WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization and access to social services in Colombia

Decentralization is meant to improve access to public services, but relatively few studies examine this question empirically. We explore the effects of decentralization on access to health and education in Colombia using an original database covering over 95 % of Colombian municipalities. We show that decentralization improved enrollment rates in public schools and access of the poor to public health services. In both sectors, improving access was driven by the financial contributions of local governments. Small increases in own-shares of spending led to surprisingly large increases in the access of the poor in both sectors. Our theoretical model implies that where local information dominates productive efficiency, elected local governments will provide services better tailored to local needs. Decentralizing such services should increase their use by the public. Together, theory and empirics imply that decentralization made the Colombian state more accountable. It provided local officials with the information and incentives they need to allocate resources in a manner responsive to voters’ needs and improve the impact of public expenditures.     

Citizen political knowledge and accountability: Survey evidence on devolution in Kenya

Devolution complicates citizens’ ability to assign responsibility for the provision of public goods and services to different tiers of government. Misattribution of responsibility limits the effectiveness of electoral accountability in the nested principal–agent relationships comprising voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. This raises two important questions. First, how do citizens learn about the functions of different tiers of government under devolution? Second, how do levels of political knowledge condition citizens’ evaluations of subnational governments? Using cross‐sectional and panel survey data from Kenya (2014–2018), this article shows that voters accumulate knowledge through exposure to government services, and that gender and partisanship mediate knowledge accumulation. In addition, exposed citizens are more likely to give positive evaluations of subnational politicians, despite the fact that such exposure may reveal subnational governments’ low capacity, ineffectiveness, and governance gaps. These findings advance our understanding of the dynamics of political accountability under devolution.     

Political Institutions and Pollution: Evidence from Coal‐Fired Power Generation

What is the relationship between political institutions and air pollution generated by the power sector? Here we focus on the association between democracy and power generated from coal, the most polluting of all fossil fuels. Using a new dataset on coal‐fired power plants commissioned between 1980 and 2016 in 71 countries, we find that the relationship between democracy and coal varies according to the environmental Kuznets curve logic. Democratic political institutions at lower levels of economic development are correlated with increased commissioning of coal power plants, as governments seek to appeal to an electorate prioritizing economic growth and affordable energy access. As a country becomes richer, democracy comes to have a negative association with coal power, as clean air becomes a more salient issue for the public.     

Competitive Tendering in the Welfare State: Perceptions and Preferences among Local Politicians

Competitive tendering for public services has triggered a heated academic debate. In political economy, competition is claimed to improve efficiency. If this is true, why are most governments faithful to the monopoly model? Political economists suggest that public sector employees and unions influence the preferences of the elected politicians. In new institutional theory, competition is claimed to undermine democratic governance. If this is true, why do some elected governments make use of competitive tendering? In this tradition, organisational solutions are seen as expressions of autonomous values and perceptions about the outcomes of organisational solutions – not as manifestations of vote–maximising politicians subject to self–interested interest groups. When governments use competition, it is due to misconceived management fads that have temporarily penetrated long–established perceptions and value systems. These propositions have not been subjected to proper empirical testing. We have analysed extensive data about Norwegian local politicians, and found support for the notion that the perceptions of elected politicians affect their preferences for tendering for residential care services for elderly people and hospital services. But we found support for the political economy propositions as well. Party affiliation, interest group background and economic situation influence the perceptions and organisational preferences of elected politicians. Reform may be a question of political values and perceived consequences, but these values, perceptions and policy preferences are influenced by political self–interest and can be changed by exogenous economic shocks.     

PBB in American Local Governments: It's More than a Management Tool

Despite academic findings that performance information seldom is used in appropriations decisions, many professional organizations and governments continue to press for integrating performance information into local public management, planning, and budgeting processes. Is it possible to reconcile such inconsistencies? Looking beyond the executive–legislative relationship and departmental appropriations, the author examines the budget implications of applying performance information at the subdepartmental program level. Case analysis of Indianapolis’s IndyStat initiative underscores that performance measurement application is positively related to intradepartmental program budget changes. Hence, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) can improve local budgeting despite severe political constraints. Still, successful use of PBB requires strong executive leadership, and its effects remain less visible at the departmental level or within the wider political arena of legislative bargaining. The author concludes by recommending some rethinking of the current analytical focus of PBB both in future research as well as recommended practice.     

Effective Foreign Aid Following Civil War: The Nonstrategic‐Desperation Hypothesis

When does aid foster development after civil war? A testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development. This article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis, an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals. Paradoxically, incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income. Ten‐year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970–96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis. By focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients, and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals, the nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war, when institutions are weak.     

Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool

This article discusses the common‐pool problems that arise when multiple territorially overlapping governments share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area. Contrary to the traditional Tiebout model in which increasing the number of competing governments improves efficiency, I argue that increasing the number of overlapping governments results in “overfishing” from the shared tax base. I test the model empirically using data from U.S. counties and find a strong positive relationship between the number of overlapping jurisdictions and the size of the local public sector. Substantively, the “overlap effect” amounts to roughly 10% of local revenue.     

Cheap and Dirty: The Effect of Contracting Out Cleaning on Efficiency and Effectiveness

Contracting out of public services, especially ancillary services, has been a key feature of New Public Management since the 1980s. By 2014, more than £100 billion of U.K. public services were being contracted out annually to the private sector. A number of high‐profile cases have prompted a debate about the value for money that these contracts provide. Value for money comprises both the cost and the quality of the services. This article empirically tests the contestability and quality shading hypotheses of contracting out in the context of cleaning services in the English National Health Service. Additionally, a new hypothesis of coupling is presented and tested: the effect of contracting of ancillary services on patient health outcomes, using the hospital‐acquired infection rate as our measure. Using data from 2010–11 to 2013–14 for 130 National Health Service trusts, the study finds that private providers are cheaper but dirtier than their in‐house counterparts.     

Isolated counties,administrative monitoring,and the misuse of public funds in China

This article empirically investigates the effects of administrative monitoring on the misuse of funds by local governments and provides a representative model of fiscal decentralization with political centralization, where administrative monitoring relies on the top‐down hierarchy of the bureaucratic system in China based on a unique data set from audit programs. We show a double effect between distance and monitoring in local China. The incentive for misusing public funds can be strengthened if the county (a) is governed by a leader whose tenure is longer than 3 years, (b) is governed by a politician from outside the county, or (c) receives more transfer payments. These findings suggest that the administrative monitoring of local governments can be vital to remedying the misuse of public funds.     

Citizen satisfaction under changing political leadership: The role of partisan motivated reasoning

There exists a gap in our understanding of what citizen satisfaction evaluations actually represent. While recent years have witnessed a move away from performance‐based models to cognitive‐implicit models of citizen satisfaction, the inherent political nature of government, its institutions, and services has been largely ignored. Drawing on the functional responsibility chain between political principals and governmental, public‐service‐delivering institutions, we outline a theory of citizen satisfaction that accounts for the political nature of these institutions. In the context of two consecutive general elections, we find a partisan bias in citizen satisfaction with government and the legislative branch, but not for institutions that are more clearly separated from national government. These mixed findings are suggestive of a dispersion effect of the partisan bias in citizen satisfaction, namely, that citizens are less likely to use their partisan lenses in cases where the responsibility of political principals is dispersed across multiple actors.     

Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

An important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods, primarily education and health care. In Norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector. The development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes. The important revenue sources of the local and county governments, grants and income tax revenue, have been controlled nationally, and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900–1990. The approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income-elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength. The decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups, and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome. The analysis shows how politics matter, and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30% more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run.     

Determinants and Evaluation of Local Energy‐Efficiency Initiatives from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

This article examines variation in local‐level energy‐efficiency grants and corresponding initiatives from the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) in the United States. The analysis is based upon a hurdle model of counts of energy‐efficiency grants received by 348 local governments that received these grants from 2009 to 2013, as well as 348 matched local governments that did not receive such funds. City‐level characteristics including amount of federal financial support, per capita income, signaling of preferences for sustainability policies, manufacturing, and political influences are shown to be empirically important determinants of variation in local energy‐efficiency initiatives. The evidence suggests that all else held equal, the $21.8 billion in ARRA funds expended with the intent of increasing local energy‐efficiency programs and policies successfully led to this end.     

Oil,elections and fiscal transparency

How does governments’ ability to gain financing from oil income affect their behaviour? Numerous studies have explored the effects of oil wealth on countries’ political characteristics, especially the level of democracy. Oil has also been associated with a significant electoral incumbency advantage across different political regimes. However, the relationship between oil wealth and incumbent governments’ behaviour, including election-year fiscal manipulation, has been studied to a lesser extent. This article argues that higher oil rents increase election-year public spending as they provide national governments both with direct revenue and increased financing opportunities. However, fiscal transparency mitigates this effect. Consequently, oil-induced electoral budget cycles decrease as fiscal transparency increases. Using a high-quality measure of fiscal transparency in a panel of countries, robust evidence in favour of this argument is found. The findings suggest that many of the previous results on the political effects of oil, including incumbency advantage, might run through an election-year spending channel, and that fiscal institutions might matter substantially for the political effects of oil.     

