The Taliban and Islam

This paper examines the aims, motives and methods of the Taliban, the present rulers of most of Afghanistan. In accordance with their fundamentalist views the Taliban have established an Islamic system which focuses on the implementation of Shariah. This paper argues that the Taliban apply directly the divine injunctions which they have drastically sharpened ‐ that means without being sanctioned by act of law of men. The government which the Taliban have set up has so far reached only a low level of institutionalization; the real power emanates from their leader, Mullah Omar.     

How Many Lives Do the Taliban Have?

After having participated in the civil war and later ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, the current Taliban have a third life as insurgents against the Afghan government and its foreign supporters. Their aim is to return to power and establish an Islamic system. Pakistani shelter and support, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist tactics allowed the Neo-Taliban to extend their influence, particularly to the south and east of Afghanistan. They used the weakness of the Hamid Karzai regime to set up shadow governments. Since even the coalition forces have abandoned the aim of defeating them, the Taliban are guaranteed survival after foreign combat troops leave Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Due to the different interests of the main stakeholders—the Afghan government, the Taliban, the United States, and Pakistan—it is unlikely that the conflict will end by negotiations any time soon. Thus, the civil war will continue. When the Taliban try to extend their reach beyond rural areas and into non-Pashtun districts, they will meet tough resistance. Therefore, it is likely that the fragmentation of Afghanistan will persist and that the Taliban will not return as rulers of a united Afghanistan.     

De-antagonising the Other: Changing Constructions of the Taliban and the Possibility of Reconciliation

Shortly after 9/11 any kind of engagement, let alone reconciliation, with the Taliban was considered absurd. Recently, however, Afghan as well as Western elites have announced that they are now willing to talk to parts of the Taliban in an attempt to begin a reconciliation process in Afghanistan. This article focuses on the discourse theoretical framework developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and illustrates the merits of such an approach for explaining how such a shift became possible. It argues that the turn to reconciliation with the Taliban was enabled by a transformation of the discursive construction of the Taliban. The article focuses on the discursive dynamics of the (de)coupling and differentiation of signifiers as a central mechanism of meaning production. It argues that antagonistic identity constructions in the context of the global war on terror formed the discursive background against which the Taliban were first articulated as part of the terrorist “Other”, which made any engagement impossible. From 2009 onwards, however, it can be observed how the signifier “Taliban” was decoupled from the identity of the “terrorist”, how it transcended the antagonistic frontier and came to be seen as an entity worthy of engagement.     

阿富汗大变局:地缘政治和安全格局的演变

当前,阿富汗正在经历重大变局.阿富汗塔利班(阿塔)成功卷土重来,并且完成临时政府组建.尽管仍有多重挑战,但阿塔执政已不存在根本性威胁.这引发阿富汗地缘政治格局和地区安全形势的深度调整.在地缘政治格局方面,整体呈现"美国西方影响力下降,地区国家影响力上升"这一"东升西降"趋势.美国正在从"局内人"变为"局外人",但仍将发...     

无人攻击机面临的国际法挑战——以美国在巴基斯坦的无人机攻击为例

过去十年间,无人机数量和战场使用快速增加。自2004年以来,美国利用无人攻击机在巴基斯坦境内定点清除基地组织和塔利班人员,在取得一定打击效果的同时,也造成了严重的平民伤亡。许多批评者认为,在巴基斯坦的无人机攻击不仅存在法律方面的问题,而且对南亚反恐局势产生了负面作用。本文试从国际法,着重是战争法的角度分析在巴无人机攻击的非法性及其影响。     

Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insurgency that mimics operations and tactics witnessed in Iraq. This article assesses this insurgency and the re-emergent Taliban. The common view of the Taliban as simply a radical Afghan Islamist movement is overly simple, for that organization has been able to build on tribal kinship networks and a charismatic mullah phenomenon to mobilize a critical and dynamic rural base of support. This support, buttressed by Talib reinforcements from Pakistan's border areas, is enough to frustrate the U.S.-led Coalition's counterinsurgency strategy. At the operational level, the Taliban is fighting a classic “war of the flea,” while the Coalition continues to fight the war largely according to the Taliban “game plan.” This is resulting in its losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village at a time.     

