Subnational Taxes in Developing Countries: The Way Forward

Both theory and experience in a variety of circumstances around the world suggest strongly that if fiscal decentralization is to produce sustainable net benefits in developing countries, subnational governments require much more real taxing power than they now have. Students of public finance have studied the subject, and practitioners in developing countries have installed many different versions of subnational government tax. In most developing countries there are potentially sound and productive taxes that subnational governments could use: personal income tax surcharges, property taxes, taxes on the use of motor vehicles, payroll taxes, and even subnational value‐added taxes and local “business value” taxes may all be viable options in particular countries. Still, there is no general consensus about what works and what does not. In this review paper, we try and pull together enough evidence to suggest the way forward. We also develop the argument that given political realities one cannot usually decentralize significant revenues to subnational governments without having in place an intergovernmental transfer system to offset at least some of the disequalizing effects that would otherwise occur. Nor does it make sense to think of decentralizing exactly the same package of tax choices to all subnational governments regardless of their scale and scope of operations.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

The incentive effects of property taxes on local governments

This paper applies the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) to local property taxes. When local governments maximize their revenues, property taxes provide incentives for adequate amenity provision. Local amenity provision determines property values which then determine local tax revenues. As long as the demand for housing is inelastic, property-taxes will provide stronger incentives for local governments than lump-sum taxes. As current property values reflect expectations about future amenity levels, property taxes create incentives for even the most myopic government to invest for the future. Local property taxes can also act to limit the incentives of localities to tax; there are cases where higher levels of local property taxes lead to lower overall tax burdens. These ideas are applied to the tax reform in the late 1970s; one reason that tax reform may have been so successful is that in a period where land prices are driven by many forces other than government amenities, property taxes lose their value as incentive devices.     

Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study

We consider an economy composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region are spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two regions are pooled and used to finance both public goods according to the population size of each region. The experiment shows that centralization induces lower tax morale and less efficient outcomes. The reasons are that centralization gives rise to an interregional incentive problem and creates inequalities in income between regions.     

(Non)equivalence in a federalism: Dual tax shares, flypaper effects and Leviathan

Among the best-known theorems of fiscal federalism is the presumed allocative and distributive equivalence between a lump-sum grant to a collectivity and a set of lump sum grants to the members of a collectivity. Interestingly, the simple elegance of the theorem is at odds with observed behavior. Grants to governments produce greater public spending than does tax reduction. Explanations of this "flypaper effect" range from misspecified econometric modeling to presumed behavior based on fiscal illusion. In this paper we show that theoretical equivalence exists in a model that recognizes only one tax share, the citizen voter's local tax share. When the model is expanded to include voters' federal tax shares as well as local taxes, non-equivalence and the flypaper effect become the rule, not the exception.     

Fiscal decentralization and the size of government: a European country empirical analysis

This article is an original contribution to the understanding of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. Using a panel data set of the EU-15 countries, we analyse the effect of decentralization on aggregate, national and subnational government sizes by separating the long run effects of decentralization from its short run dynamics. In the long run, tax autonomy reduces central expenditure but increases—and to a greater extent—subnational public expenditure, leading to higher aggregate public expenditure. We find also that vertical imbalances tend to increase the sizes of subnational, national and aggregate governments.     

Administrative problems of the provincial sales tax on beer in Papua New Guinea

With the establishment of provincial government in Papua New Guinea, the Organic Law has conferred on the provincial governments the authority to raise revenue using local revenue bases including retail sales taxes. These taxes have significant advantages and a sales tax on beer has particular benefits in P.N.G. in terms of potential yield and ease of administrative management. The tax is levied on the two breweries and the breweries collect the tax at their breweries and wholesale warehouses on behalf of the provincial governments. For the brewery with the dominant share of the market the arrangement under which it collects the tax for a commission and pays over quarterly to the provincial governments brings financial advantage. The brewery with a smaller share of the market and localized sales is less likely to be benefitting by the arrangement. For the future given expected beer consumption a change from a quantity based tax to ad valorem rates would be financially advantageous to the provincial governments, and would reduce the need for some provinces to seek tax sources elsewhere, but experience shows the general benefit of raising the tax, not at the point of final sale, but on the wholesaler or manufacturer.     

