Resurgent religious terrorism: A study of some of the Lebanese Shi'a contemporary terrorism

Abstract

This study introduces the concept of geocultural immobility. A minority's geocultural immobility is identified as an imposed low geographic mobility within a nation with low cultural pluralism. It establishes the Lebanese Shi'a geocultural immobility, to which it attributes their religious resurgence. This Lebanese Shi'a religious resurgence is proven in this research to produce the zealots needed by religious terrorist organizations. This study also introduces and defines religious terrorism as violent acts performed by elements of religious organizations or sects, growing out of a commitment to communicate a divine message. It makes distinctions among religious terrorism, secular terrorism, and fighters for religious freedom, which are based on the actors' motives, affinities, and consciousness of the maliciousness of their acts. The primary and secondary data and the quasiexperiment in this research support its special hypotheses. They indicate a statistical correlation between eight Lebanese Shi ‘a cultural and religious attributes.     

Women and Organized Racial Terrorism in the United States

Racial terrorism—violence perpetrated by organized groups against racial minorities in pursuit of white and Aryan supremacist agendas—has played a significant role in U.S. society and politics. Women have been important actors in much of this violence. This article examines women's involvement in racial terrorism from the immediate post-Civil War period to the present. Although organized racial violence by women has increased over time, this trend may not continue. The strategic directions and tactical choices of Aryan and white supremacist groups are likely to alter the extent and nature of women's involvement in racial terrorism in the future.     

Medical technology in combatting terrorism

State‐sponsored terrorism is a form of coercion, backed up by the threat and use of violence, to achieve political ends. These terrorist tactics also involve signaling of intentions and responses between the terrorist sponsor and those whom it targets. Accordingly this study examines Iranian state sponsorship of anti‐U.S. terrorism in the period of 1980–1990 as an example of political communication aimed at manipulating U.S. policy through the threat and use of violence. Official Iranian media are quantitatively content‐analyzed to demonstrate their systematic use of threat‐projections as warnings and indications to the U.S. in this period.     

In the Name of the Cause: Women's Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism

The article begins by providing a brief history of the involvement of females in the conduct of modern terrorism and discusses the different ideological mindsets that account for their becoming more involved in terrorism associated with ethno-separatist rather than religious concerns, with an eye to the fact that the trend shows unmistakable signs of changing. Secondly, it considers the structure of logic, or systems of contention, that secular and religious groups employ in attempting to legitimize women and girls offering themselves up as martyrs, and discusses what mechanisms they share for doing so. The thesis of this paper is that secular and religious terrorism, though seeking to create significantly different worlds, one modern, the other traditional, fall back upon many of the same rhetorical strategies to justify females engaging in political violence, especially the rhetoric of martyrdom. The Sri Lankan nationalist-based Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is highlighted as the secular example and Hamas and Islamic Jihad as the religious ones.     

France faced with terrorism

Abstract

France is an interesting laboratory for studying terrorism, or antiterrorism, not because extreme violence has been committed on a large scale as in Lebanon, but because, faced with diverse terrorist actions over a short period, France has worked out and considerably modified a policy for dealing with terrorism. The subject herein is not terrorism but the official response to it, namely counterterrorist policy and actions.     

Ethnic competition,radical Islam,and challenges to stability in the Republic of Dagestan

Previous academic work on stability in Dagestan has focused on two potential cleavages, the republic’s ethnic diversity and the challenge from radical Islamist groups. Using results from a December 2005 survey, and focusing on Dagestan’s six main ethnic groups, this paper investigates attitudes towards the dual topics of the politicization of ethnicity and the relationship between terrorism and Islamism. We find that Dagestanis maintain layered conceptions of identity, and do not attribute violence predominantly to radical Islam in the republic or the wider North Caucasus. Scholars should be aware of Rogers Brubaker’s concept of groupism in analyzing not just ethnic groups, but religious movements as well.     

The analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism

Extortionate terrorism is the threatened use of terrorist acts to gain concessions from the victim. In this article, game theory is used to seek answers to the following questions: (a) When will people resort to extortionate terrorism? (b) When will extortionate terrorism succeed and when will it fail? (c) What constitutes an “optimal” threat, i.e., what bribes, extortion, ransom, or payoff should be asked in exchange for which hostages or property? (d) When should unsuccessful threats be carried out and when should they be abandoned? (e) How should a victim choose among potential responses to specific terrorist threats and to the general problem of terrorism? Two different game theoretic models of terrorism are examined— one using ordinal preferences, the other von Neumann‐Mor‐genstern utilities. Terrorism is considered not simply as isolated incidents; institutions are potential victims of repeated terrorism. The terrorist and the victim, in formulating a response to each incident, are guided not only by present gains and losses, but by the effect their response has on others’ perception of their credibility and resolve—two long‐run variables.     

The threat of international terrorism in the united states: The police response

Abstract

As the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis unfolded, leaders of the UN coalition against Iraq became increasingly concerned about the possibility of terrorism accompanying the initiation of hostilities with Baghdad. Such concerns were reinforced by Iraqi warnings and by Baghdad's long association with international terrorist movements. Ultimately, however, the Iraqis proved unable to make effective use of terrorism to support their war effort. This failure resulted for a variety of reasons including effective counterterrorism measures by the allies. Additionally, a number of other nations with terrorist linkages pressured their terrorist clients to refrain from helping Saddam Hussein. They did this for reasons of their own that nevertheless supported allied strategy. Finally, the Iraqis’ lack of any precrisis preparation for terrorist action meant that they were simply unable to mount more than a few ineffective operations.     

What Does the “Terrorist” Label Really Do? Measuring and Explaining the Effects of the “Terrorist” and “Islamist” Categories

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labeling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present article evaluates whether or not the terrorist label—as well as the “Islamist” one—really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (N = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labeling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analyzed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.     

U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 1980s and the priorities for the 1990s

Abstract

The Department of State's counterterrorism coordinator discusses current patterns in international terrorism and cites three areas of growing concern: radical Palestinian terrorist groups, Libyan supported terrorism, and narcoterrorism in the Andean nations. He explains U.S. Government counterterrorism policy and assesses its effectiveness. The recent trend toward treating terrorists as criminals and applying the rule of law against them is examined. He also emphasizes the importance of pressuring countries that sponsor terrorism and of refusing to make deals with terrorists.     

Economic Development,Poorly Managed Political Conflict and Terrorism in India

Terrorism is frequently argued to be the product of poverty and poor levels of economic development in countries. Examining the distribution of terrorist attacks and casualties due to terrorism across the states of India, this article demonstrates that the phenomenon of terrorism is not a clear product of poor economic development but rather exacerbated by unresolved and poorly managed political conflict. Poorer states in India are not necessarily more prone to terrorism, but states that have outstanding and poorly addressed political disputes do experience a disproportionately high level of terrorist activity. This study examines six sources of political conflict that contribute to terrorism in India—separatist movements, ethnic conflict, communal conflict, the presence of scheduled castes and tribes, high population growth, and the phenomenon of stateless areas—and makes several observations on the successes and failures of Indian counterterrorism policy.     

In search of an anti‐terrorism policy: Lessons from the reagan era

Abstract

During the 1980s, terrorist activities became a real threat to Americans at home and abroad. The Reagan administration's policy response to this threat was encumbered by several factors, both of commission and omission. Dominant anti‐communist ideological perceptions in the administration at times blurred the disparate causes of international terrorism and the varied motives of terrorist groups. The administration was unable to back up its words with consistent, resolute policy action. And U.S. intelligence operations were not able to detect or prevent several terrorist strikes against U.S. facilities, especially in the Middle East.

The U.S. air raid on Libya served notice that the United States would strike militarily at state sponsors of terrorism. It also called into the question the Reagan administration's willingness to adhere strictly to international law in its efforts to prosecute certain governments who aid and abet terrorist groups. There is no policy panacea for terrorism; terrorism can only be countered by a resolute policy which combines protection, prevention, and prosecution, including military retaliation if it is necessary and can be carried out proportionate to the aggrieved terrorist offense. The lessons gleaned from the Reagan administration's anti‐terrorist experience are both constructive and instructive. However, only if more deliberate efforts are made to integrate these lessons into policy considerations will they become utilitarian assets to counter terrorist activities, at home and abroad.     

