Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

The European Union and Belarus: democracy promotion by technocratic means?

Is Belarus an enviable constant in international relations: a maverick, isolated from the West and inseparable from the East? On the surface, there seems to be business as usual: Lukashenko's regime remains unchallenged; Belarus’ relations with the European Union – spasmodic at best; while its absorption into Russia's Eurasian project continues apace. Yet, some critical disjunctures – manifested in government tacit resistance to Russia's influence, and more instructively, in people's growing affinity with Europe – may indicate a sea-change transformation in the very fabric of society. This article, utilizing extensive and subject-focused research, conducted in the country between 2009 and 2013, examines the nature and causalities of the occurring change. It argues that democracy promotion, in Belarus’ case, may work better when depoliticized and inculcated, through norms, regulations, and practices of international order, into the daily lives of individuals. Through its continued technocratic, inclusive, and sector-level engagement, European Union governance, even under the conditions of limited bilateral dialogue, have succeeded in fostering much-needed space for reciprocal learning and critical reasoning, which may have far greater transformative potential than manufacturing a single collective will for democracy building.     

Russia and the role of the OSCE in European security: a ‘Forum’ for dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of interests?

Abstract

This essay explores Russia's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) policy, by focusing on two questions. First of all, analysts have noted Russia's disinterest and obstructive policies towards the Organization. Thus, the question is what – if anything – does the Russian Federation still want from the OSCE? Secondly, does the OSCE still serve as a forum for dialog? These two issues are studied on the basis of rational institutionalism and realism. The essay demonstrates that Russia is still interested in the OSCE, but its policy has become more pragmatic, selective and instrumentalist. It includes obstructive and constructive strategies. At the same time, today the Russian Federation ascribes less significance to the Organization in European security. This is predetermined not only by its inability to push its interests through the OSCE, but also by the declining interest of other participating States in the Organization. The differences between OSCE participants have turned it into a battlefield of interests in many areas.     

The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad

Russia's recent actions in its neighbourhood have not only upset Western policies but have also reinvigorated arguments that Russia may be promoting autocracy to counteract democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States. They have also underlined a broader problem: that of how illiberal powers may react to democracy promotion, especially when their strategic interests are at stake. This article investigates these issues by studying Russia's interactions with the countries in its neighbourhood and democracy promoters. First, the article argues that even if Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization and ineffectiveness of democracy promotion in its neighbourhood, its actions do not constitute autocracy promotion and largely lack ideological underpinnings. Second, Russia's counteraction to democracy promotion stems from its ambitions of restoring its great power status, maintaining its regional influence, and perceiving Western policies as a threat to its interests. Third, when it considers its strategic interests undermined, Russia employs economic and military threats (sometimes incentives) against its neighbourhood countries to make the compliance with Western policies less preferable.     

Spoiler or facilitator of democratization?: Russia's role in Georgia and Ukraine

In the post-Soviet space, Georgia and Ukraine are broadly perceived as exceptions to the growing authoritarianism in the region owing to the far-reaching political changes triggered by the so-called Colour Revolutions a decade ago. This article examines Russia's reaction to political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in light of the interplay between the democracy-promotion policies implemented by the EU and US and domestic patterns of democratization. We argue that despite the relatively weak impact of EU and US policies vis-à-vis domestic structures, Russia has responded harshly to (what it perceives as) a Western expansionist agenda in pursuit of reasserting its own hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space. However, coercive pressure from Russia has also unintended, counterproductive effects. We argue that the pressure has actually made Georgia and Ukraine more determined to pursue their pro-Western orientation and has spawned democratization, thereby supporting the objectives of the Western democracy promoters.     

Russia-North Korea Economic Ties: Is There More Than Meets the Eye?

Russia's relations with North Korea are often ignored in the West. The conventional view is that Russia's role with respect to the North is purely political and diplomatic, predicated on Russia's permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Often overlooked is the fact that Russia maintains a range of economic links with the DPRK. Taken together, they constitute quite a substantial leverage that Russia can exercise over North Korea, when and if it chooses to do so. The paper aims to investigate the economic dimension of the Russia-North Korea relationship. The article also examines North Korea's domestic economic situation, mostly drawing upon Russian expert assessments.     

The future of the United States as a European power: The case of NATO enlargement

Abstract

European Union enlargement has left Russia on the margins of European political processes and led to widespread suspicion in the Moscow foreign policy establishment of European motives. This has resulted in, first, increasing resistance to the imposition of European norms and, second, a more assertive policy, particularly in the EU's and Russia's ‘overlapping neighbourhoods’. Although Moscow is likely to continue the strategy of engagement initiated under Putin, Brussels must radically rethink the nature and extent of Russia's ‘Europeanisation’. Russia's drive for modernisation will coexist with the strengthening of sovereignty and the power of the state, seen by the Putin administration as key to external and internal security. The EU will have to limit its ambition and work within this ‘window’—wider or narrower depending on state of play—of policy possibilities.     

