当代南亚恐怖主义的起源与诱发因素

南亚地区是恐怖主义的重灾区，也是国际社会打击恐怖主义和暴力极端主义的前沿地带。“9·11”事件后美国发动“反恐战争”以来，南亚反恐局势的走向引发密集关注，阿富汗、巴基斯坦和印度的情况尤为明显。当代恐怖主义在南亚地区的崛起并不是偶然的，有若干重的历史与地缘政治诱因发挥了作用，既包括地区部的因素，也包括跨地区及国际范围的问题，这些外因素的作用也在很大程度上解释了南亚恐怖主义问题的复杂性和应对恐怖主义挑战的持久性。     

新形势下的巴基斯坦和与时俱进的中巴关系

美国在阿富汗的反恐战争对巴基斯坦安全形势产生巨大负面影响。巴议会大选后,新政府可能调整反恐策略,妥善处理与美国和阿富汗关系。中国和巴基斯坦共同培育的友好关系已成为国家间关系的典范。李克强总理访巴,则开创了中巴合作的战略新格局,开启了中巴双边关系新阶段。     

评塔利班对巴基斯坦的渗透北大核心CSSCISSCI

美国在阿富汗发动反恐战争后,塔利班加强了对巴基斯坦的渗透。特别是2004年以来,巴基斯坦开始出现基地组织的"巴基斯坦化"以及巴基斯坦塔利班,且它们的势力和影响不断扩大,不仅对巴国内政局,而且对地区局势,特别是对美国主导的反恐战争产生了重要影响。在美国全力实施阿巴新战略之际,塔利班势力对巴基斯坦的渗透及其后续发展值得关注和研究。     

奥巴马“阿富巴”新战略及其面临的挑战

面对阿富汗动荡局势长期化和塔利班势力在阿富汗、巴基斯坦边境地区日益坐大的趋势，及出于美国南亚战略的深层次考虑，奥巴马政府推出了“阿富巴”新战略。新战略的核心是，逐渐向阿富汗增兵强力打击恐怖势力以帮助阿富汗军警承担本国安全责任；强化阿富汗政权建设，以铲除塔利班与基地组织生存的社会基础。然而，阿巴边境的反恐行动能否奏效、阿富汗各级政权能否承担起责任以及南亚地区周边大国利益是否会碰撞，都是对奥巴马新战略的挑战。     

伊拉克战争对美巴联盟的重构

“9. 11”事件后 ,美国出于反恐需要 ,恢复与巴基斯坦的联盟关系 ,但随着美国在阿富汗反恐战争的完成 ,联盟出现裂痕。伊拉克战争的爆发不仅缝合联盟裂痕 ,而且促进联盟继续发展 ,但这种发展态势是有条件的、暂时的。     

巴基斯坦部族地区形势及其影响

“9·11”事件后，巴基斯坦成为美国的反恐盟友，在地区反恐中发挥着重要作用。鉴于巴特殊的国内外形势，以及以普什图族为主体的巴边境部族地区同阿富汗之间千丝万缕的联系，部族地区与巴政府在反恐问题上的分歧由来已久。巴政府对部族地区政策时有变化，对地区各方反恐力量都有影响，而风云变幻的巴政局，也导致地区局势越发错综复杂，这促使美国主导的阿富汗反恐战争不得不采用新策略来应对严峻的挑战。     

论奥巴马政府的“阿富巴”战略困局

奥巴马在阿富汗战争问题上继承了布什的失误，将不具有连续性的恐怖主义和具有连续性的战争混为一谈，采取增兵阿富汗的方针，战争造成的死伤人数激增，美国已有半数以上的人反对这场战争。奥巴马又将战争扩大到巴基斯坦，遭到塔利班的疯狂报复，恐怖主义袭击遍及巴基斯坦各大城市，巴基斯坦形势恶化。在阿富汗启动和平进程，解决美国和北约撤军问题，成立联合政府，恢复阿富汗的和平与稳定，在巴基斯坦实现停战，是值得探索的出路。     

