Russian-Speakers in Ukraine and Kazakhstan: “Nationality,” “Population,” or Neither?

A political scientist examines the level of attachment to the “Russian-speaker” label among Russians and Russian-speakers who live outside of Russia within the former Soviet Union. Also examined is the proposition that this label is the main alternative to assimilation and that those who accept it think differently from those who do not about issues such as the independence of their state of residence. Survey and focus-group data collected in 1998 and 1999 in Ukraine and Kazakhstan are examined to analyze whether “Russian-speaker” is a more important identity marker than citizenship and ethnic group.     

Payoffs,Parties, or Policies: “Money Politics” and Electoral Authoritarian Resilience

A key part of what sustains electoral authoritarianism over the long term is genuine popular support. Dominant parties, particularly in a developmental context (the primary setting for such regimes), and especially where elections are more than minimally meaningful, curry performance legitimacy and loyalty not just through skewed rules and coercion, but through material incentives: “money politics.” If challengers can find a way to de-emphasize support based on material inducements, they stand a chance of securing gains via elections, rather than relying on economic downturns to shrink patronage coffers. Drawing on extensive original ethnographic and survey data from electoral-authoritarian Malaysia, I explore campaign finance and distributions on both sides in the latest, most regime-threatening general election, which was held on May 5, 2013. Evidence suggests that it was by disentangling clientelist networks from the patronage they so often serve to disseminate, allowing a focus on more programmatic than particularistic appeals, that the opposition Pakatan Rakyat alliance so nearly bested the long-dominant Barisan Nasional regime. Persona – being known and seen among the electorate – still matters as much as before, but relies less consistently than in the past on targeted patronage as a premise for loyalty.     

做强“码头”,激活“源头”

一座城市的文化软实力,总在博物馆、美术馆与剧场、图书馆之间显现。不知从什么时候起,“来上海看美展”已经成为市民美好生活和游客体验上海的优选。无论是博物馆里丰富、浩瀚的历史珍存藏品,让人们直观且动情地意识到中华文化的璀璨多姿,恢宏浩渺,抑或是各大美术馆中精彩纷呈的艺术展览,古今中外,远至宋元时期的艺术珍品,近到现当代艺术大师的经典之作,在上海大大小小的美术馆中,观者都能找到自己的“心头好”,花上一整天的时间,来进行一次既可远及古代,又能穿越未来的艺术之旅。     

那夜,于丹“气场”

在反对者看来,于丹的被轰,主要是因为她的学术浮浅和卖弄包装。无论是《论语》还是昆曲,她都能口吐莲花,似乎要说动天雨,但回头想想只是一堆无用的排比句而已。"不用你代表我们,下去!""下去!"……"哦,下去……"接嘴的是向来以铁齿铜牙、能说会道著称的北京师范大学教授于丹。在北京大学百年讲堂的舞台上,身着黑色短裙装,脖子上...     

何时是“他们”,何时是“我们”

如果一个人工智能,真的到了能够独立判断、独立学习的水平,它会把我们人类视为自己的同类吗？最近,随着电影《超能查派》、《复联2》隆重上映,对＂怎么让AI（人工智能）理解人类的道德体系＂、＂AI造反了怎么办＂等问题的讨论非常热烈,＂人工智能＂似乎一夜之间就和普通人扯上了关系。想要造出一个能够和人类智力水平相当的AI（比如查派）,显然并不容易;而如果真的造出来了,这些个AI会如何看待我们,则是个更加复杂的问题。     

我爱“红酒”,你爱“鲜肉”

"叔时代"的偶像剧不需要"岁月如刀,独放过他一人"的不老神话。要的就是老而弥坚,老而弥贱。另一方面,青春偶像剧也不甘落后,影视圈的"鲜肉"层出不穷,各领风骚数年。从前,说一个演员是"偶像派",那等于是在骂他没有实力。现在嘛,没有人愿意再做听上去就闷闷的"实力派"。越有实力的,越喜欢当众宣布"我明明是个偶像派",以显得...     

