The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology

Terrorism costs money. Although the costs of specific operations may be relatively inexpensive, terrorist organizations require much larger budgets in order to function. But how do terrorist groups acquire funding? What explains the variation in the particular sources used by different groups? This article develops a theory of terrorist financing that identifies criteria by which we can evaluate the different sources of terrorist funding, particularly in terms of their advantages and disadvantages to the terrorist group. These criteria are then applied across a typology of four primary types of terrorist financing: state sponsorship, illegal activity, legal activity, and popular support.     

A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality 1

Decreasing state sponsorship for terrorism in the post-9/11 environment has pressed terrorist groups to find alternative sources of financial support. Some groups have created their own “in-house” criminal capabilities, for example FARC, the LTTE, and Al Qaeda. Several analysts have argued that this “mutation” in organizational form may lead terrorist groups to ally with organized crime, whereas others have suggested that distinct organizational and ideological differences between the two will preclude cooperation. Drawing on both accounts, it is argued in this article that the degree of a terrorist group's organizational capacity and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will engage in, while ideological (political) distinctiveness will preclude fully symbiotic cooperation between terrorists and organized crime groups.     

A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure

Terrorist groups strive to balance efficiency with their need for security. This article examines the factors that affect a group's choice of organizational structure. I classify 254 groups from the Global Terrorism Database into one of four basic structures: market, all-channel, hub-spoke, or bureaucracy. The results of a multinomial logistic regression reveal that as secret organizations, terrorist groups are not just driven by achieving efficiencies in their organization but rather by protecting against infiltration and threats. Internal factors such as target selection, operational pace, ideology, and stated goals shape a group's structure. External environmental factors such as political rights, civil liberties, polity durability, and state wealth also help shape a group's structure.     

Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption

Because of the importance of technology to the operations of modern terrorist groups, the factors that affect the technological sophistication of extreme organizations are of great interest. In this article, the process through which terrorist groups seek out and deploy new technology is examined by bringing to bear the deep literature that exists on technology adoption by commercial organizations. A framework is described that delineates not only the factors that influence a group's decision-making processes surrounding new technology but also the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful absorption and use of unfamiliar technologies by a terrorist organization. This framework, by taking a holistic view of the entire technology adoption process, sets out a methodology to both more reasonably predict the outcome of a group's technology-seeking efforts and to speculate about its future innovation efforts. Such a technology focused viewpoint provides a route to more fully inform risk assessment, especially with regard to the low probabilityhigh consequence technologies that have served as the focus of much recent counterterrorist deliberation. The lessons provided by the framework with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism and to novel counterterrorist routes are discussed.     

Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria

More than 3,500 people have died in Nigeria since 2009 when Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group from northeastern Nigeria, launched its violent campaign to wrest power from the Nigerian government and foist an Islamic state under the supreme law of Sharia. Attempts at negotiating with the group, including the recent amnesty offer extended to its members by the Nigerian government, have stalled due to distrust on both sides and the factionalized leadership of the group's different cells. This article provides a systematic account of Boko Haram's emergence, demands, and modus operandi. It also evaluates how the Nigerian government has responded to the group's threat and how they should respond. The socioeconomic approach of this article helps to explain the Boko Haram problem beyond a usual religious agenda and to evaluate the development of the group in the context of Nigeria's checkered political history and local economic grievances.     

“Special” Communiqué Issued by the Belgian Marxist Terrorist Group, “Communist Combatant Cells” (CCC)

This section of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism is dedicated to the reprinting of selected, translated terrorist communiqués that provide insights into the mindset, worldview, or operational thinking of a group. In terms of communiqués, this section employs the following typology of terrorist communiqués. There are three types of terrorist communiqués: attack, strategic, and special. Attack communiqués are issued to claim responsibility for an attack, explain the target selected, and provide the political rationale for attacking the target. A strategic communiqué is a longer document that is issued to provide strategic direction or commentary on political events, issues, and developments relevant to the group's cause and constituency. It can be used to explain changes of strategy or reinforce the strategic direction of the group. The special communiqué is similar to the attack communiqué in that it is event-driven but addresses non-attack events like anniversary dates, hunger strikes, elections, deaths of leaders, ceasefires, issuing threats or warnings, annual progress reports, issuing apologies, and so on. All three communiqués are issued publicly and intended to influence various audiences.     

Selective Engagement with Islamist Terrorists: Exploring the Prospects

Despite claims to the contrary, governments have frequently talked to groups branded as terrorists in their efforts to find peaceful solutions to longstanding armed conflicts. The rhetoric of the so-called War on Terror has tended to portray an uncompromising and extreme, monolithic Islamist enemy with whom such accommodation is unthinkable. Therefore, it is not surprising that the potential for dialogue and negotiation with Islamist terrorist groups has been relatively neglected. This article examines the character of the contemporary Islamist threat and explores the prospects for selective engagement with terrorist groups that may not share Al Qaeda's global jihadist agenda.     

