新闻侵权的构成及其责任承担

近年来,随着新闻媒体舆论监督范围的扩大,新闻媒体由于种种原因引起的侵权纠纷逐渐增多,新闻侵权问题已成为备受关注的法律问题和社会问题。对此,本文从新闻侵权的构成要件、责任的承担主体、责任承担形式以及抗辩事由等方面探讨了新闻侵权行为。     

对商法视野中企业社会责任研究起点的定位和再思考

企业社会责任是21世纪以来形成的一个重要概念,研究商法视野中的企业社会责任应该把商法定位为一个独立的法律部门,作为研究的逻辑起点。然后,根据企业承担社会责任所对应的权利主体不同分为企业的相对社会责任和企业的绝对社会责任。因此,研究商法视野中的企业社会责任不仅有很强的理论意义还有很强的社会现实意义。     

高楼坠物致人伤害责任问题评析——对《侵权责任法》第87条的质疑

责任人不明确的高楼坠物致人伤害案件自重庆＂烟灰缸案＂以来一直争议不断,《侵权责任法》第87条有明确的规定,但是该规定缺乏法理基础,也不符合情理。本文从诉讼法的归责原则、举证责任、责任主体、法律和法院的局限性等角度对高楼坠物致人伤害责任问题进行了评析,提出了不能让可能的一个群体承担赔偿责任的理由,同时阐明了《侵权责任法》第87条的负面影响。     

强化重污染行业上市公司环境责任的法律对策

全球环境问题日趋严重,重大环境灾害事故频发。企业环境责任成为衡量企业社会责任承担的一个重要指标。本文以紫金矿业污染事件为导入,对重污染行业上市公司的环境社会责任的承担进行探讨,力图在现行法律制度框架内,尝试理清强化重污染行业上市公司的环境社会责任法律对策问题。     

浅析垄断企业的社会责任

在新的时代背景下,企业的社会责任,尤其是垄断企业的社会责任,显现出其特殊性和必要性。垄断企业在享受"垄断"权利的同时,应该更加主动的承担更多的社会责任。我国垄断企业大多为国有企业,在承担社会责任方面存在很多不足。提高垄断企业的社会责任意识,需要政府的调控、社会的监督,更需要企业的自觉。本文首先阐述了企业社会责任的涵义,延伸到垄断企业的社会责任问题,从案例入手提出了加强垄断企业社会责任的相关建议。     

俄罗斯企业社会责任履行现状及对我国的启示

在俄罗斯政府推动下,俄罗斯企业社会责任在过去近十年内出现了一个新发展。俄罗斯与中国有着类似的转型背景,在企业社会责任的履行方面很大程度上受政府的影响,采取的是自上而下的企业社会责任推进方式。俄罗斯企业社会责任履行过程中政府在承担主体上注重区分不同类型企业的社会责任分层次履行、在推进主体上以政府推进为主导模式、在推进方式上注重"公私协作"等成功举措及主要经验,对于完善我国企业社会责任履行具有重要的借鉴意义。     

未参保单位职工职业伤害法律问题研究

我国现行《工伤保险条例》将参加工伤保险和未参加工伤保险的工伤问题进行统一规定,但未明确规定未参加工伤保险的单位职工职业伤害的事实如何确定,责任怎样承担。未参保单位职工职业伤害符合工伤事故构成要件,应属于工伤,工伤事故作为法律事实,应当由劳动争议仲裁机构或人民法院认定。基于工伤的社会风险属性,未参保单位职工职业伤害应当实行法定的工伤待遇,而不能要求民事侵权赔偿。现行《工伤保险条例》应当在主体、劳动争议仲裁与裁后民事诉讼的关系、加大保护力度、实现制度创新等方面进一步完善。     

浅析垄断企业社会责任

在新的时代背景下,企业的社会责任,尤其是垄断企业的社会责任,显现出其特殊性和必要性.垄断企业在享受"垄断"权利的同时,应该更加主动的承担更多的社会责任.我国垄断企业大多为国有企业,在承担社会责任方面存在很多不足.提高垄断企业的社会责任意识,需要政府的调控、社会的监督,更需要企业的自觉.本文首先阐述了企业社会责任的涵义,延伸到垄断企业的社会责任问题,从案例入手提出了加强垄断企业社会责任的相关建议.     

论企业社会责任的法律规制

随着和谐社会的逐步构建,如何促使企业承担社会责任,实现企业经济效益和社会公共效益的协调统一,值得深入探究。本文从法律规制的角度展开探讨,阐释了企业社会责任的基本含义,分析了我国企业社会责任法律规制的现状及存在的问题,进而提出了相关完善法律规制的对策。     

企业社会责任与立法

本文从企业社会责任的概念分析入手,结合经济、道德、法律等角度综合对企业社会责任的概念进行综合界定,明确其在经济——道德——法律上的层面区别,并在此基础上针对企业社会责任的立法途径、模式与范围等方面提出初步的方案与建议.     

