Approval regulation and endogenous consumer confidence: Theory and analogies to licensing,safety, and financial regulation

Safety regulation – in the form of pre-market approval, licensure, screening, and product entry limitations – governs numerous market realms, including consumer finance. In this article, we ask whether the effects of safety regulation go beyond safety and affect consumers' beliefs about the distribution of products they can use. We model “approval regulation,” where a government regulator must approve the market entry of a product based upon observable, unbiased, and non-anticipable experiments. We show that even if regulator and firm disagree about only quality standards, the disagreement induces the firm to provide more information about its product than it would in the absence of regulation. Put differently, purely first-order disagreements in regulation generate second-order consequences (more certainty about product quality). These second-order consequences of regulation are sufficient to generate first-order effects among end-users (more consumption of superior products), even when users are risk-neutral. In other words, even if approval regulation produces little or no improvement in safety or quality, it still aggregates information useful to “downstream” product users; these users will exhibit higher consumption and will more readily switch to superior products. In contrast with libertarian analyses of entry regulation and licensure, the model predicts that entry restrictions may be associated with greater product or service utilization (consumption) as well as with greater price sensitivity among consumers. Because contemporary cost–benefit analyses ignore these second-order effects, they are unlikely to capture the possible confidence effects of approval regulation.     

The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective

Regulatory arbitrage, or the ability of financial firms to circumvent or neutralize rules, is a classic problem of financial regulation. This article draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) to reformulate this old problem, thus defining regulatory arbitrage as a contracting hazard arising from interactions between the regulator and regulated firms, given bounded rationality and opportunism. Following standard TCE, the article first characterizes the implicit regulatory contract in finance, focusing in particular on the mobile and elastic nature of regulated actors and financial assets as well as the contested utility of financial innovation. It is then argued that this incomplete and hazard-prone regulatory bargain must be matched with a governance structure that both adapts to unforeseen circumstances and avoidance strategies and copes with radical uncertainty about the welfare consequences of financial innovation. To that end, the article discusses how a governance structure here termed “relational regulation” might facilitate such ex post governance under uncertainty.     

Advertising and the conquest of culture

Thomas Frank's important The conquest of cool: Business culture, counterculture, and the rise of hip consumerism usefully described the advertising industry's “conquest of cool” in the 1960s and beyond, the co-optation of the hip and the cool for the purposes of advertising marketing. This article argues that, since Frank's book appeared, the “convergence of commerce and content” – as the advertising industry calls it – has meant that the production of content is even more entwined with advertising than ever before. The first part of this article describes this shift with particular attention paid to the production of advertising music, which increasingly employs well-known rock, hip-hop, and other popular musicians. The analytical portion of this article draws on the studies of Richard A. Peterson and others on the rise of the socially elite “omnivore” consumer of cultural products to argue that advertising has played a crucial role in this shift, emphasizing the cool and the trendy. Last, the article updates Pierre Bourdieu's influential notion of cultural capital, for, if social elites are more omnivorous in their tastes, then cultural capital today must increasingly be associated with knowledge of the trendy, not only the fine arts.     

Introduction to Neumann: law and socialist political theory

Abstract

Regulators attempt to understand financial markets and their risks in terms of categories of knowledge and datasets that are defined and produced by the markets. However, regulators cannot adequately interpret or utilize such knowledge, for reasons including their social distance from the sites of knowledge production, the diversity of financial firms’ proprietary risk models, firms’ abilities to game the rules thus rendering the ‘metrics’ meaningless and several backfiring aspects of global regulatory networking and reform. Calls for yet more information about trading, posed in terms of the merits of transparency, result in information swamping of regulators. Meanwhile, while policy-makers tinker with regulatory structures (‘architecture’), political reaction to the crisis de-legitimizes public regulation as a project. Yet there is one positive aspect of the reforms – enhancing powers for ‘resolution’ of financial firms in ways that impact upon investors while minimizing wider destabilization – upon which the regulatory information requirement can and should be refocused. To protect the public interest, legal transparency is required, trading transparency is not. This paper introduces these issues by drawing on critical work on transparency and markets.     

