Present at the Destruction? The Liberal Order in the Trump Era

Abstract

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 sent shock waves across political classes globally and prompted debates about whether his ‘America first’ agenda threatened the liberal international order. During his first year in office, Trump seemed determined to undermine the hallmarks of the liberal international order: democracy, liberal economics and international cooperation. So, are we witnessing the emergence of a “post-liberal” and “post-American” era? Four sources of evidence help frame – if not answer – the question: history, the crisis of liberal democracy, Trump’s world view, and the power of civil society (globally and nationally) to constrain any US President. They yield three main judgements. First, continuity often trumps change in US foreign policy. Second, the liberal international order may have been more fragile pre-Trump than was widely realised. Third, American power must be put at the service of its own democracy if the US is to become the example to the world it used to be.     

Welcome home! Routines,ontological insecurity and the politics of US military reunion videos

Abstract

This article investigates the military ‘reunion’ videos that proliferated in the United States throughout the late 2000s and early 2010s. The typical video entails a returning soldier who surprises a family member, usually a child or female spouse, at a public event. I articulate the reunion video as a key feature of populism in contemporary US society. The videos can be considered examples of the ‘encounters’ theorized by both Anthony Giddens and Erving Goffman. Both private and public ‘social occasions’ with performative qualities of ‘day-to-day life’, the videos disclose the institutional and societal routines of not only a family but broader layers and circles of the US political community. They relate not only to loss but also to redemption. The article therefore investigates when and how, and provides a provisional argument for why, these videos have proliferated by consulting the everyday features of ontological security. It focuses on both the local and the international contexts within which they attend to, but also generate, US ontological insecurity.     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

Trump and the End of an Era? The Liberal International Order in Perspective

ABSTRACT

The liberal international economic and political order which the United States created from the ashes of World War II and has since led is in trouble. To United States President Donald Trump, the order which provided the framework under which sovereign states agreed to follow a rules-based system of economic and political cooperation and shared multilateral governance, has not only allowed other nations (in particular, China) to take advantage of US ‘magnanimity’, but also weakened the United States economically, while asymmetric alliances compromised its military advantages. Given the sustained assault this cosmopolitan order is facing, many fear that it may not survive if Trump is re-elected in November 2020. Indeed, if the United States response to the COVID-19 pandemic is any guide, an ‘America First’ agenda, especially a hard-line approach to China, will shape US policy if Trump wins a second term.     

Hard‐Core Toughie: Donald Trump’s Negotiations for the United States Presidency

This paper examines the negotiation tactics employed by Donald Trump in his 2016 presidential campaign. Drawing on data from multiple sources (interviews, debates, articles, books), our analysis begins with a brief overview of Trump’s personality and philosophy, which offers a basis for understanding his general negotiating approach. We then highlight six competitive tactics and four principles of persuasion that Trump employs, with specific examples of how he used them during the campaign with his primary negotiating counterparts – the other candidates, the Republican Party, the press corps, and the American electorate. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of his negotiating approach and preferred tactics in dealing with domestic and international issues as president of the United States.     

The Redirection of US Foreign Strategy against the Background of Globalization

American foreign strategy has had strong continuity since World War Ⅱ despite differences among successive presidents.Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign revealed ideas and goals for US strategy and strategy adjustment that differ significantly from those of predecessors.The decline in relative gains and rise in cost for US involvement in globalization are reasons for Trump to redirect US foreign strategy.The relative decrease of both US trade and foreign direct investment in the US,amid security threats and the identity crisis of the American people,has tremendously increased the pricetag for US involvement in globalization.     

Ukraine's relations with the West since the Orange Revolution

Abstract

This article argues that many of Ukraine's problems are long-standing and remain unresolved because government policies are virtual (i.e. do not conform to official documents or statements) thereby reducing the effectiveness of the West's (here understood primarily as NATO and the EU) engagement with Ukraine and the ability of Kyiv to pursue its declared foreign policy objectives. The article discusses Ukraine's relations with the West through cycles of Disinterest, Partnership and Disillusionment. Under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma three cycles equated to Kravchuk's presidency (Disinterest, 1991–94), Kuchma's first term (Partnership, 1994–99) and second term (Disillusionment, 2000–04). Three cycles partially repeated itself during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency with Partnership (2005–06) after the Orange Revolution followed by Disillusionment (2007–09), often described as ‘Ukraine fatigue’. US Disinterest in Ukraine from 2009 is an outgrowth of the Barrack Obama administrations ‘re-set’ policies with Russia resembling the ‘Russia-first’ policies of the early 1990s George W. Bush administration. US Disinterest covers the late Yushchenko era and continued into the Yanukovych presidency. The West held out a hope of Partnership for Viktor Yanukovych following his February 2010 election after taking at face value his claim of becoming a more democratic leader, compared with during the 2004 elections, coupled with an expectation he would bring political stability to Ukraine. Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusionment the following year.     