Terrorism and overkill

The purpose of this paper is to review the international terrorist activities of the last half century of this millennium and to make a case for needed changes in U.S. efforts to curb the growth of terrorism. Unless we can muster a unified front against global terrorism and organized crime, we are in danger of carrying these burdens with us into the new millennium. Whereas most discussions are focused on how to respond during or after a terrorist event, this paper explores measures for averting international terrorism disasters before they occur. With the growing availability of weapons of mass destruction and computer technology to terrorist and organized crime groups, there is a growing potential for disasters of proportions never before experienced. Consequently the risks are becoming too great to continue with a reactive approach to terrorism. The paper begins with a discussion of how the basis for international terrorism has changed since its modern form began in the 1960s. It then extrapolates the evolutionary trends of terrorism to make projections for what we can expect in the future. Finally, it presents a number of practical ideas for preventing terrorist actions before they occur, beginning with an argument for redefining terrorism in terms that enable us to organize more effectively against it.     

Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion,State Failure,and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries

This study empirically evaluates the question of whether or not the promotion of democracy in the Middle East will reduce terrorism, both in terms of terrorist attacks sustained by Middle Eastern countries and in terms of attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups based in Middle Eastern countries. Using a series of pooled, time-series negative binomial statistical regression models on 19 countries from 1972 to 2003 the analysis demonstrates that the more politically liberal Middle Eastern states—measured both in terms of democratic processes and in terms of civil liberties protections—are actually more prone to terrorist activity than are Middle Eastern dictatorships. The study demonstrates, furthermore, that an even more significant predictor of Middle Eastern terrorist attacks is the intensity of state failures, or episodes of severe political instability that limit central government projection of domestic authority, suffered by states in the region. States that are unable to respond to fundamental challenges to political stability posed by internal political strife, ethnic conflict or the phenomenon of “stateless areas,” geographic or political spaces within states that eschew central government authority, are significantly more likely to host or sustain attacks from terrorist groups. The findings have implications for current United States antiterrorism policy toward the Middle East and provide a statistical/empirical foundation to previous studies on the relationship between terrorism and state failure.     

Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations

Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new conceptthe Dune organizationthat is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.     

Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations

Extreme religious interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic Revivalism influence the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Islamic “terrorists” are able to legitimize their movement as an act of violent Jihad permitted by the Quran essentially because of religious sanctions that permit the use of violence as an act of defense and to preserve the will of God in Islamic communities. The Quran systematizes this use and relates it to other aspects of the Shariat through its discourse on revivalism. Based on the Quranic principle of ijtihad, terrorists emphasize the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a legitimate premise for the use of excessive aggression. According to ijtihad Muslims can interpret and determine the extent of their Islamic practices individually as long as these are directed toward ensuring the will of God in an Islamic community. Thus terrorists use ijtihad to emphasize Quranic clauses that sanction the use of violent Jihad as a method ordained by God to preserve the Shariat in an Islamic community. The manner in which terrorists use ijtihad to contextualize geopolitical factors as a cause for violent Jihad is determined by their extreme interpretations of the Quran. These interpretations also determine the extent of violence used in a Jihad for religious amelioration. The religious legitimacy of this violence prevails until the cause and course of violent Jihad correlates with the Quran's discourse on violence and revivalism. In contemporary times an extreme interpretation of the movement of Revivalism ¹ 1. Refers to the contemporary movement of Islamic Revivalism. that is inspired by “revivalism” also provides an organized premise for Islamic terrorism. When implemented, this causes variations within specific geopolitical conditions and in different Jihadi groups. However a common understanding of religious doctrines determines the extent of Revivalism in Islamic communities because this movement relies heavily on the Quranic discourse for its existence. Thus, the religious basis for Islamic terrorism is primarily found when extreme interpretations of the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism are directed toward obtaining an equally radical version of Revivalism in specific geopolitical conditions. In this manner, extreme Quranic and Revivalist interpretations ensure the ideological persistence of Islamic terrorism as a religious effort to preserve the will of God in an Islamic community. The aim of this article is to show the manner in which religion can cause the emergence of Islamic violence as it is known today. The discourse on Islamic violence and counterterrorism needs to be urgently studied given the numerous instances of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Many writings on Islamic violence and statements released after an act of Islamic violence allude to the impact of religion on violent Jihad, but they rarely explore it or present a premise for its existence. This exploration will be conducted based on research of the author's on the Kashmir crisis and the insurgency in it. Thus, examples from insurgency in Kashmir will be used on occasion to illustratively develop this argument. In his book The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington states that a theory must be causal and simple. Using the words of Thomas Kuhn, he explains that “to be accepted as a paradigm [it] must seem better than its competitors but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” ² 2. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1996), p. 30. Furthering such simplicity and exploration, will be the central effort of this discourse. The sources for this exploration will be mainly derived from theoretical and practical understandings of terrorism, Islamic religion and theology, and the movement of Islamic Revivalism. A comparison between Islam and other religions will not be presented when evaluating the impact of Islam on violent Jihad. It will essentially present religious premises for violent Jihad from a Muslim rather than non-Muslim or “Western” perspective; although it is accepted that parallels in the understanding of “violence” do exist in the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Non-Muslim perspectives on violence and terrorism are relevant and known to the author. However a perpetual emphasis on these factors or a failure to acknowledge them limits the scope of the study of Islamic terrorism itself. The aim will be to present an Islamic perspective on violent Jihad. Then, it is accepted that a complex interplay between religious understandings and geopolitical events influence the emergence of Islamic violence in contemporary times. Thereafter, it must be stated that extreme psychological and sociological factors intrinsic to the Jihadis influence the religious choices that cause violent Jihad. An analysis of these factors is outside the realm of this discourse, which remains political in its scope. Further, on occasion a lack of empirical data and non-circumstantial evidence is encountered to substantiate some contentions mentioned ahead. As it has been suggested previously ³ 3. Nancy C. Biggo, The Rationality of the Use of Terrorism by Secular and Religious Groups available at (http://www.dissertations.com), 2002. this is mainly because there is a dearth of such data and reliable evidence pertaining to religious terrorism. At certain points, it becomes difficult to validate external opinions mainly because of the right to individual interpretations vested by the Quran in all Muslims. The validity of these opinions is vested in the fact that they are taken from informed Muslims who practice moderate and radical interpretations of Islam. Any reader may be expected to believe that any kind of terrorism is unjustifiable. However, in order to address these movements effectively, they must be studied from all possible dimensions and especially from the cultural contexts from which they arise.     

