Why Do People Stigmatise the Poor at a Time of Rapidly Increasing Inequality,and What Can Be Done About It?

This paper starts out from a puzzle. During the past thirty years, incomes have grown more unequal, a small group at the top has captured a much greater share of resources and poverty has increased. Despite this, most people are markedly less likely to want government to redistribute income or tackle poverty and are less sympathetic towards those without jobs. The greater insecurity of many people's lives in the current crisis renders the issue more perplexing. This paper describes trends in inequality, poverty and unemployment; presents new data on attitudes, media discussion and political platforms; discusses theoretical approaches from social psychologists, political scientists, sociologists and other commentators; and considers how a more generous welfare state might be pursued.     

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Previous studies report that semi‐democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi‐democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi‐democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi‐democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi‐democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single‐party regimes.     

Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia

Why are voters influenced by the views of local patrons when casting their ballots? The existing literature suggests that coercion and personal obligations underpin this form of clientelism, causing voters to support candidates for reasons tangential to political performance. However, voters who support candidates preferred by local patrons may be making sophisticated political inferences. In many developing countries, elected politicians need to work with local patrons to deliver resources to voters, giving voters good reason to consider their patron's opinions of candidates. This argument is tested using data from an original survey of traditional chiefs and an experiment involving voters in Zambia. Chiefs and politicians with stronger relationships collaborate more effectively to provide local public goods. Furthermore, voters are particularly likely to vote with their chief if they perceive the importance of chiefs and politicians working jointly for local development.     

Do Poor Citizens Vote for Redistribution,Against Immigration or Against the Establishment? A Conjoint Experiment in Denmark

What is the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and vote choice? The literature on this question is fragmented and points to motivations based on welfare policy, immigration policy or anti‐establishment sentiments. To test which of these motives explains differences in voting behaviour between classes, a conjoint experiment in which fictitious candidates present randomly assigned positions was designed. The experiment evaluated the relative importance of the position on welfare, immigration and anti‐establishment as well as candidates’ occupational background. By splitting the analyses into lower, middle‐ and upper class voters, it was found that lower class voters are most distinct from other voters in their preferences for anti‐establishment candidates. Strikingly, lower class voters even support welfare retrenchment, as long as it is an anti‐establishment candidate proposing it. The experiment also found a general tendency to vote against career politicians across classes and remarkably few differences regarding immigration preferences.     

Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in?the?UN General Assembly?

Using panel data for 188 countries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the United States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.     

Do Inheritance Customs Affect Political and Social Inequality?

Why are some societies more unequal than others? The French revolutionaries believed unequal inheritances among siblings to be responsible for the strict hierarchies of the ancien régime. To achieve equality, the revolutionaries therefore enforced equal inheritance rights. Their goal was to empower women and to disenfranchise the noble class. But do equal inheritances succeed in leveling the societal playing field? We study Germany—a country with pronounced local‐level variation in inheritance customs—and find that municipalities that historically equally apportioned wealth, to this day, elect more women into political councils and have fewer aristocrats in the social elite. Using historic data, we point to two mechanisms: wealth equality and pro‐egalitarian preferences. In a final step, we also show that, counterintuitively, equitable inheritance customs positively predict income inequality. We interpret this finding to mean that equitable inheritances level the playing field by rewarding talent, not status.     

Explaining Turnout Decline in Britain, 1964–2005: Party Identification and the Political Context

Turnout decline in Britain is greater than it first appears since changes in the social composition of the electorate have had a positive impact on turnout. This paper finds that whereas a weakening in the strength of party identification is associated with the long-term decline, the political context influences short-term variation. Partisan dealignment is also changing the dynamics of the determinants of turnout. Since non-identifiers are more strongly influenced by the political context than strong identifiers, and there are now more non-identifiers than previously, the political context is becoming a more important factor in determining whether people vote or not.