The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal

During the 2016 United States presidential election campaign, Donald Trump promised to “renegotiate” the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran nuclear deal. The deal does not prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons and in some ways actually makes it easier for Iran to go nuclear in the future. The mere continuation of the current deal could undermine America’s interests in the Middle East and its global non-proliferation policy. How then can the Donald Trump Administration work to renegotiate the deal? This analysis provides a strategy that the Trump Administration can follow to improve American policy toward Iran, namely do what Iran is doing to the United States: abide by the strict terms of the agreement, whilst competing in all of the ways not covered in the deal. From an American perspective, increasing pressure on Tehran will constrain Iran’s destabilising influence in the region. Over time, Washington can leverage the pressure to force Iran back to the table to strike a renegotiated agreement that eliminates, not just delays, the Iranian nuclear and missile threat.     

Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.     

GCC-US Alliance-Making Reconsidered: The Travails of Dependency

ABSTRACT

Donald Trump’s presidency may have altered less in relations between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council than recent accounts suggest. Instead, power relations between the US and its Gulf allies have long been, and continue to be, asymmetrical. Dependency theory and postcolonial analysis illustrate the ways in which the US global hegemon exhibits hierarchy, exerting control over Gulf economic resources (oil) and extending its ‘security umbrella’ (e.g. weapons sales and bases) – all in highly unequal dynamics. A critical discourse analysis of American and Saudi speeches during the 2017 Riyadh summit further confirms this assessment. This raises questions about alliance-making and alliance-maintenance norms of promise-keeping and reciprocity.     

Does US presidential rhetoric affect asymmetric political violence?

Although political violence has proven to be difficult for governments to manage, predict or control, previous research on the impact of relevant federal government actions and US presidential rhetoric on terrorist attacks and hate crimes demonstrates that what the US government does matters in ways that are both expected and unexpected. In the US, government counterterrorism strategies changed rapidly in response to the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the US. The Bush administration formed a new executive department, centralised intelligence agencies, invested in tangible counterterrorism measures, implemented two invasions and occupations, and spoke publicly about terrorism on a near-daily basis. Yet much has changed since that research, as the US has since elected a president whose presidential campaign relied upon espousing antagonism towards Muslims, immigrants and other minority groups. Further, President Trump’s administration has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to isolate and suppress Muslims as a strategy to combat Islamist extremism in contrast to previous administrations’ more cooperative approaches. This article considers what existing research tells us about whether and how the different actions of the Trump administration may fuel both Jihadi and far-right extremism.     

Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary

There is a broad consensus about the ways in which public opinion and domestic politics influenced American foreign policy during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. Historians generally concur that the American public was ignorant about and uninterested in international politics. They also agree that the president’s perception of public sentiment and his reading of the political landscape played essentially negative roles; that is, they were constraints at the point of implementation, rather than factors that shaped the substance of his policy, and were unquestionably a hindrance. Taking a fresh look at the origins of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine raises questions about this interpretation. Roosevelt believed that Americans were passionately opposed to the blockade of Venezuela by European Powers in late 1902 and early 1903 and viewed it as a threat to the Monroe Doctrine. This perception and Roosevelt’s 1904 presidential campaign therefore significantly affected the timing and content of the Roosevelt Corollary.     

Red Dawn is Now: Race vs. Nation and the American Election

This article details the long-standing struggle within the American far right between those whose mission it is to resist the perceived subversion of international communism and its neo-Soviet successors now in power in the Kremlin and those whose mission is dedicated to preserving the White Race from the twin threats of miscegenation and marginalization from the corridors of power. Using the metaphor of the 1984 low-budget spectacular Red Dawn and noting the current pattern of Russian interference in the election and contacts with the Trump campaign, it traces the struggle from the ascendancy of anti-communism in the 1950s and 1960s to the current triumph of the race warriors and conspiracy theorists who championed the candidacy of Donald Trump. “Red Dawn Is Now” concludes with the observation that, for those who most fear foreign subversion, the revelations about Russian penwetration of the American election process and the Trump presidency represents a 21st-century version of the Soviet occupation that the young patriots of Red Dawn fame successfully repelled. If this is so, it suggests the possibility that Thomas Jefferson's observation that “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants” may be prophetic and that the fifth wave of terrorism might at long last be at hand.     

胁迫式外交:战略竞争时代美国对外战略的转型

以特朗普政府2017年《国家安全战略报告》和2018年《国防战略报告》为标志,世界进入美国启动的战略竞争新时期,地缘政治争夺和大国竞争再度成为世界政治的突出主题。美国重振和维护世界主导地位的目标未变,但"胁迫式外交"成为特朗普政府推行对外战略的常态,美国对外行为出现了冷战结束以来最为显著的变化,表现为重新激活战略军事威慑以压制战略军事竞争对手、以贸易热战和科技冷战方式打压战略经济竞争对手、以政治勒索方式逼盟友承担义务、以极限施压方式压制地区敌对国家、以退群和搅局方式阻挠多边外交。美国推行胁迫式外交与特朗普个人的执政风格相关,但根本性的原因是国际政治权力结构的重大变化和战略竞争时代的来临,推动美国对外权力输出发生了转型性变化。这也意味着美国对外权力输出方式正在发生从软实力向硬实力、从依赖制度优势向依赖实力优势的巨大偏转。美国所谓国际"领导力"正加速蜕变为维护美国特权的"胁迫力",美国权力输出的这种变化可能代表着未来美国外交发展的一种长期趋势。     

