Negative Weights for Performance Measures

ABSTRACT

Quantitative performance measurement is a controversial idea in the public sector. This paper argues that management by measurement is sensible if the measurement methods have a sufficient quality. In particular, quantitative performance measures have to address problems of gaming and monitoring intensity. I look at the assignment of negative weights to poor, but informative, performance measures even if these measures have a positive correlation with the non-contractible performance objective. In a simple agency relationship, I show how a poor measure with negative weight can serve as an indicator for manipulation. However, the benefits derived from a negative weight may come at the price of increased measurement risk. Healthcare and research organizations provide examples of how negative weights can improve performance measurement.     

Does E-Government Measure Up to E-Business? Comparing End User Perceptions of U.S. Federal Government and E-Business Web Sites

This paper examines the federal government's success in implementing and providing high-quality service through e-government, something that has received very little attention. We define quality from the perspective of the end users of federal agency Web sites, as measured through customer survey data. Using data from the American Customer Satisfaction Index, we compare the performance of federal agency Web sites across a range of relevant variables with a private sector equivalent, e-business Web sites. Our findings suggest that federal e-government Web sites are not yet, in the aggregate, providing the same level of quality as their e-business counterparts. We also find significant variability among federal agencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for e-government performance measurement, performance benchmarking, and the market-centered theories of administrative reform that are driving e-government and similar transformations of government practice.     

Interstate and Intergovernmental Factors Affecting the Conditions of Rural Bridges

Many of the nation's rural highway bridges are structurallydeficient, functionally inadequate, or both. Rural bridges areparticularly likely to be in poor condition in states wherethe federal government plays a small role in the highway program,where local governments play a large role in highway financing,and where the chief state transportation agency is a highwaydepartment rather than a department of transportation. The assignmentof responsibilities, then, appears to influence program performance.     

Exploring the relationship between performance management and program impact: A case study of the job training partnership act

Programs that involve multiple levels of government may suffer from a principal‐agent problem: Lower levels of government may wish to pursue different objectives than the higher level of government that provides funding. One strategy for dealing with this problem is to establish a performance management system where units operating the program are accountable for meeting performance standards and are rewarded or sanctioned depending on how well they perform. Title II‐A of the Job Training Partnership Act provides training for economically disadvantaged adults and has operated under a performance management system since 1983 when the program was established. The federal government's goal for the program is to maximize impact on the employment and earnings of participants, but because control groups are not available for the 640 local programs, proxy measures of performance must be used. In this paper, data from an experiment in 16 sites are used to determine how closely measured performance corresponds to program impact. It is concluded that there is only a weak correspondence between the two measures and that the Department of Labor should avoid making significant rewards or sanctions based on the current performance management system. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Do Job Corps performance measures track program impacts?

Since the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act, performance measurement systems based on short‐term program outcomes have been increasingly used to assess the effectiveness of federal programs. This paper examines the association between program performance measures and long‐term program impacts, using nine‐year follow‐up data from a recent large‐scale, national experimental evaluation of Job Corps, the nation's largest federal job training program for disadvantaged youths. Job Corps is an important test case because it uses a comprehensive performance system that is widely emulated. We find that impacts on key outcomes are not associated with measured center performance levels. Participants in higherperforming centers had better outcomes; however, the same pattern holds for comparable controls. Thus, the performance measurement system is not achieving the goal of ranking and rewarding centers on the basis of their ability to improve participant outcomes relative to what these outcomes would have been otherwise. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Using Performance Measures for Federal Budgeting: Proposals and Prospects

The political system, the popular press, and the public have recently been concerned about measuring government performance. This concern for measuring performance should imply a concern for measuring it correctly. With this in mind, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently conducted an analysis of the use of performance measures in the budget process. The study attempts to review the issues raised by performance budgeting in the context of past and current efforts to link performance measures and budgeting. This article focuses on two portions of that study: The status of the current federal performance measurement efforts and specific observations designed to inject a note of caution into the current debate about performance measurement and budgeting.     

Reinventing Reforms: How to Improve Program Management Using Performance Measures. Really

This paper looks at the design and use of incentivized performance measures to motivate managerial efficiency and promote greater program effectiveness. It starts off by looking at recent reforms like the Government Performance and Results Act to understand why they were largely unsuccessful in altering the decision‐making process of government agencies. One problem was that performance measures have been both numerous and complicated, thereby making their role in management and oversight difficult. Equally important, no external incentives were attached to program accomplishments. The paper then examines what elements would be needed to build a management system that encourages both more efficient and more effective agency behavior. The goal of performance budgeting is to develop performance measures that display the progress of a program toward its stated objectives. Assessments based on these measures may then call for rewards or punishments. As such, it also may encourage program managers toward improved performance. The paper examines the pitfalls and complexities dealt with by Congress and Office of Management and Budget in the process. For example, a performance system must distinguish between funding program needs, as warranted by sectoral indicators, and management concerns. It must also unambiguously tie incentives to performance measures to motivate agencies, while building in commitment devices for the principals. Incentivized performance measures may not be appropriate in all conditions, but may be helpful for motivating managers and improving program performance in particular circumstances.     

