Developments in Danish Parliamentary Democracy: Accountability, Parties and External Constraints

Danish parliamentary developments since the Second World War include the consolidation of minority rule, a reduction in the power of established political parties, and more external constraints on parliamentary actors. They also involve a number of more specific changes to the various steps of delegation and accountability. The evidence tends to support the thesis of a paradox in the development of parliamentary democracy. On the one hand, changes in the constitutional chain of delegation and accountability have, on the whole, favoured the principals (voters, parliament, ministers) compared with their agents (parliament, ministers, civil servants). On the other hand, the established parties have declined somewhat and there are more external constraints than there used to be. This implies that the power of democratic principals has increased within narrower limits of action. In such a situation, the principals can be said to 'decide more about less' because of the stronger national and (not least) international constraints. However, the emergence of a partially new system of governance cannot unequivocally be called better or worse than the traditional Danish system of democratic governance.     

Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work

Abstract. In modern democracies political parties exist because (1) they reduce transaction costs in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas and (2) help overcome the dilemma of collective action. In Western Europe political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political delegation and accountability work in practice. Party representatives in public office are ultimately the agents of the extra–parliamentary party organization. In order to contain agency loss parties rely on party–internal mechanisms and the institutionalisation of party rights in public rules and, in contrast to US parties, they apply the full range of ex ante and ex post mechanisms. Generally, the role of party is weaker the further down the chain of delegation.     

Iceland: Searching for Democracy along Three Dimensions of Citizen Control

This article scrutinises delegation and accountability in Iceland. In a healthy democracy, the representatives serve the wishes and interests of the main principal, the people. In an ailing democracy, the agents of the people primarily serve themselves.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, the semi-presidential constitutional framework places the voters in a central role. They vote in two systems, electing MPs in the parliamentary system and the president by a national vote. The open primary, adopted by the main political parties, gives the voters the opportunity to participate in the selection of candidates in parliamentary elections. The central role of the voters is, however, often made difficult by the fluctuation and complexity of this dual system of representation. Second, citizen control through party organisations and party membership has all but disappeared. Instead, political parties cater to the fickle electorate and produce government policy aiming at economic stability and economic growth. Third, external constraints – the political presidency, judicial activism and Iceland's membership of the European Economic Area – all weigh in and sometimes override decisions reached by the parliamentary system of government.
The final conclusion is that the Icelandic system of governance has become a rather messy and complicated political arrangement, thereby resembling the situation in other modern democracies.     

Pre-parliamentary party career and political representation

Abstract

Members of parliament are accountable to both their district and party. Consequently, they have to balance their responsiveness to these competing principals when their preferences diverge. Existing research on this representational dilemma focuses mostly on the role of political institutions, whereas this article offers a new individual-level explanation: pre-parliamentary party careers. Using sequence analysis, three ideal-typical pre-parliamentary career paths are identified: the party local, the party functionary, and the party civilian. The share of party locals increases over time at the expense of party civilians in the Danish parliament, and these party locals are more likely to diverge from the party’s position when it is unpopular among their constituents. These findings corroborate existing evidence of political professionalisation in parliamentary democracies, but they also suggest that professionalisation may be associated with a localisation of politics leading to more rather than less constituency representation.     

Sweden: Democratic Reforms and Partisan Decline in an Emerging Separation-of-Powers System1

Early in the twentieth century, parliamentary democracy developed within an 1809 constitution based on separation of powers. By the mid-1970s, the last remnants of this constitution had disappeared. After that, measures such as more openness in candidate nominations, positive preference voting and more scrutiny by parliamentarians were introduced to strengthen the democratic chain. But a weakening of political parties and an increased importance of external constraints are again moving Sweden towards a de facto separation-of-powers system. There is once again a considerable discrepancy between the written constitutional framework and the 'working constitution'. In particular, local and supranational constraints on national policy making provide reason for a reconsideration of the constitutional framework.     

Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction

Abstract. The role of the president is presumed to vary amongst presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. However, there are a variety of subtypes within semi-presidential systems. Debate often hinges on the prime minister and government, and to whom they are more accountable. However, the accountability of prime ministers and governments to presidents can be rather 'fuzzy'. This article looks through the prism of the president rather than that of the government. After examining definitions of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, several dispositional categories of political regimes will be established. Then presidential power will be assessed through a series of dichotomous measures, and for all electoral democracies with a president. Finally, the character of each category will be assessed. The concept of 'semi-presidentialism' is rejected in favour of more meaningful labels: presidential systems, parliamentary systems with presidential dominance, parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective and parliamentary systems with figurehead presidents.     