A ‘pivot’ that never existed: America’s Asian strategy under Obama and Trump

This article argues that Donald Trump’s Asian strategy hardly marks a radical transformation from Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. This is because the ‘pivot to Asia’ never really existed. Although Obama was successful in building legitimacy for the strategy through international norms, he failed to translate his lofty rhetoric into practice. Much of his original pivot components (building a constructive relationship with China, coordinating with Asian allies and multilateralism in the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership) has either failed or did not live up to expectations. Donald Trump was adamant that the Asian pivot was a bad strategy and that he would not follow it. But although he completely discarded Obama’s legitimization of the rebalance (as Trump speaks pragmatically and does not care about international norms), in actuality he has followed many of Obama’s policies, and even improved on some of them. That being said, Trump’s ‘pivot actions’ appear to be erratic, pragmatic short-term actions rather than a meticulously planned long-term strategy similar to Obama’s rebalance (which did not materialize). Thus, while Obama failed to transform the pivot into an effective strategy, neither is Trump’s effectiveness backed by a coherent Asian strategy.     

The making of a public in a political campaign: A participant observation study

Abstract

The author served as a press assistant in the 1978 gubernatorial campaign of Ohio Lieutenant Governor Richard F. Celeste. This article examines the evolution of campaign strategy in the 1978 Democratic primary. Faced with token opposition, Celeste used the primary to introduce policies and establish themes for his general election campaign against incumbent James E. Rhodes. This study focuses on the Celeste campaign's efforts to identify and reach a particular constituency within the Ohio electorate. The “making of a public,” influenced by demographics and the results of opinion surveys, became a tentative, reactive process. The candidate's public identity and strategy were negotiated during the course of the primary campaign. Pressed by events and criticism from the press, the candidate eventually deemphasized the specifics of issues as he sought to redefine himself for a public of voters.     

美国政治极化与对华政策的极端化

美国总统特朗普执政以来,美国两党的斗争异常激烈,政治极化程度之深为近几十年来所罕见,有学者甚至称其为"超级极化"。面对政治极化及其背后的深层问题,美国总统特朗普为巩固执政权威、两党政客为解决国内经济问题,都将对华强硬作为优先事项。美国部分学术界精英等提出为了凝聚人心和强化国家认同,呼吁与中国开展新冷战。这股强大的力量与中美两国结构性矛盾趋于尖锐一起,共同推动了美国对华政策的极端化。但与中国对抗无法缓解美国激烈的党争,难以改善其国内的不平等问题,也解决不了美国国家认同面临的长期挑战。美国要走出政治极化,需要共和党或民主党通过选民重组获得对另一方的压倒性优势,从而长期主导政治议程。未来美国的党争还会非常激烈,但不管其国内政治如何演进,美国对华强硬的趋势都很难改变。     

Superficial,not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy

Abstract

Surveys such as the European Commission's Eurobarometer regularly reveal high levels of public support for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This paper argues, however, that public support for ESDP is only superficial, not substantial. First, there is no homogeneous ‘European’ public support for ESDP. Second, security and defence, as covered by ESDP with its focus on global crisis-management, rank very low among Europeans’ priorities. Third, Europeans are very sceptical about the appropriateness of military means, and hence a core element of ESDP, as a legitimate instrument in international affairs. These reservations are likely to have constraining effects on ESDP's future development. At the same time, there are compelling reasons for the further development of ESDP. Therefore, Europe's political elites should initiate a public diplomacy campaign inside the EU in which the case for Europe's further evolution as a strategic security and defence actor is made. ESDP operations are the most promising starting points as they illustrate both the normative and the ‘realist’ necessities of European engagement in global security affairs.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

Art of the Power Deal: The Four Negotiation Roles of Donald J. Trump

In this article, I mine President Donald Trump’s considerable writing and speaking record to synthesize the key elements of his deal‐making approach to help make better sense of his rhetoric and actions on the world’s diplomatic stage. My argument is that Trump’s coercive negotiation style is best understood through the prism of his four public roles: observer, performer, controller, and disrupter. In this article, I analyze how these roles translate into his negotiating behavior. Spotting and exploiting vulnerability is his trade; leverage and bravado are his tools. After assessing the opposing side, Trump uses leverage to threaten his counterparts’ weaknesses, while using bravado to play up the advantages of reaching an agreement on his terms. This way, he presents a drastic structured choice to his opponents, leaving them the least maneuvering space. In the final section of the paper, I illustrate how the four‐role framework helps explain Trump’s decisions in the nuclear negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. I also consider opportunities for further research.