Labour Constitutions and Occupational Communities: Social Norms and Legal Norms at Work

This paper considers the interaction of legal norms and social norms in the regulation of work and working relations, observing that, with the contraction of collective bargaining, this is a matter that no longer attracts the attention that it deserves. Drawing upon two concepts from sociology – Max Weber's ‘labour constitution’ and Seymour Martin Lipset's ‘occupational community’ – it focuses on possibilities for the emergence, within groups of workers, of shared normative beliefs concerning ‘industrial justice’ (Selznick); for collective solidarity and agency; for the transformation of shared beliefs into legally binding norms; and for the enforcement of those norms. If labour law is currently in ‘crisis’, then a promising route out of the crisis, we argue, is for the law to recover its procedural focus, facilitating and encouraging these processes.     

Seeking Shelter in Personal Insolvency Law: Recession,Eviction, and Bankruptcy's Social Safety Net

Many legal systems understand consumer insolvency laws as social insurance, providing relief and a ‘fresh start’ to over‐indebted households who fall through gaps in the social safety net. Personal insolvency law in England and Wales in practice functions similarly, but in terms of legal principle and policy is ambivalent – sometimes emphasizing household debt relief, other times creditor wealth maximization. This article assesses, in the context of novel debt problems brought to prominence by recession and austerity, the extent to which the law has embraced personal insolvency's social insurance function. The discussion is framed particularly by the escalating United Kingdom housing crisis and the case of Places for People v. Sharples concerning consumer bankruptcy's (non)protection of debtors from eviction. The analysis illustrates how tensions between conceptual understandings and personal insolvency law's practical operation undermine the law's ability to fulfil its potential to produce positive policy responses to contemporary socio‐economic challenges.     

Of ‘Landmark’ or ‘Leading’ Cases: Salomon's Challenge

This article seeks to question the two dominant conceptions of ‘landmark’ or ‘leading’ cases in English legal scholarship, using the House of Lords decision in Salomon v. Salomon Co Ltd. – the most famous case in corporate law – as a case study. It argues that neither the first dominant conception of ‘leading’ or ‘landmark’ cases, characterized by the analysis of the intrinsic merits of a case, nor the second, which looks at the historical contexts in which cases were decided, appears sufficient by itself to determine whether a case is landmark or canonical. Rather, we have to look at how the canonicity of a case is constructed by subsequent courts. The article seeks to advance the debate concerning the formation of landmark cases and aims to challenge certain prevailing views on the canonicity of corporate law's arguably most significant case.     

Democracy and emergency: finding the constitutional foundation of the knowledgeable state in social dynamics

This article aims to bring to light the law–society dynamic relationship in constitutional governance by engaging with the question of political constitutionalism from the perspective of institutional epistemology. It first reframes the debate surrounding legal and political constitutionalism as one concerning the state's ‘epistemic competence’ in governance shaped by the constitution, and then traces how constitutional ordering has given rise to the ‘knowledgeable state’ by setting a unique social dynamic in motion: the ‘epistemico-political constitution’. Using the example of the World Health Organization's initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a the article presents a two-part argument. First, constitutional ordering institutes a process of knowledge production embedded in the interaction between the state and society – a unique law–society dynamic – that responds to governance needs. Second, given the current law–society dynamic in the suprastate political landscape, the legitimacy challenge facing expertise-steered global governance is further intensified as more crisis responses are expected from outside the state.     

Reflections on the sociology of law: A rejection of law as ‘socially marginal’

Rejecting the concept of law as subservient to social pathology, the principle aim of this article is to locate law as a critical matter of social structure – and power – which requires to be considered as a central element in the construction of society and social institutions. As such, this article contends that wider jurisprudential notions such as legal procedure and procedural justice, and juridical power and discretion are cogent, robust normative social concerns (as much as they are legal concerns) that positively require consideration and representation in the empirical study of sociological phenomena. Reflecting upon scholarship and research evidence on legal procedure and decision-making, the article attempts to elucidate the inter-relationship between power, ‘the social’, and the operation of law. It concludes that law is not ‘socially marginal’ but socially, totally central.     

IT and Law,and Law Schools

If 'computing and law' as a discipline is to push forward and develop, it will do so best within the context of the law school rather than as a joint enterprise between law and other disciplines. It is in the law school that the understanding of the nature of law is at its height. Yet there are problems here-law schools have a strained relationship with technology and their concept of the breadth of 'legal scholarship' can be limited by conventional (or ideologically-biased) views of law and an undergraduate-oriented view of the law school's purpose. There are also problems arising from the nature of communications between lawyers and computer scientists. In this article, I highlight these problems and also argue for a more developed and extended view of legal scholarship which will be able to incorporate study and research of the impact of the computer upon legal society as well as the legal control of the unwanted elements arising from these new technologies. Most writings on IT and the law school concentrate upon its use as an educational tool. My interest here is not so much in this side of things, but in the research culture of the law school. Whilst there is sometimes a view that the linkage of law school and IT is purely related to the use of technology in legal education, the remit is wider and includes the understanding of the link between substantive law and the context of the new computerized world and also the impact of the computer in the practice of law. This latter aspect is becoming increasingly important with the Woolf reforms and computerization of the procedural elements of law, but also in substantive law: for example, administrative systems are becoming more and more mediated by technology, and administrative law must be reviewed and re-worked in this context.     

