State-sponsored violence as a tragedy of the commons: England's privateering wars with France and Spain, 1625–1630

The “tragedy of the commons” is the familiar problem that open access to a common property resource leads to overexploitation and to zero profits. A commons model is applied to an example of state sponsored private violence, the practice of privateering or licensed piracy. It is predicted that the presence of uncertainty about the value of the prey will reduce the amount of exploitation effort, and that industry profits may be positive due to both uncertainty and heterogeneous exploiters. Using data from England's wars with France and Spain between 1625 and 1630, the model suggests that the commons, represented by enemy merchant shipping, was not overexploited and that privateering profits were positive. The dynamic paths of privateering effort, ships seized, and individual firm profits were, however, consistent with the normal expectation that commons exploitation will peak and fall, as competition drives down returns through entry. “England was never richer than when at war with Spain.” Sir Edward Coke      

Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants

This article considers a rent-seeking model with N asymmetriccontestants. Each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent. Oneof the N contestants is selected as the winner based onTullock's probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated.     

Between Deadlock and Decentralization: Bargaining Dynamics in Federal States

A classic way to meet regionally diverse interests is to grant partial autonomy to sub-national entities, either by assigning them the right to decide upon policies (federalism), to implement policies (decentralization), or both. This article argues and formally elaborates that central governments may intentionally choose to increase decentralization in an effort to facilitate agreements that otherwise would be deadlocked. In this regard, a central government's decision to promote decentralization depends on its own relative valuation of policy change and congruence. We illustrate the empirical validity of our argument with a case study pertaining to the Swiss New Regional Policy.     

Socialism,knowledge, the instrumental valuation principle and the enhancement of individual dignity

Abstract

Socialism is frequently associated with central planning, public ownership, anathema to markets and the emasculation of the individual. Recent market socialist contributions attempt to overcome socialism's seeming resistance to markets. However, such contributions are frequently undermined by Hayek's invocation of fragmented knowledge. This article endeavours to contribute to a broadly conceived socialism that is not grounded in a particular array of institutions, but one which, via the instrumental valuation principle, the capabilities approach and Dewey's conceptualization of knowledge, offers the prospect of enhancing individual dignity. The instrumental valuation principle is viewed as key to socialism's engagement with dignity as it provides the framework for the enhancement of egalitarianism, democracy and the undermining of invidious institutional arrangements.     

Rent dissipation through self-regulation: The social cost of monopoly under threat of reform

This piece offers an alternative perspective on the social cost of monopoly and rent seeking. An existing monopolist whose right is contested in a political market has an incentive to expend resources on direct lobbying efforts while also attempting to defuse reformist opposition. Because the strength of reformist opposition will generally be a function of the monopolist's past, present, and expected future pricing/output decisions, such opposition is endogenous. The probability that an existing monopoly right will be retained depends on both direct lobbying efforts by the monopolist as well as the strength, resolve, and cohesiveness of the reformers. By modifying its output/pricing decision and, in effect, engaging in self-regulation, the monopolist gives up current profits in exchange for the expected future profits associated with retaining its monopoly rights. Such opposition dissipating effort is a form of indirect rent seeking that is complementary to direct lobbying efforts. And unlike the Tullock costs implied by the incumbent's direct lobbying, this form of indirect rent seeking may imply a reduction in the social cost of monopoly.     

Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox

In this paper we revisit Tullock's paradox (Tullock, 1980) and consider a rent-seeking game in which parties face increasing returns to effort. We allow parties to randomize their strategies and give them an exit option. Given the mixed participation strategies of the parties, valuable rents may occasionally remain unexploited. We consider such a lost-treasure effect as an additional cost of rent seeking and examine how the expected value of such a lost rent varies with changes in the parameters of the problem.     

Returns to effort in rent-seeking games

In the traditional formulation of rent-seeking games, increasing returns to effort are characterized by an exponent r>1. However, when the value of the rent is normalized to 1, the players’ effort levels A and B will typically be less than 1. Thus, when A<1 and r>1, the value of A ^r decreases as r increases, contradicting the interpretation of r>1 as representing increasing returns to effort. This apparent defect in the mathematization of the problem seems to suggest that a different interpretation of r is required whenever A<1, upsetting the uniformity and elegance of the model. In this short note, we demonstrate that the perceived problem is illusory, and that the usual interpretation of r is satisfactory for all values of A.     