Norway: Madisonianism Reborn

This article discusses citizen control in Norwegian parliamentary democracy, and specifically the changes that have recently taken place. Around 1960 Norway had reached a constitutional form that, apart from the consequences of proportional representation, looked much like a Westminster system. From that point on, however, Norwegian democracy has generally moved away from this model. A series of minority governments has given rise to parliamentary reassertion. The Norwegian party system has fragmented, and the individual parties have atrophied as mass membership organizations. A wave of corporatism and later a heightened assertiveness on the part of the judiciary have helped to contain parliamentary power. Two critical European Union membership referendums in 1972 and 1994 have firmly established the role of direct democracy in critical political decisions. And despite the results of these two popular consultations, international constraints have become ever more significant. Compared with most others in Europe, however, Norway is a relatively unconstrained polity. There are few important ways in which the citizenry is partitioned into multiple democratic principals, and the country is a reasonable fit to the parliamentary ideal type of an unfettered hierarchy controlled by the median voter. At the same time, the trend is unmistakably one towards greater policy‐making complexity and increasing constraints on policy makers. Norway's reluctant but seemingly inevitable incorporation into a larger Europe is the greatest and most decisive of these constraints, but it is not the only one. Judicial institutions are likely to play an increasingly important political role, and direct democracy perhaps likewise. And although central bank independence has met with greater scepticism than in most other European countries, it is not likely to be reversed. All in all, it seems that Norwegian parliamentary governance is becoming at least a little more Madisonian and a little less Westminsterian.     

Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation

European(ist) scholars have largely followed their American(ist) colleagues in the formulation of theories about delegation of powers to non-majoritarian institutions, most notably through the application of principal-agent models of relations between legislative principals and their executive and judicial agents. This article suggests that Europeanists can once again learn from recent developments in both theory and method in the study of delegation in American politics. The first section discusses the methodological challenges of testing hypotheses about the conditions under which agents might enjoy some degree of autonomy from their legislative principals, and draws lessons from the recent Americanist literature. The section examines the development in American politics of a second wave of principal-agent analysis which aims to formulate and test hypotheses about the conditions under which legislative principals might delegate authority and discretion to bureaucratic agents. The third and final section of the article examines some preliminary applications of the principal-agent approach to the European Union and to the comparative study of European parliamentary democracies, and proposes a research agenda for the comparative study of national-level delegation in the parliamentary systems of Western Europe.     

The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power: Measuring the Mechanical Effect of a Political Institution

Recent discussions of Swedish political change have focused on the decline of Social Democratic 'hegemony' and on the end of the 'Swedish model'. In contrast to preference– or interest –driven explanations for these developments, this paper investigates the impact of constitutional changes made in 1969 in Sweden, which included the elimination of the Upper House or First Chamber of the Swedish parliament and the introduction of a more directly proportional electoral system. Using a simulation model, the actual electoral results from 1969 through 1994 were plugged into the formulas set forth by the old constitutional rules, in order to generate the number of parliamentary seats each party would have received under the old system. This simulation shows that the Social Democratic Party would have received a significantly larger share of parliamentary seats under the old constitutional rules than under the current constitution. Thus one can conclude that the new constitution decreased Social Democratic power in Sweden.     

Scotland's Future Political System

Debates on Scottish constitutional reform go hand in hand with discussions of political reform. Its reformers use the image of ‘old Westminster’ to describe ‘control freakery’ within government and an adversarial political system. Many thought that the Scottish political system could diverge from the UK, to strengthen the parliamentary system, introduce consensus politics and further Scotland's alleged social and democratic tradition. Yet the experience of devolution suggests that Holyrood and Westminster politics share key features. Both systems are driven by government, making policy in ‘communities’ involving interest groups and governing bodies, with parliaments performing a limited role and public participation limited largely to elections. The Scottish government's style of policy‐making is distinctive, but new reforms are in their infancy and their effects have not been examined in depth. In this context, the article identifies Scotland's ability to make and implement policy in a new way, based on its current trajectory rather than the hopes of reformers.     