We All Make Mistakes: A ‘Duty of Virtue’ Theory of Restitutionary Liability for Mistaken Payments

In contrast to the moral foundations of contract, tort, and the law of property, which are generally regarded as elements of Kantian ‘right’, the liability to return the value of mistaken payments is, it is argued, an example of the law's enforcing a duty of virtue, the legalisation of the duty of beneficence in a way similar (though not identical) to how the law might instantiate a duty of easy rescue. Accordingly, one of Birks's most cherished theses – that the law of unjust enrichment represents a distinctive element of private law – can be made out: it is distinctive in having an entirely different normative source: in virtue, not in right. But this result comes at a cost: (1) a legal system could function more or less justly without such a liability; (2) Birks's thesis that liability for mistaken payment is the archetype or paradigmatic case of liability for unjust enrichment would have to be abandoned; and (3) we would have to recognise that the ground of this liability is policy‐motivated.     

Gender,race, bias and perspective: OR,how otherness colours your judgment

This discussion considers assumptions about judges and judging and suggests that despite what is sometimes perceived as increasing diversity on the bench and in the legal profession, outsider decision makers’ membership of the jurisprudential community is still marked by ‘otherness’. The argument draws upon my ongoing interest in the law's concern with the concepts of ‘objectivity’, ‘neutrality’ and ‘perspective’. I argue that the legal system is inherently suspicious of ‘otherness’ and most specifically so when ‘others’ occupy positions of ‘judgement’. The consequence is to render decisions made by ‘otherised’ judges liable to attack for bias in a way that decisions made by insiders simply are not. The argument is illustrated by a review of a number of challenges made on the ground of ‘bias’ or recusal motions to judges whose failure to match the white Anglo hetero-normative standard of ‘the judge’ is seen as a limit on their ability to be ‘impartial’. The examples used range across many jurisdictions, from Australia, Canada, the US and a challenge to the impartiality of a decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).     

Time in Law's Domain

Law bends the past of a community's common life towards its future. 1 Precedent is one of law's favored tools for doing the bending, and legal systems that assign precedent a starring role seem especially mindful of time. Yet, mindfulness of time goes far deeper into law's DNA. It is not limited to the doctrine of precedent or unique to common‐law jurisdictions. Recognizing that time is an elemental dimension of human experience and basic ordering principle of practical agency, law utilizes and orders time. Temporality is essential to law's distinctive mode of governance and guidance.     

When Is a Regime Not a Legal System? Alexy on Moral Correctness and Social Efficacy

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness.     

Lessons from the Wolfenden Report

The article traces the recent history of homosexual law reform in the UK and the countries of the Commonwealth of Nations, using as its point of departure the Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, 1957 (‘Wolfenden Report’). In light of the Wolfenden principle – that certain matters of private morality are not the law's business and especially not the proper business of punishment under the criminal law – the article proposes a methodology for law reform in those countries of the Commonwealth that inherited the penal offences but have not yet acted to repeal them.     

Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: Lehman Brothers and the Regulation of the Legal Profession

Should transactional lawyers bear responsibility when their competent actions facilitate unlawful activity by their client? Or is a lawyer's only concern to act in the client's interest by providing her with the advice and support she seeks? The high profile failure of Lehman Brothers provides a unique opportunity to explore these questions in the context of the provision of a legal opinion by a magic circle law firm. A legal opinion which, although as a matter of law was accurate, was a necessary precursor to an accounting treatment by Lehman Brothers which was described by the Lehman's Bankruptcy Examiner as ‘balance sheet manipulation’. The article argues that the law's existing understanding of when consequential responsibility should be imposed on those who assist another's wrongdoing provides a theory and a tool‐kit whose application can be justifiably extended to the professional regulation of transactional lawyers.     

Taxonomies of Squatting: Unlawful Occupation in a New Legal Order

Legal responses to the activity of ‘squatting’ include criminal justice, civil actions, property law and housing policy. Some legal analyses of unauthorised occupation focus on the act of squatting, others on the squatter's claim to title through adverse possession. This paper explores recent developments in the law of adverse possession which have been shaped by particular discursive constructions of both squatters and dispossessed landowners. It develops a ‘taxonomy of squatting’ by mapping the positions adopted by the Law Commission, the legislature and various domestic and European courts, in respect of moral issues thrown up by the doctrine of adverse possession, including the distinction between good faith and bad faith squatting, the landowner's duty of stewardship, and the question of compensation. By unpacking the circumstances in which squatting occurs, the paper develops a series of matrices to classify legal responses to unlawful occupation and to facilitate a more systematic and coherent understanding of law's responses to squatting.     

