Lobbying and compromise

The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two typical settings. In the first, lobbies are assumed to act as “principals” and the setters of the policy (the candidates in a Downsian electoral competition or the elected policy maker in a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition) are conceived as “agents”. In the second setting, the proposed policies are solely determined by the lobbies who are assumed to take the dual role of “principals” in one stage of the public-policy game and ‘agents’ in its second stage. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that in the latter setting, the compromising effect of lobbying need not exist. Our reduced-form, two-stage public-policy contest, where two interest groups compete on the approval or rejection of the policy set by a politician, is sufficient to show that the proposed and possibly implemented policy can be more extreme and less efficient than the preferred policies of the interest groups. In such situations then more than the calf (interest groups) wish to suck the cow (politician) desires to suckle thereby threatening the public well being more than the lobbying interest groups. The main result specifies the conditions that give rise to such a situation under both the perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests.     

Strategic agricultural trade policy interdependence and the exchange rate: A game theoretic analysis

Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence is modeled using a game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of this game. Without compensatory payments to those with the highest political influence, the results suggest that only modest reform is possible. With compensation, liberalization occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also indicate that the U.S. gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as the dollar appreciates. Research was supported by Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station project 14065 “Economic Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Implications for U.S. Agriculture.”     

Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system

Theories of political entrepreneurship usually focus on the construction of coalitions necessary to change policy. We argue that political entrepreneurs who are unable to secure favored policies may redirect their efforts to a “higher tier,” attempting to change the rules of the game to enable the exploitation of future political profit opportunities. We present a taxonomy of three levels of political rules—pre-constitutional, constitutional, and post-constitutional—and identify the salient characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship that targets rules at each level. The development of the congressional committee system is explored as a case study in entrepreneurship over post-constitutional rules.     

Infinitely repeated contests: How strategic interaction affects the efficiency of governance

Contests over the scope and strength of regulation and governance are commonplace – and commonly repeated. The same players vie for the same government prize year after year: for example, environmental standards, government contracts, research grants, and public good provision. The open question is whether more rents are dissipated in repeated regulatory contests than onetime competitions. This question matters for regulation and governance because societies should design policies to waste the fewest scarce resources. According to some, the answer is “no”, but others say “yes”– more resources are wasted when people compete repeatedly for the same government prize. Herein, we use two game theoretic equilibrium concepts to help untangle the answer. Our results suggest non‐myopic contestants are more likely to behave as partners than rivals – provided the context is relatively sterile. Several common complications help break up the tacit partnership, including a disparity in relative ability, a shrinking prize, and additional players.     

Assessing Public Procurement of Innovation as a Cross‐Domain Policy: A Framework and Application to the Chinese Context

Despite the fact that public procurement of innovation (PPI) has become an increasingly popular policy tool, there has been a lack of holistic approaches to assessing policies promoting PPI. This article attempts to address this gap by proposing a framework which links the multiple levels and aspects related to the design and implementation of PPI policies. By adopting a systemic understanding of “public procurement” as well as “innovation policies,” this article positions PPI as a cross‐domain policy which is inherently a mix of procurement and innovation‐related interventions. The article develops an assessment framework using “vertical coherence” and “horizontal coherence” as criteria. It then illustrates the use of the framework by applying it to PPI policies in China. The framework can aid the conduct of ex ante as well as ex post assessment of PPI policies, which can further inform policy design, implementation, and learning.     

Surviving local government policy intervention: the case of embedded markets within a historical cultural cluster

China's name derives from “china” (porcelain), and “China” (pronounced as “Changnan”) is the former name of Jingdezhen, the capital city of porcelain—through whose exports of “blue‐and‐white” china the country gained international renown. The 2200‐year‐old porcelain cluster in Jingdezhen has survived through multiple empires with distinct policies towards the development of the city's dominant industry. This in‐depth case study examines interactions between local government and the business community to discover the effectiveness of policies and the perception of those policies by entrepreneurs through qualitative research employing Grounded Theory methodology. The centralized institutional structure in China contributes significantly to the findings of a total split of “government action” from “public perception” and leads to new considerations for policy‐makers to redesign their economic development strategies and plans to engender real effects in the desired direction. This paper also provides an exemplary lesson for historical cultural clusters seeking to escape from unfavorable policy interference. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An historical description and analysis of pronatalist policies in Italy,Germany and Sweden

The various pronatalist policies enacted between World War I and World War II by three European countries are presented within the context of a “coercive” and “noncoercive” policy dichotomy. The social context in which Italy, Germany, and Sweden enacted pronatalist policies is examined with special emphasis on Italian and German migration policies. An attempt is made to assess the impact of the various pronatalist measures on birth rates. Implications of the study indicate that knowledge of existing overt pronatalist policies and an understanding of the social milieu in which such policies are enacted will help present-day population policy planners.     