抵制“政治病毒”,全球战“疫”

在这场关系到全人类共同命运的大考验面前,谁都无法独善其身,唯有携手合作,同心勠力,才有可能打赢这场与病魔的战争。在中国对新冠肺炎疫情的防控进入最吃劲的关键时刻,疫情在全球也开始呈现蔓延扩散之势。世界卫生组织总干事谭德塞2月28日在日内瓦宣布,将新冠肺炎疫情全球风险级别由此前的"高"上调至"非常高"。一场席卷全球的公共卫生危机正扑面魏,世界七大洲中只有A S罕至的南极洲未受影响。     

打通交通“大动脉”,畅通经济“微循环”

随着上海全面恢复正常生产生活秩序,浦东国际机场货邮航班量逐步回升。除了机场,高速、高铁、公交和地铁等各路通道也在这个6月逐步恢复到疫情前的状态。     

Culture,Closeness, or Commerce? Policy Diffusion and Social Spending Dynamics

In a globalized world where trans‐ and supranational networks, communication and the exchange of information gain in importance, national political decision making processes do not occur independently from each other. Policy diffusion is assumed to become more and more relevant also for welfare state development. This paper explicitly focuses on the policy diffusion among 21 OECD countries in the period between 1980 and 2007 looking at social spending dynamics. The empirical findings of the spatial regressions clearly indicate that spatial patterns in social spending dynamics are driven by policy diffusion processes. In fact, economic interdependencies define the pathways of diffusion. Trading partners move in the same direction regarding social policy behavior. Surprisingly, cultural and geographical proximity are less relevant for the diffusion processes, at least in terms of social spending dynamics.     

“小角落”,微更新

上海的这些变化是无心之作吗?当然不是,角角落落虽小,却是上海迈入新的发展阶段后,通过精细化管理和城市微更新带来的新一轮成长。市委书记李强说:"一座令人向往的城市、让人流连忘返的城市,一定是细微处特别见精神、特别有味道的城市。"     

高铁,“复兴号”的中国芯

从追赶者到领跑者,从技术引进者到标准制定者,从首条高寒高铁到唯一热带高铁,从“和谐号”到“复兴号”……这五年,中国高铁飞速发展,高铁运营里程突破2_2万公里,占世界高铁总里程的60％以上,书写了高端装备的中国传奇。     

日本“,核”去何从

遭受过两次核伤害的日本人,在地震一周年之际,把这个国家彻底推向了"脱核"的十字路口。日语中的"绊(Kizuna)",寓意为"纽带、联系"。日前,这一承载着一年来日本人精神共鸣的汉字被日本汉字能力检定协会评选为最能代表2011年日本世态民情的"年度汉字"。     

The Ottoman Identity: Turkish,Muslim or Rum?

It is awkward for historians to depict a clear-cut portrayal of Ottoman identity. Scholarly analyses by and large lay emphasis on the Islamic and Turkish character of the Ottoman Empire. However, it would be reductionist to evaluate an empire that lasted for six centuries, on three different continents, with solely monolithic ethno-religious tools. A new approach around the term Rum may help to get rid of this reductionism and to understand the sui generis structure of the Ottoman identity. Instead of focusing on ethnic and religious aspects, this novel approach would add both a territorial dimension of Ottoman hegemony and also a social component regarding the relations between the rulers and the ruled. The Rum, with a meaning above Orthodoxy, Greek or Roman Empire, can highlight the ingredients of Ottoman identity and help to overcome the influence of modern nationalist discourses in historical readings.     

Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and democracy, or just another coup?