美国阿-巴“全面新战略”评析

奥巴马政府的阿一巴“全面新战略”是美国实施阿富汗反恐战争进入新阶段对反恐力量的一次大规模转移和重新部署,战略目标更加明确;美国在增加兵力的同时更注重加强阿富汗和巴基斯坦自身的反恐能力,达成战略目标的手段更加全面和明智。“全面新战略”出台尚不足一年,完全落实尚需时间以及复杂的政治和军事运作,其实际效果也同样有待时间的考验。     

当前阿富汗形势对中亚安全的影响

目前阿富汗战争处在交战双方边打边谈的局面,塔利班在阿富汗北部扩大势力范围,并有外溢之势。卡尔扎伊政府与塔利班的和谈、美国撤军等是当前阿富汗问题中的热点。美国与巴基斯坦的关系由于反恐问题矛盾激化,对阿富汗局势产生影响。毒品成为阿富汗非传统安全中的首要威胁。阿富汗形势对中亚安全影响有限,主要体现在非传统安全领域,即恐怖主义合流和毒品泛滥。中亚安全威胁仍主要来自地区内部。     

新阶段反恐战争：巴基斯坦的处境与美巴矛盾

在美国领导的国际反恐战争中，巴基斯坦发挥了无以替代的作用。但近年来巴国内局势持续动荡，恐怖主义威胁日渐严重。为增进国家安全和稳定局势，穆沙拉夫和新近执政的吉拉尼政府开始调整应对恐怖和极端势力的战略，但新政策的尝试引发美国的担忧和美巴之间的矛盾。从趋势看，巴将强调以符合国情的方式采取反恐行动．改善与美国合作中的弱势地位；美国则将在反恐紧迫性与现实局限之间寻找平衡。     

美国奥巴马政府的南亚政策初探

随着奥巴马大选胜出和入主白宫,美国的南亚政策和美印关系的发展走向再次引起国际社会的关注。普遍关心的问题包括美国南亚政策的调整、奥巴马政府扩大在阿富汗和巴基斯坦的反恐行动、美印战略关系前景、美国对印巴关系的影响,以及美国对印美民用核合作、克什米尔争端的具体政策选择。本文试探讨奥巴马政府的南亚政策、反恐战略、美印关系走向及可能对该地区局势产生的外交与安全效应。     

美国新战略下阿富汗安全形势及其对中国西部边境安全的影响

2009年3月，美国总统奥巴马宣布了新的“阿富汗和巴基斯坦战略”，该战略有两个显著特点，一个特点是将巴基斯坦因素纳入到新战略框架中，另一特点是大量增兵阿富汗。阿富汗与中国相邻，其国内安全形势对中国西部边境地区的安全有着重要影响。     

试析巴基斯坦参与阿富汗重建

自美国发动阿富汗战争以来,阿国内局势一直动荡不安,这给巴基斯坦的经济、政治、外交战略及安全局势都造成了严重影响。为尽快恢复阿富汗的和平与稳定,巴通过提供经济援助、增强战略互信以及加强反恐合作等方式积极参与阿富汗重建,并取得一定成效。同时,巴积极参与阿富汗重建对巴自身以及巴阿、巴美及巴印关系都产生了影响。此外,由于巴国内经济形势恶化、安全局势欠佳等因素,巴积极参与阿富汗重建也面临诸多困难和挑战。     

阿富汗大变局:地缘政治和安全格局的演变

当前,阿富汗正在经历重大变局.阿富汗塔利班(阿塔)成功卷土重来,并且完成临时政府组建.尽管仍有多重挑战,但阿塔执政已不存在根本性威胁.这引发阿富汗地缘政治格局和地区安全形势的深度调整.在地缘政治格局方面,整体呈现"美国西方影响力下降,地区国家影响力上升"这一"东升西降"趋势.美国正在从"局内人"变为"局外人",但仍将发...     

