U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 1980s and the priorities for the 1990s

Abstract

The Department of State's counterterrorism coordinator discusses current patterns in international terrorism and cites three areas of growing concern: radical Palestinian terrorist groups, Libyan supported terrorism, and narcoterrorism in the Andean nations. He explains U.S. Government counterterrorism policy and assesses its effectiveness. The recent trend toward treating terrorists as criminals and applying the rule of law against them is examined. He also emphasizes the importance of pressuring countries that sponsor terrorism and of refusing to make deals with terrorists.     

The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization,New Terror,and the Delusions of Regionalism

One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism the past fifteen years has been the resurgence and proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative. Such groups are far more lethal than their secular counterparts, regarding violence as a divine duty or sacramental act conveyed by sacred text and imparted by clerical authority. Moreover, religious terrorism is not restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the Middle East. The same characteristics—the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of “enemies”—are also apparent among American Christian white supremacists, among some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in Israel, and among radical Sikh movements in India. Finally, as many of these groups embrace strong millennialist or apocalyptic beliefs, we may be on the cusp of a new and potentially more dangerous era of terrorism as the year 2000—the literal millennium—approaches.     

The threat of international terrorism in the united states: The police response

Abstract

As the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis unfolded, leaders of the UN coalition against Iraq became increasingly concerned about the possibility of terrorism accompanying the initiation of hostilities with Baghdad. Such concerns were reinforced by Iraqi warnings and by Baghdad's long association with international terrorist movements. Ultimately, however, the Iraqis proved unable to make effective use of terrorism to support their war effort. This failure resulted for a variety of reasons including effective counterterrorism measures by the allies. Additionally, a number of other nations with terrorist linkages pressured their terrorist clients to refrain from helping Saddam Hussein. They did this for reasons of their own that nevertheless supported allied strategy. Finally, the Iraqis’ lack of any precrisis preparation for terrorist action meant that they were simply unable to mount more than a few ineffective operations.     

In search of an anti‐terrorism policy: Lessons from the reagan era

Abstract

During the 1980s, terrorist activities became a real threat to Americans at home and abroad. The Reagan administration's policy response to this threat was encumbered by several factors, both of commission and omission. Dominant anti‐communist ideological perceptions in the administration at times blurred the disparate causes of international terrorism and the varied motives of terrorist groups. The administration was unable to back up its words with consistent, resolute policy action. And U.S. intelligence operations were not able to detect or prevent several terrorist strikes against U.S. facilities, especially in the Middle East.

The U.S. air raid on Libya served notice that the United States would strike militarily at state sponsors of terrorism. It also called into the question the Reagan administration's willingness to adhere strictly to international law in its efforts to prosecute certain governments who aid and abet terrorist groups. There is no policy panacea for terrorism; terrorism can only be countered by a resolute policy which combines protection, prevention, and prosecution, including military retaliation if it is necessary and can be carried out proportionate to the aggrieved terrorist offense. The lessons gleaned from the Reagan administration's anti‐terrorist experience are both constructive and instructive. However, only if more deliberate efforts are made to integrate these lessons into policy considerations will they become utilitarian assets to counter terrorist activities, at home and abroad.     

Nationalists without a nation: South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands

Abstract

This article focuses on the phenomenon of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands. Beginning with a historical examination of the colonial relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia, attention is then given to the circumstances in which some 21,000 South Moluccans came to the Netherlands in the early 1950s, and the social, economic, and political conditions of the South Moluccan community in Holland since then. Then follows a detailed examination of the main incidents of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands which climaxed in a series of violent incidents against Dutch and Indonesian targets in the mid‐1970s. Special attention is placed on the ways in which successive Dutch governments have responded to the various outbreaks of terrorism, as well as to the effects of this terrorism on public opinion. The article then shows what effects South Moluccan terrorism has had on the policies of Dutch and Indonesian governments; on national and international public opinion; on the South Moluccans in the Moluccas; and on the international terrorist community. The paper concludes that the focus of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands is likely to shift from attempts to secure an independent homeland for their people to closer contacts with other terrorist groups espousing anti‐colonial, anti‐imperialist, and nationalist ideals.     

The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime,A Case Study

Scholars have long recognized that terrorist groups have engaged in transnational organized crime activities. But the question that comes up is, “When does a criminal enterprise become a terrorist group or vice versa?” Terrorist groups have used physical violence, participated in weapons and drug trafficking networks, immigrant smuggling, and money laundering. More recently a number of terrorist groups have established what Jonathan White has referred to as “illegal multinational criminal organizations.” This article will examine the convergence of terrorism and organized crime through the prism of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).     

