 when ASEAN's ‘primary manager’ role emerged from negotiations with the USA; 1978–1991 when ASEAN's role was strengthened through negotiations with China during the Cambodian conflict; and 1991-present when ASEAN created and expanded the ‘regional conductor’ role. Negotiations during the Cold War established a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its ‘regional conductor’ role after the Cold War. ASEAN's ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.     

Australia and the China Threat: managing ambiguity

A China Threat – the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese – has been an ever present in the politics of Australia since even before there was a Commonwealth of Australia. It was both a major cause of Federation in 1901 and a determinant of Australia's foreign policy thereafter. In the last 20 years, concerns about China have come to focus less on migration and more on economic integration and China's political influence. There are as always distinct paradoxes in the China Threat. It may be a useful vehicle for making a political point at election time but China has a place in the Australian economy that has led Australia's leaders to at least modify their resistance once in office.     

The rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan's construction of identity: Is China a focal point of Japanese nationalism?

Abstract

Since 1945, the United States (US) has served as a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-wing Japanese nationalism. Both sides argued that the US was an arrogant hegemon that unjustly robbed Japan of its autonomy, and prevented Japan from achieving its own ideal national identity. Both sides frequently demanded that Japan should be more ‘resolute’ and resist unfair demands emanating from the US. In recent years, however, both camps are increasingly using the same rhetoric to criticise the Japanese government's China policy. China is also being depicted as an overbearing state that unfairly browbeats Japan into making diplomatic concessions. Given the similarities between the portrayal of China and the US, has China now become a nationalist focal point for both the Japanese Left and Right? Utilising constructivist insights, this article seeks to shed light on this question, by examining how the Japanese Right and Left portray China, and explores the implications for Japan's China policy.