The value of reducing risks of death: A note on new evidence

Government agencies face difficult resource-allocation decisions when confronted with projects that will reduce risks of fatality. Evidence from individual behavior helps determine society's values for reducing risks. The most credible evidence is based on individuals' willingness to pay (or willingness to accept compensation) for small changes in risks. Studies of consumer behavior are limited, but more evidence is available relating wages to job risks. Contingent valuation studies reinforce the wage-risk implications, leading to a range of values that can be compared with the costs of proposals to reduce fatal risks.     

Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd's as a “private regime”

Kidnap for ransom raises significant governance challenges. In the absence of formal regulation and enforcement, insurers have created an effective private governance regime to facilitate smooth commercial resolutions. Controlling ransoms is paramount: “supernormal” profits for kidnappers create kidnapping booms and undermine the market for insurance. Ransom control requires cooperation, but there are high transactions costs in enforcing a collusive agreement. The Coasean prediction is that a single firm will form to internalize the externalities arising from lax insurance and mismanaged ransom negotiations—or a government must order the market. There is indeed a single source of kidnap insurance: Lloyd's of London. Yet, within the Lloyd's market several insurers compete for business. Lloyd's is a club providing private governance: Its members issue standard contracts, follow the same regime for kidnap resolution, and exchange information to stabilize ransoms. Lloyd's, therefore, combines aspects of Coase's “single firm” and “government” solution to the externalities problem.     

Policymaking with Multiple Agencies

Authority over related policy issues is often dispersed among multiple government agencies. In this article, I study when Congress should delegate to multiple agencies, and how shared regulatory space complicates agency decision making. To do so, I develop a formal model of decentralized policymaking with two agencies that incorporates information acquisition and information sharing, delineating situations where legislators should and should not prefer multiple agencies. Greater divergence between the agencies' ideal points distorts information sharing and policy choices, but it may increase the amount of information acquisition. Congress achieves better policy outcomes by delegating authority to both agencies if the agencies have strong policy disagreements. If the agencies have similar policy preferences, however, then Congress may want to consolidate authority within one agency because this approach mitigates free-riding and takes advantage of returns to scale.     

Voting as an act of contribution

This paper presents a theory which rationalizes voting in terms of the marginal utility a citizen derives from contributing a small amount of effort in the political process when the cost of voting is small. Citizens abstain when the marginal cost of voting exceeds the marginal perceived benefit. A simple choice rule for voting in a two candidate race is derived from the theory. This rule depends on the voter's subjective belief about the election outcome as well as his preferences for the candidates. The key assumption is that the voter's utility increases if he votes for a winner, or decreases if he votes for a loser. This assumption is no less plausible than the assumption that voters believe they can be pivotal.     

Rent-seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts

The objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive. Tullock's standard rent-seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts. A positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest, because a contender's private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders. Coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent-seeking model, the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is a priori ambiguous. It is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful, excessive aggregate efforts.     

Taxes,Time, and Support for Security

New technologies have been developed in response to terrorism. These present problems for local officials: implementing technologies will be expensive, and no technologies exist that can be used to gauge demand. We apply contingent valuation methodologies to determine support for additional taxes to pay for new terrorism‐related technologies and services. We present findings from a national survey about people's attitudes toward terrorism prevention and response. We find that respondents generally support new services and technologies and local tax increases to pay for them. We also find that respondents are willing to pay more if programs have everyday uses that would enhance public safety, but are less supportive as inconveniences increase.     

‘US Intelligence and Vietnam’: The Official Version(s)

Recent declassifications of the official histories of Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency activities in the Vietnam War give historians a sharper outline of the overall American intelligence effort in that conflict and a trove of supporting details. While scholars will have to use the new releases with caution, the histories (when combined with appraisals from the Armed Services) offer glimpses of the scale of the US intelligence program and some of the complications that hindered its effectiveness. Two particular features stand out when these materials are viewed in conjunction: the disconnectedness of the various agencies' and Services' efforts from each other (and from decision makers in Washington); and the difficulties that all of them had in working with America's South Vietnamese allies. The picture emerging is thus one of a congeries of largely independent intelligence campaigns working simultaneously against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targets. Intelligence miscues did not lose the Vietnam War for the Americans and South Vietnamese, but it now seems clearer that they made victory less likely.     