The U.S. Navy's role in countering maritime terrorism

Abstract

There have been few spectacular acts of maritime terrorism. About ninety‐five percent of all incidents of what would be classified as transnational maritime terrorism involved bombings, hijackings, and “other” attacks. Nearly all of these took place when ships were in port, and the victims were predominantly merchant ships. Only a small number of terrorist attacks have been reported against men‐of‐war–none against U.S. Navy ships. Bombing, including various forms of mining, comprises the major threat to merchant ships, while the dangers of U.S. Navy ships would be aggravated by the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear propulsion plants.

Counter terrorism as carried out by the U.S. Navy involves actions to deter or defeat direct terrorist activity (against the ship itself) and indirect activity (against other U.S. interests). U.S Navy ships are especially well organized, constructed, and equipped to deal with the former, but they would be virtually powerless to assist U.S. merchant ships against the most probable threats (bombing, hijacking, and attacks) in the most probable location (overseas ports).     

The Evolution of the U.S. Government's Annual Report on Terrorism: A Personal Commentary

This article examines the evolution of a key U.S. Government annual publication on terrorism. From its inception in 1977 to the present, the U.S. Government's annual terrorism report has been the primary statistical compiler of international terrorist incidents. Given the magnitude of this task and the inherent difficulty in defining the term “terrorism,” this report has been controversial and criticized. Love it or hate it, for many decades, this report was the sole source of statistics on international terrorism. The author argues that despite its flaws, this unclassified annual report does provide value and usually paints a fairly accurate picture of the international terrorism landscape. Over the last two years however, there have been claims that this report has become politicized and tailored to fit the views of the administration on the terrorist threat. The author rejects this charge and claims that this publication has been objective and that it has evolved over time into a more credible and useful report.     

A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality 1

Decreasing state sponsorship for terrorism in the post-9/11 environment has pressed terrorist groups to find alternative sources of financial support. Some groups have created their own “in-house” criminal capabilities, for example FARC, the LTTE, and Al Qaeda. Several analysts have argued that this “mutation” in organizational form may lead terrorist groups to ally with organized crime, whereas others have suggested that distinct organizational and ideological differences between the two will preclude cooperation. Drawing on both accounts, it is argued in this article that the degree of a terrorist group's organizational capacity and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will engage in, while ideological (political) distinctiveness will preclude fully symbiotic cooperation between terrorists and organized crime groups.     

The Future of Preventive Wars: the case of Iraq

Abstract

Eight years have past since the devastating September 11 attacks, and the USA has engaged in two wars in the name of uprooting global ‘terrorism’ and providing security to American citizens. The Bush administration bequeathed a legacy of two ongoing wars and growing threats emerging from ‘terrorist’ acts. This article analyses the future of the preventive war doctrine, formulated by the Bush administration, under international law. The article thus explores whether the preventive war doctrine has the potential to set a customary precedence, or whether it merely constitutes a breach of international law.     

Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe

Abstract

This article investigates the importance of the invasion and occupation of Iraq as motivation for recent acts of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. It analyses the mass casualty terrorist attack attributed to a group of Islamist militants in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the killing of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam by an Al Qaeda–inspired terrorist network. The first case has been assumed to be mainly motivated by the Iraq war, whereas the other case has been perceived as an act by an individual, motivated by domestic factors in Holland. The article situates these acts of terrorism within the theory of so-called spillover effects from armed conflicts to international terrorism. It argues that the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists in both cases, but that the terrorists linked the Iraq issue with perceived injustices against Muslims in Europe and globally.     

The predictability of international terrorism: A time‐series analysis

Abstract

The study examines the predictability of international terrorism in terms of the existence of trends, seasonality, and periodicity of terrorist events. The data base used was the RAND Corporation's Chronology of International Terrorism. It contains the attributes of every case of international terrorism from 1968 to 1986 (n = 5,589). The authors applied Box‐Jenkins models for a time‐series analysis of the occurrence of terrorist events as well as their victimization rates. The analysis revealed that occurrence of terrorist events is far from being random: There is a clear trend and an almost constant periodicity of one month that can be best described by a first‐order moving average model. The fit of this model was tested both by statistical diagnostics and the accuracy of predictions based on this model compared to actual occurrence. However, the series of victimization rates did not reveal any predictability aside from the overall trend of an increasing level of victimization. The findings of the study are discussed by two approaches: the contagiousness of terrorism and the concept of media‐oriented terrorism. These two concepts, separately or combined, may explain some of the patterns revealed in the occurrence of terrorist events. However, they both highlight the part played by the mass media, either as a target for publicity‐seeking terrorists or as an influential factor in the process of contagion.     

Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud,the Propensity to Travel,and International Terrorism

The misuse of passports is intrinsically connected with international terrorism. Terrorist groups and their operatives demonstrate a propensity to travel in order to meet, organize, train, plan, reconnoiter targets, and deploy for attacks. To travel surreptitiously, terrorist activists and operatives typically make use of improperly obtained, altered, or counterfeit passports and visas. The present study addresses three key issues relating to the terrorist misuse of passports: (a) the role of passport misuse in the operational activities of international terrorist networks; (b) the ways in which terrorist elements acquire seemingly genuine passports; and (c) the various international covenants, agreements, and related action plans intended to constrain terrorists’ ability to move surreptitiously across borders. The analysis describes a terrorism cycle, a complex array of key activities that together serve as enablers for international terrorism. The role of passports and surreptitious travel is examined for each stage of this terrorism cycle.     

