The Scope of Article 12 EC: Some Remarks on the Influence of European Citizenship

Abstract:  According to European Court of Justice (ECJ) case-law, the scope of application of the EC Treaty is engaged under the following conditions when the free movement of persons has been established: a cross-border connection is given; the Union citizen concerned resides legally in the host Member State; and the measure in question or the regulation has a connection with the residence or facilitates it. This condition will regularly be fulfilled since nearly every (national) regulation has a direct or indirect effect on the stay. A general link to primary or secondary law is, on the other hand, not necessary. Secondary law, however, can be significant in connection with the lawful residence. Even if partly vehement critiques have been formulated against this approach of the ECJ, it is convincing with regard to the aim of guaranteeing the free movement to European citizens.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

The European Court of Justice and the Rhetoric of Affirmative Action

The recent Marschall decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to uphold a principle giving precedence to women for promotions in the workplace seems promising for the future of affirmative action. At first glance, this decision seems to indicate that the ECJ has taken a different path, moving away from its earlier Kalanke decision which had jeopardised further development of affirmative action in the European Union. On a closer examination, both Kalanke’s sweeping ban of preferential treatment based on gender and Marschall’s new interpretation appear as discursive replies to the same dilemma: should the Court deny the normative objective of equality contained in EC law to generate meaning, thus turning equality into a mere formal principle and rendering judicial review trivial? Or should it embrace a substantive reading of the fundamental principle of equality between men and women, thus substituting the Court judgment for that of the legislature, and subverting the limits of the ECJ’s powers? The aim of this article is to analyse the ECJ’s rhetorical response to the complexities contained in affirmative action judicial review.     

Forward or Back: The Future of European Integration and the Impossibility of the Status Quo

This article considers how the legal and political order of the EU can cope if the ‘Ever Closer Union’ envisaged by the Treaties ceases to be inevitable. In particular, it focuses on what are the likely consequences if previously successful integration mechanisms such as integration through law (including adventurous pro‐integration interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)) and functional integration can no longer successfully push forward the integration process. It considers whether it is possible for the Union to ‘stand still’, that is, to maintain the current level of integration without either moving forward to more intensive integration or engaging in costly and disruptive disintegration. In order to substantiate this claim, the article looks at three areas, the law of citizenship, the Eurozone and the legislative structures of the Union, showing in each case that the neither the current degree of integration nor methods used in recent times to move the integration process forward provide a long term basis for policy.     

Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal Approach

Over the years, in the case‐law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) determining the availability of family reunification rights for migrant Member State nationals, the pendulum has swung back and forth, from a ‘moderate approach’ in cases such as Morson and Jhanjan (1982) and Akrich (2003), towards a more ‘liberal approach’ in cases such as Carpenter (2002) and Jia (2007). Under the Court's ‘moderate approach’, family reunification rights in the context of the Community's internal market policy are only granted in situations where this is necessary for enabling a Member State national to move between Member States in the process of exercising one of the economic fundamental freedoms; in other words, where there is a sufficient link between the exercise of one of those freedoms and the need to grant family reunification rights under EC law. Conversely, under the Court's ‘liberal approach’, in order for family reunification rights to be bestowed by EC law, it suffices that the situation involves the exercise of one of the market freedoms and that the claimants have a familial link which is covered by Community law; in other words, there is no need to illustrate that there is a link between the grant of such rights and the furtherance of the Community's aim of establishing an internal market. The recent judgments of the ECJ in Eind and Metock (and its order in Sahin) appear to have decidedly moved the pendulum towards the ‘liberal approach’ side. In this article, it will be explained that the fact that the EU is aspiring to be not only a supranational organisation with a successful and smoothly functioning market but also a polity, the citizens of which enjoy a number of basic rights which form the core of a meaningful status of Union citizenship, is the major driving force behind this move. In particular, the move towards a wholehearted adoption of the ‘liberal approach’ seems to have been fuelled by a desire, on the part of the Court, to respond to a number of problems arising from its ‘moderate approach’ and which appear to be an anomaly in a citizens' Europe. These are: a) the incongruity caused between the (new) aim of the Community of creating a meaningful status of Union citizenship and the treatment of Union citizens (under the Court's ‘moderate approach’) as mere factors of production; and b) the emergence of reverse discrimination. The article will conclude with an explanation of why the adoption of the Court's liberal approach does not appear to be a proper solution to these problems.     

‘The referring court asks,in essence’: Is reformulation of preliminary questions by the Court of Justice a decision writing fixture or a decision‐making approach?