The Appointments Dilemma

In a separation of powers political system, effective bureaucratic control may be undermined by the fact that the power to appoint bureaucrats is controlled by a different set of principals from those that may control them through statutory or budgetary means. In particular, executives have proposal power over bureaucratic appointments and removals while legislators have proposal power over laws. In this article, I explore the consequences of this division of authority for bureaucratic outcomes. I argue that this pattern of authority often produces outcomes inferior to those generated when appointment, removal, and legislative powers are centralized as is the case in many parliamentary systems. The model reveals that restricting executive removal power can mitigate these problems. Finally, I discuss the relevance of this appointments dilemma for bargaining over bureaucratic structures with a focus on removal powers, independent commissions, and civil service rules .     

Prinzipal Parlament. Die Bedeutung europäischer Parlamente als Wahlorgane

In parliamentary systems of government, parliaments can be conceptualized as central power-distributing institutions and as principals of the cabinet and other external officeholders. Relying on the principal-agent framework, this paper shows that electoral powers of parliaments can reduce agency loss and indicate a deviation from the ideal typical chain of delegation in parliamentary systems. Electoral powers of parliaments can be used to assess the degree to which cabinets are indeed constrained by external officeholders, whose constraining effect is often simply assumed. Empirically, the paper offers the first systematic comparative study of electoral powers of 25 European parliaments with regard to seven state offices. The analysis reveals major differences between parliaments and identifies electoral powers as an empirically distinct dimension of parliamentary power resources.     

Do Belgian parties undermine the democratic chain of delegation?

The Belgian party-archy violates the ideal-type chain of parliamentary delegation in many ways, insofar as political parties play a predominant role at each stage. They channel the delegation of power from voters to MPs, from Parliament to the cabinet, from the collective cabinet to individual ministers, and from ministers to their civil servants. Hence, they can be considered the effective principals in the polity, and many actors of the parliamentary chain of delegation, such as MPs, ministers, and civil servants have been reduced to mere party agents. The extreme fragmentation of the Belgian party system in combination with its increasing need for multilevel coordination have further enhanced the position of political parties in the Belgian polity. Yet, at the same time (since the early 1990s), Belgium has also witnessed a gradual decline in the informal system of partitocratic delegation and clientelistic excesses, thereby giving back part of their autonomy to some formal agents, such as the cabinet, top civil servants and some MPs. Still, one can wonder whether these corrections are sufficient to counter the strong outburst of public dissatisfaction with the way parties have run the country in past decades.     

Swedish Bureaucracy in an Era of Change

Swedish bureaucracy combines some structural peculiarities founded on constitutional traits from the 17^th century with a clear formal division of labor between the national and local levels from the late 19^th century. These structures have mainly remained unchanged during periods of strong expansion in the first post-WWII decades and preconditions for shrinking during the 1980s and 1990s. In this article, we highlight how these changes have put stress on the bureaucracy and the public sector in general, and how demands for reform and adapting have been managed and viewed by the administrative and political camps, respectively. Social, educational, and political changes among Swedish bureaucrats and their roles are presented and analyzed. The national bureaucracy has "muddled through" and has not been subjected to radical reforms. Its working is still approved—though by no means regarded as sacred—by its administrative agents and its political principals.     

Decentralized Governance under Centralized Party Rule in Ethiopia: The Tigray Experience

Abstract

In the mid-1990s Ethiopia adopted a federal constitution promising regional autonomy and the creation and strengthening of local government units below the regional level. Some observers attribute the various shortcomings of Ethiopian federalism that have emerged since then to the original institutional/constitutional design. This paper, however, argues that what is not in the constitution has come to influence the workings of decentralization more than what is codified in it. The dominant national party in power, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), either directly or through affiliates, controls political office at all levels of government, thereby limiting the room for local initiative and autonomy. The presence of a national dominant party limits the responsiveness and downward accountability of Wereda (district) authorities; it also undermines political competition, and by extension, good governance at the grassroots level. The paper is based on field research carried out in the Tigray regional state of Ethiopia. The conclusion is that when one party dominates the politics of the region and its institutions, extra-constitutional intra-party politics determine how things work, thereby subjugating localities’ autonomy and impeding their ability to deliver on promises of decentralization.     