Religiosity and Rebellion in Nigeria: Considering Boko Haram in the Radical Tradition

Testing social movement theory positing that radical organizations are ideologically driven at their core, but are supported by civilians who are driven by social factors, this research interrogates the disparity between radical group ideology and supporter belief set in the context of present-day Nigeria. Content analysis of randomly selected Boko Haram publications establishes the high, and increasing, levels of religiosity exhibited by the violent social movement itself. In contrast, a large-N survey of Nigerians conducted in 2012 and 2013 shows that high levels of religiosity do not significantly predict willingness to justify violence, commitment to non-state violent actors, or positive attitude toward Boko Haram among Nigerians as a whole, but rather the opposite. Given these findings, Boko Haram may be better understood within the tradition of radical extremist movements across the ideological spectrum, even while it frames its struggle as that of a distinctly religious movement.     

Strategy of tension: The Belgian terrorist crisis 1982–1986

Abstract

Between 1982 and 1986, Belgium suffered a series of terrorist attacks that claimed more than 30 lives, making this campaign one of the most destructive in the recent history of western Europe. Two major groups were involved: one was purportedly a leftist radical sect, the other an anonymous cell popularly known as the “mad killers,” whom subsequent investigation has shown to be connected to neo‐Nazi organizations. Both groups were apparently seeking to destabilize the Belgian state at a time of intense political conflict, and it was widely suggested that the apparently opposed political extremes were actually allied in a common cause. In addition, official enquiries established connections between the terrorist groups and agents of Belgian state security. This paper discusses the use of terrorism in a political “strategy of tension” modeled on that developed in Italy in the late 1960s. It also suggests that the contemporary structure of European terrorist groups readily lends itself to manipulation in the cause of provocateur activity.     

Does Drug Trafficking Impact Terrorism? Afghan Opioids and Terrorist Violence in Central Asia

ABSTRACT

The relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism remains a contentious issue. While some assert that drug trafficking is a strong predictor of terrorism, others contest this observation. This study focuses on the impact of the Afghan opioid trade on terrorist violence in Central Asia, a region of drug transit states. We employ Geographic Information Systems–enabled visualizations of the drug trade and terrorism as well as statistical tests to study the drug–terror relationship at the subnational level. Our findings lend support to the argument that the drug trade facilitates terrorism, but we also find that the drug–terror relationship is multifaceted, complex, and intimately linked to the state.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.