From Swagger to Self-Advocacy: India’s Postgraduate “Transition” in the World Bank

The International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's facility for low-income countries, has granted India an unprecedented exception to its usual “graduation” policy—extending transitional support to its largest borrower, even though it has crossed the normal eligibility cutoff for IDA’s soft loans (based on per capita income). Before 2012, some Indian officials had called for a “graceful graduation,” believing that India did not need concessionary development assistance any longer. But with IDA graduation imminent in 2013 and facing a limit on borrowing from the Bank’s other window for middle-income countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, India successfully appealed for continued IDA access. This article draws on official interviews and documents to show how India secured post-graduation transitional support from IDA—suggesting that while India’s leaders seek to present their country as a rising power with influence in multilateral institutions, they can also be pragmatic in their status demands and quietly persuasive in their economic diplomacy.     

“Ultimate Destiny” Delayed: The Liberals,the Organization of American States,and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1963–1968

Until Canada joined in 1990, the issue of its membership in the Organisation of American States bedevilled Canadian foreign policy, which many observers saw as a decisive test of Ottawa’s interest in Latin America. Under the Liberal government of Lester Pearson, prime minister from 1963 to 1968, and the stewardship of his secretary of state for External Affairs, Paul Martin, Canada seemed poised to join OAS. But a mixture of foreign and domestic factors—including American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Cuba’s isolation within the hemisphere, and growing Canadian nationalism—ruined this initiative. Using the Pearson government’s policy toward the OAS as a lens through which to explore the direction of Canadian foreign relations in the 1960s, this analysis also examines competing views of Canada’s place in the world.     

British nuclear non-proliferation policies towards Iran and the Middle East

The article argues that British non-proliferation policies towards the Middle East have had limited success because they are circumscribed by dependence on alliances and constrained by other factors such as Britain's historical legacy, its status as a nuclear weapons state and, especially through the European Union's engagement with the region, the communication of self-interest rather than credible pursuit of the declared objective of regional security-building. Despite promoting and implementing its own disarmament policies, Britain has been unable to overcome mistrust and perceptions of hypocrisy in the region in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This is particularly evident in the dispute with Iran, which is examined in detail with the assistance of Adler's ‘double-damned dilemma’ model. The analysis argues that the Western coercive approach has facilitated the stalemate with Iran, because it has encouraged Iran's provocations and allowed it to respond with a strategy of denial. The analysis suggests that Britain and its allies adopt a defusing strategy which does not reduce the dispute to a proliferation problem, but treats Iran's behaviour as a quest for recognition. Britain has little influence on Iran, but might build on its relationship with Turkey to develop this approach in conjunction with its allies.     

Transatlantic investor protection as a threat to democracy: the potency and limits of an emotive frame*

Abstract

A campaign by civil society organizations (CSOs) turned a relatively obscure area of international economic law—investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS)—into the focus of opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and later the European Union (EU)–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). This article analyses how CSOs impacted on the EU’s position, while highlighting the limitations of their influence. Combining insights from constructivist International Political Economy literature with scholarship emphasizing the importance of emotions in advocacy framing, I contend that CSOs were able to create a polysemic ‘injustice frame’. The characterization of transatlantic ISDS as a threat to democracy and the rule of law aroused anger, while being ambiguous enough to garner widespread support. The ambiguity of CSOs’ advocacy frame and the concreteness of its target, however, were also the frame’s Achilles heel. These aspects provided space for the European Commission to reform a specific element of the agreement and thereby repair the latter’s overall legitimacy. The Commission’s counter-frame emphasized the reform’s democratic credentials by representing TTIP as an opportunity to move ISDS towards a system of ‘public law’. While this reframing failed to satisfy most opposition, it placated pivotal actors and allowed the Commission to move forward.     