Unintended Consequences of Local Sales Tax: Capitalization of Sales Taxes into Housing Prices

Local governments are under pressure to look for alternatives to property taxes as their main revenue source. One response has been to adopt local sales taxes. Prior studies offer little guidance on whether and how much local governments enhance their revenue capacity with local sales taxes. This article unveils the underlying mechanisms by exploring the capitalization of sales taxes into housing prices as a property tax base measure. The empirical analysis reveals a capitalization of local sales taxes into housing prices, indicating the reduction of property tax bases in higher sales tax areas from the long-term perspective. The findings suggest that a sales tax rate increase might not raise local revenue capacity as much as policymakers intend.     

Decentralization,Fiscal Independence,and Poverty in the Philippines

Decentralization is a common public sector reform in developing countries. Its basic rationale is that local governments have an informational advantage regarding the needs and preferences of consumers. However, decentralization also has drawbacks. Foremost is the efficiency advantage of the central government in providing public services because of economies of scale and better access to resources. This study looked at the relationship between decentralization and poverty using data from Philippine cities and municipalities. Results suggest that decentralization, as represented by fiscal independence and measured by the share of locally sourced revenues to total local government revenues, is indeed associated with lower poverty. However, this effect is not linear—the marginal effect of decentralization on poverty diminishes as decentralization increases. Moreover, decentralization moderates the positive effect of good governance on poverty reduction and the magnitude of the relationship between poverty and decentralization is stronger in poorer municipalities than in richer ones.     

Mayoral Public Sector Work Experience and Tax Collection Performance in Colombian Local Governments

ABSTRACT

Local governments in Latin America tend to have limited capacity to collect taxes. Existing theory explains tax collection performance as a function of political, socio-economic, and cultural factors. Yet across Latin America, tax collection performance varies greatly between localities that are similar along these dimensions. We suggest that organizational capacity, represented by managers' human capital, explains variation in local tax collection performance. We test this theoretical idea against panel data on most Colombian local governments, where elected mayors are the top managers determining the local tax collection strategy. We examine two indicators of tax collection performance: (1) the per-capita amount of property tax collected and (2) property tax collected as a percentage of total property valuation. Controlling for important confounders, the length of the mayor's prior public sector work experience is positively associated with the per-capita amount of property tax collected but not the percentage of total property valuation collected in property tax. Our results suggest that Colombian mayors gain relevant skills over their career. Our study has implications for other developing countries with a similar property tax collection system.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries

Excessive borrowing by subnational governments is considered to be one of the perils of fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization might ensure the fiscal stability of the public sector by constraining Leviathan governments. Since the impact of decentralized government on fiscal outcomes is therefore ambiguous from a theoretical perspective, we explore this question empirically with a panel of 17 OECD countries over the 1975–2001 period. Our findings suggest that expenditure decentralization significantly reduces public indebtedness, whereas tax decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalances are insignificant.     

Local Officials’ Support for PILOTs/SILOTs: Nonprofit Engagement,Economic Stress,and Politics

Nonprofit property tax exemption has become a major policy issue as the collapse of the housing market, the Great Recession, and property tax caps have threatened local tax collections. Consequently, many local governments have sought to obtain payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) from charities that are formally exempt from property taxes. Using a 2010 survey of local government officials in Indiana, this article examines whether support for PILOT policies is related to officials’ personal involvement with nonprofits, their views on government–nonprofit relationships, the type of position they hold, the level of economic distress in the county, local political conditions, and local nonprofit wealth. The findings support most of these hypotheses but also show that attitudes toward PILOTs appear to be shaped by somewhat different concerns than attitudes toward services in lieu of taxes (SILOTs).     

The Humean Critique of Lump Sum Taxation (or the Implausibility of Pure Lump Sum Taxes in Autocracy)

This paper revives Hume's idea that it is unlikely forsovereign governments to implement pure lump-sum taxationbecause lump-sum taxes are arbitrary. We phrase the problem asone of time-inconsistency of tax collection for a tax revenuemaximizing Leviathan government. We demonstrate that whilelump-sum taxation is more efficient than distortionary incometax in terms of the ex ante amount of tax revenueraised, honoring a lump-sum tax is less likely to be crediblethan honoring a distortionary income tax. We also extend theframework to understanding the relationship betweenexpropriation risk and the lack of foreign direct investment.     

