Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future

This article considers the current state of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement and its likely future trajectory. It considers the principle assumptions both today and in the past about Al Qaeda and how they affect our understanding of the movement and the threat that it poses; Al Qaeda's current capacity for violence; and its ability to plan strategically and implement terrorist operations. The article further identifies nine key change drivers that will likely determine Al Qaeda's fate in the years to come before concluding that, even while the core Al Qaeda group may be in decline, Al Qaeda-ism, the movement's ideology, continues to resonate and attract new adherents. In sum, it argues that Al Qaeda remains an appealing brand most recently and most especially to extremist groups in North and West Africa and the Levant.     

Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement

This article provides a detailed examination of how the Salafi-jihadi movement perceives the “Arab Spring” revolutionary events. Although Western scholars almost unanimously agree that these events will have an enormous impact on Al Qaeda and other groups that share its ideology, the voice of the jihadis has not been examined in detail. This article addresses this critical gap in the literature through an analysis of 101 significant documents produced by jihadi thinkers within a year following the movement's very first statement on the uprising in Tunisia. These include statements released by jihadi spokesmen, interviews with the movement's intellectual leaders, and discussions on jihadi Web forums. The article concludes that Al Qaeda and the jihadi movement largely believe that the uprisings provide them a great deal of new opportunities, and outlines the movement's developing strategy to capitalize on rapidly changing events on the ground.     

Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda's organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL's behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.     

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State's Break: Strategic Strife or Lackluster Leadership?

Employing counterfactuals to assess individual and systemic explanations for the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), this article concludes that individual leaders factor greatly into terrorist alliance outcomes. Osama bin Laden was instrumental in keeping Al Qaeda and ISIS allied as he prioritized unity and handled internal disputes more deftly than his successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although a troubled alliance, strategic differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split. Rather, the capabilities of Al Qaeda's leader determined the group's ability to prevent alliance ruptures.     

Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for U.S. Policy

Almost eight years after the September 2001 attacks, U.S. counterterrorism strategy would benefit from a clearer definition of its adversaries. Some have suggested that U.S. counterterrorism policy focus primarily on Sunni jihadists. This term would account for groups such as Al Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, but not Shi'ite militias in Iraq or Hizbullah. Although any attempt to narrow the scope of U.S. counterterrorism strategy has merit, it is worth noting that important distinctions exist between the various groups. To explore these distinctions, this article examines the different historical trajectories and current arguments between two of the most well-known Sunni jihadists: Al Qaeda and Hamas.     

Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia--The Genealogy of a Terror Network

The aim of this study is to analyze the process by which Al Qaeda has sought to co-opt essentially localized struggles in Southeast Asia into an evolving network of worldwide jihad. The article illustrates how, long before it was appropriate to speak of an entity called Al Qaeda, Islamists have been thinking transnationally since the 1980s. The argument attempts to piece together available evidence to reveal a plausible explanation of the origins, growth and direction of the main Islamist grouping in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah, and its deepening relationship with Al Qaeda. The article suggests that the roots of a Southeast Asian terror network can be traced to two geographically separate ethno-religious struggles in the Philippines and Indonesia. The analysis demonstrates that these guerrilla groups orchestrating their distinct struggles were eventually combined through the auspices of Al Qaeda and the globalized franchising opportunities it exploited from the early 1990s.‐     

The Islamic State's Evolving Chemical Arsenal

This article examines the growing chemical weapon capabilities of the Islamic State from the crude poisons and toxins of its founding father Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to the current battlefield use of indigenously produced mustard gas in Iraq and Syria. By examining this evolution as a phenomenon separate from Al Qaeda, a clearer picture emerges of a dedicated and increasingly successful chemical weapons program that threatens military forces and civilian populations around the world.     