Somalia versus Captain ‘Hook’: assessing the EU's security actorness in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa

An internal security problem of Somalia—state failure from internal conflict resulting in increased piracy—has increasingly become an external security problem for the European Union (EU). This article contributes to analysing the role of the EU as a security actor in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, by examining three different dimensions of the EU response to this problem: (a) the immediate EU response (the EU military mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta); (b) the medium-term EU response (the Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme launched by the European Commission); and (c) the long-term EU response (development and security assistance). This article concludes that the EU has been very active in addressing piracy through its naval task-force to protect maritime transport in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, as well as its efforts to enhance regional counter-piracy capacities and thematic and geographical financial instruments. The EU thus has taken up the fight against ‘Captain Hook’.     

Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration

When President Gerald Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break by continuing the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. Nixon had given the Shah of Iran a “blank cheque” to purchase whatever American arms he desired—short of nuclear weapons. Although Ford’s authority would be challenged by members of his own Administration and a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority, the need to support allies in the Middle East against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount.     

‘I'm glad I'm not a Saudi woman’: the First Gulf War and US encounters with Saudi gender relations

On 6 November 1990, nearly 50 Saudi women staged a protest against the ban on women operating motor vehicles in Saudi Arabia. Occurring in the midst of the First Gulf War, the women's protest was a political statement about the harsh restrictions placed on women in the Middle Eastern country which both reflected and influenced Saudi society’s encounter with their American allies during the war. When United States (US) military personnel flooded into Saudi Arabia during the war, they were shocked at the way American servicewomen were treated by their Saudi allies and the second-class status of Saudi women throughout the country. This article explores Americans' reactions to their encounter with Saudi gender relations during the war and argues that the poor treatment of women in Saudi Arabia—which Americans dubbed ‘gender apartheid’—caused many Americans to question the longstanding US alliance with the conservative Muslim country. In doing so, US journalists, military personnel, scholars and the general public began to demand that concern about women's rights should be integrated seriously into US foreign policy towards the Muslim world.     

Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention

Abstract

Scholars have vigorously debated whether adversaries carefully scrutinize if states have, in the past, demonstrated toughness and whether adversaries base present and future crisis-bargaining behavior on this record. If they do—as a central strain of deterrence theory, and its contemporary defenders, maintain—hard-line policies, including limited military interventions, can bolster deterrence. We know much less about a second audience that is presumably attentive to demonstrations of resolve: allies. A common view, derived from the same logic, and which we call Hawkish Reassurance Theory, suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies’ faraway military interventions. In contrast, we argue that such interventions call into doubt the intervener’s will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies’ security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners’ hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance. To assess this argument, we examine the varied stances leading US allies took from the start of the US intervention in Vietnam through its end. Allied behavior was largely consistent with our expectations. We conclude that, if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.     

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the rhetoric of participation

The World Bank and IMF have proposed the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) framework for all poor countries as a condition of receiving unconditional debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. The PRSPs will also be the key vehicle for the World Bank and IMF and other donors for various assistance packages, including loans. Like its predecessors, the PRSP framework promotes the ideas of ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’. This article argues that ownership of such a grand framework cannot possibly rest with the poor countries or their people if the whole idea is the product of World Bank and IMF think-tanks. It discusses participation in the development of Bangladesh's PRSP and argues that neither participation nor ownership was the target in preparing a national poverty-reduction strategy: they were merely necessary components of a document required for the continuation of debt and lending relationships with the World Bank and IMF.     

A Future US Defense Program in an Era of Great Power Competition

The Great Power Competition requires a new defense posture that adapts to the exigencies of the Russia-Ukraine war and the rise of China. A successful defense posture will necessarily require a reexamination of US defense strategy, and, importantly, the level of resources devoted by the US and its allies to national defense. A defense real growth commitment should be initiated now and sustained for as long as this more competitive and threatening security environment remains in place     

The Future Role of the European Union in Europe's Development Assistance

This paper reviews the response of the European Commission to a number of critical assessments of its administration of the EU's development assistance programme. Focusing particularly upon the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of developing countries, it considers the recent Cotonou Agreement in the context of this reform agenda. It identifies those issues that remain unresolved, including the difficulties of developing objective criteria for assessing need and performance, the role of the Inter-service Quality Support Group and the relationship between the Directorate Generals for Development and External Relations. It identifies the conflicting objectives for development policy amongst the member states as lying at the heart of the EU's development policy problems and reviews the options that may present themselves should this reform programme fail to satisfy criticism from the member states.     

