Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror

This article argues that a successful strategy for fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) requires actions aimed not only at defeating the Al Qaeda network and denying its operatives sanctuary, but also efforts to delegitimize Al Qaeda's ideology; the United States has focused on the former at the expense of the latter. The GWOT requires a new strategy, one that continues to target Al Qaeda operatives and their assets, while undermining Al Qaeda's message. This requires a better understanding of Al Qaeda's ideology, how U.S. foreign policy may fuel that ideology, and a strategy for undermining militant Islam's worldview.     

Osama bin Laden and Guerrilla War

Is Osama bin Laden just an evil person or is he a thoughtful, determined adversary with a well-planned strategy? This article outlines how bin Laden, as a mujahideen fighter in the Soviet Afghanistan War, became familiar with Mao's protracted guerrilla concept, and how he later proclaimed its significance in developing his Jihad warfare strategy.     

Al Qaeda,Trends in Terrorism,and Future Potentialities: An Assessment

The Manhattan trial of four men linked to Osama bin Laden was the result of the largest overseas investigation ever mounted by the U.S. government. The trial generated thousands of pages of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses with some knowledge of bin Laden's group. What was learned from the trial is that bin Laden's organization experienced severe cash flow problems in the mid-1990s; that the U.S. government has had some real successes in finding informants within bin Laden's organization; that bin Laden has taken steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction; that the training of bin Laden's followers in his camps in Afghanistan is quite rigorous, featuring tuition on a wide range of weapons and explosives and terrorism techniques; and that bin Laden's group operates transnationally, its membership drawn from four continents. Finally, the trial underlines the strengths and limits of the law enforcement approach to bin Laden.     

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State's Break: Strategic Strife or Lackluster Leadership?

Employing counterfactuals to assess individual and systemic explanations for the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), this article concludes that individual leaders factor greatly into terrorist alliance outcomes. Osama bin Laden was instrumental in keeping Al Qaeda and ISIS allied as he prioritized unity and handled internal disputes more deftly than his successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although a troubled alliance, strategic differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split. Rather, the capabilities of Al Qaeda's leader determined the group's ability to prevent alliance ruptures.     

The Islamic Awakening's Second Wave

Hassan al-Turabi, often referred to as the most significant Muslim cleric since Ayatollah Khomeini, had a central influence during the 1990s on the rise of Sunni Islamist movements across the Middle East and North Africa. He was a mentor of Ayman al-Zawahiri and had a close personal relationship with Osama bin Laden, sponsoring his presence in Sudan before the Al Qaeda leader fled to Afghanistan. Al-Turabi was the ideological force behind the coup led by Omar al-Bashir, with whom he has since fallen out, that brought Islamists to power in Sudan in 1989. As an opposition leader al-Turabi has been in and out of jail for years, most recently over the issue of Darfur.
The soft-spoken philosopher of Islam sat down with me for a lengthy and candid discussion in the summer of 1992. We met in a dilapidated townhouse near DuPont Circle in Washington, where he had come, as it turned out without success, to repair relations with the United States.     

ISIL's Execution Videos: Audience Segmentation and Terrorist Communication in the Digital Age

ABSTRACT

This article offers a bottom-up understanding of the media strategy employed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as it relates to the production and dissemination of its hostage execution videos. Through an empirical analysis of sixty-two videos of executions produced by ISIL in the year following its establishment as the “Islamic State” in 2014, this study examines the videos as a major component of ISIL's media strategy. Through these media products, ISIL seeks to spread a political message aimed at both local and global, ingroup and outgroup consumption through audience segmentation, while striving to influence both local and global audiences through the use and production of graphic violence. This article also discusses the strategy governing the production and release of ISIL's execution videos; how it relies on the global media to transmit its intertwined political and religious agenda in the digital media age.     

Connecting a Thousand Points of Hatred 1

The relationship between Al Qaeda and Iran has been one of continuing controversy even prior to 9/11 and is more relevant today as U.S. forces find themselves on battlefields where both have vital interests and roles. It's clear that Al Qaeda and Iran have longstanding issues with the United States, but despite the wild allegations, these two parties remain far apart based on religious differences and differing geopolitical aims. Still, the signs of cooperation between extremists in pursuit of a common aim remains clear and must be taken into account as the United States works to restore stability across the Middle East.     

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the Russian–Western relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.     

'New Africa', globalisation and the confines of elite reformism: 'Getting the rhetoric right', getting the strategy wrong

The launch in July 2001 of the New Africa Initiative was a culmination of events over the last two years involving the emergence of a group of African leaders who have increasingly played a prominent role in negotiations between Africa and the developed world. This 'New Africa', initially comprising Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa but now more diffuse, has been welcomed at a great number of elite gathering points by the North. This article investigates what is 'new', if anything, about the positions being advanced by this group. The article contends that a hearing is being granted to the New Africa representatives precisely because the message communicated fits the neo liberal discourse. While appreciating elements of New Africa's agenda, it is feared that there is no obvious strategy to be found in the New Africa Initiative inequalities of the global political economy.     

Al Qaeda's Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad

Militant Islamist Sayyid Imam's legal critique of Al Qaeda's anti-U.S. mass casualty terrorism holds great potential utility for counterterrorist messaging strategy. In this article, a jihad–realist Islamist theological–jurisprudential methodology is first defended as the means most productive for delegitimizing Al Qaeda among high value, religiously motivated recruits. Second, Sayyid Imam's specific allegations and detailed Sharia proofs against Al Qaeda are presented. Finally, implications are drawn for U.S. counterterrorist messaging focusing especially on the utility of wielding this theological–juridical approach as compared to other “counternarrative” approaches, and the vital need to accurately characterize Islamism and its relation to terrorism.     

Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda,Ideology, and Terror

Propaganda is at the heart of the struggle between Al Qaeda's strain of militant Islamism and the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. In an ideological struggle, propaganda is critical in shaping outcomes. Both Al Qaeda and the U.S. and U.K. governments recognize this, and have devised propaganda strategies to construct and disseminate messages for key audiences. This article considers the key elements in the Al Qaeda propaganda narrative, and the means through which it is disseminated. On the other side, it assesses the U.S. and U.K. governments’ response, focusing particularly on the British effort to define and propagate a narrative centered on British values.     

Al Qaeda's Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda's Objectives

Terrorism scholars are divided over whether terrorism is an effective tactic. Disagreement derives from the fact that the objectives of terrorist groups are often highly contested. Nowhere is this clearer than in contemporary statements on Al Qaeda. This article explores the most common interpretations for why Al Qaeda attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, and then analyzes their empirical support. After determining the most compelling interpretation of Al Qaeda's objectives, the article evaluates Al Qaeda's success in achieving them since perpetrating this watershed attack. The following analysis provides a timely case study in the classic debate over whether terrorism is strategically rational behavior.     

Some Aspects of Management Training in Romania and American Assistance in its Development

Abstract

Romania emerged from 40 plus years of communism with little understanding of management under free market conditions. The country's managers have been scrambling to catch up to the western world so that it can compete on an international basis. Romania has rich resources and untapped capabilities that are slowly being developed in the post communist era. Assistance from western nations has helped to fill the gap left by the socialist mentality. The United States has been noteworthy in its management training assistance. This article is a survey of the programs attempted over the past thirteen years plus some reflections of earlier programs from the west.     

Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network

This piece attempts to add to the discourse on violent substate political activism by underscoring certain overlooked elements in the study of groups such as Al Qaeda as it relates to organizational paradigms. Specifically, this essay sheds light on the nature of networks in the business world and the ways in which firms utilize organization as a method of creating value. This article starts with the assumption that the end of firm organization is ultimately the maximization of innovative capacity. The conclusion of this essay finds that Al Qaeda's use of networks has not created the indestructible conglomerate many students of terrorism fear, but rather that the resort by Al Qaeda to an all-channel network was the result of poor strategy and indeterminate political goals that have robbed it of much of its effectiveness. This study uses cursory examinations of several other similar organizations to underscore the difference in strategy and firm innovation between firms considered to have high added-value and Al Qaeda.‐     

A First Draft of the History of America's Ongoing Wars on Terrorism

This research note attempts to map the Al Qaeda movement's trajectory from the 11 September 2001 attacks to the stunning events of 2014—which saw the continued rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its expulsion from the Al Qaeda movement, followed by ISIS's stunning thrust into Iraq, its declaration of a caliphate, and the re-engagement of American military forces in this region. It attempts to place in context the Al Qaeda movement's evolution to explain why the United States under President Barack Obama, despite hopes and expectations to the contrary, is still enmeshed in the war on terrorism proclaimed by George W. Bush over a decade ago.     

Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia's pursuit of international status

What determined Russia's national interests and grand strategy in the first decade after the Cold War? This article uses aspirational constructivism, which combines social psychology with constructivism, to answer this question. Central to aspirational constructivism are the roles that the past self and in-groups, and their perceived effectiveness play in the selection of a national identity and the definition of national interests. This article explains why Russian political elites settled on a statist national identity that focused on retaining Russia's historical status as a Western great power and hegemon in the former Soviet Union and in engaging the country in bounded status competition with the United States.     

Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey's Jihadi Policies and Western Security

Turkish support to jihadists is not merely a tactic aimed at removing Assad from power. It stems from a strategic decision on the part of Turkish authorities to influence Middle East affairs through non-state actors, much as Iran has been doing for some time. Turkey's support of jihadists transiting into Syria and its establishment of close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are joint aspects of this strategy. Turkish authorities have permitted Al Qaeda sympathizers to use pro-government media to promote their beliefs. The authorities have adopted a new political language that fuels anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. Prosecutors who have attempted to prevent shipments of weapons to Al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria have been fired and in some cases incarcerated. Indeed, by now Turkish prosecutors and the Turkish National Police are thoroughly intimidated. Not a single counterterror operation has been launched to disrupt Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s networks or recruitment activities. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization has been given full responsibility to deal with jihadist activities, without any active oversight, and the police are loath to venture into their territory. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey's jihadi policies have direct and indirect impact on Western security. This article examines Turkey's jihadi policies by examining official statements, media reports, interviews, and fieldwork.     

The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All Their Jihadi Children

Omar Bakri Mohammed (the Tottenham Ayatollah) and Abu Hamza al-Masri (the hook-handed cleric) are two of the more infamous figures to emerge from what critics called “Londonistan.” However, they should be remembered not only for their rhetoric and appearance, but also for the fact that their respective organizations, Bakri's Al Muhajiroun, and Hamza's Supporters of Shariah based at the Finsbury Park Mosque, have been the connective thread through most Islamist terrorist plots that have emanated from the United Kingdom. This article maps out the network of terrorist plots in the United Kingdom and abroad that appears to have emanated from the networks around these two men with a view to understanding better how the connections remained unclear for so long and how understanding of the networks evolved over time.     

The Rise of the Rest Warms the Planet

tokyo —America's post‐World War II commitment to universal rules of openness has spread economic gains far and wide, enabling new prosperity on a global scale. It is this American‐forged stable world order that has led to what Fareed Zakaria refers to as “the third great powershift” in the last 500 years: the “rise of the rest,” which follows on the rise of the West and the rise of the United States as the dominant Western power. It is indeed a remarkable legacy of American hegemony that China, India and others are rising, or arising anew, without the pillage, plunder and war associated with the emergent great power experiences of the past.