Saddam and Israel: What Do the New Iraqi Records Reveal?

This article uses newly available Iraqi records to examine Saddam Hussein's strategic view of Israel, from the time of his political ascendancy in the late 1970s to the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991. It sheds light on a variety of issues: the sources and motives of Saddam's bitter hostility to Israel, his desire for a bloody war of attrition against the “Zionist entity,” the role of Israel in motivating the Iraqi nuclear programme, Iraq–Israel relations during the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam's fears of an Israeli strike in the run-up to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and his motives for attacking Israel with SCUD missiles in 1991.     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953–1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.     

Oil Sovereignty,American Foreign Policy,and the 1968 Coups in Iraq

This analysis assesses American foreign policy toward the Ba’ath Party’s 1968 coup in Iraq. Whilst prominent American business groups expressed sympathy for the new Ba’athist regime in Baghdad, there is, as yet, no available evidence that these business groups received any official support from Washington. On the contrary, key policymakers within the Lyndon Johnson Administration had come to see the Ba’ath as a Cold War “enemy” by the late 1960s.     

Whose House is this Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddam Iraq

Although many people displaced by Saddam's regime over the yearslooked forward to returning as soon as the 2003 war ended, anumber of problems emerged which continued to bedevil the returnprocess as late as one year after the war. These problems includedan unclear political future for the country, competing politicaland sectarian forces that often view IDPs and refugees as strategictools or weapons, a hesitant and initially undecided Coalitionpolicy on the return issue, unclear mandates for the variousactors that could assist with returns, lack of funding, andmost importantly of all, an extremely poor security situationwhich has impeded or even blocked all progress on the returnissue. Nonetheless, because Iraq's Ba'athist dictatorship wasthe overwhelming cause of displacement in the country to beginwith, the future does hold some hope for Iraqi displaced persons.This paper examines the causes of return problems in Iraq andhow various authorities in post-Ba'athist Iraq are addressingthe return issue. Particularly around the contested city ofKirkuk, problems relating to the return issue risk ignitingethnic conflict and possibly even civil war in Iraq as a whole.The article examines the return issue for the period from March2003 to June 2004, focusing especially on northern Iraq andKirkuk. The research presented here is based on fieldwork conductedin Iraq by the author between September 2003 and May 2004. Theauthor went to Iraq independently, with the assistance of aCanadian Department of National Defence post-doctoral researchgrant. Interviews were conducted with US and Coalition ProvisionalAuthority officials, Iraqi Interim Government officials, KurdistanRegional Government officials, NGO workers, and IDPs themselvesduring visits to camps around Kirkuk and Baghdad.     

Notes on Italian foreign politics

The relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran both shapes and is shaped by a new Middle Eastern “Cold War”. The United States and the Islamic Republic should transcend the prospects for hegemonial conflict or strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, along the lines of the realignment in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China that took place during President Richard Nixon's tenure in the White House. The article examines the imperatives for a comprehensive and strategic realignment of US–Iranian relations from the standpoint of Iranian interests and foreign policy concepts as well as from an American perspective. It also evaluates the actual prospects for US–Iranian rapprochement.     

In the eye of the storm: Ambassador James Richards' mission to Iraq in April 1957

This article discusses the visit of James Richards, President Eisenhower's special emissary to the Middle East, to Iraq in April 1957 following the pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. An analysis of the Richards Mission encompasses a range of specific issues, including the relationship in Iraq between the US and UK and American assessments of the stability of the Iraqi government. Moreover, this article examines the American strategy for navigating the rising tide of Arab nationalist sentiment in Iraq after the Suez War. This article explores the ways in which US policy-makers privileged the notions of ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in Iraqi political affairs and reflects on the critical dilemmas and contradictions underlying American policy towards Iraq and the Middle East after the 1956 Suez War.     

D. Rossini,Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy: Culture,Diplomacy, and War Propaganda

The period 1967–1968 was a difficult one for the Anglo–American relationship, as a result of developments such as British defense cuts “East of Suez.” In the run-up to a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1968, the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau provided a lively and detailed evaluation of American bonds with Britain. The analysis maintained that the relationship was based on deeply established cooperation in defense, diplomacy and intelligence, and that despite recent problems Britain would remain of unparalleled importance as an American ally. The immediate impact of the memorandum in the White House of Lyndon B. Johnson was quite limited, but among other things the document helps to explain the ready blossoming of close high-level Anglo–American bonds during, for example, the Falklands War of 1982. The most important sections of the memorandum are reproduced, and a brief analysis is provided to put the issues in context.     

Collateral Damage? “Marigold,” Franco–American Relations,and Secret Vietnam Peace Diplomacy, 1966–1967

The Vietnam War exacerbated the already tense relationship between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon B. Johnson; and Franco–American relations reached a nadir in winter 1966–1967 when de Gaulle vetoed a proposed visit to Hanoi by Jean Sainteny, a former colonial official, who Washington had desired to probe North Vietnam’s position. This analysis adds a new wrinkle to the story. Building on research for Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (2012), the author reveals that French knowledge of only the Polish version of that peace initiative’s failure, fully blaming the Americans, further soured de Gaulle’s view of Johnson’s handling of the war and American sincerity in seeking peace. The analysis also unveils a new dimension of Henry Kissinger’s involvement in Vietnam diplomacy—prior to the Nixon White House—missing from earlier accounts.     

Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy

Entering the White House at the crest of the African independence movement, John F. Kennedy and many of his advisors believed that Africa had surpassed Asia as the most permeable battlefield in the East–West Cold War struggle. While the battle lines of the Cold War had already been clearly drawn in Europe and in much of Asia, newly independent Africa was wide open for superpower competition. The central component of Kennedy's approach to dealing with Africa was his use of personal diplomacy with the leaders of that continent. This article is a case study of Kennedy's first successful use of personal diplomacy with an African head of State—Guinea's Sékou Touré.     

Iran's Hezbollah Model in Iraq and Syria: Fait Accompli?

This essay argues the wars in Iraq and Syria are not over. Iran has used the war against the Islamic State, and, more generally, the instability in Iraq and Syria, to successfully spread and legitimize its influence. If the U.S. intends to challenge Iran's influence in Syria and Iraq, it needs to demonstrate its long-term commitment to its local partners, and it needs to work with its partners to secure and stabilize eastern Syria and western Iraq. Countering Iran's influence in Iraq and Syria is a long-term project, and creating viable alternatives to Iranian influence in Damascus and Baghdad is the best way to prevent them from becoming long-term Iranian dependencies.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

An analysis of news sources used in reports on slavery in the Sudan in the New York Times and Washington Post between 1986 and 2001

Abstract

For over 25 years the Sudan and the United States have had a contentious relationship. In 1986 several international human rights organisations pointed to the re-emergence of the practice of slavery in the Sudan. Past research by American media has shown that journalists tend to use routine channels and American government officials, especially those from the ‘golden triangle’ (the White House, Pentagon and State Department) when covering stories related to foreign countries. However, in the case of the Sudan there was no clear American foreign policy for an extended period of time. Consequently, there was a stark absence of reporting on the slavery issue in the two elite American newspapers (the New York Times and the Washington Post) examined in this study. Furthermore, even when the topic was covered the sources used defined the issue through an American perspective, rather than within an historical and geopolitical context.     

Analysis: The effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey

This article examines the potential repercussions of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. An introduction to the Kurdish problem and its securitisation in Turkey precedes an analysis of the Gulf War's impact on Turkey's policies towards the Kurds—in both Turkey and Iraq. The article briefly documents the struggle between the EU's pressures on Turkey after 1999 to improve Kurdish rights and the state's reluctance to implement reforms. Impacting reforms is the heightened sense of insecurity in Turkey after the Iraq War and the perceived threat of greater autonomy for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In response, Turkey has identified the Turkmen minority as a key strategic concern. None the less, increasingly the ruling Justice and Development Party's attitude towards Iraqi Kurdish groups indicates the evolution of a more pragmatic approach. In conclusion, two possible options emerge: the continued desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey or its re-securitisation.     

Ambassador David Bruce and “LBJ's War”: Vietnam Viewed from London, 1963–1968

Recent decades have seen growing historical interest in “second rank” officials who, whilst they do not play a leading role in government or political movements, can influence the way decisions are shaped and executed. At the same time, the interest of scholars in American policy during the Vietnam War shows no signs of abating. This article investigates the experience of one second rank official during the war, David Bruce, who was Ambassador to London during 1961–1969. Making particular use of Bruce's extensive diaries, it traces his shifting views on the war, looks at the extent to which he shared the outlook of other official,s and asks what influence, if any, he had on events. It argues that, whilst he always remained loyal to his own government and often mirrored the outlook of the Johnson Administration, Bruce had his own perspective on events, was consistently critical of American tactics on the ground, and, in Spring 1967, influenced by Robert McNamara, became an early advocate of retrenchment.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

“Arab Oil Belongs to the Arabs”: Raw Material Sovereignty,Cold War Boundaries,and the Nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1967–1973

Drawing from material in American and British national archives, the Johnson and Nixon presidential libraries, the archives of the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations record, this article examines the international politics surrounding the June 1972 nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The response to the nationalisation reveals a complex relationship between traditional Cold War concerns and the emergence of a Third World challenge to the structure of the post-war international economy: the practice of raw material sovereignty. Although Soviet aid to the Ba'ath government was central to nationalisation, it was far from exclusive. Accordingly, the nationalisation illustrates the dynamism of the Cold War era and places on display important forces that operated independently of Cold War constraints.     

Milton's army: The white house press corps

White House reporters follow a path constructed by presidential advisers that they hope will lead them to fulfill goals set by their news organizations. White House officials ration them facilities for work, access to newsworthy people, and reportable information in amounts that depend on the importance to the President of the type of media they work in, the status of their particular news organization, and the staff's respect for the influence and competence of a particular individual. In this context, several constraints that affect White House reporting are discussed here: those placed on reporters by their organizations; by the way their type of media covers the White House; by their relations with each other; and by their concepts of what they are required to do. The framework for this discussion and analysis is a classification by type of media and news organizations that assign journalists to the White House. Of the resulting six categories, the first three have the most structural and organizational influence and are given the most attention. The special status, unique history, and influence of photographers at the White House require that they be treated separately.     

Change Nobody Believes In: Obama and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Despite the promise of ‘change’ in President Barack Obama's early dealings with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the policy that has since emanated from the White House was in fact commensurate with those of preceding administrations. Rather than heralding a new direction for American engagement with the conflict, the Obama Administration had displayed more patterns of continuity than change in its dealings with both parties. Specifically, by continuing to act as “Israel's attorney” during negotiations, the Obama team had in effect negated the president's early pledges to act as an honest broker in the conflict. In assessing the (in)effectiveness of the Administration's management of the Israeli–Palestinian issue, it seems that on-going mediation efforts to revive the moribund peace process have exhausted their potential. Arbitration may be explored as a more effective method to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian territorial dispute.