The crisis of the state in Russia

President Dmitry Medvedev is neither a “liberal” nor a “puppet” of his mentor, Vladimir Putin. He is a capable politician, who appears genuinely to believe in the rule of law. Yet his formative policy experience has been overwhelmingly dirigiste, the approach that is unlikely to change fundamentally under his presidency. Medvedev's personal preferences in foreign policy are largely in line with the policies initiated by Putin, although his rhetoric and style will likely be more conciliatory. He will inherit a plethora of problems created by Russia's assertive policy, both in its near and far abroad. Moreover, the institutional constraints and informal rules within which Medvedev will have to operate make policy continuity more likely than policy reversal.     

Toward an International Relations Theory of National Innovation Rates

The ability of nations to innovate technologically plays an important causal role in both security studies and international political economy. Explanations for national differences in technological capabilities, however, have had little place in international relations theory. This gap is partly the result of assumptions made by scholars that the rate and direction of technological change are determined by a state's domestic institutions and policies. This article will bring together recent findings about the political economy of technological innovation in order to show that much of this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Instead, it will be shown that, due to the distributive nature of technological change, different combinations of domestic tensions and external security concerns motivate elites to pursue or eschew a technologically competitive economy. Institutions are not causal, they are merely instrumental. Recent findings in the economic development literature therefore have important implications for security studies.     

Lifting the 'No Haste,Be Patient' Policy: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

Cross-Strait relations remain deadlocked following Chen Shui-bian's inauguration as Taiwan's president. Amid this political stalemate, Chen's administration decided to change the 'no haste, be patient' ( jie-ji yueng-ren ) policy while refusing to endorse the 'one China' principle. While this policy change is in response to domestic demands, Chen and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are unlikely to reap any benefit from these actions without active cooperation from China's leaders. Beijing will continue to use its economic clout in an attempt to pull Taiwan into political union, as Taipei needs to nurture an environment favourable for domestic and foreign investment in Taiwan in order to maintain its competitive edge over China and thus preserve its de facto independence. Beijing's leaders will need to rethink their rigid stand on the 'one China' principle, since increased cross-Strait economic integration may not lead to the expected political union they desire.     

Russia's African Toolkit: Digital Influence and Entrepreneurs of Influence

Today, Russian influence on the African continent is still anecdotic compared to the People's Republic of China, the United States, and former colonial powers, such as France. Yet, Moscow has committed to reasserting itself as an alternative pole of influence to China and Western countries in the eyes of some African elites. This article analyzes two key components of Russia's African toolkit: its media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, which have managed to impose themselves on the African media landscape, and its entrepreneurs of influence, in charge of influence campaigns of different scopes. The article contends that Russia's media success relies more on the appropriation of its informational content by African actors with their own political agendas than on Moscow convincing African audiences of the legitimacy of its foreign policy or political model, and that entrepreneurs of influence may play a useful, but limited, role in testing new parameters of influence.     

Agenda-setting from behind: India and the framework convention on climate change

ABSTRACT

India’s approach and policies at climate change negotiations have garnered considerable interest and attention. Over the last three decades, India’s positions have gained more importance as its carbon emissions rise. In this article, I explain India’s ratification of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) using the New Interdependence approach, a framework that explains state behavior by analyzing how global rules affects the domestic politics and policymaking around a particular issue. Specifically, I map how the conflicts around which countries should address global warming influenced the domestic politics of climate change in India, particularly the rise of MEA in leading India’s policymaking on climate change, including FCCC negotiations. MEA’s political understanding of climate change, sharpened by two domestic environmental groups – TERI and CSE, decisively shaped India’s approach at FCCC negotiations. Indian negotiators focused on hammering the differences between developed and developing countries helping shape a Framework Convention that differentiated climate responsibilities based on development constraints.     

The Russia–EU Energy Relationship: Getting it Right

The problems of Russia's energy sector, the part of the economy most broadly linked with Russia's prosperity and revived international influence, have been emphasized by the global financial crisis. Yet it remains an open question whether this, as well as various other factors, including the beginning of a genuine gas market and China's methodical advances in Central Asia, could encourage Russia to take the difficult decisions needed to make the energy sector more responsive and competitive. For its part, the EU has the potential to influence Russia, but if it continues to define itself by its divisions, it will not be able to use the influence it has gained. Without a strategic and coordinated approach, the EU is unlikely to be able to overcome its security dilemma and could find that the future is determined by other actors.     

Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment

The subject of this article is the changing balance between Russia's positive and negative interests in the Conference on/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) as these have evolved in relation to Western policies on the OSCE and European security relations in general. Parallel to the decline of positive Russian interests in the CSCE/OSCE, an increase in negative attitudes can be observed, most of which concern the OSCE's activities in post-Soviet countries. While the Soviet Union was traditionally a reliable supporter of the CSCE, the Russian Federation, which initially pursued the same policy, has lost most of its sense of ownership in the OSCE. This change in Russian attitudes is critical for the Organisation's future, for an OSCE without active Russian participation would lose much of its raison d'être.     