Mayoral Public Sector Work Experience and Tax Collection Performance in Colombian Local Governments

ABSTRACT

Local governments in Latin America tend to have limited capacity to collect taxes. Existing theory explains tax collection performance as a function of political, socio-economic, and cultural factors. Yet across Latin America, tax collection performance varies greatly between localities that are similar along these dimensions. We suggest that organizational capacity, represented by managers' human capital, explains variation in local tax collection performance. We test this theoretical idea against panel data on most Colombian local governments, where elected mayors are the top managers determining the local tax collection strategy. We examine two indicators of tax collection performance: (1) the per-capita amount of property tax collected and (2) property tax collected as a percentage of total property valuation. Controlling for important confounders, the length of the mayor's prior public sector work experience is positively associated with the per-capita amount of property tax collected but not the percentage of total property valuation collected in property tax. Our results suggest that Colombian mayors gain relevant skills over their career. Our study has implications for other developing countries with a similar property tax collection system.     

In search of the ‘Other’ in Asia: Russia–China relations revisited

This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.     

Social Identity and Electoral Accountability

In a laboratory experiment, we explore the effects of group identities on the principal‐agent relationship between voters and representatives. In an adverse selection framework with observable effort, voters can choose to condition their reelection choices on representatives' effort alone, beliefs about representatives' competence, or both of those jointly. We show that inducing social identities increases the weight of representatives' effort in voters' reelection decisions. Further, when voters and representatives share a social identity, representatives tend to invest less effort and their effort is independent of their competence. In contrast, “out‐group” representatives compensate for lower competence with higher effort and reduce effort when voters are likely to perceive them as competent. Voters often adopt laxer retention standards for representatives who are fellow group members and are responsive to evidence of other‐regardingness from out‐group representatives, but some voters actively resist treating representatives with shared identity more favorably and “overcorrect” as a consequence.     

The Renewal of the Local Conservative Party Campaign Capability: An Organizational Insight into Central Co-ordination

The importance of local campaigning for general election success is widely accepted. By focusing on the British Conservative Party, this article offers qualitative support through a research design in which interviews were conducted with local activists in four target constituencies and with regional officials; as a result, some understanding of the long campaign was also obtained. Embracing the contemporary view that campaigning effectiveness is a function of the party centre's ability to direct local parties, this study provides an organizational insight into how the centre was able to enhance its control, but also discusses the implications of this for local activists and for the local party organizational structure. The findings reveal that activist de-politicization and de-skilling, and a more formal and dismissive approach to party management, have undermined the local effort with the result that the party's local campaigning effort remains organizationally sub-optimal. The engagement of outside expertise and supporter networks has also changed the nature of the local party, so that it is moving towards a network of local political capabilities.     

Donors’ Responses to Profit Incentives in the Social Sector: The Entrepreneurial Orientation Reward and the Profit Penalty

This study uses an online survey experiment to test whether the pairing of profit-seeking with mission-related programs in the social sector attracts or deters donations from individual donors. We test individuals’ response to three types of profit incentives allowed under current U.S. public policy: (1) non-distributed profit to an organization, which is allowed for nonprofit entities; (2) profit to the organization's equity investors and owners, which is allowed under for-profit social enterprise governance charters; and (3) profit to lending investors, which is introduced by social impact bonds, a pay-for-success policy tool. We test trust theory, under which profit incentives deter donors against entrepreneurial orientation (EO) theory, which suggests that donors are attracted to organizations that use innovative, market-driven programs. Findings indicate support for both theories, but the support depends on how the specific profit incentive is structured. Donors support organizations that use profit-generating social enterprise programs—but only when the profits are non-distributable; donors’ support is significantly lower for social enterprises in which owners and equity investors may profit. Importantly however, this negative effect is not found for pay-for-success policy tools where lending investors, rather than equity investors and owners, receive profits.     

The hijacking of a new corporate form? Benefit corporations and corporate personhood

Benefit corporations are a new type of corporate entity developed to remedy antisocial corporate behaviour by enabling mission-driven investors, managers and entrepreneurs to prioritize social values and contest the idea that profits are the only and best measure of corporate performance. To resocialize the corporate entity, the benefit corporation movement built enabling discourses and evaluation practices into the dominant model of corporate governance, shareholder value ideology. These discourses and practices expand both the purpose of the corporate entity and shareholders’ power to enforce that purpose. However, this paper argues that the effort to ‘re-embed’ the corporate entity by making it subject to non-economic claims expands the scope of corporate personhood and that doing so within extant power relations of the firm opens the door to alternative projects that undermine the benefit corporation movement's goal of fostering corporate social responsibility.