The political economy of Indian planning

Peruvian statistics were examined to see if construction remained labour‐intensive during 1955–67. Data on output, employment, capital, and materials consumption were either lacking or had defects that made a direct comparison of trends impossible. But conclusions could be drawn from relative price and wage trends. If materials and capital had not been substituted for labour, average construction costs would have risen substantially more than they did. Our estimate was that by 1967 they would have been 25 per cent higher.

Evidence from a sample of firms, however, suggested that adoption of labour‐saving techniques cannot be tied simply to changes in wages compared with other costs. All eleven innovations studied, it is true, were markedly labour‐saving; but the rate of adoption did not closely follow wage changes. Adoption came most often during those less tense years when builders were neither overstrained with orders nor lacking credit and clients. One must conclude that both rising wages and innovations can limit employment expansion in relatively poor countries.

Since both agriculture and manufacturing have been unable to absorb the growing labour force of poor countries, economists have turned their attention to other sectors for supplementary employment expansion. One of these is construction. The construction sector creates not only jobs but builds capital goods with a desirable low import content. In association with carefully structured financial institutions, it may even generate savings. How much employment a given expansion of construction will provide depends on the production functions of the sector: their slopes and their potential shifts. One must find the changes in labour productivity that go with likely changes in volume, capital accumulation, trends in material supplies, and alternate technologies.

All these questions will get imprecise answers without good statistics on output, labour, capital, and materials, both unit prices and volume. If output varies in composition and in the relative quality of components, problems of weighting and aggregating arise. Because of the sector's ? instability and footloose nature, data on construction remain inferior compared with other sectors even in the most advanced and statistics‐rich countries. Can one make anything of the sorts of data available in poor countries where the sector must play its most crucial role?

In this article, using rather limited data, we note with considerable alarm that steady labour intensity and corresponding employment expansion cannot be taken for granted. Where daily wages are but a fraction of hourly American wages, and where interest rates are a multiple of American rates, the more lavish use of materials and machinery compared with labour can nevertheless begin early.

Peru is the country selected for our study. During 1955–67 Peru had a relatively high national output growth rate of 5.6 per cent together with a moderate rate of inflation of about 9 per cent. Except for the devaluation years of 1958 and 1967, flourishing exports of fishmeal, copper, cotton, and sugar helped carry this rate of growth. Lima was one of the continent's fastest‐growing cities in population and building, particularly in squatter barriadas. But in the 1960s commercial conduction also grew at more than a 15 per cent compound rate, measured in square metres built, according to some estimates.1 During 1964–68, construction had high priority under President Fernando Belaunde, a professional architect. More U.S. foreign aid for housing (direct and guaranteed private loans) went to Peru in absolute terms during this period than to any other country. We shall analyse the consequences by examining (1) trends in relative costs, (2) relative output and import trends, and (3) data about receptivity to innovations in a sample of firms.     

The political practice of genetic epistemology

Genetic epistemology is sometimes taken by those unfamiliar with it as a justification for a meritocracy of moral reasoning and the continued oppression of people employing reasoning at lower stages than those who seek to perpetuate the oppression. Whether this interpretation is praised or reviled, it remains erroneous. In particular, this misunderstanding is applied to attempts by genetic epistemologists to apply its insights to the construction of the larger social world. However, a genetic-epistemological politics is really characterized by a concern for maintaining systems permitting free discourse among moral agents. This article outlines the nature of the erroneous interpretations and discusses genetic epistemology's proper application to politics. Stephen chilton is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota at Duluth, where he specializes in conceptual analysis in the fields of comparative politics and political psychology. He is the author ofDefining Political Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988);Grounding Political Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); and (with Shawn Rosenberg and Dana Ward) ofPolitical Reasoning and Cognition: A Piagetian View (Duke University Press, 1988).     

当代亚洲政党政治演进的主要特点

亚洲国家的政党政治发源于19世纪,其发展历程蜿蜒曲折、复杂多样,大体经历了三个发展阶段:第一阶段,从19世纪到二战结束,为亚洲政党政治的形成阶段,产生了一批民族主义政党和工人阶级政党.第二阶段,从战后到冷战结束,为其迅速兴起和蓬勃发展的阶段,各种类型的政党相继出现,政党政治在多数国家立足并发挥作用.第三阶段,从冷战后至今,为其调整与演变阶段,政党政治出现了更为复杂的变化,多党民主浪潮在亚洲部分国家兴起,许多国家的政党政治发生深刻变动.     

The emergence of political pluralism in Romania

This paper puts forward arguments supporting the idea that the essence of political evolution in Romania since 1989 has been the same as in other former communist countries of East Central Europe. In spite of some specific features, of some delays, and of difficulties, it is a process of democratization. As political practice has revealed, pluralism is first associated here with the establishment of a multi-party system and also with the proliferation of different non-party groups. The most important moments of the pluralization process in Romania are evoked, focusing on the elections and the adoption of the new Constitution.     

The decentralisation of city government and the restoration of political trust

Abstract

‘Local politics’ has specific features that are conducive to the generation of trust, more so than ‘centralised politics’. Local politics is characterised by processes that occur on a small scale, within institutions that enjoy a certain autonomy, that are imbedded in a social community with which the citizens can identify, and that offer the possibility of more democratic participation. Where is the threshold between local and central politics? Clearly, if a city grows to the size of almost half a million inhabitants, as was the case in the port city of Antwerp, it becomes too large for local politics. It also becomes vulnerable to the lure of political distrust, as was manifested by the amazing rise of the extreme right in the 1990s. At least this was the theory that prompted the political leaders of the city to introduce a certain degree of decentralisation. To a certain extent they were right. Our evidence shows that the district councils generate more trust than the city council. Moreover they generate trust among sections of the population that were and remain distrustful of central politics. Will this capital of local political trust overflow into the trust in the higher authorities? Some of the data point in that direction but they are far from conclusive. Anyway it is too early to tell. The decentralisation reform in Antwerp is an interesting experiment but a very recent one.