Is It Ideology or Desperation: Why Do Organizations Deploy Women in Violent Terrorist Attacks?

Why do some terrorist organizations deploy women on the front lines and in violent attacks? This study explores the social conditions, economic factors, and organizational characteristics that might explain women's participation in violent terrorist activity. With a new data set of 395 terrorist organizations, women's participation in terrorist attacks was quantified and coded. The logistic regression analysis results suggest that women's educational attainment, social rights, terrorist organization's age and size, and the level of a country's economic development are important predictors of the deployment of women in terrorist violence while a terrorist group's ideological or religious orientation and the level of democracy do not significantly influence the likelihood of women's participation.     

Does the International Trafficking of Cultural Heritage Really Fuel Military Conflicts?

General media outlets are increasingly arguing that the looting of cultural heritage artifacts contributes to the funding of terrorist groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This article reexamines this claim in light of the political science literature on internal conflicts duration. While we do know that armed conflicts contribute to an increase of looting activities in the territories at war, it is still too early to generalize the ISIS case and conclude that these activities contribute to significantly funding armed non-state actors and to prolonging internal armed conflicts. However, establishing this link may add political weight to archeologists' and art historians' efforts to curb the international trafficking of looted objects.     

Precipitating state failure: do civil wars and violent non-state actors create failed states?

This article examines whether the incidence of civil wars and the presence of violent non-state actors have an effect on state failure. Research on failed states has thus far prioritised armed conflicts as one of the key causes of state failure. This study challenges that claim and posits that civil war incidence has limited impact on the transition from fragility to failure. Global quantitative analysis of state failure processes from 1995 to 2014 shows that although armed conflicts are widespread in failed states, civil violence does not lead to state failure and large numbers of failed states become engulfed by civil war only after the failure occurs. By contrast, this study demonstrates a direct link between the presence of violent non-state actors and state failure.     

In the Name of the Father? Christian Militantism in Tripura,Northern Uganda,and Ambon

Although armed groups and political violence referring to Islam have attracted increasing attention since the start of the global war against terror, one particular religion can hardly be described as the main source of inspiration of what is commonly referred to as “terrorist acts of violence.” Faith-based violence occurs in different parts of the world and its perpetrators adhere to all major world faiths including Christianity. As such, this article treats three cases of non-state armed actors that explain their actions as being motivated by Christian beliefs and aimed at the creation of a new local society that is guided by religion: the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the Lord's Resistance Army, and the Ambonese Christian militias. It analyzes the way by which they instrumentalized religion against respective backgrounds of conflict rooted in social change, the erosion of traditional identities, imbalances of power, and widening communautarian faultlines.     

Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State

Several violent non-state groups also administer social services. Although earlier works stress the effects of social service provision on support and sympathy for violent groups, this article emphasizes a broader challenge. Namely, social welfare organizations threaten to rob the state of the legitimacy it derives through the social contract. Abolishing these organizations can cause humanitarian crises, radicalize populations, and erode domestic and international policy support. Ignoring them invites the continued erosion of state power. The way out of this dilemma is through a strategy of “displacement,” whereby the state eradicates non-state social services while concurrently extending its own welfare capacity.     

Uprooting or Sowing Violence?: Coca Eradication and Guerrilla Violence in Colombia

Belligerent nonstate actors including terrorist organizations often exploit illicit economies to fund their activities. In Colombia numerous belligerent groups are involved in illegal narcotics markets. For more than 20 years, the Colombian government has responded with targeted eradication of illicit crops, intending to undermine the groups' sources of revenue while simultaneously disrupting the illicit drug economy. Despite its duration, this policy's effect on guerrilla violence remains unclear. Examining the potential for violent backlash to these tactics, this research note assesses the impact of aerial coca crop eradication in Colombia from 2004–2005 on domestic Colombian guerrilla kidnappings, assassinations, and terrorism.     

State Weakness and “Vacuum of Power” in Lebanon

The conventional wisdom is that weak and failed states are at great risk of becoming havens for transnational terrorist and guerilla groups. The assumption is that lack of enforcement capabilities enables militant organizations to infiltrate and fill the “vacuum of power” that is created in the absence of a strong state. This article argues, though, that this is only one of the ways in which weak states are attractive to militant groups. It explores the various mechanisms through which the vacuum of power translates into opportunities for such groups. These mechanisms include the easiness of acquiring support and recruitment within refugees or marginalized populations; the ability of the violent non-state transnational organization to establish a “surrogate state” in supplying institutions and services that enhance its public appeal; the relations between civil or communal conflict and the success of such groups; and the use of transnational violent groups as proxies for other states. Using the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hezbollah in Lebanon as the primary cases, as well as two mini-cases from Central America and Africa, the paper illustrates the working of these mechanisms and contributes to our understanding of the relations between state weakness and transnational violent non-state organizations.     