So Hard to Say Goodbye? Turnover Intention among U.S. Federal Employees

Why do U.S. federal government employees choose to leave the federal service? By focusing on turnover intentions, this article develops propositions about why employees anticipate leaving their jobs along three dimensions: (1) demographic factors, (2) workplace satisfaction factors, and (3) organizational/relational factors. Two distinct measures of turnover intention are advanced that reflect those who intend to leave their agency for another position within the federal government and those who intend to leave the federal government for an outside position. The 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey is used to test the impacts of three clusters of independent variables on these measures of turnover intention. The findings suggest that overall job satisfaction and age affect turnover consistently. Practical recommendations are outlined for public managers seeking to boost employee retention.     

Extending the Theory of Goal Ambiguity to Programs: Examining the Relationship between Goal Ambiguity and Performance

One of the main assumptions of empirical studies conducted on the influence of goal ambiguity in public management is that goal ambiguity relates negatively to performance. However, this relationship has rarely been tested at the program level because common goal ambiguity and performance measures for disparate government programs have been scant. The availability of Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) results for a number of federal programs provides the opportunity for an analysis testing the foregoing assumption. Measures of program goal ambiguity—target, timeline, and program evaluation—are shown to have negative relationships with different program performance scores, taking into account alternative influences or biases on performance. This analysis extends the theory of goal ambiguity by providing the first analysis of large‐sample federal programs. The theoretical and practical implications are presented in the discussion and conclusion.     

Potential Effects of Federal Policy Devolution on Local Housing Expenditures

As 1994 came to a close, the future of the U.S. Department ofHousing and Urban Development (HUD) and the continued role ofthe federal government in low-income housing assistance washighly uncertain. The agency was targeted for elimination bycongressional leaders, its budget was the object of recissionattempts, and agency officials proposed a radical reinventionto alter housing programs and the delivery system for federalhousing assistance. Given the likelihood of either more budgetcuts (resulting in greater reliance on nonfederal sources offunds) or the devolution of policy responsibility through blockgrants, there is heightened concern for how local governmentsallocate housing funds. This article examines housing expenditurestrategies of large U.S. cities. The analysis describes factorsrelated to a greater use of nonfederal housing revenues by cities,and examines the impact of funding source on program and beneficiarytargeting. The data suggest that reduced federal spending ora shift to block grants is likely to result in more housingbenefits directed to moderate-income households and to homeownersand homebuyers.     

Strengthening the Intergovernmental Grant System: Long-Term Lessons for the Federal–Local Relationship

This study investigates the longitudinal political and administrative problems associated with federal–local government relations. The findings demonstrate four primary challenges of the system of federal grants-in-aid that hinder the relationship of policy design at the federal level and policy implementation in local communities: the politics of decentralization, subnational capacity, program accountability and program adaptability. A case study of the Community Development Block Grant, as assessed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the General Accounting Office between 1974 and the present, is included to demonstrate the application of these problems within the system. Although the "evolution of devolution" can greatly benefit the recipients of public services at the local level, it often operates within an unorganized and ineffective system that public managers at all levels of government must continue to develop.     

The Obama Administration and PBB: Building on the Legacy of Federal Performance‐Informed Budgeting?

The administration of President Barack Obama, like those of his immediate predecessors, is focused on trying to improve the quality of, and use of, performance data. The federal government has been pursuing performance‐informed budget reforms for more than 50 years. Most recently, the Bush administration reforms included the President’s Management Agenda and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). The Obama administration reforms include: measuring the effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; reducing or eliminating poorly‐performing programs; setting a limited number of short‐term, high‐priority performance goals; and funding detailed program evaluations. The administration is taking a more agency‐driven approach than the Bush administration, but continues to find it challenging to move beyond production of performance data to its use. There should be opportunities to show how performance information can be used for decision making, given the change in the political climate and the needs to reduce spending and the deficit. Historically, there has been little appetite in the Congress for evidence‐based decision making. The administration, however, can continue to demonstrate how federal agencies can use performance information to more effectively manage programs.     

Divided government and US federal rulemaking

Despite paying a great deal of attention to the effects of divided government on legislative outputs, scholars of American politics have surprisingly ignored the potential impact of divided government on bureaucratic regulatory outputs. In this article we argue that divided government should reduce the volume of federal agency rulemaking. We test this hypothesis against a data set covering 21,000 rules from 1983 to 2005. Our study is one of the first to analyze the determinants of federal bureaucratic rulemaking activity across such a long period of time. Our results demonstrate that during periods of divided government, agencies issue fewer rules and fewer substantively significant rules than they do during periods of unified government. These findings suggest that divided government impedes agency rulemaking.     

