the impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one-, two-, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.     

Do Intergovernmental Institutions Matter? The Case of Water Diversion Regulation in the Great Lakes Basin

This article explores the role of intergovernmental institutions in domestic policy formation by investigating the extent to which these institutions substantively influence domestic policy choices. It does so by utilizing a rational choice institutionalist approach that focuses on the constraints and incentives created by intergovernmental rules and how these constraints and incentives do or do not influence eventual government policy decisions. The veto player concept is used to highlight some of the most important constraints and incentives, as well as to differentiate among various types of intergovernmental institutions. The cases examined involve water diversion regulation in the Great Lakes Basin and the three distinct intergovernmental institutions that have been created in this area: the International Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great Lakes Charter, and the Water Resources Development Act. The evidence suggests that intergovernmental institutions can matter in the development of domestic policy, but only those that include veto players as part of their institutional design.     

Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements

Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible? Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms. Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation. Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide. Especially in treaty member‐states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression. By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decisions, I show that positive effects of human rights treaties increase when there are more legislative veto players.     

Executive budget proposal,executive veto,legislative override,and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.     

The first word and the last word in the budgetary process: A comparative institutional analysis of proposal and veto authorities

This study examines the role of proposal authority and executive veto in the budgetary process. A five stage sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional actors — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. We examine: (i) the factors that affect the executive's power in shaping the final budget when the executive is granted proposal authority; (ii) how increased veto authority, in combination with executive proposal authority, affects the executive's power in forming the final budget; and (iii) the effects of different types of proposal authority and veto rules on the efficiency of the budgetary process.     

On the pricing and benefit structure of a private club or public utility

In this study the structure-induced equilibrium approach for modeling democratic institutions is extended to allow for the added structural features of executive veto and legislative override. A multidimensional model is presented for a budgetary process involving three actors — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive. In order to focus attention on the role of the veto and override possibilities, simplifying assumptions are made with regard to other aspects of the agenda formation process. In particular, the committee has monopoly agenda power, a closed amendment control rule is operative, and perfect-foresight expectations are held by the committee and the executive. Given these assumptions, utility maximization by the several actors generates a budget outcome characterized as a structure-induced equilibrium. The general model is illustrated geometrically with a two-dimensional example, permitting budget outcomes to be analyzed for various combinations of veto rules and override provisions. The analysis demonstrates that budget outcomes are sensitive to alternative specifications of veto rules and override provisions. In the illustration, executive veto power is shown to vary directly with both the permissiveness of the veto rule and the stringency of the override provision. Similar relationships, however, are not found to exist for total budget expenditures.     

Constitutional courts as veto players: Divorce and decrees in Italy

Abstract. This article argues that constitutional courts in Western European parliamentary systems should be integrated into discussions of how public policies are changed, rather than being viewed as an external veto point. It attempts to bridge a gap between a judicial politics literature that focuses on the micro–level of individual judges' votes and comparative scholarship that operates at the macro–level. A model for viewing constitutional courts as veto players, as a third institutional actor, is proposed and is then illustrated using the cases of legalizing divorce and blocking the executive reissuing decree laws in Italy. The model considers both the indirect and direct influences that constitutional courts can exert on the policy–making process. It also facilitates understanding and explaining the role of courts, as well as legislatures and executives, in conducting the interactions and bargaining that result in policy change.     

Veto Rhetoric and Legislative Riders

Riders to appropriations bills have long been a favorite congressional instrument for forcing presidents to accept unwanted policies. To resist unwanted riders, presidents have increasingly resorted to veto threats. Are such threats credible, and do they influence legislation? To answer these questions, we analyze the legislative histories of hundreds of threatened and unthreatened riders from 1985 through 2008. We find that threats are effective in bringing the final legislation closer to the president's preferences. Threats achieve their success, in large part, by interrupting the textbook legislative process in the Senate—spawning filibusters, prompting leaders to punt bills to conference, and encouraging the use of other “unorthodox” procedures. Unlike conventional models that regard veto threats as minimally effective, the findings presented here depict veto rhetoric as integral to identifying critical riders separating the legislative parties that must be resolved in order to avoid gridlock and pass annual appropriations legislation.     

Pension Reform in Germany and Austria: System Change vs. Quantitative Retrenchment

This article first outlines the differences in outcome of pension reform in Germany and Austria. The 2001 German pension reform cut benefits very little, but it started a system changing transformation process by strengthening the second (occupational pensions) and third pillar (private pensions). The 2003 Austrian pension reform, pushed through against major opposition from the labour unions, contains very few elements of policy innovation, but benefits have been cut back much more significantly than in the German case. The paper explains the difference in outcomes (system change in Germany, retrenchment in Austria) by looking at the structure of political institutions. The federal government in Austria is much less constrained by formal veto players than the German government, which had to engage in extensive coalition-building to get the pension bill through the second chamber of parliament. Therefore the influence of informal veto players (mainly unions) was much higher in Germany. The impact on the reform outcome was the positive discrimination of occupational pensions and less severe cuts in the benefit levels. The concluding thesis is that for successful and long-term sustainable welfare state reform, a small number of formal veto players is a valuable resource. A large number of formal veto players is an obstacle to retrenchment reforms, although it might encourage policy innovation, because political actors will look for other policy venues to increase their leverage.     