The Effects of Political and Fiscal Incentives on Local Government Behavior: An Analysis of Fiscal Slack in China

This study examines the determinants of fiscal slack from the perspective of Chinese local government officials. Given China's rapid economic growth over the past 30-plus years, Chinese local governments reportedly hold huge slack resources that attract public scrutiny. In an effort to improve their fiscal performance, some localities recently established budget stabilization funds, following a top-down initiative. However, it remains unclear to what extent fiscal slack has accumulated and which factors affect slack resource levels of Chinese local governments. By employing a panel dataset (249 prefecture-level cities, 1999–2009), this study finds that political and fiscal factors exert significant influence over local officials’ decisions about slack resource levels. The findings of the study bear implications for establishing fiscal rules and improving the performance of sub-national governments in China and other countries.     

Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services

Why do some local governments deliver public services directly while others rely on providers from the private sector? Previous literature on local contracting out and on the privatization of state-owned enterprises have offered two competing interpretations on why center-right governments rely more on private providers. Some maintain that center-right politicians contract out more because, like Adam Smith, they believe in market competition. Others claim that center-right politicians use privatization in a Machiavellian fashion; it is used as a strategy to retain power, by ??purchasing?? the electoral support of certain constituencies. Using a unique dataset, which includes the political attitudes of over 8,000 Swedish local politicians from 290 municipalities for a period of 10 years, this paper tests these ideological predictions together with additional political economy factors which have been overlooked in previous studies, such as the number of veto players. Results first indicate support for the Machiavellian interpretation, as contracting out increases with electoral competition. Second, irrespective of ideological concerns, municipalities with more veto players in the coalition government contract out fewer services.     

Public Trust in Government in Japan and South Korea: Does the Rise of Critical Citizens Matter?

Based on the Asia Barometer Survey of 2003, 2004, and 2006, government performance, citizen empowerment, and citizen satisfaction with self‐expression values are associated with public trust in government in Japan and South Korea. This study finds, first, that government performance on the economy, controlling political corruption, the quality of public services, crime, and attention to citizen input are significantly associated with broad public trust in government in both Japan and South Korea. Likewise, citizens’ satisfaction with their right to gather and demonstrate and to criticize the government is closely connected to trust in central and local governments in Japan. In South Korea, citizens’ satisfaction with their right to gather and demonstrate is intimately linked to trust in local government. Implications for government leadership to enhance performance, transparency, citizen participation, and public trust in government are analyzed and elaborated upon in this insightful study.     

Party patronage in contemporary democracies: Results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions

This Research Note presents a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five regions. The data was collected using the same methodology to compare patterns of patronage within countries, across countries and across world regions that are usually studied separately. The Note addresses three research questions that are at the centre of debates on party patronage, which is understood as the power of political parties to make appointments to the public and semi‐public sector: the scope of patronage, the underlying motivations and the criteria on the basis of which appointees are selected. The exploration of the dataset shows that party patronage is, to a different degree, widespread across all regions. The data further shows differences between policy areas, types of institutions such as government ministries, agencies and state‐owned enterprises, and higher, middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy. It is demonstrated that the political control of policy making and implementation is the most common motivation for making political appointments. However, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve the purpose of both political control and rewarding supporters in exchange for votes and services. Finally, the data shows that parties prefer to select appointees who are characterised by political and personal loyalty as well as professional competence.     

Local interests,central leadership,and the passage of TRA86

The U.S. federalist public economy is an ever-evolving system of financing and expenditure responsibilities between local, state, and federal governments. The past decades have seen a significant centralization of responsibility for the financing of state and local public services through grants-in-aid and federal tax subsidies. This article advances a model of local constituent influence in central government fiscal policies which seeks to explain this trend, and then examines how strong executive branch and congressional leadership might begin to control the local pressures for central government financing. TRA86 is offered as one example in which this leaedership proved effective. The general lesson is that good fiscal policy in federalist public economies requires not only capable local governments, but central government political institutions with the strength to meet national needs as well.     

Explaining Levels of Local Government Involvement in Service Delivery: The Dynamics of Cross‐Sector Partnerships in Malawi

This study explores how local governments and their development partners—that is, donors, non‐governmental organisations and private companies—structure their partnerships as they work together to provide services to communities. Cases of collaboration between four organisations working in the rural water supply sector and six local governments in Malawi are studied. Using a cross‐case qualitative methodology, we illustrate how power and control translate into practices, leading to different levels of local government involvement in service delivery. This study contributes to the literature on cross‐sector partnerships in particular by developing empirically‐based propositions that help explain the dynamic trajectories that partnerships between local governments and their development partners can take. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.