An economic approach to social choice — II

There is a formal equivalence between games, societies, and economies. Lindahl equilibrium for a game or society corresponds to competitive equilibrium for the equivalent economy. Results on existence and optimality of competitive equilibrium thus apply to the theory of games and societies. The “core” for a game or society as derived by extension from the core of an economy is “too large” to be interesting. An example illustrates that the α-core may be disjoint from the set of Lindahl equilibria. However, if the power of coalitions to inflict negative externalities is suitably restricted, Lindahl equilibria must be in the α-core.     

Strategien und institutionelle Perspektiven nach der Verfassungskrise: „Funktionalistische” und „institutionalistische” Wege zu einem neuen europäischen Verhandlungspaket

The European Council today is the only institution which has the potential and the possibility to lead the EU out of its current “valley of uncertainty”. Under the leadership of a new generation of heads of state, the conclusion of a European package deal may be expected from 2007 onwards, containing three central elements: 1. a “Europe of projects”, identifying policies and projects of common interest, 2. the “flexibilisation” of the EU in order to facilitate European politics among the member states and 3. institutional or constitutional reforms of the European polity, for which the constitutional treaty will remain the single most important point of reference. However, no simple, “optimal” road for the future development of the EU may be anticipated.     

Bringing a Network Perspective to Chinese Internet Studies: An Exploratory Analysis

This paper adopts a network perspective to explore the ways digitally-mediated relationships prompt social and/or political participation in China. In the “chicken game scenario”, my analysis suggests that collective actions are facilitated by both weak and strong ties, which generate a fairly unified collective identity that is conductive to high-risk mobilization. In the “public crisis scenario”, it is generally weak ties that facilitate relatively lower-risk mobilization. In the “compromise scenario”, if collective actions do occur, they are generally low-risk and non-political. This appears to be largely due to the dominance of weak ties in the compromise scenario. The “banal scenario” is a black box that has yet to be sufficiently investigated in the future.     

On resistance in the post-political city: conduct and counter-conduct in Vancouver

The paper contributes to understandings of contestation and resistance in urban politics, using a land use struggle against a “big-box” development in Vancouver, Canada as an example. It surveys Foucault's work on “governmentality,” highlighting the centrality of the notion of resistance in this work before focusing in particular on Foucault's yet underexplored conceptions of “conduct” and “counter-conduct”. These concepts offer an analysis of urban politics beyond the binary of successful implementation of city policies or their failure, and of cooption or revolt; therefore, proving especially useful in the analysis of urban governance which is increasingly characterised as “post-political”.     

House money effects on trust and reciprocity

In a typical laboratory “Investment Game” experiment, participants’ endowments are provided by the experimenter; thus, the worst case for the investor is that she loses all of her “found” money. By contrast, in naturally occurring environments, investment decisions can often lead to a loss of one’s own money. This paper investigates whether “trust” found in one-shot anonymous laboratory interaction is robust to “own money” environments. Our results show that, consistent with previous investment game results, most investors send a positive amount, and most trustees return at least the transfer amount, regardless of whether the investors purchase or are gifted their endowment. However, investments are on average lower when participants use their own money, and the fraction of maximum investments (the most “risky” investment decision) is only half as large under “own money” as it is under gifted endowments. Our results explain why one should exercise caution in placing trust in any government’s ability to spend other people’s money prudently.     

The logic of ‘Policy’ and successful policies

Developed on the premise that how we conceive of ‘policy’ and ‘successful policy’ guides policy sciences' research and evaluation, this paper responds to the conceptual questions of “what is a policy?” and “when is a policy successful?” Formal or logical conditions are established to distinguish ‘policy’ from related concepts. The notion ‘relevant public’ is introduced to distinguish public policies from private policies and to identify fairly-declared policies. Further, conditions are developed that can be used as logical tests for three types of policy success: implementation success, instrumental success and success in normative justification.     

Contested governance: The new repertoire of the Eurozone crisis

The austerity policies that EU policymakers adopted in response to the Eurozone crisis are often criticized as the product of institutionalized neoliberal ideas. This critique has merits, but tends to overlook institutional changes that do not neatly conform to well demarcated neoliberal ideas considered as “switchmen,” “paradigms,” or “blueprints.” This article offers an alternative reading of the Eurozone's institutional evolution that bridges pragmatist scholarship with cognitive and social psychology. The Eurozone crisis saw the emergence of a new and contested repertoire of governance. Policymakers agreed that “stronger governance” was necessary, but they struggled over how to perform that repertoire. This contest ultimately produced institutional changes that typically mixed austerity and unconventional policies. The advantage of thinking about ideas in terms of repertoires that actors perform is to afford a more granular view of institutions as sites of individual cognition, collective innovation, and political contestation.     

