Identity and political preferences in Ukraine – before and after the Euromaidan

Abstract

Taking advantage of a panel survey in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan, we analyze the relationship between ethnicity, language practice, and civic identities on the one hand and political attitudes on the other. We find that while ethnic identities and language practices change little on the aggregate level over the period, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people thinking of Ukraine as their homeland. There has also been a large fall in support for a close political and economic relationship with Russia and some increase in support for joining the European Union. Nevertheless, we find that identities in general, and language practice in particular, remain powerful predictors of political attitudes and that people are more likely to shift attitudes to reflect their identities rather than modify their identities to match their politics.     

Does everyday corruption affect how Russians view their political leadership?

Do Russians’ personal experiences with corruption influence how they evaluate their political leaders and, if so, in what direction? In addressing this question, we focus specifically on small-scale corruption that arises when Russians encounter employees of service provision organizations. We analyze survey data gathered in the summer of 2015 from Russia to trace the links between personal corrupt behavior and political attitudes. We show that participation in everyday corruption lowers a person’s support for the political regime, both as a bivariate relationship and in a multivariate model with controls. Being involved in corrupt transactions reduces support for the regime through two indirect mechanisms: by making the political leadership’s performance seem worse and by heightening perceptions that corruption is widespread among the country’s leaders. We find no support for arguments in the literature that bribery and other forms of bureaucratic corruption help citizens pursue their needs in the face of inefficient state institutions and less developed economies. In Russia, those who frequently encounter corruption are less, not more, happy with the regime.     

Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis

Abstract

Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples’ Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues.     

The file on operation “Priboi”: A re-assessment of the mass deportations of 1949

Abstract

Using information from documents found in the Russian State Military Archives, this article discusses the organization and execution of the Soviet mass deportations from the Baltic States in March 1949 — code-named Operation “Priboi” by the USSR MVD. These findings are presented for the first time in English, in the context both of established historiographical interpretations and recent literature on the deportations. The aim is to encourage a scholarly reassessment of Operation “Priboi” as a crime against humanity perpetrated by the Soviet occupation regime, but supported by indigenous collaborators to a far greater degree than previously assumed.     

Do social networks bridge political divides? The analysis of VKontakte social network communication in Ukraine

New electronic forms of political communication have become increasingly popular in countries with weak democratic institutions. The effectiveness of these new forms of association in altering political behavior, however, remains uncertain even in developed democratic regimes. This paper investigates connections between regional variation in electoral behavior and regional distribution of electronic social networks in the case of Ukraine's polarized and institutionally unstable democracy. Our analysis of online networks shows that, somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom, electronic communication does not bridge political divides. This finding casts doubt on the effectiveness of online forms of political communication as a source of behavioral change.     

Gorbachev and the “National Question”: Restructuring the Soviet Federation

An American specialist on Russian economic law and managerial behavior examines the means by which enterprise directors cope with non-payments. Analysis is based primarily on evidence from six in-depth case studies of industrial enterprises in Moscow, Saratov, and Yekaterinburg. On-site observation of managerial routines complements intensive interviews with a range of managerial personnel and examination of sales contracts and other documentary records. The author identifies three basic patterns of adaptation to the threat of insolvency, the factors that explain the managers' behavioral choices, and the implications of these changes for the broader banking, inter-enterprise, and legal systems.     

Official Russian identity discourse in light of the annexation of Crimea: national or imperial?

Close examination and analysis of the Kremlin’s framing of Russia’s annexation of Crimea reveals that domestically it was presented in unprecedented national irredentist terminology, aiming at reunifying the Russian nation in one state. The Russian nation was largely described in ethno-lingual or ethno-cultural terms, while the Russian state was all but explicitly declared as a nation–state of ethnic Russians. The official identity discourse was marked by the recasting and unprecedentedly strong reassertion of boundaries between the Russian and Ukrainian nations, legitimizing Russian claims to Crimea. However, the changing references to the crisis in Eastern Ukraine illustrate how the Kremlin’s identity rhetoric is still mainly guided by considerations of political necessity, rather than dictated by some national or ideological vision. Significantly, the focus of the Russian official identity discourse shifted from the state to the nation. This marks a decisive departure from Putin’s earlier largely statist rhetoric in the 2000s, and a new stage of maturation and official acclamation of national ethnicization trends launched during his third presidential term. After years of sitting on the fence, the Kremlin reinvented itself as an active and initiating player in the nationalism field.     