The Substitution Approach To Intergovernmental Relations: The Case Of OSHA

Federal legislation of the last two decades has substantiallyreduced state autonomy in dealing with many regulatory issues.Participation in the implementation of these federal programsmay, however, enable states to exert some leverage over policyoutcomes. Variations in state leverage no doubt exist from oneintergovernmental grant program to the next. Substitution authoritymay be one variable accounting for this variation. Under a substitutionapproach, a federal agency cannot only sever the flow of fundsto a grantee; it can also step in and operate a program if statesfail to meet expectations or choose not to participate. Thisarticle generates more basic propositions about the substitutionapproach by analyzing its implementation under the OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970. The article examines the roleplayed by substitution authority in motivating the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration (OSHA) to adopt an aggressiveposture toward the states. The article then assesses whetherOSHA's aggressiveness prompted state grantees to exert considerableeffort on behalf of program goals. Finally, the implicationsof current reform proposals, which call for a sorting out offunctions between the states and the federal government, receiveattention.     

State Capacity,Bureaucratic Politicization,and Corruption in the Brazilian State

Responding to recent articles in Governance highlighting the need for improved measurement of bureaucratic characteristics, this article describes efforts to map Brazil's federal agencies on three dimensions—capacity, autonomy, and partisan dominance—derived from data on more than 326,000 civil servants. The article provides a “proof of concept” about the utility of agency‐level measures of these variables, demonstrating how they relate to an output common to all agencies: corruption. The article provides a first step in the direction of building a comparative research program that offers objective evaluation of bureaucracies within nation‐states, with the intent of better disentangling their impact on governance outcomes.     

NOT JUST BRICKS AND MORTAR: EEO IN HOMESWEST

Abstract: Moves by both state and federal governments to implement private sector management practices in government administration have received attention from a number of writers. Feminist critics of corporate management argue that, in very devolved situations, public sector management concentrates on the achievement of program outcomes to the detriment of other management objectives and Equal Employment Opportunity is ignored. The contention that efficiency and effectiveness are promoted at the expense of equity under a regime of public sector corporate management will be addressed through a case study of the West Australian Housing Commission, Homeswest. This paper examines the results of Equal Employment Opportunity programs in a highly corporatised state government agency.     

Strange bedfellows: Federal systems and performance management

This paper offers the first link between models of the measurement and management of performance and the dimensions of governance arrangements in federal systems. Four ideal type approaches to governance in federal systems are correlated against four ideal types of measuring and managing performance. The paper develops a model that will support empirical research examining reform trajectories where evolving systems of federalism require evolving systems to manage performance in joint arrangements between levels of government.     

Federal Frustration, State Satisfaction? Voters and Decentralized Governmental Power

An analysis using the 1996 American National Elections Studyand measures of state government responsiveness and performancefinds that feelings about one's state government are largelyideological in orientation and have little to do with any perceivedfailures on the part of the federal government or the actualperformance or perceived responsiveness of the respondent'sstate government. National economic performance was the onlynon-ideological factor that consistently related to feelingsabout the federal government and state governments. Feelingsabout the federal and state governments, and for the principleof big government in general, were powerfully linked to candidatevote choice in the 1996 presidential election, even after partisanand ideological factors were taken into account.     

Encouraging Local Compliance with Federal Civil Rights Laws: Field Experiments with the National Voter Registration Act

Can state officials increase local officials’ compliance with an important federal civil rights law with subtle interventions? The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires voter registration services at certain government agencies, but many counties fail to comply with the act. Working with officials in two states, the authors conducted field experiments to determine whether two methods commonly used by state officials increase compliance with the NVRA. Findings show that although the effects of the methods on output were sizable relative to recent performance, agency performance remained poor overall, with many offices continuing their history of registering no voters. The authors also discovered that gains in performance were largest for the offices that had performed best in the past. These findings suggest that while subtle interventions by state officials can produce increased compliance, stronger tactics may be needed to secure implementation of this federal law by local government agents.     

Das institutionelle Erbe des „Treuhand-Regimes“ in Ostdeutschland: Zentralisierung oder Auflösung in der bundesstaatlichen Normalverfassung?

The unification of Germany in 1990 deeply affected the traditional structure and mechanisms of the former West German federal state. The grave and deeply rooted economic problems in East Germany as well as the strong position of the federal government and the relative weakness of the East German state governments during the economic transformation made it highly possible that a centralization within the federal state even beyond East Germany would occur. Empirical research on the privatisation agency ‘Treuhandanstalt’ and its successor organisations, which is presented in the article, demonstrates what development the relationship between the federal and the East German states has taken in this policy area since 1990. The article further analyses if the centralization thesis can be confirmed and what can generally be concluded about the essential characteristics of the current federal system.