The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism

This article assesses current trends and developments in terrorism within the context of the overall progress being achieved in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). It examines first the transformation that Al Qaeda has achieved in the time since the 11 September 2001 attacks and the variety of affiliated or associated groups (e.g., what are often referred to as Al Qaeda "clones" or "franchises") that have emerged to prosecute the jihadist struggle. It then focuses on recent developments in Saudi Arabia and especially Iraq in order to shed further light on Al Qaeda's current strategy and operations. In conclusion, this article offers some broad recommendations regarding the future conduct of the GWOT.­     

Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network

This piece attempts to add to the discourse on violent substate political activism by underscoring certain overlooked elements in the study of groups such as Al Qaeda as it relates to organizational paradigms. Specifically, this essay sheds light on the nature of networks in the business world and the ways in which firms utilize organization as a method of creating value. This article starts with the assumption that the end of firm organization is ultimately the maximization of innovative capacity. The conclusion of this essay finds that Al Qaeda's use of networks has not created the indestructible conglomerate many students of terrorism fear, but rather that the resort by Al Qaeda to an all-channel network was the result of poor strategy and indeterminate political goals that have robbed it of much of its effectiveness. This study uses cursory examinations of several other similar organizations to underscore the difference in strategy and firm innovation between firms considered to have high added-value and Al Qaeda.‐     

Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

On 29 October 2010, authorities in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates intercepted explosive packages that had been placed on U.S.-bound planes. Less than a year earlier, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives aboard Northwest Flight 253. These attacks originated and were organized in Yemen under the supervision of a local Al Qaeda affiliate known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. These attacks are a manifestation of the group's growing international ambitions, yet little scholarship on Al Qaeda explores how affiliates with robust ties to Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan balance their dedication to global and local jihad(s). This article contends that despite its strong ties to Al Qaeda Central and international posture, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula still must maintain local relevance and support. Its ability to do so carries implications for counterterrorism policymakers and the broader Al Qaeda movement.     

Al Qaeda's Operations: Project Management Analysis

In recent years, Al Qaeda succeeded in perpetrating several terrorist attacks that were successfully calculated and executed. Each operation may be considered to be analyzed as a project. This article analyzes the events taken by Al Qaeda prior to their operations, focusing on planning, controlling, and decision-making processes, using common tools from the project management area. This unique approach enables an understanding of the operational aspects of Al Qaeda and the managerial processes that its leaders were focused on. It was found that Al Qaeda's greatest managerial strength lies in human resource management, which includes team members recruiting, developing a clear organizational structure, team developing and team members motivating. Al Qaeda's greatest weakness lies in time management, resulting with many operations’ schedule delays.     

Locating Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers

This article claims that the ongoing debate about the structure and dynamics of Al Qaeda has failed to appreciate the importance of an organizational layer that is situated between the top leadership and the grass-roots. Rather than being “leaderless,” it is the group's middle management that holds Al Qaeda together. In Clausewitzian terms, Al Qaeda's middle managers represent a center of gravity—a “hub of … power and movement”—that facilitates the grass-roots’ integration into the organization and provides the top leadership with the global reach it needs in order to carry out its terrorist campaign, especially in Europe and North America. They are, in other words, the connective tissue that makes Al Qaeda work. The article substantiates this hypothesis by providing a number of case studies of Al Qaeda middle managers, which illustrate the critical role they have played in integrating the grass-roots with the top leadership. The policy implications are both obvious and important. If neither the top leadership nor the grass-roots alone can provide Al Qaeda with strategic momentum, it will be essential to identify and neutralize the middle managers, and—in doing so—“cause the network to collapse on itself.”     

Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey's Jihadi Policies and Western Security

Turkish support to jihadists is not merely a tactic aimed at removing Assad from power. It stems from a strategic decision on the part of Turkish authorities to influence Middle East affairs through non-state actors, much as Iran has been doing for some time. Turkey's support of jihadists transiting into Syria and its establishment of close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are joint aspects of this strategy. Turkish authorities have permitted Al Qaeda sympathizers to use pro-government media to promote their beliefs. The authorities have adopted a new political language that fuels anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. Prosecutors who have attempted to prevent shipments of weapons to Al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria have been fired and in some cases incarcerated. Indeed, by now Turkish prosecutors and the Turkish National Police are thoroughly intimidated. Not a single counterterror operation has been launched to disrupt Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s networks or recruitment activities. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization has been given full responsibility to deal with jihadist activities, without any active oversight, and the police are loath to venture into their territory. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey's jihadi policies have direct and indirect impact on Western security. This article examines Turkey's jihadi policies by examining official statements, media reports, interviews, and fieldwork.     

Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror

This article argues that a successful strategy for fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) requires actions aimed not only at defeating the Al Qaeda network and denying its operatives sanctuary, but also efforts to delegitimize Al Qaeda's ideology; the United States has focused on the former at the expense of the latter. The GWOT requires a new strategy, one that continues to target Al Qaeda operatives and their assets, while undermining Al Qaeda's message. This requires a better understanding of Al Qaeda's ideology, how U.S. foreign policy may fuel that ideology, and a strategy for undermining militant Islam's worldview.     

Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution

The inner organizational structure of Al Qaeda within the expanded framework of the “Global Jihad movement” has been a subject of much debate between scholars. As will be elaborated later, the “Global Jihad movement” is composed of several elements that possess radical Islamic ideology and conduct operational activity in different regions in the world under the banner of Jihad. The dominant factor within the “Global Jihad movement” is by no doubt Al Qaeda. The purpose of this article is to focus solely on Al Qaeda and present the formal internal structure of the organization. The article argues that Al Qaeda is first and foremost, an infrastructural organization with a formal echelon, hierarchy, sub-departmental division, and duties distribution reflecting characteristics of a guerilla and terrorist organization. The article portrays the formal layout of Al Qaeda, composed of the main command apparatus, and names the different personalities who fill the more important positions within Al Qaeda's hierarchy from its days of inception until today.     

Al Qaeda's Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad

Militant Islamist Sayyid Imam's legal critique of Al Qaeda's anti-U.S. mass casualty terrorism holds great potential utility for counterterrorist messaging strategy. In this article, a jihad–realist Islamist theological–jurisprudential methodology is first defended as the means most productive for delegitimizing Al Qaeda among high value, religiously motivated recruits. Second, Sayyid Imam's specific allegations and detailed Sharia proofs against Al Qaeda are presented. Finally, implications are drawn for U.S. counterterrorist messaging focusing especially on the utility of wielding this theological–juridical approach as compared to other “counternarrative” approaches, and the vital need to accurately characterize Islamism and its relation to terrorism.     

Al Qaeda's Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda's Objectives

Terrorism scholars are divided over whether terrorism is an effective tactic. Disagreement derives from the fact that the objectives of terrorist groups are often highly contested. Nowhere is this clearer than in contemporary statements on Al Qaeda. This article explores the most common interpretations for why Al Qaeda attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, and then analyzes their empirical support. After determining the most compelling interpretation of Al Qaeda's objectives, the article evaluates Al Qaeda's success in achieving them since perpetrating this watershed attack. The following analysis provides a timely case study in the classic debate over whether terrorism is strategically rational behavior.     

Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot

This article analyzes the suicide bomb attacks on four London transportation targets on 7 July 2005 and the plot to bomb simultaneously at least seven American and Canadian passenger airliners as they departed from London's Heathrow Airport. American, British, and Pakistani authorities thwarted this planned attack in August 2006. Both incidents are among the most important Al Qaeda operations in recent years. Initially, they were dismissed by the authorities, pundits, and the media alike as the work of amateur terrorists—untrained “bunches of guys” acting entirely on their own with no links to Al Qaeda. Subsequent evidence, however, has come to light, which reveals clear links to senior Al Qaeda commanders operating in Pakistan's lawless frontier border area with Afghanistan.     

Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State Through Strategies Publicized in Jihadist Magazines

As Al Qaeda and the Islamic State vie for ascendancy in the jihad movement, policymakers grapple with distinguishing the threat posed by these groups. Proceeding from the terrorists’ view of media as a critical arena of jihad, this study applies content analysis to Al Qaeda- and Islamic State-produced magazines in order to empirically differentiate the two groups through the strategies publicized therein. Findings reveal that Al Qaeda consistently employs attrition to compel changes in the West's policy and behavior, while the Islamic State has shifted from intimidating populations to outbidding competing groups to solidify its claim to the Caliphate.     

Neo-Jihadist Prosumers and Al Qaeda Single Narrative: The Case Study of Giuliano Delnevo

Scholars in the field of terrorism and violent extremism often refer to the so-called Al Qaeda single narrative. This article suggests that the Internet challenges the existence of a “single narrative,” by arguing that neo-jihadist prosumers may reinterpret Al Qaeda's narrative and create hybrid symbols and identities. The article discusses the case study of an Italian neo-jihadist allegedly killed in Syria, Giuliano Delnevo, presenting research on his YouTube and Facebook production. Delnevo's narrative, which emerges from the diverse messages circulating on the Internet, recasts the Al Qaeda narrative by hybridizing it with other cultural backgrounds and political symbols.