试析德国对卢旺达的发展援助

发展援助是德国外交政策的一极,既是推动和实现德国对非洲外交目标的重要工具,也强烈地塑造了德国的对非洲政策。作为世界最不发达国家之一,卢旺达在德国对非洲发展援助中占据了特殊的位置。20世纪60年代以来,德国对卢旺达发展援助主要经历了4个发展阶段,目前呈现出快速发展的势头。德国主要通过财政援助和技术援助促进卢旺达在医疗卫生、种族和解、政治发展以及经济改革等领域的建设。德国对卢旺达的援助,既有其显著的特点和优势,也存在明显的缺陷。中、德两国对卢旺达的援助存在很大差异。     

Officialising strategies: participatory processes and gender in Thailand's water resources sector

This paper examines participatory processes in an Asian Development Bank (ADB) technical assistance package in Thailand's water resource sector. The authors analyse various levels of social interaction in the local community, in meso‐level stakeholder consultations, and in opposition to ADB's environment programmes expressed by civil society organisations. While participatory approaches are employed to promote more bottom‐up management regimes in water resources, the authors find that local power and gender differences have been overlooked. Evolving institutions of resource governance are constituted by gender, reproducing gender inequalities such as regarding water intended for agricultural use as a ‘male’ resource. Finally, it is argued that understandings and practices of participation legitimise particular agendas in a politically polarised arena.     

面对“中等收入陷阱”:中国和拉美的选择——中国社会科学论坛(2012年国际问题)“变化中的世界经济:中国和拉美及加勒比的选择”综述

2012年5月8日,中国社会科学论坛(2012年国际问题)在北京新闻大厦隆重召开。作为中国社会科学院的学术品牌之一、中国唯一的拉丁美洲和加勒比问题年度国际论坛,本论坛从2005年至今已经连续举办了八届,此次年度论坛的主题是     

Financing the peace: Evaluating World Bank post-conflict assistance programs

Does World Bank aid to countries damaged by civil conflict meet its stated goals of speeding economic recovery and reducing the risk of conflict recidivism? We contend that the Bank’s success depends on its ability to bolster and signal the credibility of politicians’ commitments to peaceful politics and tailor its programs to the post-conflict environment. In the first systematic evaluation of World Bank post-conflict assistance, we estimate selection-corrected event history models of the effect of Bank programs on recovery and recurrence using an original dataset of all World Bank programs in post-conflict environments. Among key results, we find that the Bank tends to select aid recipients according to their pre-existing probability of conflict recurrence and that, once we control for this non-random selection, the Bank has no systematic effect on either conflict recurrence or economic recovery.     

Reading jihad: Mapping the shifting themes of Inspire magazine

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire magazine has received attention within Western academia and media for its role in inspiring and instructing a series of homegrown terrorist attacks. Reporting on the magazine often characterises it as a Western-centric instrument of jihadi discourse. This characterisation, while broadly accurate, is in need of refinement. Using a modified version of Jennifer Attride-Stirling’s method of thematic network analysis, this research visualises and analyses the narrative themes contained within fourteen issues of Inspire magazine. It demonstrates that the magazine’s narrative extends well beyond the Western world. In reality, Inspire’s themes centre not only on the West and its Muslim populations, but on local politics and broader religious issues. The magazine’s thematic focus has also shifted over time—particularly in response to (a) political volatility in the Middle East and North Africa, (b) the killing of prominent jihadists, and (c) the execution of successful individual jihad operations. Throughout these periods of change, Inspire struggled to maintain focus on its anti-Western narrative and proved easily distracted by local issues and the “martyrdom” of Al Qaeda leaders. Understanding Inspire’s thematic landscape and its shifting character prove important in understanding and responding effectively to its jihadi discourse.     

Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner

As the largest African economy and the leading African aid-provider, with plans to establish an aid agency, South Africa is often ranked among the developing world's ‘emerging donors’. However, the country's development cooperation commitments are smaller in scope, scale and ambition than the aid regimes of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) or Gulf state donors. Given its limited resources and domestic socioeconomic challenges, South Africa prefers the role of ‘development partner’. In this role, South Africa's development cooperation in Africa has ranged from peacekeeping, electoral reform and post-conflict reconstruction to support for strengthening regional and continental institutions, implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and improving bilateral political and economic relations through dialogue and cooperation. This article seeks to determine whether Pretoria's development cooperation offers an alternative perspective to the aid policies and practices of the traditional and large rising donors. We conclude that South Africa does not fit neatly the ‘donor’ category of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and neither is Pretoria's aid-spending typically ‘ODA’ (official development assistance). Instead, with its new aid agency, South Africa occupies a unique space in Africa's development cooperation landscape. With fewer aid resources, but a ‘comparative advantage’ in understanding Africa's security/governance/development nexus, South Africa can play an instrumental role in facilitating trilateral partnerships, especially in Southern Africa.     

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East

This article examines the geopolitical and economic implications of the Belt and Road Initiative for the Middle East. It locates the BRI within the region’s politics and examines the opportunities that the initiative offers for the region, as well as its inherent risks and challenges. It argues that the BRI is not merely an economic project as framed by Beijing, but that it represents a new stage in China’s engagement with the region, and—if fully implemented—could have wide geopolitical implications. The Middle East has the potential to contribute immensely to China’s sustained growth by addressing its energy security, supporting China’s role as a ‘megatrader’, and, more importantly, driving China’s efforts to become a global maritime power and monetary power by internationalizing the Renminbi (RMB). Thus, the BRI could have wide implications for the Middle East. Far from being a win-win project for all, the BRI will likely benefit some countries in the region more than others. Iran stands ready to benefit most. The BRI will likely increase the strategic importance of the Suez Canal and could potentially undermine the importance of some logistic hubs in the Middle East in favour of other trade hubs in Central Asia.     

Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ Relationships

Affect exists among close allies and influences their actions and reactions vis-à-vis each other. These countries’ perceptions of, and affective attachment to, the specialness of their relationships explains why, in certain circumstances, big clashes occur among them. In this sense, affect explains why crises among close allies are more signals of strength than weakness: the passionate nature of such crises—as opposed to more routine or recurrent disagreements—is triggered by the high value placed by close allies on their ties and not, as often stated in the literature, by the erosion of these ties. After developing this argument, I illustrate it with the analysis of two crises among close allies: the Suez crisis between Britain and the United States in late 1956, and the Iraq crisis between France and the United States in early 2003. I then contrast these episodes with a crisis between two allies with a much less affectively charged relationship—the United States and Turkey, also in early 2003 over the Iraq War issue.     

Alliance Forging or Partnership Building? China’s Policy in the Asia-Pacific under the Xi Administration

ABSTRACT

Should China forge a military alliance? Some scholars believe it should, others believe it should adhere to a policy of non-alignment. For China many risks are associated with military alliances. On the one hand, China would likely be involved in unwanted conflicts and confrontations created by potential allies. On the other hand, China would be bound to compete with the existing hegemon, the United States, which has already established a huge alliance system, to win more allies. China just cannot afford this. The intensified strategic competition between China and the United States may also lead to a new antagonism in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, China’s ‘non-alliance’ policy does not mean China has to abandon the development of strategic cooperation with other countries or renounce the right to build a cooperative partnership network. Since Xi Jinping came to power, the Chinese government has continuously expanded its strategic partnership network in the region. This policy could avoid US-China competition over military allies and enhance strategic trust between China and its neighbouring countries, creating conditions for China’s peaceful development and global strategic stability.