Central Asian Countries: Learning to Live Next to the Taliban

With the withdrawal of the US and coalition forces from Afghanistan and the rapid takeover by the Taliban, most Central Asian governments recognized the Taliban in a pragmatic decision to peacefully coexist with the neighboring extremist regime that will likely remain in power for the foreseeable future. Tajikistan is, however, denying the Taliban recognition and indirectly supporting the resistance movement in Panjshir. The political and human catastrophe in Afghanistan is threatening to boost autocratic tendencies and further deepen political gaps in Central Asian societies. This article discusses the rationale behind each Central Asian government’s approach to the Talibanized Afghanistan and the looming domestic and external challenges to the region.     

Women in Afghanistan: Passive victims of the borga or active social participants?

This paper, based on field research in Kabul in February 2002, begins by discussing how women experience war and violent conflict differently from men, in particular by defining different types of violence against women in Afghanistan. Second, by identifying individual Afghan women, as well as women's networks and organisations, I analyse their different coping strategies and the ways in which networking and different forms of group solidarity became mechanisms for women's empowerment. Third, I demonstrate how, throughout Taliban rule, many women risked their lives by turning their homes into underground networks of schools for girls and young women. I argue that, as social actors, they created cohesion and solidarity in their communities. Their secret organisations have already laid the foundation for the building of social capital, which is crucial for the process of reconstruction in Afghanistan. In the final section, I propose that women in Afghanistan, as social actors, are optimistic and willing to participate in the process of reconstruction. As a researcher, I intend to articulate their voice, views, and demands, which I hope will be taken into consideration by policy makers and aid workers.     

Diplomacy of Estrangement: The Dealings of the United States with Pakistan before 9/11

Diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the American Embassy in Islamabad published by the National Security Archive shows that during the last 35 years of the twentieth century American diplomacy toward Pakistan faced a mutually de-escalating relationship. Pakistan wanted American economic and military assistance as well as support in its conflicts with India. The United States was ready to aid Pakistan, but only so far as Islamabad respected American demands. These focused on containing Soviet influence in the region and, more recently, fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States also asked Pakistan to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. To enforce this policy, successive American administrations showered Pakistan with sanctions. These sanctions were lifted again and again, because they undercut American diplomatic influence with the Pakistani government. Washington did not intend to support Pakistan in its conflicts with India. Pakistan let down the United States by not using its leverage over the Taliban to capture Osama Bin Laden. Mistrust resulting from this roller coaster relationship should have warned American diplomats not to take Pakistan's support in the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for granted.     

On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010

This article provides a review of the history of jihadi foreign fighters in Afghanistan over the last 30 years. It details the post-9/11 period and the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. forces, focusing on the ethnic origin of the foreign fighters and how different groups engaged in different aspects of the conflict. Additionally, the piece explains that while the foreign fighters who came to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan included, among others, Uzbekistanis (not Afghan Uzbeks), Turks, and Arabs, there was also a significant force of Pakistanis—of both Pashtun and Punjabi origins—that joined, bolstering the Taliban army.     

Containing Pakistan: Engaging the Raja-Mandala in South-Central Asia

Recent events have refocused attention on Pakistan's role as an epicenter of global Islamist terror and called into question Islamabad's reliability as an ally in the fight against a resurgent Taliban and the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Pakistan in fact suffers from abiding structural pathologies that make it a questionable Western ally at best. In its foreign policy toward Pakistan, the United States would do well to consider the ancient Indian geopolitical concept of the raja-mandala (“ruler circle”), which seeks to balance opposing spheres of influence and exploit the tensions between them. This concept provides the key to containing and eventually eliminating South-Central Asian terror.     

Communication Breakdown: Strategic Communications and Defeat in Afghanistan

The author reflects on our decade long conflict in Afghanistan and identifies what he considers a main contributor to the malaise. He believes it is a failure to communicate: a message of purpose which answers the oft-asked “why are we there?” question amongst Western audiences; a message of resolve on which Afghans can bet their lives that ISAF will remain there until the Taliban is beaten or compelled to reasonable compromise; and, a message of what success will look like which is accompanied by a compelling rationalization of the cost.     

High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington's Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan

Four years have passed since the United States and allied governments toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and began security and nation-building operations. Despite the continuing deployment of thousands of Western troops and the expenditure of billions of dollars in foreign aid, current conditions in Afghanistan are perilous. Poverty is rampant, the drug trade has shown no sign of decline, warlords remain in power, and the Taliban continues to confront US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces. With the US preparing to reduce its troop presence in 2006 and NATO poised to deploy forces into Afghanistan's dangerous southern provinces, Western security and nation-building efforts are at risk of failure.     