The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints

Examining constitutional and political developments since the Second World War, this article shows that Finland has moved from a system dominated by the president toward a normal parliamentary democracy. Government formation is now based on partisan negotiations and the president is almost completely excluded from the policy process in domestic matters. The chain of delegation from the voters to the civil servants is thus now simpler than before and subject to fewer external constraints. In fact, Finland is probably the only West European country where parliamentary democracy has become less constrained since the 1980s. Leadership by presidents has effectively been replaced with leadership by strong majority governments, which have ruled, without much effective opposition, since the early 1980s. The stronger role of parties in shaping public policy stands in contrast to the weakening of the parties among the electorate. The ability of political parties to effectively align preferences is increasingly in doubt, as indicated by the transforming cleavage structure, lower turnout and declining party membership.     

The rise of post-imperial populism: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain

Abstract.  Recent approaches to contemporary Euroscepticism have explained it in terms of the politics of opposition and peripherality characteristic of competitive party systems. Euroscepticism becomes a central strategy by which non-mainstream parties or factions within mainstream parties attempt to gain political advantage. In the British case, there has been a focus on the influence Eurosceptic factionalism can have within a first-past-the-post parliamentary system. This article challenges explanations of British Euroscepticism in terms of the politics of opposition and the workings of the party system. Instead, it is proposed that a structural crisis of British party politics has allowed Euroscepticism to enter the political mainstream. The author conceives of Euroscepticism as a distinct and powerful national movement asserting conceptions of Britain's exceptional national identity. This is viewed as part of a post-imperial crisis that shifts parties, and factions within parties, towards populist forms of legitimation that have weakened possibilities for stable and coherent political leadership over European integration. Consequently, mainstream parties have struggled to protect themselves against the ideological influence of this populist Euroscepticism. This is particularly evident during periods of Eurosceptic mobilization, and is demonstrated in this article through the examination of the extensive role played by right-wing Eurosceptic forces during the attempt by the Major Government to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.     

Expanding the Online Political Demos but Maintaining the Status Quo? Internet and Social Media Use by Finnish Voters Prior to Elections, 2003–15

Though reinforcement/mobilisation theories regarding the impact of the Internet on citizens’ political engagement are predictive, there are few longitudinal studies on how the profile of the citizens using the Internet for political purposes has changed and how this relates to such theoretical perspectives. Using survey data from four Finnish parliamentary elections, 2003–15, this longitudinal study examines the evolution of the predictors of belonging to the segment of citizens who extensively engage in searching for political information online during the elections. Additionally, the research longitudinally studies the evolution of the drivers of citizens deeming online sources as important for informing their voting decisions. In light of demographic and resource‐based traits, a mobilisation trend is detected across time in the analyses. As to factors concerning attitudes and orientation to politics, however, a more evident reinforcement trend has emerged. These patterns are also evident when examining social media engagement through searching for political information during campaigns. Although the Internet and social media are becoming important for a demographically increasingly diverse group of citizens, especially the young, it is those already predisposed for doing so who have, over time, engaged politically to an increasing degree through these channels.     

Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

Despite extensive research on Eurosceptic challenger parties, our knowledge of their influence on political opposition has so far been sparse. In this article we make an in‐depth assessment of parliamentary EU opposition, based on 4,264 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committees (EACs) of Denmark and Sweden. Our analysis shows that the presence of Eurosceptic challenger parties in the national parliamentary arena impacts patterns and practices of EU opposition significantly. A greater presence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties in parliament is associated with more opposition in EU politics. These parties deliver a vast majority of the polity‐oriented opposition towards the EU and present more policy alternatives than mainstream parties. The findings presented have implications for our understanding of national parliamentary EU opposition as well as for the assessment of the impact of Eurosceptic challenger parties on the process of European integration.     

ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: THE BRITISH DEBATE*

Abstract: This paper examines recent developments in the debate in Britain about the role of public enterprises which are wholly owned by the State, that is, the nationalized industries. The changing political and economic context surrounding public enterprise is briefly outlined and the successive attempts to give operational significance to concepts of accountability and performance are noted. In the light of this review recent developments in the framework of control are discussed. It is argued that the parliamentary system has failed to develop adequate criteria of accountability and performance for the nationalized industries, in part because of inherent difficulties common to systems of representative government, which in Britain have been exacerbated by a declining rate of economic growth and attendant attempts to reduce public expenditure.