The Politics of Rule of Law Reform: From Delegation to Autonomy

How can we understand the delegation of power and authority – for example, from a polity to an administrator - in a world of fragmented governance? In this paper, I introduce the practices of contemporary ‘rule of law’ and ‘governance’ reform, which reframe this question in politically powerful ways. These practices are increasingly important in development contexts, and beyond. Practitioners begin with the assumption that some sort of administration occurs in the development contexts in which they work. They then focus on how to convene a political community in which to embed – and potentially legitimate - that administration. They thereby reconfigure the question of delegation into one of autonomy – or managing the extent to and ways in which the administrative legal system self-produces. In doing so, I argue that contemporary rule of law practitioners wield constitutional power under the rubric of workaday administrative reform. At the same time, they efface their political accountability.     

Expediency,Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law: A Systems Perspective on Civil/Criminal Procedural Hybrids

In recent years an increasing quantity of UK legislation has introduced blended or ‘hybridised’ procedures that blur the previously clear demarcation between civil and criminal legal processes, typically on the grounds of normatively-motivated political expediency. This paper provides a critical perspective on instances of procedural hybridisation in order to illustrate that, first, the reliance upon civil law measures to remedy criminal law infractions can raise human rights issues and, second, that such instrumental criminal justice strategies deliberately circumvent the enhanced procedural protections of the criminal law. By conceptualising the rule of law as a structural coupling between the political and legal systems, and due process rights as necessary and self-imposed limitations upon systemic operations, this paper employs a systems-theoretical approach to critique this balancing act between expediency and principle, and queries the circumstances under which legislation contravening the rule of law can be said to lack legitimacy.     

Mos Geometricus and the Common Law Mind: Interrogating Contract Theory

Euclidian theories have it that there exist one or a small number of apex principles from which the entire fasciculus of rules of contract law can be logically deduced. Two arguments are marshalled against the Euclidian project. First, that it has been unsuccessfully attempted before – in the form of the nineteenth century contract law treatise which emulated the civil lawyer's rationalistic model, mos geometricus – cautioning us against setting much store by its present reincarnation. Second, that the common law's methodology makes it resistant to this form of theorising. Euclidian theory presupposes a picture of rules on which: a) cases involve an application of logically prior rules; b) rules are reliably identifiable by different actors in the legal system; and c) rules normatively range over an indefinite spectrum of future cases. It will be argued that the common law defies this picture of rules thus rendering Euclidian theory analytically impossible.     

Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial Psychology: Social Science as Social Authority and the Co‐Production of Law and Science

This article combines Monahan and Walker's classification of social facts, social authority, and social frameworks with political‐institutionalism's view of law and science as competing institutional logics to explain how, and with what consequences, employment discrimination law and industrial‐organizational (I‐O) psychology became co‐produced. When social science is incorporated into enforcement of legislative law as social authority—rationale for judicial rule making—law's institutional logic of relying on precedent and reasoning by analogy ensures that social science will have ongoing influence on law's development. By helping set research agendas and providing new professional opportunities, institutionalized legal doctrine shapes social science knowledge. But because of differences in institutional logic, wherein legal cumulation is backward looking whereas scientific cumulation is forward looking, co‐production of law and science may produce institutional mismatch between legal doctrine and scientific knowledge.     

Politics by Other Means in South Africa Today

Rick Abel's classic Politics by Other Means (1995) used South Africa to argue for law's ‘potential nobility’, but it did so avoiding a heroic mode characteristic of much anti-apartheid writing. Abel showed how law could, with strenuous exertion, be turned into a defensive shield for the oppressed. As a sword, however, it was ‘two-edged’. It allowed the powerful to frustrate or overturn hard-won symbolic victories. Recently, the heroic mode has returned to South Africa. The Constitutional Court, in particular, is lauded for having combated ‘state capture’ under deposed President Jacob Zuma. A closer examination of this period, however, does much to vindicate Abel's earlier scepticism about law's offensive value. The spectacular deployment of law to fight politicians’ crimes has exposed the judiciary to unexpected political threats. Meanwhile, civil society's efforts to entrust judges with administrative duties shirked by the government has inevitably entailed the sacrifice of some rule of law values.     

The right to be forgotten – a Dutch perspective

This paper will be investigate to what extent the right to be forgotten as proposed by the European Commission is already recognized in Dutch tort law. The focus of this paper will be on the existence and the desirability of such a right and not on questions of enforcement. It is submitted that although Dutch law does not recognize the right to be forgotten as such, several judicial decisions can be identified that afford protection to interests that are also protected by the proposed right to be forgotten. This indicates that in the Netherlands a right to be forgotten in some form or another might have developed over time but this would have been a lengthy affair. A more precise formulation of this right by the legislator is therefore welcomed. It has been remarked that the name ‘right to be forgotten’ may give rise to unrealistic expectations but the Dutch experience shows that people do not seem to be very aware of their rights. ‘A right to be forgotten’ – however imprecise from a legal viewpoint – might be catchy enough to remedy this.