The irreversibility of history: the case of the Ukrainian crisis (2013–2015)

Abstract

Today’s Ukraine figures as the land of irreconcilable differences, on the verge of disintegrating into different parts. Issues regarding nation-building processes, national identity types within the main ethnic communities, as well as regional political preferences have all become critical. Thus, this paper examines how enduring regional political preferences, embedded in a fragmented and porous national identity framework, have been serving as destabilizing factors in the eastern part of the country. The conclusions offer an understanding of the 2013–2015 crisis, while they can also be extrapolated to other regions of the ex-Soviet space.     

‘Europeanization’ as a legitimation strategy of political parties: the cases of Ukraine and Georgia

This article’s objective is to critically assess the top-down rational choice and sociological approaches to Europeanization, while advocating the ‘usages of Europe’ approach. I argue that both classic top-down perspectives do not adequately grasp the nature of Europeanization of political parties beyond member and candidate countries. Empirically, the analysis focuses on transnational cooperation of political parties from Ukraine and Georgia and stresses agency of domestic partisan actors seeking international and domestic legitimacy. It is argued that European party federations and parliamentary cooperation formats should not only be seen as channels of top-down Europeanization, but they should rather be conceptualized as resources that are used strategically by domestic political parties. Thus the article deals with the following question: To what extent and how channels of Europeanization have been used by national political parties from outside the European Union as resources serving to attain partisan goals, both in terms of domestic positioning and international legitimacy? Patterns of strategic and legitimating usage of European partisan and parliamentary resources depend on whether parties in question are in power or in opposition and whether they are more pro-European or more pro-Russian.     

Tracing Foreign Policy Decisions: A Study of Citizens' Use of Heuristics

Public opinion researchers agree that citizens use simplifying heuristics to reach real, stable preferences. In domestic policy, the focus has been on citizens delegating judgement to opinion leaders, notably political parties. By contrast, citizens have been held to deduce foreign policy opinions from their own values or principles. Yet there is ample scope for delegation in the foreign policy sphere. In this exploratory study I use a 'process-tracing' method to test directly for delegation heuristic processing in university students' judgements on the Iranian nuclear issue. A substantial minority sought guidance on foreign policy decisions, either from parties, international actors or newspapers. This was not always simple delegation; some used such heuristics within more complex decision-making processes. However, others relied on simple delegation, raising questions about the 'effectiveness' of their processing.     

What Actually Matters? Understanding Attitudes toward Immigration in Switzerland

On 9 February 2014, the Swiss people accepted the popular initiative “against mass immigration” launched by the national‐conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP). This voting outcome has triggered wide‐ranging debates about both the policy on immigrants as well as the future of Switzerland within the European context. Against this background, we evaluate attitudes toward immigration in Switzerland. Using hitherto unexplored survey data of MOSAiCH, our empirical analyses show that already in the year 2013, before the debate about the initiative on mass immigration was in full swing, roughly 53 percent of the 1011 interviewed Swiss citizens stated that immigration should be reduced. Moreover, our estimations indicate that the threats and fears induced by immigration and the will to maintain sovereignty and autonomy are particularly relevant for attitudes toward immigration. By contrast, education and national or personal economic conditions are only weakly related to the immigration issue.     

Fear of Crime or Fear of Life? Public Insecurities in Chile

Chile is regarded as one of the safest countries in Latin America. Crime rates are extremely low when compared to the rest of the region, and the police are widely considered to be efficient and trustworthy. Despite these objective trends, fear of crime is widespread throughout Chile. Why are Chileans so fearful when their country is so safe? We argue that fear of crime in Chile does not reflect fear of criminal acts per se, but is rather a manifestation of a wide range of daily insecurities. That is, fear of crime is rooted in other economic, social, and political insecurities featuring prominently in Chilean life today. To substantiate this argument, we test the ability of these “other” insecurities to predict fear of crime using a recent survey conducted by the International Labor Organization in 2001. We test our hypothesis alongside counterhypotheses prominent in the literature: social identity characteristics, victimization, trust in the media, urbanization, and community participation. We find that political, social, and economic insecurities best predict fear of crime; however, victimization, urbanization, and trust in the media are also significant. Our results suggest that scholars should study fear of crime not only as it relates to victimization and criminalization, but also in a context of insecurities generated by increasing rates of unemployment and poverty.     

Todos somos indígenas: Towards a New Language of National Political Identity

One of the most striking aspects of ‘Red October’ was the central role played by indigenous groups and their leaders who were largely able to set the agenda of protest. This paper explores how the concept of indigeneity as a mobilising concept has moved from the periphery of the political arena to centre stage. Two indigenous leaders played significant roles: whereas the political rhetoric of Felipe Quispe is exclusionary and particularistic, Evo Morales's rhetoric is inclusive and broad. Indigenous identity as articulated by indigenous leaders is contrasted to the identities expressed by rural people and raises the question of how indigeneity is defined and by whom.