Serving Clients When the Server Crashes: How Frontline Workers Cope with E‐Government Challenges

Implementing e‐government in the contemporary American state is challenging. E‐government places high technical demands on agencies and citizens in an environment of budget austerity and political polarization. Governments developing e‐government policies often mobilize frontline workers—also termed “street‐level bureaucrats”—to help citizens gain access to services. However, we know little about how frontline workers cope in these challenging circumstances. This article fills this gap by examining frontline workers implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Based on a qualitative analysis, the authors find that frontline workers “move toward clients” when coping with stress: they bend the rules, work overtime, and collaborate in order to help clients. They are less inclined to “move away” or “move against” clients, for instance, through rigid rule following and rationing. In other words, frontline workers try to serve clients, even “when the server crashes.” Frontline workers, then, can play a vital role in the successful implementation of e‐government policies.     

数字竞赛与双重博弈:对易地扶贫搬迁政策执行偏差的一种解释

基层政策执行会出现偏差已经成为学界的共识,但是对于此问题的分析机制并不明晰,多数研究均是从单一视角予以阐释。通过深入考察易地搬迁中“拆旧复垦”政策的具体执行过程,从自上而下与自下而上相互融合视角入手,讨论“拆旧复垦”政策如何在不同利益主体的互构下发生了转变,为何完美的指标数据与文字背后却发现政策执行陷入模糊或搁置状态。从案例解构结果来看,在发展导向的逻辑下,基层政府通过主动加码寻求搬迁规模最大化以谋求在“数字竞赛”中胜出;在压力型体制的上下博弈中,基层政府采取拼凑应对的模糊执行策略以有效应对自上而下的政绩考核;在不完全信息状态的混合博弈中,政策受众在理性计算之下与基层政府形成了“合谋的沉默”。文章的贡献在于,对基层政策执行偏差的解释没有囿于讨论科层结构的弊端,而是从政策设计本身以及不同利益主体互构的视角出发解读其内在逻辑。     

Look to Denmark or not? An experimental study of the Social Democrats’ strategic choices

Social Democratic parties struggle to maintain their strong electoral position, as political competition has shifted from the traditional left-right dimension to the cultural dimension. This has led to a debate on what would be the most viable electoral strategy for these parties in terms of adjusting their policies. Some propose a “New Left” policy platform that combines social investment and progressive cultural policies; others an “Old Left” policy platform that combines traditional redistribution policies and social-conservative cultural policies. We conducted a survey experiment to test the effects of these two platforms on support for the Norwegian Labour party. Our results show that the New Left platform is more popular among current Labour voters and voters from competing left-wing parties, and the two policy platforms are equally popular among the total electorate.     

The Interventionist Turn of UN Peacekeeping: New Western Politics of Protection or Bureaucratic Mission Creep?

During recent years, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping system has exerted robust interventions in the domestic jurisdiction of target states for human rights purposes. The existing literature attributes the explanation mainly to the “new politics of protection” pursued by Western governments and thus validates the realist hypothesis. This article analyzes the Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti cases to demonstrate that not only government policies (the realist hypothesis) but also independent bureaucratic powers exerted by senior UN officials (the social constructivist thesis) have contributed to the emergence of interventionist policies at the UN. Moreover, “bottom-up” initiatives stemming from the virtue ethics of senior UN officials have played a much more decisive role in generating the interventionist turn than “top-down” institutional guidelines and doctrines, such as the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle. Instead of RtoP, UN officials draw upon broad legitimating principles of the UN, notably human security, to justify their interventionist policies.     

Framing morality policy issues: state legislative debates on abortion restrictions

Policy Sciences - Scholars of “morality policies” have often assumed a signature characteristic of such policies is that advocates will frame them as clashes between fundamental moral...     

National-Level Family Policies and workers’ Access to Schedule Control in a European Comparative Perspective: Crowding Out or In,and for Whom?

Abstract

This paper examines national-level family policies in a comparative perspective, to see whether they “crowd out” company-level family-friendly policies, namely schedule control. Further, it examines whether this relationship varies for different types of family policies, and for different groups of workers – i.e. distinguished by gender, parenthood status and skill divisions. The paper uses data from 27 European countries in 2010, and applies multilevel random slopes models with cross-level interaction terms. Results show that generous national-level family policies, in particular work-facilitating policies, “crowd in” company-level schedule control provisions, especially for high-skilled workers. However, very generous leave entitlements seem to crowd out schedule control provision.