The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain

This paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition, measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election (i.e. the difference between the vote share and 50%). Two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper. On the one hand, the Leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is, the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector, irrespective of the ideology of the party in power. On the other hand, the Partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low (i.e., parties on the left/right will increase/decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low). These hypotheses are tested with information on spending, own revenues and deficit for more than 500 Spanish local governments over 8 years (1992–1999), and information on the results of two local electoral contests (1991 and 1995). The evidence favors the Partisan hypothesis over the Leviathan one. We found that, for left-wing governments, spending, taxes and deficits increased as the electoral margin increases; whereas, for right-wing governments, a greater margin of victory led to reductions in all these variables.     

Property tax in Indonesia: measuring and explaining administrative (under‐) performance

One of the arguments made by some Indonesian government officials in defence of continued central control over the property tax is that it has performed well under their authority and that its decentralisation would inevitably result in weaker operations and outcomes. The property tax has indeed grown remarkably well over the past 15 years. This growth, however, has been from a very low base, has been dominated by increased revenues from the mining sector and has been driven by a small number of sub‐national governments. Recently, only around 40% of local sector property tax potential has been realised under central control, given the existing tax rate and base. Property valuations are the most problematic aspect of administration but tax coverage and collections are also sub‐standard. While there may, in fact, be insufficient local government capacity to manage the property tax, even to current levels of performance, this problem could be solved by transferring the relevant central staff to local governments, as has been carried out in other newly decentralised sectors. But even before tax administration is devolved, local governments could at least be given some authority over the property tax rate, presently one of the lowest in the world. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Policy Decentralization and the Endogenous Effects of State Traditions: Devolution of Water Management in Ghana and Senegal

Abstract

The widely held belief that decentralization of public services would reduce the fiscal burden of deeply indebted states led a large number of developing countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s to embark on devolution and public sector reform. Among the responsibilities that have generally been devolved are the provision and support of drinking water facilities. There is, however, a substantial cross-national difference in implementation records of public service devolution. This paper argues that state-building legacies, which shaped the capacity of local governments and the opportunity structure of local governments to cooperate with indigenous communities, explain this variation. This argument is analyzed in the context of devolution of water supply in Ghana and Senegal. The analysis shows that the weak capacity of local governments is compensated in Ghana, but not in Senegal, through co-optation of historically strong traditional authorities into local governance structures.     

A tragedy of the anticommons: local option taxation and cell phone tax bills

When multiple taxing jurisdictions overlap and fail to account for one another’s actions, they over-tax the common base. This is a prediction of the anticommons model, in which numerous parties have authority to exclude others from using a resource. This model further predicts that when governments over-tax the base, private parties will underutilize the resource, and underutilization will be greater as the number of parties with exclusion rights rises. We test these predictions by studying cell phone taxation and local option tax authority, which allows some cities, counties, and special-purpose districts to levy taxes on cell phone use. Consistent with theory, we find that the tax rate on cell phone service is higher when local governments have the option to tax. Further, the percentage of households owning cell phones is lower when there is the local option to tax, and ownership rates fall with the number of taxes levied.     

Public Opinion and American Federalism: Perspectives on Taxes, Spending, and Trust--An ACIR Update

The research reported here updates for 1999 some public opiniondata previously provided by the U. S. Advisory Commission onIntergovernmental Relations. The 1999 survey results indicatea general continuation of opinion trends established by thelate 1970s to the mid-1980s. Local government is viewed as givingcitizens the most for their money, followed by state governmentand the federal government. Americans still regard the federalincome tax as the worst tax, followed by the local propertytax. Likewise, Americans express the most trust and confidencein local government and the least trust and confidence in thefederal government, although confidence in all governments increasedover comparable data for 1992. Race and party identificationand, in one case, region are significant factors differentiatingopinions about the federal, state, and local governments andtheir taxes.     

Taxation by Citation? Exploring Local Governments’ Revenue Motive for Traffic Fines

Anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments may have a revenue motive for traffic fines, beyond public safety concerns. Using California's county-level data over a 12-year period, this article shows that counties increased per capita traffic fines by 40 to 42 cents immediately after a 10 percentage point tax revenue loss in the previous year; however, these counties did not reduce traffic fines if they experienced a tax revenue increase in the previous year. This finding indicates that county governments probably view traffic fines as a revenue source to offset tax revenue loss, but not as a revenue stabilizer to manage revenue fluctuation. This article also finds that low-income and Hispanic-majority counties raised more traffic fines. Counties that generated more revenue from the hotel tax—a tax typically paid by travelers and visitors—raised more traffic fines, indicating a possible tax-exporting behavior by shifting the traffic fine burden to nonlocal drivers.