Large firms as political actors: A comparative analysis of the chemical industry in Britain,Italy and West Germany

Large firms as political actors are compared in the chemical industry in three countries. In West Germany, co‐ordinated action through the industry associations is important, but firms are developing their own political capabilities. In Italy links with political parties are important, but the operating environment of firms has become less politicised. Britain conforms more to a ‘company state’ model, with the government relations divisions of firms playing a key role. The greatest divergence between the three countries is in terms of relationships with political parties. In general, there is a trend towards greater convergence in government‐business relations in the industry in the three countries, internationalisation being a key factor.     

Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas

How do a regulator's decisions depend on the characteristics and strategies of its external clients? We develop a theory of approval regulation in which an uninformed regulator may veto the submission of a better‐informed firm. The firm can perform publicly observable experiments to generate product information prior to submission. We find that when experimentation is short, Type I errors (approving bad products) are more likely for products submitted by firms with lower experimentation costs (larger firms), while Type II errors (rejecting good products) should be concentrated among smaller firms. These comparative statics are reversed when experimentation is long. We perform a statistical analysis on FDA approvals of new pharmaceutical products using two different measures of Type I error. We find consistent support for the counterintuitive hypothesis that, under particular conditions, errors are decreasing in the size of the firm submitting the product.     

Restraining auto imports: Does anyone win?

The conventional wisdom suggests that import restraints help the protected domestic industry at the expense of consumers. In the longer term, however, trade restraint may encourage foreign firms to adopt new and more threatening business strategies, such as upgrading the quality of their products or moving plants to the United States. If these long-term dynamic effects of restraint are considered, trade restraints may prove harmful to the domestic industry as well as consumers.     

应急产业发展的制约因素与突破途径

应急产业发展滞后已成为制约政府应急能力提升的瓶颈。应急产品需求的不确定性、应急产业市场的非成熟性、应急产品安全技术标准不完善、技术含量不足是当前制约应急产业快速发展的主要因素。政府须采取强制措施,积极培育应急产业市场;完善应急产品的安全技术标准,加强市场监管力度;积极倡导产学研充分结合,提高应急产业科技创新能力;培养企业社会责任感,鼓励企业参与应急产品的生产与供给。     

Multinational Corporations and Service Provision in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Legitimacy and Institutionalization Matter

This article considers attempts by multinational corporations to provide services in areas of limited statehood. Under which conditions are such attempts effective? We make two arguments: First, they must be legitimate to be effective. Second, the institutional design of the firms’ service provision programs is an important factor for their effectiveness. We assess these arguments by analyzing multinationals in the South African car industry fighting HIV/AIDS, and international mining firms in South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo trying to improve public security. The analysis demonstrates that under conditions of legitimacy and high degrees of institutionalization firm programs effectively contribute to service provision in areas of limited statehood.     

Economic interdependence and the making of trade policy: Industrial demand for an open market in Japan

Abstract

The central question of this article is how the internationalization of corporate activity has changed the trade policy preferences of Japanese corporations. Using case studies of the automobile and textile industries, the paper tests the hypothesis that as firms strengthen multinational operations, they become more committed to trade liberalization of their home market. Growing multinational operations are one of the major reasons why internationally‐oriented automakers have committed themselves to promoting the opening of keiretsu groups as well as the market access for foreign products. In the textile industry, apparel makers opposed import restrictions because of their overseas productions and intra‐firm trade. Towel manufacturers also opposed restrictions on imports of cotton yarn because they were users of imported yarn. However, large textile producers supported import restrictions in spite of their international links. Their preferences stemmed largely from their desire to maintain their domestic linkages with downstream producers.     