RIVAL EXPLANATIONS OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, ITS FAILURE AND PRIVATIZATION

This article contrasts three types of explanation of three events – the initial nationalization of many British industries, mainly in the 1940s, the failure of most nationalized industries to be economically successful by the 1970s and the privatization of most of them in the 1980s and 1990s. Its first section summarizes briefly an ordinary historical account of each event as developed elsewhere at greater length (in Foster 1992). The second section considers Chicagoan and Virginian explanations of the same events; and whether they are consistent with the other historical explanations. It concludes that Chicagoan theories do not explain any of these episodes plausibly, except possible rail nationalization, but in that case it worked in any sense only over an implausibly long period. Virginian type explanations have greater power in explaining both nationalization and its so-called'failure'thereafter. It is more difficult to explain privatization satisfactorily in Virginian terms.     

Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism

This article analyzes the factors that have motivated members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) to abandon terrorism and the factors that have motivated other members of the terrorist organization to maintain their activism. The article examines the process of disengagement of an important faction of ETA and that of other terrorists throughout the group's protracted campaign in order to explain the reasons behind the decision to give up violence. The article concludes with an analysis of the variables that should be considered in order to encourage the collective disengagement of the group that has become the most enduring terrorist organization in Europe.     

Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction

This article examines the factors that have contributed to the end of the Red Army Faction (RAF), and places particular emphasis on the causes and characteristics of individual disengagement of RAF members from the armed struggle. It discusses the evolution, ideology, and decline of each of the three generations of the RAF. The article's contribution is twofold. First, by assessing both contextual- and individual-level factors that led to the group's demise, the article bridges two approaches to analyzing the demise of terrorist organizations—the literature on how terrorism ends and why individuals disengage from terrorism. Second, the article helps build a growing empirical body of work on the demise of terrorist groups that can be used to confirm, challenge, or refine existing hypotheses on how terrorism ends, while formulating new ones. The article concludes that different factors contributed to the decline of each subsequent generation of the RAF. Successful German police efforts played a critical role in thwarting the RAF's first generation. Lack of public support and recruits, due in large part to an escalation of terrorist violence, hastened the decline of the second generation of the group. The third generation suffered from serious interorganizational strife, exacerbated by a government initiative that offered to release those RAF members from prison who renounced terrorism.     

Is It Ideology or Desperation: Why Do Organizations Deploy Women in Violent Terrorist Attacks?

Why do some terrorist organizations deploy women on the front lines and in violent attacks? This study explores the social conditions, economic factors, and organizational characteristics that might explain women's participation in violent terrorist activity. With a new data set of 395 terrorist organizations, women's participation in terrorist attacks was quantified and coded. The logistic regression analysis results suggest that women's educational attainment, social rights, terrorist organization's age and size, and the level of a country's economic development are important predictors of the deployment of women in terrorist violence while a terrorist group's ideological or religious orientation and the level of democracy do not significantly influence the likelihood of women's participation.     

“Our Backs Are Against the Wall”: The Black Liberation Army and Domestic Terrorism in 1970s America

This article addresses the gap in the literature on U.S. domestic terrorism and counterterrorism in the 1970s by examining a once-notorious but now largely forgotten terrorist group, the Black Liberation Army (BLA). An outgrowth of the Black Panther Party, the BLA was directly responsible for at least 20 fatalities, making it amongst the most lethal “homegrown” U.S. groups of the period. This article seeks to shed new light on the BLA by exploring its relatively short but violent trajectory. By focusing on the group's origins, operations, ideology, and structure, the BLA can be understood as part of a wider landscape of homegrown political violence. The BLA emerged during the waning phase of a protest cycle that included the civil rights, Black Power, and anti-war movements. Like other terrorist groups before and after, the BLA claimed to be acting in self-defense and on behalf of the people, presenting itself as an army resisting police occupation of minority communities. With the collapse of the extreme Left in the mid-1970s, the BLA's prospects for creating a broader revolutionary base became remote. The article also examines law-enforcement responses to the BLA and the competing ways in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police (and in particular, the New York Police Department) framed and countered the BLA threat.     

Something Must be Done-Military Intervention

In the late twentieth century, the United States' federal government responded to the threat of terrorism by passing a wide range of counterterrorist laws. The vigor that accompanied these initiatives echoed at a state level where, virtually unnoticed, states passed similar legislation. This article examines state measures in three areas: the funding of foreign terrorist organizations, the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, and definitions of terrorist activity. While these statutes, as a legal matter, may not violate any specific federal provisions or constitutional prohibitions, they raise important questions about federal supremacy in foreign affairs and the constitutional protections afforded citizens. More significantly, as a policy concern, these provisions threaten America's ability to speak in one voice, introducing divisions into the domestic realm and diminishing the ability of the federal government to negotiate with foreign states and organizations. They also mask an appropriate role for the states in fighting terrorism. Both the policy implications and legal considerations suggest that such measures may ultimately undermine America's ability to counter the terrorist threat.     

Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future

This article considers the current state of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement and its likely future trajectory. It considers the principle assumptions both today and in the past about Al Qaeda and how they affect our understanding of the movement and the threat that it poses; Al Qaeda's current capacity for violence; and its ability to plan strategically and implement terrorist operations. The article further identifies nine key change drivers that will likely determine Al Qaeda's fate in the years to come before concluding that, even while the core Al Qaeda group may be in decline, Al Qaeda-ism, the movement's ideology, continues to resonate and attract new adherents. In sum, it argues that Al Qaeda remains an appealing brand most recently and most especially to extremist groups in North and West Africa and the Levant.     

Terrorism,Signaling, and Suicide Attack

This article examines the strategic utility of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism, we suggest, can be thought of as a form of strategic "signaling." We define terrorism as a signaling game in which terrorist attacks are used to communicate a group's character and objectives to a set of target audiences. This is followed by an examination of the utility of suicide attacks as a signaling tactic. The relative effectiveness of suicide operations is evaluated in relation to other tactical options that are traditionally available to terrorist organizations. We go on to examine the institutional and social context of suicide terrorism, concluding with an examination of the evolutionary use of suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.‐     

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State's Break: Strategic Strife or Lackluster Leadership?

Employing counterfactuals to assess individual and systemic explanations for the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), this article concludes that individual leaders factor greatly into terrorist alliance outcomes. Osama bin Laden was instrumental in keeping Al Qaeda and ISIS allied as he prioritized unity and handled internal disputes more deftly than his successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although a troubled alliance, strategic differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split. Rather, the capabilities of Al Qaeda's leader determined the group's ability to prevent alliance ruptures.     

The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism

This article examines Israel's attempts to weaken and defeat the Lebanese Hizballah. It reviews Hizballah's rise after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hizballah's successful effort to force Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, the 2006 war, and Israeli attempts to deter Hizballah. The article argues that Israel has largely failed to defeat Hizballah militarily and politically. Israel's experience offers lessons for how terrorist groups learn, the effectiveness of terrorist attrition strategies against casualty-sensitivity states, the difficulties in coercing terrorist groups, and the importance of an information strategy. Finally, Israel's clash with Hizballah indicates the importance of thinking of groups that are large and multi-faceted from a counterinsurgency paradigm.     

The Stasi–Meinhof Complex?

The extent of the East German Ministry for State Security's involvement with militant left-wing terrorist organizations that operated in West Germany remains one of the most contentious issues with respect to the legacy of left-wing terrorism in Germany. Fueled by new archival evidence and much speculation, the topic has been the subject of many unfounded and sensationalist assertions. This article seeks to provide a chronological reassessment based on the current state of knowledge, and thus seeks to make a contribution to a growing literature on state involvement with terrorist groups. While the East German spy agency at times colluded with terrorist groups, the degree of support fluctuated considerably and there is no evidence that a state actor “created” the armed groups or “directed” their activities.     

A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970–78

Abstract

The terrorists who have ravaged Italy over the past several years are not totally faceless. The names and backgrounds of many are well known, as are their habitual modes of operations and the ideologies by which they are moved. After a brief catalog of the terrorists’ actions, the article outlines the physiognomy of Italy's major terrorist groups. A substantial part of this consists of a list of each group's victims, since any assessment of the terrorist groups’ effects must begin with an awareness of which sectors of Italian society have been struck. The backgrounds of the terrorists, the political language they speak, and the list of their victims point unambiguously to the conclusion that terrorism in Italy is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of the Left and that it conceives of itself as a means of bringing about a Communist regime. The terrorists regard themselves as the competitors and reformers of the Italian Communist party. But at the same time they have made good their claim as the mortal enemies of the enemies of the Communist party. The question regarding the Italian terrorists’ international connections cannot be answered definitively. Such evidence as exists, however, suggests that today's self‐declared Communist terrorists may be acting in ways similar to their predecessors of the 1940s and early 1950s, who found safe haven in the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.     

Historical constraints to privatization: The case of the nationalized chilean copper industry

The military regime that came to power in 1973 made no attempt to hide its intentions to drastically restructure the state. Because of Chile’s historical economic dependence on its copper industry, which had been nationalized at high political and economic cost, many feared that the nationalization process would be reverted and that the gains won against dependency would be lost. The article examines why the efforts to privatize the Chilean National Copper Corporation (CODELCO) were not successful. This failure must be attributed to the country’s long experience with external economic dependence, which produced a deep-seated national awareness of the drawbacks of foreign control, and to the benefits that the industry brings to powerful groups in the regime, above all the Chilean Army.