A military coup abruptly ended Ould Taya’s authoritarianregime in Mauritania, one of the longest-running regimes inWest Africa. The bloodless coup broke a dangerous politicalimpasse and stopped what seemed to be a slide towards breakdownand violence. Using the democratization literature, this articleexplains its root causes and evaluates the prospects for theestablishment of a genuine democracy after two decades of arepressive military and then quasi-military regime. It arguesthat several variables combined to seal the regime’s fate.These are essentially the deeply flawed, tribally based, make-believedemocracy, Ould Taya’s own troubled personality, and finally,the security apparatus’s withdrawal of its backing. Thearticle also argues that the new military junta’s firstdecisions appear encouraging enough but that its determinationto keep a tight control over the transition process and avoidthe fundamental aspects of Mauritania’s malaise may jeopardizegenuine long-term democratization. ^1. Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘A balance sheet of Africa’stransition to democratic governance’, in John Mbaku andJulius O. Ihonvbere (eds), The Transition to Democratic Governancein Africa (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003), p. 51. ^2. On Mali, see Zeric K. Smith, ‘Mali’s decade of democracy’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), pp. 73–9; for the Ivorianexperiment under General Guéï, see Boubacar N’Diaye,‘Not a miracle after all ... Côte d’Ivoire’sdownfall: flawed civil-military relations and missed opportunities’,Scientia Militaria 33, 1 (2005), pp. 89–118. ^3. Alfred Stepan, ‘Paths toward redemocratisation: theoreticaland comparative considerations’, in Guillermo O’Donnell,Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule (The Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, MD, 1988), pp. 64–84. ^4. One of the very few Anglophone specialists on Mauritania, AnthonyPazzanita, thought that the prospects for democracy for Mauritaniaafter 1992 were ‘bright’, but apparently never revisitedthe issue. See Anthony Pazzanita, ‘The origin and evolutionof Mauritania’s second republic’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies 34, 4 (1996), pp. 575–96. ^5. For an authoritative discussion of the subject, see PhilippeMarchesin, Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Khartala,Paris, 1992). ^6. See Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, ‘Des voix dans le désert:sur les élections de l’ère pluraliste’,Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 31–9. ^7. There are no official statistics on the ethno-cultural make-upof the country. At independence, it was assumed that the Beydane(including the Haratines) made up 75 percent of the population.However, in the late 1970s, the government kept under seal theresults of the national census, prompting allegations that thiswas done to conceal the demographic shift in favour of blacks,who have a higher birth rate. Unspoken quotas seem to stilluse 75:25 percent of Beydane and Negro-Mauritanians, respectively.However, there is a growing consensus that the general breakdowngiven here, although a rough estimate, is closest to the demographicreality of Mauritania today. ^8. ‘El Hor’ means freeman. It is a semi-recognizedpolitical movement set up by the Haratine elites to fight themanifestations and legacy of slavery. SOS-Esclaves is (untilrecently non-recognized) a human rights organization set upto monitor the issue of slavery and assist slaves to attainfreedom. ^9. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, Mauritania’s Campaign ofTerror: State sponsored repression of black Africans (HumanRights Watch, New York, 1994); Janet Fleishman, ‘Ethniccleansing’, Africa Report 39 (1994), p. 45. ^10. The chairman of the junta has publicly stated that the fearof a complete breakdown of the state is what prompted the militaryto act. As I argue, other less lofty considerations, such aspersonal survival, cannot be discounted. ^11. The International Crisis Group, in particular, issued a reportthat exposed Ould Taya’s attempts to delegitimize thelegal opposition, including moderate Islamists, by assimilatingthem to fundamentalist terrorists, warning that the whole schemecould very well backfire. See International Crisis Group, L’Islamismeen Afrique du nord IV: Contestation islamiste en Mauritanie:Menace ou bouc émissaire? (Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afriquedu Nord No. 41, Brussels, 2005). ^12. After his November 2003 electoral victory, which the US governmentmust have known to be fraudulent, he received a glowing messageof congratulations from President Bush. This support to oneof the most repressive regimes in West Africa was bitterly resentedby many democratic activists. Initially, the Bush administrationwas the only government to demand the return of Ould Taya topower, who was called, in the early hours of the coup, by theUS ambassador in Nouakchott, as the US State Department dailybriefings of 4 August 2005 indicate. ^13. The chairman of the military council made this statement threedays after the coup when he addressed the assembled leadersof political parties. For the text of the statement, see http://ufpweb.org/transition/ce385/interv/alloc_eli.htm,4 December 2006. ^14. Author’s interviews with Mohamed Vall Ould Oumere, editorialdirector of La Tribune, Nouackchott, May 2004. ^15. Mahamadou Sy, L’enfer d’inal (L’Harmattan,Paris, 2000). ^16. The best-known members of this financial and political network:Ahmed Ould Taya (Ould Taya’s brother), Abdallahi OuldNoueguet, Sejad Ould Abeidna (both Smasside), Mohamed Ould Bouamattou(an Oulad Bousbaa), and Abdou Ould Maham (an Idewaali). ^17. See Africa Research Bulletin (15 November 1987), p. 8674. ^18. See Philippe Marchesin, ‘Origine et évolution despartis et groupes politiques’, Politique Africaine 55(1994), p. 27. ^19. Stepan, ‘Paths’, p. 76. ^20. See ‘Petit coup d’Etat entre amis’, La Lettredu Continent (Paris), 25 August 2005. ^21. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania’s stalled democratisation’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), p. 93. ^22. Peter Da Costa, ‘Democracy in doubt’, Africa Report37, 3 (1992), p. 60. ^23. Boubacar N’Diaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Matturin Houngnikpo,‘Not Yet Democracy’: West Africa’s slow farewellto authoritarianism (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 2005),pp. 107–37. ^24. Cedric Jourde, ‘"The President is coming to visit!" Dramasand the hijack of democratisation in the Islamic Republic ofMauritania’, Comparative Politics 38 (2005), pp. 421–40. ^25. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘The effect of Mauritania’s"human rights deficit": the case against "to forgive and forget"’,African Journal of Policy Studies 8, 1 (2002), pp. 17–35. ^26. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, p. 193. ^27. The coup leaders made a point to signal the transitory natureof military regime and their willingness to usher in a politicalsystem that was completely different from the one they overthrew.See ‘Nouakchott calm, but new "colonels’ regime"faces outside political pressure’ (http://journals.aol.com/mfg917/Lilithharp17/entries/2378,5 April 2006). ^28. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,2003), pp. 3–27. Up to August 2005, Mauritania seemedto fit approximately Ottaway’s ’semi-authoritarianismof decay’ category, pp. 21–3. ^29. William Case, ‘New uncertainties for an old pseudo-democracy’,Comparative Politics 37, 1 (2004), pp. 83–104. ^30. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, pp. 122–6. ^31. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa:Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, 1982). ^32. Jennifer Widner, ‘Two leadership styles and patterns ofpolitical liberalisation’, African Studies Review 37,1 (1994), pp. 151–74; Larry Diamond, ‘Beyond authoritarianism:strategies for democratisation’, in Brad Roberts (ed.),The New Democracies, Global Change and U.S. Policy (MIT Press,Cambridge, MA, 1995); also Juan J. Linz, ‘Crisis, breakdownand re-equilibration’, in Juan Linz and A. Stepan (eds),The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore, MD, 1978), pp. 4–5. ^33. Mohamed Nassirou Athie, ‘Il y a onze ans, le 16 mars’,Al Beyane 14 (1996), p. 8. ^34. Since the 1978 coup, there has been a proliferation of Arabnationalist groups in the Mauritanian army. See Anthony Pazzanita,‘Mauritania’s foreign policy: in search of protection’,Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 3 (1992), pp. 288–300.For example, the military council’s No. 2, Mohamed OuldAbdel Aziz, is said to be one of the leaders of the Nasseristmovement, a pan-Arab nationalist group. ^35. See for example, Mohamed Fall Ould Oumère, ‘Ilévite le face à face’, Al Beyane 5 (1992),p. 1. ^36. Habib Ould Mahfoudh, ‘La tension’, Al Beyane 6 (1992)(Supplement), p. 2. ^37. Ibid, p. 1; see also François Soudan, ‘MaaouiyaOuld Taya: "Le Sénégal nous veut du mal"’,Jeune Afrique 1513 (1990), pp. 34–7. ^38. Pierre-Robert Baudel, ‘La Mauritanie dans l’ordreinternational’, Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 11–19. ^39. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson of the commission on the situationin the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’ (African Union,Addis Ababa, 8 September 2005), p. 7. ^40. Ibid, p. 10. ^41. N‘Diaye, ‘Not a miracle’, p. 105. ^42. Stepan, ‘Paths’, pp. 77–8. ^43. See Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: a future freeof slavery?’, 17 November 2002 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR380032002!Open,17 August 2005). ^44. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005 (The World Bank,Washington, DC, 2005), p. 23. ^45. According to the same World Bank report (Ibid, p. 73), in 2000,the top 10 percent of Mauritanians enjoyed nearly 30 percentof national ‘income or consumption’, whereas thelowest 30 percent share less than 9 percent. ^46. Moussa Diop, ‘Quand Ely se fâche, les fauteuilstremblent!’, L’éveil-hebdo 613 (2005), pp.1, 3. ^47. The IMF statement is available at http://www.imf.org/external/country/mrt/index.htm,10 January 2005. ^48. See Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds), Security Sector Governancein Africa: A handbook (Centre for Democracy and Development,Lagos, 2004). ^49. For a population of less than three million, Mauritania hasnearly twice the number of men in the security forces as eitherMali or Senegal. The population of each of these states is atleast three times that of Mauritania. See International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002–2003(International Strategic Studies, London, 2002), pp. 207–11. ^50. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertaindemocracies (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,MD, 1989), p. 66. ^51. The UN Office for West Africa has finally identified this situationas a major cause of coups and instability in the sub-region.The author has collaborated in the drafting of a report to callattention to this issue and how to address it. ^52. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson’, pp. 10–11.     

