Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant

Many rational choice treatments of guerrilla insurgency have focused on the strategic calculus by which government and insurgent elites use the tactical weapons of coercion and benefits to win the support of nonelites. This paper uses Frohlich and Oppenheimer's model of the rational tax payer/tax evader to develop a model of the decision calculus by which nonelites respond to the tactical behavior of elites and thereby choose between supporting the incumbent regime, its insurgent opposition or neither. This model is then used to assess the likely impact of various insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics on nonelite support and loyalty.     

Insurgency and Peace Building in the Northeast Indian State of Manipur

This article looks at the ongoing insurgency in the remote Indian northeast, and has a special focus on the state of Manipur. Manipur is regarded as India’s eastern most state, and is geographically sandwiched in between East Asia proper and South Asia proper. This article tries to analyze the different facets of this very complex situation, and pays special attention to how the conflict has changed its character with the passage of time. For purposes of this article, primary data was collected by interviewing local people of Manipuri descent in eastern India to get first hand information about the conflict. Finally, at the end of the article, methods of peace building have been suggested as the way forward.     

More Inequality,More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

The hypothesis of inequality as the source of violent conflict is investigated empirically in the context of killings by Nepalese Maoists in their People's War against their government during 1996–2003. The dependent variable is the total number of people killed during that period by Maoist rebels in each of 3,857 villages. Inequality is measured by the Gini, the Esteban‐Ray polarization index, and four other between‐groups indexes. Using models with district fixed effects, and instrumenting for endogeneity of the inequality measures, we find strong evidence that greater inequality escalated killings by Maoists. Poverty did not necessarily increase violence. Education moderated the effect of inequality on killing, while predominance of farmers and of Nepali speakers exacerbated it. We find evidence that more killings occurred in populous villages, lending support to the idea that violence was directed at expanding the Maoist franchise by demonstrating that opposition to the monarchy and elites in power was possible to achieve.