公司人格本质与社会责任的三种维度

从本质上说,法律塑造的公司人格不过是人与人之间社会关系在法律、社会伦理与自我认识层次上的集中反映。相应地,对公司社会责任也可从三个维度予以解构:法律意义上的社会责任是一切公司应尽的最低限度的法定责任,其约束力最强;伦理意义上的社会责任则是对公司的外在约束,此种约束机制可以是纯粹倡导性的公司伦理,也可以是介于伦理与法律之间的"软法";而公司内生的超出法律与"软法"之上的社会责任则是纯粹自律性的。三种性质的社会责任相互依存并相互转化,因此,仅有法律意义上的社会责任机制是远远不够的。     

论公司社会责任的司法实践——从公益诉讼角度谈我国公司社会责任司法实践的完善

公司社会责任是公司在追求利润最大化的同时对社会应尽的责任。我国公司社会责任的实体法规定相对完善,而在诉讼法领域却一直缺少与实体规定相对应的救济程序,导致公司违反社会责任,对社会公共利益构成危害时没有合适的诉讼程序对其进行追究,因此,构建公益诉讼程序应是完善我国公司社会责任司法实践的重要步骤。依据我国具体国情,应从立法和实务操作上分别着手,改革我国的诉讼结构,构建公益诉讼制度,以期增加公司社会责任的可诉性,把公司社会责任真正落实到司法实践中。     

企业促进就业社会责任立法研究

促进就业是当前我们践行科学发展观、构建和谐社会的重要任务,也是企业承担社会责任的重要形式。承担促进就业的社会责任既是企业的道德义务,又是企业的法律义务,它主要体现在企业促进公平就业、促进雇员培训、促进就业稳定和促进失业人员再就业的责任等方面。我国应当加强企业促进就业责任的立法工作,促使企业更好地履行相关社会责任。     

企业社会责任视域下的劳动者工作环境权保护

企业社会责任是劳动权实现的保障与推动力.本文认为,传统的企业雇员责任仅指企业的经济责任和法律责任,现代企业雇员责任还应包含更高层次的道德要求.企业社会责任视域下的雇员责任,应当以工作环境权的保护为核心,通过法律建立起工作环境权的独立体系,完善劳动者工作环境权制度,落实和保障劳动者享有的实体性和程序性权利,鼓励职工参与企业的经营决策,从而真正地改善劳动环境,落实企业社会责任.     

论公司法人格否认诉求主体适用范围之拓宽

我国现行《中华人民共和国公司法》（以下简称《公司法》）中规定了债权人可以作为诉求主体启动公司法人格否认制度。但在营利性与社会性并存的现代公司中,该制度尚未能满足对利益相关者的法律保护。债权人以外的其他利益相关者也可以作为诉求主体启动公司法人格否认制度。而拓宽公司法人格否认诉求主体的范围又是强化公司社会责任的最佳途径。     

试论社会管理创新中的企业社会责任

企业是社会管理的主体,在社会管理创新实践中能否有效发挥企业的基层基础作用直接关系到社会管理创新的成效,而企业履行社会责任是其充分发挥作用的关键。本文阐释了企业社会责任的内涵和国内外对企业社会责任认识的现状,分析了我国企业社会责任缺失的主要方面及成因,以此为基础,对我国企业在社会管理创新实践中如何履行社会责任提出相应的建议。     

论债权人参与公司治理的模式——基于公司社会责任视角的考察

公司社会责任理论纠正了股东利益至上的片面理念,要求公司在开展经营活动中不仅要遵守法律法规,而且也要遵守一般的商业伦理和社会的善良风俗,尤其要注重对公司债权人的责任承担。当今各国关于债权人参与公司治理的模式主要有两种,一种是以英、美为代表的债权人间接、消极参与模式,另一种是以德国和日本为代表的债权人直接、积极参与模式。我国债权人特别是银行债权人参与公司治理的模式应从内部监督和外部制约两个方面来完善。     

The Trial of Joseph Dotterweich: The Origins of the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”     

Co-evolution of politics and corporate governance

In the OECD countries, there exists a negative cross-country correlation between an economy's degree of employment protection and its degree of corporate ownership dispersion. One explanation is that employees’ political rights influence corporate governance: systems characterized by strong employees’ rights tend to be balanced by strong and concentrated owners. In this approach, the separation between ownership and control is only possible when unions and social democratic parties are sufficiently weak. In this paper we argue that causation runs also in the opposite direction (from strong concentrated ownership to strong employees’ protection) and leads to multiple equilibria characterized by alternative co-evolution paths of politics and corporate governance. To empirically assess our theoretical arguments we estimate a simultaneous equation model for workers rights’ protection and corporate ownership structure determination by three-stage least squares in a sample of 21 OECD countries. We conclude by arguing that the relative relevance of each flow of causation has important economic policy implications.     

Food Fraud and the Partnership for a ‘Healthier’ America: A Case Study in State-Corporate Crime

At a moment of heightened public concern over food-related health issues, major corporations in the food industry have found their products and practices under scrutiny. Needing to be understood as socially responsible, these corporations have established partnerships with the state to construct a positive, proactive, and cooperative public image. One major public–private partnership that evolved from former First Lady Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move initiative—the Partnership for a Healthier America—serves as a case study in this paper, which analyzes the consequences and social harms perpetuated by a public health campaign bound by the imperative to maximize profit. By using trusted state actors to deliver accurate but deceptive claims about food companies’ commitment to public health, this public–private partnership actively misleads the public and potentially exacerbates public health challenges, warranting a skeptical revision of how we understand corporate social responsibility and neoliberal governance on issues of health and nutrition. As a form of fraud, these attempts to mislead the public go beyond the actions of public sector individuals or members of corporate boards, but are structurally incentivized by the legal rights, regulatory privileges, and profit-related incentives central to the modern corporate form. While conventional criminological research tends to underemphasize state and corporate harms, we make use of a critical criminological perspective to analyze state-corporate partnerships in the space between food industry practices and public health policy.