Stimulating ‘green’ technological innovation: An analysis of alternative policy mechanisms

As our understanding of human impacts on the environment has increased, it has become clear that we need to move toward a closed-loop industrial society in order to avoid undesirable health and ecosystem consequences. Achievement of this goal depends on radical technological innovation in both products and processes. This paper explores how to design public policy mechanisms to stimulate rather than impede pollution-preventing technological innovation. It begins with a discussion of the role of government in civilian technology development and diffusion. It then sets out six design criteria for policy to promote green technology innovation. Based on this set of design criteria, the article assesses the potential and limitations of current U.S. policy approaches to stimulate technological innovation that moves us toward a minimal waste society. The main conclusions of this assessment are as follows. Over the past decade, the U.S. environmental policy system has experienced a variety of reforms and new initiatives, many aimed directly at promoting environmentally-friendly technological change. The strengths of these reforms are to increase the information that the private sector has about the magnitude and cost of their environmental impacts and to allow greater flexibility in the technologies that firms choose to meet environmental regulations and goals. Because of these reforms, firms are likely to undertake technological innovation for the environment in situations with clear short-term economic benefits, i.e. to capture the much heralded win-win potential of environmental regulation. However, these reforms have significant weaknesses as well. Unless policy provides stronger political or economic incentives and clearer signals about future environmental performance requirements, we are unlikely to be able to drive technological innovation in industries where the pay-off is more longterm or uncertain, and thus will make only limited progress toward the goal of a minimal waste society.     

Mixing business with politics: Does corporate social responsibility end where lobbying transparency begins?

Scholars increasingly have argued that the future effectiveness and legitimacy of firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities are dependent on more transparent forms of lobbying to ensure firms' policy positions are aligned with their CSR commitments. Very little empirical work, however, has systematically analyzed firms' lobbying disclosures or examined how these firms coordinate their lobbying and CSR activities. We address these empirical questions by analyzing the CSR reports of 150 corporations from Germany, the UK and the US over an 18-year period and by conducting interviews with the CSR managers of these firms. We find that corporations have become more transparent about their public policy advocacy over time, thus acknowledging that lobbying is a CSR issue. For most firms, however, this commitment to transparency appears to be largely ceremonial. Few firms disclose the specific policy positions they advocate or sufficiently coordinate the work of their lobbying and CSR units to foster greater alignment of these activities. These modest changes in lobbying transparency appear to be driven by legitimacy concerns and, in a few instances, by governance gaps firms perceive to be relevant to their future business interests.     

Rent-seeking and market structure: Comment

If the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government, two conditions must be met: (1) there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile, and (2) the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free-rider problem in fund-raising. This argument, though seemingly intuitively appealing, has been under recent empirical attack; this paper seeks to restore the parapets.     

Catastrophe risk,insurance and terrorism

This article empirically investigates how the terrorist activity of September 11, 2001, was addressed by the insurance industry and government in the United States. It shows that the insurance system worked reasonably well in compensating losses suffered, albeit with various tribulations. It also demonstrates that the insurance industry, along with government as the ultimate risk manager, imaginatively reconfigured markets to continue terrorism insurance coverage in many contexts. The findings challenge many of Ulrich Beck’s contentions about catastrophe risks and insurability. At the same time, they indicate the fragility of the insurance system. Insurers’ perceptions and decisions about uncertainty – with potential for windfall profits as well as catastrophic losses – create crises in insurance availability and promote new forms of inequality and exclusion. Hence, while the insurance industry is a central bulwark against uncertainty, insurers can also play a key role in fostering it.     

A comparative analysis of Inspector responses to complaints about psychosocial and physical hazards

Work Health and Safety Inspectors are at the forefront of efforts to protect workers from harm from psychosocial hazards, yet the application of regulatory theory to their practice has been limited. Drawing on models of responsive regulation and strategic enforcement, we analyze extensive (N = 46,348) complaint and incident notification data from an Australian Work Health and Safety Inspectorate, to compare Inspectors' responses to psychosocial versus non-psychosocial hazards. We found psychosocial hazards were less likely to be actioned than non-psychosocial hazards. When they were actioned, psychosocial hazards saw more Inspector activity, but fewer enforcement notices than non-psychosocial hazards. These findings are inconsistent with the version of responsive regulation espoused by the regulator. Our theoretical conclusion is that Weil's strategic enforcement approach is likely to offer greater possibilities for guiding future resource allocation.     