Italy's Growing Burden of Choice in Security Policy

NATO, the EU, and the UN have been the cornerstones of Italy's foreign policy since WWII: although they continue to provide a point of reference, these institutions are undergoing major changes that reflect – and partly create – a very unpredictable international environment. The evolving security agenda, choices made by key allies (especially the United States), and domestic political forces are putting Italian decision-makers under pressure. There is a serious problem of resource constraints while the country is still unwilling to make clear-cut choices based on unavoidable tradeoffs. The past few years have witnessed a mix of continuity and change due to the political orientations of successive governments under these challenging circumstances.     

Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s

Great powers can pursue deliberate Trojan horse policies to transform rising and threatening states into followers and supporters rather than challengers by altering their domestic political and economic institutions. I contend that a great power can use trade concessions, rather than punishment, to enable a favorable foreign policy coalition in a target country. The intent is to strengthen the political power of state and societal elites who have a stake in deepening international ties, while opponents of such policies will be weakened politically and economically. The societal winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred outward-oriented grand strategy. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. I examine Britain's commercial policies toward Germany and Japan during the 1930s to better understand second-face strategies. I argue that the intent of Britain's industrial and commercial policy was to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry, and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Berlin and Tokyo away from rearmament, extreme autarky, and war.     

Russia's Artificial Intelligence Strategy: The Role of State-Owned Firms

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that whichever country becomes the leader in artificial intelligence (AI) “will become the ruler of the world.” Yet Russia lags competitors like China and the United States substantially in AI capabilities. What is Russia's strategy for boosting development of AI technologies, and what role do groups within the Russian elite play in shaping this strategy? Russia's AI development strategy is unique in that it is led not by the government, nor by the private sector, but by state-owned firms. The government's distrust of Russia's largest tech firm, Yandex, has sidelined the company from national AI planning. Meanwhile, Russia's defense conglomerate Rostec publicly appears to focus less on artificial intelligence than on other high-tech priorities. As a result, Russia's AI development has been left to a state-owned bank, Sberbank, which has taken the lead in devising plans for government-backed investment in AI.     

Evaluating Democratic Progress Inside Russia: The Komi Republic and the Republic of Bashkortostan

This article compares and contrasts the political transitions in the two Russian Republics of Komi and Bashkortostan. It is argued that these republics are among many in Russia's weak federation whose behaviour is akin to nation-states. Two critical junctures occurring in the early 1990s profoundly affected the transition paths. Democratic transitions of the political regime had been completed in both republics by early 1995. Since then both have completed regime consolidation but not resulting in democracy. Political elites have cloaked their true intentions by seeming to want to participate in the 'spirit of the times', namely democratization in post-communist Europe, while in fact promoting undemocratic practices and only superficial accountability. The arrival of President Putin at the centre may prove to be a third critical juncture that jolts the regimes in the two republics into a period of uncertainty and a new transition.     

Studying a negative external actor: Russia's management of stability and instability in the ‘Near Abroad’

The literature on transition and democratization was for long dominated by internal explanatory factors such as economic performance, civil society, institutions, etc. Only recently have external actors' democratizing efforts – like those of the US and the EU – been systematically incorporated. But the perspective remains too constrained, since only ‘positive’ external actors are considered, while possible ‘negative’ actors are left aside. This article attempts to rectify some of the imbalance. First, an analytical framework that can be used to analyse both positive and negative external actors is proposed. Then, the framework is put into use through an analysis of the negative effects of Russia's foreign policy in the so-called ‘Near Abroad’. It is argued that two general effects take shape: the ‘policy of managed stability’ and the ‘policy of managed instability’. Both are weakening the democratic perspectives in the post-Soviet area, so I argue that Russia's foreign policy in the ‘Near Abroad’ is a, hitherto, underestimated and badly understood ‘negative’ factor in the literature on transition and democratization in the post-Soviet space.     

How to Change Your Foreign Policy in 100 Days: A New Course with the Prodi Government?

Conventional wisdom has it that the new government of Romano Prodi managed to effect a significant “shift” in Italy's foreign policy away from the course of the centre-right in the proverbial first 100 days of government. A number of discontinuities with the foreign policy of the Berlusconi government have been invoked, ranging from Italy's relations with Europe and its transatlantic posture, to its engagement with areas of crisis such as the Middle East. But these claims have to be substantially qualified. In fact, it appears that the foreign policy of the Prodi government has rather pragmatically blended elements of change and continuity, and that the shift which has occurred in some areas should be understood more as a combination of domestic and international developments than a result of the change in government alone. Moreover, in order to really change Italy's foreign policy – and change it for the better – the government should focus on a different set of priorities, mainly the institutions, instruments, politics, and ideas of foreign policy.