“禁闭”的影响,从“疫情进行时”到“后疫时代”

"禁闭"的影响,无论从历史学、政治学等剖面上,还是从社会学、心理学等剖面上,都贯穿着一场大疫的始终,给我们留下意味深长的余音。春风送暖物候新,吹面不寒的温柔湿意,洗濯晦暗污垢。3月了,治愈出院的新冠肺炎患者已经超过四万名,其后,可以想见,还将有数万人陆续康复回家。而面对那些治愈者,尽管微笑迎接的面目是主流;依旧避之不及的姿态,却也绝非少数。     

疫情防控,基层人大“零件”“机器”都要用

这次新冠肺炎疫情是对我国治理体系和治理能力的一次大考。基层处于防控一线,任务繁重,治理能力又相对薄弱,压力很大。把人民代表大会制度这一根本政治制度优势更好地转化为治理效能,坚决打赢疫情防控阻击战,作为基层国家权力机关的县乡两级人大责无旁贷。     

防控“无症状感染”,大家都还要“屏牢”

从全国总体疫情来看,超过85%病例都是能够找到明确传染来源的。那些没有找到传染来源的,部分是流行病学调查的质量问题,或者是病例不配合、出于各种原因隐瞒了发病经过,或者回忆不清;余下的部分可能是无症状感染者传播。这个数据提示:由无症状感染者造成的传播,对我国新冠肺炎疫情的总体影响是有限的。从2020年4月1日开始,国家卫健委开始在每日疫情通报中公布无症状感染者的相关情况.     

我在“追踪办”,目标——“密切接触者”

她反复确认我们工作人员的身份,就是不提供自己的信息,打了几次后来就不接了。我是上海市疾控中心的一名工作人员,原来在免疫规划所工作。新冠肺炎暴发后,中心成立了"追踪办",我和另外23位同事从其他部门被紧急抽调过来。国家卫健委此前发布《新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防控方案》,对"密切接触者"这一群体有了明确的管理方案,我们的"追踪办"就是为了落实这个方案。     

“能源丝路”,为中国争口“气”!

习近平主席指出,中亚天然气管道是多方参与、共同受益的战略性合作项目,对推动地区经济发展意义重大;要继续发扬丝路精神,传承友谊,深化合作。