Signed but Not Ratified: Limits to U.S. Participation in International Environmental Agreements

Why does the United States sign environmental treaties but not ratify them? U.S. presidents have negotiated and signed several environmental treaties that ultimately could not obtain Senate ratification. This article considers two alternative explanations. First, presidents may face divided government and upcoming elections; elections can increase uncertainty regarding ratification, because they upset majorities and change congressional preferences on issues. Such factors may have caused “involuntary” defection from international environmental cooperation. Second, compensation and compromise on enabling legislation could satisfy enough senators and their constituents to allow the legislation's passage. Failure to secure ratification may be a result of the president's overestimating the potential for negotiating a policy package capable of creating sufficient support to obtain Senate ratification. I compare domestic constraints on U.S. participation in three international environmental negotiations—climate change, biodiversity, and chemicals—to assess the alternative explanations. The cases exemplify how domestic institutions affect international environmental cooperation.     

Court-ordered redistricting and the law of 1/<Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>

This paper examines the effect of redistricting on the law of 1/n, which posits that government spending increases with the number of legislative districts. Our analysis suggests that court-ordered redistricting in the 1960s significantly influenced the 1/n effect, because dividing districts (increasing their number) and merging districts (reducing their number) both reduce public spending. After redistricting, the positive relationship between seats and spending holds for lower chambers in bicameral legislatures. The US experience informs those interested in the design of bicameral institutions about the fiscal implications of legislative apportionment.     

On collective goods,private wealth,and the core solution of simple games with sidepayments

This essay identifies consequences for the core solution in a class of social decision problems concerning the provision of collective goods (or bads) if the rules are modified to permit sidepayments. In these problems, a kind of formal decision procedure that includes any weighted or unweighted majority rule governs only the decision about collective goods. Each decision about collective goods, however, implies a vector of the agents' endowments of private wealth that can, but need not, vary across the alternatives. Any agent may offer to make sidepayments from this endowment that are contingent on the collective goods decision, but the agent holds preferences that, given any fixed decision about collective goods, strictly increase in the agent's own wealth. The results indicate that the core's response to introducing the possibility of sidepayments depends on whether any agent possesses a veto over the collective goods decision. If no one has a veto, then an outcome belongs to the core of the game with sidepayments only if no sidepayment is made and the same decision about collective goods belongs to the core of the associated game without sidepayments. In this case, introducing the possibility of sidepayments does not bring a new collective goods decision into the core. Indeed, merely adding the possibility of sidepayments can cause the core to vanish. On the other hand, if at least one agent possesses a veto, then introducing sidepayments can (but need not) lead to a new core solution concerning the decision about collective goods. In any such new solution, at least one agent who has a veto — but no one who lacks it — receives a sidepayment.     

Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment

This article explores why authoritarian regimes create legislatures and then assesses their effect on economic growth and investment. In authoritarian regimes more dependent on domestic investment than natural resource revenue, the dictator creates a binding legislature as a credible constraint on the regime's confiscatory behavior. In regimes dependent on natural resource revenue, the nonbinding legislature serves as a mechanism for the dictator to bribe and split the opposition when he faces credible challenges to the regime. Using data from 121 authoritarian regimes from 1950 to 2002, the results indicate that binding legislatures have a positive impact on economic growth and domestic investment, while nonbinding legislatures have a negative impact on economic growth.     

Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: The veto control hypothesis reconsidered

Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political‐institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context‐specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.     

Domestic legislatures and international human rights law: Legislating on religious symbols in Europe

This article examines the dynamics of domestic legislatures' application of international human rights law. Specifically, this article asks the following: What factors shape how domestic legislatures apply international human rights law while they enact national law and policy? Lawmakers have a variety of motives for invoking and deliberating international law. Given these motives, the article identifies two factors — civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law — that are likely to contribute to if and how national legislatures interpret and apply international human rights law while legislating. These factors are examined through case studies on religion in schools in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. This article argues civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law inform lawmakers' estimation of political costs related to compliance and thus how they apply international human rights law to domestic legislation.     

Information provision as agenda setting: A study of bureaucracy's role in higher education policy

Many drivers of agenda setting have been considered in political science, yet the bureaucracy has been largely absent from these discussions. This article challenges that tendency by arguing that bureaucracies provide information and analysis to legislatures early in the policy process, which then affects the bills that are introduced and eventually adopted. I further posit that institutional forms condition the information a bureaucracy can provide, leading to the central hypothesis that highly centralized agencies have more concentrated agendas than decentralized institutions and therefore less congruence with and influence on legislative agendas. Based on a large original dataset of bureaucratic information and proposed legislation concerning higher education policy from two states with archetypal institutional forms, I analyze what kinds of information shift the attention of lawmakers to higher education topics of interest within different institutional arrangements. The findings further our understanding of the impact of institutional factors on information processing by legislatures and the role of the bureaucracy in agenda setting.     

Institutions and Morality Policy in Western Democracies

This article investigates whether different political institutions such as executives, legislatures, parties, party systems, judiciaries, decentralization, constitutionalism, and referendums across 24 Western democracies are venues for debate across five individual morality policies. Using data since 1945, the article compares three theories of morality policy—(1) Policy Type leading to different institutional venues; (2) Two Worlds of religious/secular party systems; and (3) U.S./European exceptionalism. In order, the most frequently debated issues are abortion, same sex marriage, euthanasia, stem cells/assisted reproductive technology (ART), and capital punishment. There is considerable variation in the institutions and country groups that debate them although fewer differences in the Two Worlds model. Abortion, euthanasia, and same sex marriage are the most convergent issues across institutions, party systems, and country groupings while capital punishment and stem cells/ART show the most diverse patterns of deliberation. The general Policy Type model of morality policy is upheld, but varies institutionally by specific issues. The Two Worlds model is of some importance, but only on three issues. There also are regional differences between the United States, Europe, and non‐European democracies.