The Colombia–Ecuador Armed Crisis of March 2008: The Practice of Targeted Killing and Incursions against Non-State Actors Harbored at Terrorist Safe Havens in a Third Party State

This article analyzes the 2008 Colombia–Ecuador armed crisis in the light of the practice of targeted killings and incursions against non-state actors harbored at terrorist safe havens in a third party state. The Colombian use of force against Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) is discussed in the context of use of force in International Law regarding the right of self-defense against non-states actors and third state parties’ obligation to deny passive support. It is argued that the Colombia situation is similar to the situation faced by Israel and Turkey.     

Non-State Health Care Provision in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Is Politicisation a Model?

Drawing on comparisons with cooperative and competitive non-state health care provision around the world, this article analyses non-state provision of health services in post-Soviet Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It explores the conditions in which non-state provisions remain cooperative or become politicised and contrasts the relations between NGOs and the state in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the way they became politicised in the Middle East. In contrast to Western conceptions of NGOs, Central Asia's health NGOs cooperate with state agencies to serve their constituencies. In contrast to the perceptions of Central Asian governments, health-oriented NGOs do not aim to politicise health care. Donor support to Central Asia's health NGOs has created civically oriented actors that fill gaps in the state's capacity and enable governments to better serve their populations.     

Doing Well by Doing Good: Understanding Hamas's Social Services as Political Advertising

Like many nonstate military actors, Hamas has long provided social services to its constituents, but the mechanism by which charity leads to increased public support is poorly understood. This article argues that providing charity benefits nonstate actors not because it isolates recipients or acts as a bribe but because it allows organizations like Hamas to overcome the legacies of their own military activities and extremist ideologies. Service provision allows them to demonstrate that they are not merely soldiers or ideologues, but capable bureaucrats and managers as well.     

Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism

Worldwide, women have historically participated in terrorist groups but their low numbers and seemingly passive roles have undermined their credibility as terrorist actors for many observers. This analysis contends that female involvement with terrorist activity is widening ideologically, logistically, and regionally for several reasons: increasing contextual pressures (e.g., domestic/international enforcement, conflict, social dislocation) creates a mutually reinforcing process driving terrorist organizations to recruit women at the same time women's motivations to join these groups increases; contextual pressures impact societal controls over women that may facilitate, if not necessitate, more overt political participation up to, and including, political violence; and operational imperatives often make female members highly effective actors for their organizations, inducing leaders toward "actor innovation" to gain strategic advantage against their adversary.     

Violence and Urban Order in Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria

This article examines the interaction between politics and informal institutions of order in two of Africa’s most violent and crime-ridden cities, Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria. In both cities, governments have failed to provide basic public services and security to citizens, especially to those who reside in informal settlements or slums. A variety of informal institutions, including ethnic militia and block-level vigilante groups, fulfill security and enforcement roles in these relatively ungoverned urban spaces. This article examines the differences in the character and organization of these “specialists in violence,” and it argues that these differences are often integrally linked to the political strategies and aims of elites. The article makes two primary contributions to existing understandings of informal order in violent cities in the developing world. First, I find that organizations seemingly organically linked to local communities, such as ethnic militia, are strongly influenced by national-level political struggles. Violent organizations can gain a foothold and degree of legitimacy by appealing to traditional loyalties, including ethnicity, but organizations with these advantages are also attractive targets for cooptation by political actors. Secondly, both direct state repression and electoral use of militia lead to more predatory forms of interaction between these groups and local communities.     

Religiosity and Rebellion in Nigeria: Considering Boko Haram in the Radical Tradition

Testing social movement theory positing that radical organizations are ideologically driven at their core, but are supported by civilians who are driven by social factors, this research interrogates the disparity between radical group ideology and supporter belief set in the context of present-day Nigeria. Content analysis of randomly selected Boko Haram publications establishes the high, and increasing, levels of religiosity exhibited by the violent social movement itself. In contrast, a large-N survey of Nigerians conducted in 2012 and 2013 shows that high levels of religiosity do not significantly predict willingness to justify violence, commitment to non-state violent actors, or positive attitude toward Boko Haram among Nigerians as a whole, but rather the opposite. Given these findings, Boko Haram may be better understood within the tradition of radical extremist movements across the ideological spectrum, even while it frames its struggle as that of a distinctly religious movement.     

The Impacts of Differential Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Across the Americas, from Northern Mexico to Colombia’s mountain valleys and Brazil’s shantytowns, escalating armed violence and the growing power of criminal organizations has generated immense public concern about the breakdown of the rule of law. While some policy makers and journalists write about state failure and the emergence of ungoverned spaces, the evidence presented in this article will show that far from a lack of governance or a failure of the state, criminal organizations often collaborate with a variety of state actors to create varied systems of localized order that perpetuate criminal power and undermine most policy efforts to control crime and violence. In contrast to past scholarship’s reliance on single case studies to analyze the efforts of armed actors to build localized orders, this article offers a systematic comparative analysis of a police-connected protection racket and a drug gang operating in two Rio de Janeiro neighborhoods under similar political conditions. Analysis of the evidence shows that variation in the organizational structures of the armed actors and, in particular, their proximity to state officials, poses varied consequences for local development, including the dynamics of politics and policymaking, associational life, and violence and security.     

