The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women

When women carry out a suicide attack they undermine the idea of who and what a terrorist is. What is generally not realized is the extent to which women are involved in terrorism. The purpose of this article is to explore and to analyze the multifaceted roles of the women in the movement of Al Qaeda. The argument is that the role of the women the world audience perceives is the one of a suicide bomber but the role of an ideological supporter and operational facilitator is more important for the maintenance of the operational capabilities and the ideological motivation for a terrorist organization. This article argues that the women follow a gender-specific interpretation of the radical ideology, the female Jihad. The concept of the female Jihad means that the women carry out a political act by supporting their male relatives, educating their children in the ideology and facilitating terrorist operations. The female Jihad is defective when the women follow the male Jihad interpretation of the Jihad by carrying out attacks. For the survival of a terrorists organization women are more important when they follow the female version of the ideology. Because the men could get arrested, die in an attack, or could get shot by the security forces, the women continue to take care about the financial issues of the organization and continue to educate the children in the “right” belief. To verify these arguments the article is divided into three parts. The first part will look at the motivation of women participation at a terrorism organization and the motivation of a terrorism organization to use women for its purposes. The second part tries to throw some light on the female suicide bombers who acted under the umbrella of the movement of Al Qaeda. In this part the female terrorist attacks will be analyzed. In the third part Sisterhoods will be explained and the concept of the female Jihad will be analyzed. The findings of this article about the involvement of women in the movement of Al Qaeda will bring us to conclusion that women do play an essential role in these organizations and groups. Following the argument that successful counterterrorism should address both the motivation and the operational capabilities of a terrorist organization there is an essential need for the national security forces to expand their capabilities to look more carefully at women.     

Locating Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers

This article claims that the ongoing debate about the structure and dynamics of Al Qaeda has failed to appreciate the importance of an organizational layer that is situated between the top leadership and the grass-roots. Rather than being “leaderless,” it is the group's middle management that holds Al Qaeda together. In Clausewitzian terms, Al Qaeda's middle managers represent a center of gravity—a “hub of … power and movement”—that facilitates the grass-roots’ integration into the organization and provides the top leadership with the global reach it needs in order to carry out its terrorist campaign, especially in Europe and North America. They are, in other words, the connective tissue that makes Al Qaeda work. The article substantiates this hypothesis by providing a number of case studies of Al Qaeda middle managers, which illustrate the critical role they have played in integrating the grass-roots with the top leadership. The policy implications are both obvious and important. If neither the top leadership nor the grass-roots alone can provide Al Qaeda with strategic momentum, it will be essential to identify and neutralize the middle managers, and—in doing so—“cause the network to collapse on itself.”     

Terrorist Victimization: Prevention,Control, and Recovery

The Muslim Brotherhood poses a unique challenge to efforts to combat Al Qaeda and like-minded groups. It is one of the key sources of Islamist thought and political activism, and plays a significant role in shaping the political and cultural environment in an Islamist direction. At the same time, it opposes Al Qaeda for ideological, organizational, and political reasons and represents one of the major challenges to the salafi-jihadist movement globally. This dual nature of the Muslim Brotherhood has long posed a difficult challenge to efforts to combat violent extremism. Does its non-violent Islamism represent a solution, by capturing Islamists within a relatively moderate organization and stopping their further radicalization (a “firewall”), or is it part of the problem, a “conveyor belt” towards extremism? This article surveys the differences between the two approaches, including their views of an Islamic state, democracy, violence, and takfir, and the significant escalation of those tensions in recent years. It concludes that the MB should be allowed to wage its battles against extremist challengers, but should not be misunderstood as a liberal organization or supported in a short-term convergence of interests.     

Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement

This article provides a detailed examination of how the Salafi-jihadi movement perceives the “Arab Spring” revolutionary events. Although Western scholars almost unanimously agree that these events will have an enormous impact on Al Qaeda and other groups that share its ideology, the voice of the jihadis has not been examined in detail. This article addresses this critical gap in the literature through an analysis of 101 significant documents produced by jihadi thinkers within a year following the movement's very first statement on the uprising in Tunisia. These include statements released by jihadi spokesmen, interviews with the movement's intellectual leaders, and discussions on jihadi Web forums. The article concludes that Al Qaeda and the jihadi movement largely believe that the uprisings provide them a great deal of new opportunities, and outlines the movement's developing strategy to capitalize on rapidly changing events on the ground.     

Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations

Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new conceptthe Dune organizationthat is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.     

Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists

This article investigates the rationales of different explanatory models that have been utilized to explain the ideology of Al Qaeda. From perceptions of madmen and religious hypocrites to Wahhabis of the twenty-first century and Salafi-Jihadists, what these approaches have in common is an “outside-in” perspective that assumes a concept of the underlying logic of Al Qaeda without sufficient reference to primary sources. It is argued that particularly those explanations that seem to have become the official wisdom regarding the fundamental logic of Al Qaeda, Wahhabism and the Salafi-Jihadist discourse, are concepts that are poorly understood and subject to much controversy. In the anxious quest to explain Al Qaeda, the terrorism studies community seems to have deviated from the guidelines of academic conduct and restricted itself to re-assuming for its own use oversimplifications of the complexity of Islamic thought, thereby granting those oversimplifications a new lease on life. The risk of such conduct is that one ends up with a misrepresentation of the very issue he or she seeks to comprehend.     

The Impossible Challenge of Deterring “Nuclear Terrorism” by Al Qaeda

Deterring Al Qaeda from using a nuclear weapon, should it acquire one, is a harder challenge than analysts have argued. Suggestions for “deterrence based on punishment” have severe limitations. Al Qaeda is not a state, has no clear command authority, and has no clear nuclear weapons–employment doctrine. Most analysts also ignore the dynamic of “crisis instability” (“use it or lose it”): should the West believe Al Qaeda has an improvised nuclear devise, it is unlikely (regardless of whether Al Qaeda leadership claimed the weapon would be held as a deterrent only) that the West would accept a mutually-assured-destruction relationship with the group. The West would hunt the weapon down, forcing Al Qaeda's hand. The best counter–Weapons of Mass Destruction–Nuclear Terrorism defense, therefore, is good counterinsurgency policy to starve it of recruits until the group dies.     

The Spiritual Teacher and His Truants: The Influence and Relevance of Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi

Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi is one of the most important spiritual fathers of the ideology and movement that has come to be known as Salafi-jihadism. Based on primary source materials produced by al-Maqdisi and other important relevant actors at different times and places, this article shows how he developed the ideas that have influenced his disciples and protégés, most prominently Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq and “godfather” of the Islamic State, and Turki al-Binali, the Islamic State's current Grand Mufti. It also explains how and why, in later years, his disciples turned against him and, despite his repeated efforts, refused to allow him to play the role of the “critical friend,” much less regain control of the movement. The article seeks to expose the intra-jihadist frictions and debates involving al-Maqdisi during different times and contexts, especially the more recent ones between him and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Indeed, it becomes obvious how al-Maqdisi has been trying to regain his lost influence and relevance among the most radical strands within his chosen movement for years. What this shows is that, amidst the fast-changing environment in which Salafi-jihadism has evolved, praxis trumps theory, and a reputation of steadfastness, zealousness, and unwavering convictions matter more to prospective radicals than a reputation of religious knowledge and scholarship.     

Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future

This article considers the current state of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement and its likely future trajectory. It considers the principle assumptions both today and in the past about Al Qaeda and how they affect our understanding of the movement and the threat that it poses; Al Qaeda's current capacity for violence; and its ability to plan strategically and implement terrorist operations. The article further identifies nine key change drivers that will likely determine Al Qaeda's fate in the years to come before concluding that, even while the core Al Qaeda group may be in decline, Al Qaeda-ism, the movement's ideology, continues to resonate and attract new adherents. In sum, it argues that Al Qaeda remains an appealing brand most recently and most especially to extremist groups in North and West Africa and the Levant.     

Neo-Jihadist Prosumers and Al Qaeda Single Narrative: The Case Study of Giuliano Delnevo

Scholars in the field of terrorism and violent extremism often refer to the so-called Al Qaeda single narrative. This article suggests that the Internet challenges the existence of a “single narrative,” by arguing that neo-jihadist prosumers may reinterpret Al Qaeda's narrative and create hybrid symbols and identities. The article discusses the case study of an Italian neo-jihadist allegedly killed in Syria, Giuliano Delnevo, presenting research on his YouTube and Facebook production. Delnevo's narrative, which emerges from the diverse messages circulating on the Internet, recasts the Al Qaeda narrative by hybridizing it with other cultural backgrounds and political symbols.     

Every Kingdom Divided Against Itself Will Be Ruined: A Reflection,a Deflection,and a Qualified Reinterpretation of the Global Jihad

Much analytical commentary implies that a generic West is the principal target of jihadist activism. This study contends that this is a misconception fostered by jihadist groups like Al Qaeda in order to accentuate their stature in the Islamic world and to obscure their true aims, which are first and foremost to secure the dominance of the Salafist interpretation of Islam. The analysis situates Al Qaeda in the tradition of Islamic reform movements and shows that a violent Sufi/Salafist conflict pervades nearly all current examples of strife within the Muslim world. In these conflicts, the role of the “West” is instrumental, not central to the struggle. Consequently, this study offers a qualification to notions of a “global jihad” and suggests this has important considerations for policymakers in determining the nature of the threat posed by Islamist militancy.     

Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

On 29 October 2010, authorities in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates intercepted explosive packages that had been placed on U.S.-bound planes. Less than a year earlier, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives aboard Northwest Flight 253. These attacks originated and were organized in Yemen under the supervision of a local Al Qaeda affiliate known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. These attacks are a manifestation of the group's growing international ambitions, yet little scholarship on Al Qaeda explores how affiliates with robust ties to Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan balance their dedication to global and local jihad(s). This article contends that despite its strong ties to Al Qaeda Central and international posture, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula still must maintain local relevance and support. Its ability to do so carries implications for counterterrorism policymakers and the broader Al Qaeda movement.     

The Tribes that Bind: Yemen and the Paradox of Political Violence

Beset by multiple security challenges, not least the emergence of a powerful Al Qaeda franchise, Yemen appears the antithesis of the “Weberian” state model. But while these challenges are acute, they should be seen as part of a wider “political field,” dominated by powerful tribes and conditioned by patrimonial networks that have long framed the modes of political exchange between the center and periphery. This remains crucial to understanding the wider eddies of tribal politics in Yemen, and in turn, the limits of a purely military response by Washington as it seeks to confront Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.     

Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot

This article analyzes the suicide bomb attacks on four London transportation targets on 7 July 2005 and the plot to bomb simultaneously at least seven American and Canadian passenger airliners as they departed from London's Heathrow Airport. American, British, and Pakistani authorities thwarted this planned attack in August 2006. Both incidents are among the most important Al Qaeda operations in recent years. Initially, they were dismissed by the authorities, pundits, and the media alike as the work of amateur terrorists—untrained “bunches of guys” acting entirely on their own with no links to Al Qaeda. Subsequent evidence, however, has come to light, which reveals clear links to senior Al Qaeda commanders operating in Pakistan's lawless frontier border area with Afghanistan.     

Groups,Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda

Appropriately describing the properties and defining the boundaries of terrorist groups is frequently challenging. Public and policy discussion of Al Qaeda as a group, network, or broad social movement is described as an example of this problem, with an emphasis on the consequences of placing a terrorist organization in each of these different categories. To resolve the confusion that such uncertainties can introduce into discussion, an approach is described focusing on the strength of command-and-control linkages within an organization for laying out the differences between groups, networks, and movements and defining the boundaries between them.     

Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda's organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL's behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.     

Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror

This article argues that a successful strategy for fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) requires actions aimed not only at defeating the Al Qaeda network and denying its operatives sanctuary, but also efforts to delegitimize Al Qaeda's ideology; the United States has focused on the former at the expense of the latter. The GWOT requires a new strategy, one that continues to target Al Qaeda operatives and their assets, while undermining Al Qaeda's message. This requires a better understanding of Al Qaeda's ideology, how U.S. foreign policy may fuel that ideology, and a strategy for undermining militant Islam's worldview.     

Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network

This piece attempts to add to the discourse on violent substate political activism by underscoring certain overlooked elements in the study of groups such as Al Qaeda as it relates to organizational paradigms. Specifically, this essay sheds light on the nature of networks in the business world and the ways in which firms utilize organization as a method of creating value. This article starts with the assumption that the end of firm organization is ultimately the maximization of innovative capacity. The conclusion of this essay finds that Al Qaeda's use of networks has not created the indestructible conglomerate many students of terrorism fear, but rather that the resort by Al Qaeda to an all-channel network was the result of poor strategy and indeterminate political goals that have robbed it of much of its effectiveness. This study uses cursory examinations of several other similar organizations to underscore the difference in strategy and firm innovation between firms considered to have high added-value and Al Qaeda.‐     

Al Qaeda's Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad

Militant Islamist Sayyid Imam's legal critique of Al Qaeda's anti-U.S. mass casualty terrorism holds great potential utility for counterterrorist messaging strategy. In this article, a jihad–realist Islamist theological–jurisprudential methodology is first defended as the means most productive for delegitimizing Al Qaeda among high value, religiously motivated recruits. Second, Sayyid Imam's specific allegations and detailed Sharia proofs against Al Qaeda are presented. Finally, implications are drawn for U.S. counterterrorist messaging focusing especially on the utility of wielding this theological–juridical approach as compared to other “counternarrative” approaches, and the vital need to accurately characterize Islamism and its relation to terrorism.