REGULATION OF ASBESTOS THE MICROANA1YTICS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE

This article analyzes the government's role in regulating asbestos-related health hazards in the United States. The U.S. government has served as both promoter and regulator of the U.S. asbestos industry, and this article examines the extent to which—in both capacities—it has hindered rather than facilitated the information dissemination essential to voluntary assumption of asbestos related risks. In documenting the behavior of the major government actors, this paper investigates the political and economic forces that have shaped U.S. asbestos policy. It shows how the Congressional transition from promoter to regulator of the asbestos industry can be explained by the susceptibility of political processes to transaction-cost augmentation by the bureaucracy.     

The dark side of price cap regulation: a laboratory experiment

In a nutshell, price cap regulation is meant to establish a quid pro quo: regulators are obliged by law to intervene only at rare, previously defined points in time, and only by imposing an upper bound on prices; firms are meant to justify regulatory restraint by adopting socially beneficial innovations. In the policy debate, a potential downside of the arrangement has featured less prominently: the economic environment is unlikely to be stable while the cap is in place. If regulators take this into account, they have to decide under uncertainty and also anticipate how regulated firms will react. In a lab experiment, we manipulate the degree of regulatory uncertainty. We compare a baseline when regulators have the same information as firms about demand with treatments wherein they receive only a noisy signal and another when they know only the distribution from which demand realizations are taken. In the face of uncertainty, regulators impose overly generous price caps, which firms exploit. In the experiment, the social damage is severe, and does not disappear with experience.     

The rise of the randomistas: on the experimental turn in international aid

Abstract

In recent years, the use of experimental methodologies has emerged as a central means of evaluating international aid interventions. Today, proponents of randomized control trials (so-called randomistas) are among the most influential of development experts. This paper examines the growth of this thought collective, analysing how uncertainty has become a central concern of development institutions. It demonstrates that transformations within the aid industry – including the influence of evidence-based policy, the economization of development and the retreat from macro-planning – created the conditions of possibility for experimentation. Within this field, the randomistas adeptly pursued a variety of rhetorical, affective, methodological and organizational strategies that emphasized the lack of credible knowledge within aid and the ability of experiments to rectify the situation. Importantly, they have insisted on the moral worth of experimentation; indeed, the experimental ethic has been proposed as the way to change the spirit of development. Through causal certitude, they propose to reduce human suffering. The rise of experimentation has not, however, eliminated accusations of uncertainty; rather, it has redistributed the means through which knowledge about development is considered credible.     

Firm size and regulatory compliance costs: The case of workers' compensation insurance

This paper examines the relative costs of workers' compensation insurance across firm-size groups, with particular focus on administrative scale economies (“compliance effects”) and biases in rate-setting (“enforcement effects”). Analyzing data on premiums and losses from the insurance industry, the authors find that the costs of insurance per dollar of loss are relatively high for very small firms. These higher costs reflect certain fixed administrative costs insurance companies must bear, but for extremely small firms these higher costs tend to be mitigated by an “enforcement” bias in state rate-setting outcomes. Due to imperfect experience-rating of insurance premiums, middle-sized firms—which have the highest losses—pay less per dollar of loss than either the smallest or largest firms. Indeed, it appears that large firms purchasing commercial workers' compensation insurance subsidize other size groups.     

Assessing the institutionalization of private sustainability governance in a changing coffee sector

The potential of transnational private governance initiatives to constitute effective alternatives to state‐led regulation of global value chains rests on their ability to scale up and become institutionalized in a given sector. This study examines whether such institutionalization has occurred in the coffee sector, the commodity with the most widespread adoption of certified products and over 30 years’ experience of private governance, and tests hypotheses on facilitating and inhibiting conditions. It finds that while norm generation around responsible supply chain management and the organizational institutionalization of standard‐setting bodies is well advanced, the practice of internalizing social and environmental externalities through the routinized production and purchase of higher priced certified goods continues to be questioned by industry actors. Indeed, conditions that favored normative and organizational institutionalization, such as high levels of industry concentration, product differentiation, and deliberative interaction, are shown to represent barriers to the practice‐oriented institutionalization of market‐driven regulatory governance.