Kicking the opium habit?: Afghanistan's drug economy and politics since the 1980s

Four misconceptions plague the efforts of the Afghan government and the international community to succeeding in weaning Afghanistan off its narcotics economy. The first myth is that the explosion of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is a new phenomenon emerging from the fall of the Taliban. The second misconception is that if the Taliban regime had remained in power, given its religious fervour, it would have extirpated the illicit economy. The third misconception is that the warlords sponsoring the illicit economy gain only immense financial profits and weapons from the drug trade, a notion that critically ignores the significant political capital that they also reap from such involvement. The final myth and the most dangerous for efforts to cement progress in Afghanistan is that large-scale eradication of the opium crop is the quickest and most effective way to stabilize the country. Only massive economic investment in Afghanistan and wise patience not to demand immediate visible measures of ‘the success’ of counter-narcotics policies can produce a decrease in Afghanistan's illicit economy that it is truly durable and not politically destabilizing.     

End States,Resource Allocation and NATO Strategy in Afghanistan

This article compares Canadian and allied goals in Afghanistan during the military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001–2002 with the objectives of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in subsequent years. The authors conclude that the limited aims in the initial campaign have been replaced by a set of more ambitious objectives. After considering force levels, resources committed to Afghanistan and the exigencies of the security situation, the authors conclude that Canadian and allied means have not been adequate to the ends sought. Despite significant progress in political reform and socio-economic improvements in many regions of the country, as of the end of 2007, allied strategy in Afghanistan may not viable without considerable increases in resources.     

Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism

This article evaluates state-sponsored terrorism as a principal-agent issue. More often applied to the study of licit national or international institutions as a way to improve their governance, we argue that applying principal-agent analysis to illicit relationships such as those between states and terrorist agents is an equally fruitful application, though one with different objectives. Rather than being used as a tool to improve governance, applying principal-agent analysis to illicit relationships such as state-sponsored terrorism may point to areas of susceptibility and thus inform more effective counterterrorism strategies. In this article, we explain why states delegate to terrorist groups, how they seek to control their agents, and the tensions in the relationship, both generally and through specific reference to Iran's sponsorship of Hizballah, Syria of various Palestinian groups, and the Taliban of al-Qa'ida. This analysis yields propositions about the conditions under which states are likely to delegate to terrorist groups and specific recommendations on how principal-agent problems of these illicit relationships may be used in practice to combat terrorism.     

Canadian women and the (re)production of women in Afghanistan

Canadian women have been at the forefront of the international movement for women's rights in Afghanistan since the rise of the Taliban in the late 1990s. Focusing on the prominent group Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (CW4WAfghan), this paper looks at the role its advocacy assumes in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. In Canada, as in the United States, government agencies have justified the military invasion of Afghanistan by revitalizing the oppressed Muslim woman as a medium through which narratives of East versus West are performed. While CW4WAfghan attempts to challenge dominant narratives of Afghan women, it ultimately reinforces the Orientalist logic on which the War on Terror operates. Drawing on Chandra Talpade Mohanty's study of feminist pedagogy, this paper explores the implications of CW4WAfghan's discourse and its dissemination through the Canadian school system. It highlights how CW4WAfghan's portrayal of Canadian values and responsibilities is at odds with feminist efforts to reconceptualize the gendered nature of war and national identity.     

Caribbean Taliban: Cuban American Terrorism in the 1970s

ABSTRACT

Most scholars have not taken Cuban-American terrorism in the 1970s seriously, despite the unprecedented campaign of terror it unleashed. Borrowing a framework of self-identity usually applied to other terrorist groups and using case studies of the Cuban Nationalism Movement in New Jersey and of Alpha 66 in Florida, this article argues that Cuban-American political ideology was the key to its impact and its support from communities in Florida and New Jersey. Militant exiles saw themselves as betrayed by two enemy states, entitled to rule in their homeland, and imbued with a mission of civilizational renewal. In these ways, Cuban-American terrorists were similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan and their reign of terror in the 1970s should be appreciated as a major episode in the history of U.S. and global terrorism.     

India's ‘Af-Pak’ Conundrum: South Asia in Flux

The risks to global security from a failure in Afghanistan are great. Abandoning the goal of establishing both a functioning Afghan state and a moderate Pakistan places greater pressure on Indian security. Pakistani intelligence would be emboldened to escalate terrorist attacks against India once it is satisfied that the Taliban would provide it strategic depth in Afghanistan. This would surely force retaliation from India.     

An Uzbekistan Perspective on the Afghan Issue

The decision by President Barack Obama to send up to 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan underlines that the Afghan dilemma is coming to the fore in world politics.