The Court of Justice can rephrase or otherwise depart from the questions referred to it by national courts under Article 267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. It does so routinely: a practice known as reformulation. Legal literature often argues that reformulation is used to clarify national court questions and bring them within the scope of European Union law. The aim of the present article is to explore this claim systematically. To this end, it compiles a unique dataset consisting of the Orders for Reference, in which the referring courts embed the preliminary questions, and the judgments, in which the Court of Justice communicates the answers. The findings suggest that reformulation is a decision‐making approach rather than a fixture of decision writing. It's main function is to neutralize conflicts and Europeanise disputes. It underlines the Court's power to shape the preliminary ruling procedure and its outcomes.     

Bus interdiction efforts by the police:<Emphasis Type="Italic">United States v. Drayton</Emphasis>

The Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutionality of police interdiction efforts when conducting bus sweeps. The Court held that law enforcement officers are not required by the Fourth Amendment to “advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches” (U.S. v. Drayton, 2002, p. 2107). The decision may have implications for how the judicial branch will balance the needs of law enforcement against citizen freedoms in the post-September 11th era. This article explores the surrounding legal issues, the case opinion, and policy implications of this case.     

European Union Soft Law: New Developments Concerning the Divide Between Legally Binding Force and Legal Effects

The judgment in Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sheds light on the legal effects of soft law instruments that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will recognise, while distinguishing between their legally binding force and their legal or practical effects. European soft law is now often relied on in national courts, and can have an important impact on the rights and obligations of individuals. However, some of the goals of the Commission are only partly attainable due to the specific legal status of soft law instruments, and the current languages policy of the European Union. Given that soft law was not found to expressly impose obligations on individuals, the Court held that there was no requirement to publish it in all the official languages of the European Union. This has a negative impact on transparency and legal certainty, diminishing the role of soft law instruments in promoting such goals.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

Compensation for Damage Caused by Defective Drugs: European Private Law between Safety Requirements and Free-Market Values

Abstract: Within the European Union, the success of private law harmonisation is based upon the fragile balance between legal integration and protection of national traditions. In this respect, a transversal analysis of the obligation of safety established by the Directive 374/85/CEE shows that harmonisation sometimes prevails over the potential protections granted to the victims of a damage caused by defective products. On the one hand, this reduction arises from the balance between objective and subjective criteria used in evaluating the defect as defined in the harmonised text. On the other hand, it results from problems of coordination between national laws and EC law remedies. This latter difficulty is illustrated by the 25 April 2002 European Court of Justice decisions on the French experience. The paradigmatic example of the pharmaceutical sector is a clear illustration of these tensions, since it heightens free‐market values at the same time as seeking to ensure compensation for breach of health and safety of consumers.     

A Paradox in the Making: Detecting Something Positive in UPA Under the Ten Kate Effect

Abstract:  The European Court of Justice has persisted in adopting an unduly restrictive interpretation of Article 230(4) EC and that persistence has reached its apogee in the UPA decision, while at the same time it was mirrored in the relevant provisions of the draft Constitution. Therefore, it is surprising to see that in the aftermath of UPA , there can be something positive that can be explored further and that can be tested in order to establish whether any indirect, alas limited, liberalisation of the standing criteria is possible. The Ten Kate case established that, in principle, a Member State could be under an obligation under domestic law to challenge the validity of Community legislation. If the state, in all of its different manifestations, fails to challenge the validity of a Community measure when such an obligation arises under municipal law, then the citizen could be in a position to claim compensation. Therefore, the case introduces the doctrine of state liability and the agency analogy (with the state representing the individual or as parens patriae) as connected paths trying to circumvent the standing restrictions. The advantage is that the proceedings would take place under national law and would be detached from the Plaumann conditions. It is proposed that constitutionally entrenched human rights, like effective judicial protection, combined with the principle of legitimate expectation, could create the legal basis for an obligation of the state under national law to challenge the validity of Community norms. The paradox is that effective judicial protection was the exact argument that the European Court of Justice sidelined in UPA .     

Unveiling a role for the EU? The ‘headscarf controversy’ in European schools

Many European countries have introduced laws and policies which proscribe religious clothing in public educational institutions. The European Convention on Human Rights has been deployed to uphold such actions, the European Court of Human Rights recognising that States should be able to limit the manifestation of religious beliefs. National courts considering the matter in terms of religious freedom (as opposed to discrimination) have reached similar conclusions. Most affected States are members of the European Union as well as the Council of Europe. This article will argue that it is more likely that European Union law could be engaged by an aggrieved teacher to challenge national law.     

The Collective Labour Law of the European Union

Abstract: The collective labour law of the European Union is embedded in a variety of legal measures incorporating principles of collective labour law reflecting national experience. The dynamic of its development has been the spill-over effect of these principles, through their translation into the status of EU law, and their development by decisions of the European Court of Justice. The article outlines a framework of principles which, it is argued, are currently embodied in the collective labour law of the EU. They include collectively bargained labour standards, workers' collective representation, workers' participation, and protection of strikers against dismissal. In addition, there is a parallel principle of collective solidarity emerging in the social security law of the EU. The principle of collective negotiation of labour law introduced by the Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy may be seen as the founding constitutional basis for the collective labour law of the European Union.     

Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgements?

Article 260(2) TFEU (ex 228(2) EC) enables the European Court of Justice to enforce compliance with its judgements. This article analyses its use in doing so and questions whether it could be applied more effectively. It commences by highlighting the principally economic and environmental context of the case‐law, and by examining the initiatives taken to tackle delays in bringing these cases before the Court. The article then critically evaluates the effectiveness of the financial sanctions available to the Court. In doing so, it aims to fill a gap in present research by looking beyond the procedural measures through which the Court and the Commission operate to examine the practical impact of Article 260(2) itself.     

Buy baby: the European Union and regulation of human reproduction

In its decision in ex parte Blood the Court of Appeal relied on European Community (EC) law to hold that the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority had acted unlawfully in taking its decision to prevent Mrs Blood from exporting sperm taken from her dying husband without his written consent. The Blood case raises the issue of the extent to which EC law may affect the regulation of human reproduction in the Member States. Responding to fears that such national regulation might be 'swept away' by the commodifying nature of EC law, this article considers the scope of the potential application of EC law to regulation of human reproduction. The cautious conclusion is that, while there may be some increase in deregulatory pressures, the 'vertical relationship' of supreme EC law to national law may turn out to be less significant than 'horizontal relationships' between policy-makers within and between the EU and its Member States.     

The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary

The rule of law is a constitutional principle under the European Convention on Human Rights. Throughout its history, the rule of law has been the lodestar guiding the development of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In recent years, the normative impact of this principle has been increasing in the case-law of the Court, in particular in cases dealing with the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses the conceptual core of the rule of law under the Convention system as a fundamental component of “European public order”. Subsequently, the three-dimensional normative status of the rule of law is explored as well as the Court's statement that the principle is “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”. On this basis, an in-depth analysis is undertaken of the application in recent Strasbourg case-law of the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental organic component of the rule of law. Finally, the author reflects on the “symbiotic” relationship in the field of judicial independence between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.     

Vulnerability as a normative argument for accommodating “justice” within the AFSJ

Vulnerability is a concept that stems from ethics and legal theory. It has progressively gained momentum in international human rights law, in particular in the European contextof the European Court of Human Rights adjudications. Also, the European Union is sensitive to it.By the introduction of competences in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) we are witnessing a progressive “vulnerabilisation” of EU law. This article intends in the first place to outline such a problematic notion and then to highlight the normative effects of vulnerability. In particular, this article will put forward the argument that such notion could serve to revamp the profile of “justice” of the AFSJ, which has been neglected so far, calling for the development of a more sophisticated ethics of State duties.     

Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution

Abstract:  This article deals with how the Court of Justice balances fundamental rights protection and Common Market freedoms. From the particular perspective of the Charter and the ECHR, whose legal status will be upgraded upon entry into force of the European Constitution, it studies the Court of Justice's approach to fundamental rights invocations by Member States in the context of Common Market freedoms. For this purpose the judgments in Schmidberger and Omega will be discussed both in the current setting and that envisioned by the European Constitution. It will emerge that the Court of Justice's reasoning in Schmidberger and Omega can be criticised on different levels, and alternative approaches are proposed. At a later stage some further elements for refining the methodology for assessing Member States' fundamental rights invocations are addressed with a view to facilitating the Court of Justice more satisfactorily to take account of the current and likely future setting of fundamental rights protection in Union law.     

Restrictions of the sale of pharmaceuticals and medical devices such as contact lenses over the internet and the free movement of goods

In the light of new case law development, this article examines whether national restrictions on the online sale of pharmaceuticals and medical devices such as contact lenses are consistent either with EU secondary law, either with Article 34 TFEU that prohibits measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports. In particular, this article focuses on an analysis of two judgments on this important issue delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2003 and 2010, namely the Deutscher Apothekerverband decision and the Ker-Optika decision.     

Free movement of law students and lawyers in the EU: a comparison of English,German and Greek legislation

This article focuses on the linked themes of mobility within the European Union for law students and for lawyers. It highlights obstacles to cross-border legal education and legal practice across three Member States: England and Wales, Germany, and Greece. The European legal framework is outlined. The implications of recent case law of the European Court of Justice, on the conditions of access to higher education and financial support, are considered. Three main areas of concern are identified: admission arrangements; student finance; and the professional recognition of qualifications. The article compares the approach of the three Member States in each of these areas and explores conflicts between their domestic law provisions and European Union law. The article concludes by identifying ways in which ‘Europeanisation’ of legal education and the legal profession could be encouraged by facilitating law student mobility and by modernising the law curriculum.