Causality between transnational terrorism and tourism: The case of Spain

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to devise a methodology for estimating the impact of transnational terrorism on tourism. Using monthly data from 1970–1988, we estimate the relationship between terrorism and tourism for Spain. We find that terrorist events have had a significant negative impact on the number of tourists visiting Spain. A typical incident is estimated as scaring away just over 140,000 tourists when all monthly impacts are combined. Moreover, the causality is unidirectional: terrorism affects tourism, but not the reverse.     

United nations resolutions against international terrorism

Abstract

Nine years after the Munich Massacre of 11 Israeli athletes and after a request by the Secretary‐General for the General Assembly to act on the problem, the General Assembly reached a general consensus on a terrorism resolution. The resolution endorses a UN committee's recommendations to refrain from assisting terrorism in any way and to cooperate in the final elimination of terrorism. Negotiation of the resolution was difficult because third world countries did not want to weaken opposition to “colonial, racist, and alien regimes,” and they have held back from approving an international convention that would require trying or extraditing those accused of terrorist crimes. Problems of constitutional protection to individuals in democracies and of political asylum also stand in the way of an overall convention. Nevertheless, the General Assembly resolution has been useful in promoting cooperation among states to eliminate terrorism and in encouraging support for conventions against specific types of terrorism such as hijacking, taking of hostages, attacking diplomatic targets, and supporting nuclear terrorism.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.     

European terrorism: A German perspective

Abstract

Concentrating on terrorism in West Germany, Italy, and the Basque provinces of Spain, the author presents a detailed picture of the motivations, the strategies, and the ‘'achievements” of a number of the best known groups which for alleged political purposes take the law into their own hands. The Red Armee Faction, perhaps the best known West German terrorist group, and the 2nd of June Movement as well as such organizations as the Revolutionary Cells and the Guerilla Diffusa are described and their aims and activities are scrutinized. German right‐wing terrorism is also shown to wield great power, its contacts with terrorists in Lebanon and Algeria rivaling those of leftist organizations. Italian terrorism is also fully covered in this paper, with the activities of the Red Brigades, the best‐known of the leftist organizations, and its international connections, as well as other groups and the individuals involved being dealt with in some detail. The events in Spain, past and present, due especially to Basque terrorism, are considered, and the Soviet influence, represented by terrorist organizations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Cuba, is discussed as is also the outlook for the future.     

Subversion and Countersubversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe

This article examines how Europe fits into the broader international campaign against terrorism. It argues that Europe is both a source and a target of terrorist activity, and faces threats including Al Qaeda–inspired terrorism, extremist political parties, insurgent sympathizer networks, subversive movements, and the overlap between crime and terrorism. The article argues that the primary threat is terrorist-linked subversion, which seeks to manipulate and exploit the sociological and ethnographic features of immigrant communities. Islamic theology is a strictly secondary factor, and a focus on Islam as such is likely to be an analytical dead-end. The article examines countersubversion as a conceptual framework for counterterrorism in Europe. The article concludes that an approach based on trusted networks and close collaboration with communities is most likely to succeed.     

Fighting World War III: A suggested strategy

Abstract

Utilizing a rational‐actor policymaker model, this paper presents the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for the formation of a transnational antiterrorist institution. Such an institution would tie together nations in their struggle against international terrorism. In particular, these institutions could provide crisis management, preemptive strikes, and retaliatory strikes. After analyzing the obstacles to the formation of such institutions, we present a specific proposal for a transnational commando unit. We chose the parameters of the proposed institution so as to maximize the likelihood of initial formation. In addition, we discuss how the transnational commando unit could, if properly designed, surmount the obstacles to formation. As terrorist groups increase their cooperation and stage incidents of a transnational kind, nations will have to turn to such institutions to increase the effectiveness of commando units, eliminate safe havens, and share intelligence. Although our proposal is more modest than those often put forth, once formed, our institution could evolve over time.     

Implementing the convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons,including diplomatic agents

Abstract

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons was negotiated by the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on the basis of a draft by the International Law Commission. The Convention represents a major move against terrorism aimed at diplomats and others who have special status under international law. The United States Government was successful in obtaining fairly rapid approval of the text and also in obtaining the necessary U.S. legislative action to put it into effect. The United States has been hampered, however, by the fact that the two federal agencies, the F.B.I, and the U.S. Marshal's service normally do not engage in the type of activity required to protect persons covered by the Convention. Local U.S. authorities are overburdened with their normal duties and there is extremely limited federal authority to extend financial assistance to the states. More far‐reaching measures to counter the growing terrorist threat are needed.