Obama and Afghanistan: a constructivist approach to shifting policy narrative and practices

Abstract

This article adopts a constructivist approach to explain how and why the Obama administration shifted its policy narrative and practices towards Afghanistan from 2011 onwards. It recognizes that the ‘Global War on Terror’ narrative helped pave the way for a set of institutionalized militarized practices and collectively held beliefs that have structured the post-9/11 world. At the same time, the article argues that the Obama administration’s ‘selling’ of its Afghan policy provided the space for an evolving approach. This policy narrative involved the ‘existential threat’ of transnational militant actors operating out of an Afghanistan–Pakistan ungoverned space being downgraded to a ‘containable’ one. Three key factors prompted this change: the administration’s discursive decoupling of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; the changing perception that the threat posed by ‘al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ was a decentralized one; and the United States’ changed conception of Afghanistan as a ‘safe haven’ for transnational terrorists.     

Diplomacy of Estrangement: The Dealings of the United States with Pakistan before 9/11

Diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the American Embassy in Islamabad published by the National Security Archive shows that during the last 35 years of the twentieth century American diplomacy toward Pakistan faced a mutually de-escalating relationship. Pakistan wanted American economic and military assistance as well as support in its conflicts with India. The United States was ready to aid Pakistan, but only so far as Islamabad respected American demands. These focused on containing Soviet influence in the region and, more recently, fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States also asked Pakistan to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. To enforce this policy, successive American administrations showered Pakistan with sanctions. These sanctions were lifted again and again, because they undercut American diplomatic influence with the Pakistani government. Washington did not intend to support Pakistan in its conflicts with India. Pakistan let down the United States by not using its leverage over the Taliban to capture Osama Bin Laden. Mistrust resulting from this roller coaster relationship should have warned American diplomats not to take Pakistan's support in the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for granted.     

Insurgents,accidental guerrillas and valley-ism: an oral history of oppositional US soldiers' attitudes toward the enemy in Afghanistan

In recent years Western policy towards Afghanistan has been marked by inconsistencies and errors. This article explores United States (US) soldiers' perceptions of the enemy in Afghanistan based on oral history interviews with dissenting combat soldiers who served in the Afghan theatre. By foregrounding soldiers' attitudes towards the enemy, this study includes marginalized voices, often overlooked, that challenge prevailing misconceptions. General David Petraeus, the former commander of US forces in Afghanistan, has argued that significant battlefield decisions are not reserved for generals alone. Petraeus' counterinsurgency programme promotes ‘strategic corporals’ whose decisions hold important consequences. If strategic corporals are involved in military decision-making, it follows that their interpretation of the conflict may also hold strategic implications for the researcher. Soldiers' views of war are not the final, authoritative verdict. However, this article suggests that these strategic corporals should be included in a complex matrix of interpretation to broaden US understanding of the enemy.     

A FAREWELL TO THE GREAT GAME? PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Long before 9–11, Russia and the United States found common ground in their efforts to undermine the Taliban government in Afghanistan, despite serious disagreements over policy in other parts of the world. The events of 9–11, however, changed Russian foreign and security policy drastically. One of the most fundamental and controversial shifts came when President Putin chose not to interfere in US negotiations with the Central Asian states to use their airbases for the US war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Putin also offered to use Russia’s oil reserves as a means to stabilize jittery world markets. In return, Russia gained US support for its bid to pipe Caspian Sea oil over Russian territory. More importantly, the US government gave Russia essentially a free hand in its war against separatist Chechnya. While there are many potential scenarios in highly unstable Central Asia that could serve to sour relations once again, Russia and the United States have an unprecedented opportunity to build trust and cooperation through peacekeeping and problem solving in the region.     

The Big Problem of Small Allies: New Data and Theory on Defiant Local Counterinsurgency Partners in Afghanistan and Iraq

Alliance politics are critical yet understudied in counterinsurgency interventions. Despite the importance of local allies, traditional research on alliances fails to account for the challenges of managing in-country counterinsurgency security partners or explain variation among which types of policy requests from large intervening allies are likely to result in compliance or defiance by local partners. When did US intervening forces have leverage in Iraq and Afghanistan, and when was American influence limited? Utilizing thousands of US government documents to analyze over 250 US demands of allies in Kabul and Baghdad, this paper reexamines established variables in the literature on inter-alliance bargaining—namely allied interests and dependencies—to offer a new model describing the interaction of these variables in asymmetric counterinsurgency partnerships. The theory predicts when large allies are likely to influence local partners and when these intervening forces will likely fail to coerce them.