When Do the Ends Justify the Means? Evaluating Procedural Fairness

How do people decide whether a political process is fair or unfair? Concerned about principles of justice, people might carefully evaluate procedural fairness based on the facts of the case. Alternately, people could be guided by their prior preferences, endorsing the procedures that produce favored policy outcomes as fair and rating those that generate disliked outcomes as unfair. Using an experimental design, we consider the conditions under which people use accuracy goals versus directional goals in evaluating political processes. We find that when procedures are clearly fair or unfair, people make unbiased assessments of procedural justice. When the fairness of a process is ambiguous, people are more likely to use their prior attitudes as a guide.     

When Does Negativity Demobilize? Tracing the Conditional Effect of Negative Campaigning on Voter Turnout

Do negative campaign advertisements affect voter turnout? Existing literature on this topic has produced conflicting empirical results. Some scholars show that negativity is demobilizing. Others show that negativity is mobilizing. Still others show that negativity has no effect on turnout. Relying on the psychology of decision making, this research argues and shows that this empirical stalemate is due to the fact that existing work ignores a crucial factor: the timing of exposure to negativity. Two independent empirical tests trace the conditional effect of negativity. The first test relies on data from the 2004 presidential campaign. The second test considers the effect of negativity over a broader period of time by considering elections 1976 to 2000. Taken together, both tests reinforce that negativity can only demobilize when two conditions are met: (1) a person is exposed to negativity after selecting a preferred candidate and (2) the negativity is about this selected candidate.     

Vote Blue,Go Green? Cameron's Conservatives and the Environment

How genuine is the Conservative party's rediscovery of the environment? Would a Conservative government led by David Cameron implement a wide‐ranging and progressive environmental policy? This article explores why Cameron has embraced the environment so enthusiastically when Conservative governments have had a poor record of environmental protection and the Conservative party has traditionally shown little interest in the issue. It assesses the impact of Cameron's strategy both on his own party and on the wider world of environmental politics and it evaluates the continuing commitment of the Conservatives to the issue by assessing what kind of policies a future Conservative government might implement. Although Cameron remains committed to the issue and he has already had a positive impact on Labour government policy, he has not yet convinced his party or its supporters, so a future Conservative government would probably represent continuity rather than significant change in environmental policy.     

Why Do States Commission the Truth? Political Considerations in the Establishment of African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Although the use of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) has grown considerably over the last 3 decades, there is still much that we do not know concerning the choice and the structuring of TRCs. While the literature has focused primarily on the effects of TRCs, we examine the domestic and the international factors influencing the choice of a commission in sub-Saharan Africa from 1974 to 2003 using pooled cross-sectional time series. We find that states which adopted a TRC prior to South Africa were generally repressive centralized regimes which used the truth commission as political cover. However, since South Africa’s TRC, democratizing states have been more likely to adopt a truth commission as a form of transitional justice.

Why Bother Lying When You Know So Few Care? Party Contact,Education and Over‐reporting Voter Turnout in Different Types of Elections

Studies on individual‐level voter turnout in the European Parliament elections rely solely on self‐reported turnout data. At the same time, a long tradition in public opinion research examines the impact of individual and contextual variables on over‐reporting of voter turnout. The ultimate goal of these efforts is an assessment of the bias introduced when turnout models are estimated from self‐reported turnout data. In this article, it is proposed that certain characteristics related to turnout (and turnout over‐reporting), like university education or party contact, should also be positively associated with political awareness and knowledge. If so, they might contribute to respondents' greater ability to distinguish between different salience levels, significantly increasing non‐voters' propensity to over‐report turnout in high‐salience elections, but not in low‐salience ones. This hypothesis is tested using data on electoral participation in Sweden, comparing patterns of turnout over‐reporting in the (high‐salience) national parliament elections and the (low‐salience) European Parliament elections. The results of this test, the first one to give an account of patterns of over‐reporting of turnout in the European Parliament elections, largely support the above hypothesis. Finally, the consequences of this phenomenon for the validity of inferences made from self‐reported turnout data are analyzed.     