Public Sector Commissioning: Experiences of Voluntary Organizations Delivering Health and Social Services

The perceived benefits to users and beneficiaries of voluntary organizations delivering public sector services have been well documented and include the engagement with parts of society that the state cannot reach, personalized service delivery, and improved services. There is a lack of clarity, however, as to whether these perceived benefits are being realized. This article presents the experiences of voluntary sector organizations involved in public sector commissioning. The research suggests that the public sector is limiting the voluntary sector's engagement in service design and performance monitoring. These findings raise questions about the role of the voluntary sector in public service provision.     

Does Targeted Capture Reduce Terrorism?

From January 1979 to December 2009, the Maoist insurgent Shining Path committed a total of 9,034 violent acts in a concerted attempt to topple the Peruvian government. These acts of violence included bombings, armed assaults, and assassinations. The Shining Path's leader Abimael Guzmán was captured by the Peruvian government on 12 September 1992. Using quarterly data and an interrupted times-series AutoRegressive Integrative Moving Average (ARIMA) study design, we investigated the effect of Abimael Guzmán's capture on the ability of the Shining Path to wage its war against the Peruvian government. Maximum-likelihood results revealed that the frequency of terrorist acts committed by the Shining Path dropped by 143 incidents per quarter a short time after Guzmán was captured. The analysis also evinced a positive relationship between the lethality of attacks and the frequency of the Shining Path's terrorist activity. We conclude that targeted capture shows some promise as an effective counterterrorism strategy, at least for terrorist groups such as the Shining Path that have a top-down type of organizational structure.     

The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime,A Case Study

Scholars have long recognized that terrorist groups have engaged in transnational organized crime activities. But the question that comes up is, “When does a criminal enterprise become a terrorist group or vice versa?” Terrorist groups have used physical violence, participated in weapons and drug trafficking networks, immigrant smuggling, and money laundering. More recently a number of terrorist groups have established what Jonathan White has referred to as “illegal multinational criminal organizations.” This article will examine the convergence of terrorism and organized crime through the prism of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).     

Could Hamas Target the West?

A violent Islamist organization, Hamas, is also a nationalist movement that holds “resistance” to Israel as its highest goal. Unlike global terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Hamas has traditionally confined its violent activities to the local arena comprising Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. While citizens of Western countries have been killed in Hamas' indiscriminate suicide bombings, Hamas has not taken its violent campaign abroad targeting Israeli diplomats or Western allies. Indeed, several layers of disincentives mitigate against Hamas targeting Israeli interests abroad or targeting Western interests. But under what conditions might Hamas be prepared to target Western interests? The answer to this question requires a level of analysis approach that considers Hamas as an organization, as a conglomerate of semi-independent cells, and as a wellspring for rogue cells and independent actors, with these last two entities posing the greatest future threat. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is precedent for Hamas considering the attacks on Israeli interests abroad and on Western interests themselves. In final analysis, the author believes Hamas unlikely to attack Western interests in the short term. But the following analysis reveals that under certain conditions Hamas' attack calculus could change in the future.     

Greece's Terrorism Problem: A Reassessment

The collapse of Greece's premier terrorist organization, the 17 November (17N) group, back in the summer of 2002 was a truly dramatic event, considering 17N's 27-year career, but it was not such a watershed event in the country's history as it was presented at the time by the mainstream political and media establishments. 17N's dismantling and imprisonment, far from demoralizing and emasculating the armed struggle movement, led to the emergence of new urban guerrilla groups and the increase and intensification of revolutionary violence. This article reassesses Greece's persistent terrorism problem by focusing on the nature, threat, and operational evolution of a new generation of political militancy.     

Organizational [Dis]trust: Comparing Disengagement Among Former Left-Wing and Right-Wing Violent Extremists

In order to move beyond the existing push/pull framework to understand disengagement, we apply a systematic coding scheme derived from Mayer and colleagues' integrative model of organizational trust to examine why people leave extremist groups. In doing so, we also rely on in-depth life history interviews with twenty former left- and right-wing extremists to examine whether antecedents of distrust vary between the two groups. Findings suggest substantial similarities and important differences between left- and right-wing extremists' decision to leave. In particular, perceptions of poor planning and organization, low-quality personnel and vindictive behavior generate perceptions of organizational distrust and disillusionment. Although findings from the current study are based on a relatively small sample, notable similarities were identified between both groups regarding sources of distrust (e.g., leaders, group members). We also identified differences regarding the role of violence in weakening solidarity and nurturing disillusionment with extremist activities. We conclude this article with suggestions for future research that extend the study of terrorism and that may have significance for how practitioners address countering violent extremism initiatives.