When Do Leaders Free-Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense

The logic of free-riding expects that individuals will underinvest in public goods, but people often behave in ways that are inconsistent with this prediction. Why do we observe variation in free-riding behavior? This study addresses this question by examining contributions to an important international public good—collective defense in military alliances. It develops a behavioral theory of free-riding in which the beliefs of world leaders are important for explaining investments in public goods. The argument holds that leaders with business experience make smaller contributions to collective defense because they are egoistic and more comfortable relying on a powerful ally for their defense. An analysis of defense expenditures in 17 non-U.S. members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1952 to 2014 provides evidence consistent with the theory. The findings suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely than other heads of government to act as self-interested utility maximizers.     

Why and how does the regulation of emerging technologies occur? Explaining the adoption of the EU General Data Protection Regulation using the multiple streams framework

Why and how the regulation of emerging technologies occurs is not clear in the literature. In this study, we adapt the multiple streams framework – often used for explaining agenda-setting and policy adoption – to examine the phenomenon. We hypothesize how technological change affects policy-making and identify conditions under which the streams can be (de-)coupled. We trace the formulation of the General Data Protection Regulation to show that the regulation occupied the legislative agenda when a policy window was exploited through policy entrepreneurship to frame technological change as a problem for data privacy and legislative harmonization within the European Union. Although constituencies interested in promoting internet technologies made every effort to stall the regulation, various actors, activities, and events helped the streams remain coupled, eventually leading to its adoption. We conclude that the alignment of problem, policy, politics, and technology – through policy entrepreneurship – influences the timing and design of technology regulation.     

Poor choice? Smith,Hayek and the moral economy of food consumption

This paper explores the moral economy of food in the United Kingdom via discourses on food bank usage and obesity. It argues that both of these markers of malnutrition were interpreted under the Conservative-led governments of David Cameron (2010–2016) as failings of personal responsibility and identified primarily with the working class, advancing the assumption that poor people make poor choices. Based on a critique of this account, our wider contribution is two-fold. First, we identify the Hayekian lineage of the discourse of personal responsibility, highlighting its utility in facilitating a form of neoliberal market consent through its insistence on self-reliance. Second, we stake out an alternative to this conceptualization through a discussion of Adam Smith’s notion of self-command, which we call interpersonal responsibility.     

Durable Democracy? Economic Inequality and Democratic Accountability in the New Gilded Age

Political Behavior - Scholarship in the U.S. provides mounting evidence of a linkage between economic inequality and inequality in representation and policymaking. In response, this article...     

When Do Voters Support the European Union’s Involvement in Gay Rights?

Commitment to the European Union’s gay rights standards remains weak in new EU members and countries applying for EU membership. If the EU’s standards have minimal consequences, then when do voters support the EU’s involvement in gay rights? The existing research misses a comparison of opinions between those who identify with gay people, and those who do not. Sexuality-based marginalization carried out by state institutions (political homophobia) motivates those who identify with gay people to support alternatives to their state’s authority. Using an original survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I find that those who identify more closely with gay people are more likely to support transferring control of gay rights to the EU. Using twenty-one surveys of EU member states, I find that in countries with high levels of political homophobia, those who report discrimination on the basis of sexuality exhibit higher levels of support for the EU.     

Do intergovernmental transfers affect the distribution of manufacturing production across regions in federal countries? Theory and evidence for Argentina

The effect of changes in the distribution of top-to-bottom intergovernmental transfers on the location of manufacturing production is analysed using a modified version of the footloose capital model. An increase in the share of transfers received by a region increases its share of manufacturing production the larger are transaction costs; the larger is the share of transfers going directly to consumers; the larger is the share of manufacturing consumption vis-à-vis non-tradable consumption; and the easier consumers can substitute among manufacturing varieties. Using data for Argentina for 1983-2005, the empirical analysis appears to support the existence of two distinctive regimes, with smaller/poorer provinces benefiting in terms of the location of manufacturing production as a response to an increase in transfers. Also, for these provinces, the benefits are greater if they are politically aligned with the federal government, especially through the receipt of discretionary transfers. For large/rich provinces, the evidence is less conclusive.