Terrorist Attacks on the Energy Sector: The Case of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

The article focuses on the attitudes of two militant Islamist groups, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, toward the issue of terrorist attacks in the energy sector. The main aim of the article is both to analyze the importance of attacks on energy infrastructure for the strategies of these two organizations, and to describe specific examples and manifestations of terrorist activities from the side of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State with regard to the energy sector in the Middle East and North Africa. The article is based on the concept of terrorist attacks on the energy sector.     

The “Forest Jihad”

Recent Al Qaeda threats and related jihadi propaganda potentially herald a new weapon in the terrorist arsenal: the deliberate setting of forest fires and other conflagrations both to terrorize society and wreck untold economic damage. Beyond the immense, new burdens that would be placed on emergency response personnel, these fires could also create grave environmental crises causing severe pollution from gases escaping into the atmosphere. The strategy of “Forest Jihad,” now being championed by Al Qaeda strategists, is supported and justified theologically by radical Islamic scholars. With this new weapon, the terrorists believe, maximum physical and financial damage can be inflicted to targeted countries at comparatively little risk.     

Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing

On 24 September 2001, President Bush announced the first stage of the War on Terrorism with an attack against the terrorist financial infrastructure. Since then, the impact of this attack on Al Qaeda's ability to operate has been minimal, for three reasons. First, Al Qaeda has built a strong network of financiers and operatives who are both frugally minded and business savvy. As a result, terrorist finances are often hidden in legitimate and illegitimate businesses and disguised as commodities and cash. Second, Al Qaeda has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital markets. Small financial transfers, underregulated Islamic banking networks and informal transfer systems throughout the world make it almost impossible to stop Al Qaeda from moving money. Third, Al Qaeda has built a significant base of Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia with international divisions that have not been scrutinized or controlled by the regime. As a result, Al Qaeda's sophisticated financial network may be able to sustain international efforts to disrupt it. Financial regulations imposed to reduce terrorist financing must be applied more broadly and be supported by significant resources. An improvement in the war on terrorist financing requires better international coordination, more effective use of financial regulations, and regulating the Saudi Arabian charity structure.‐     

Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution

The inner organizational structure of Al Qaeda within the expanded framework of the “Global Jihad movement” has been a subject of much debate between scholars. As will be elaborated later, the “Global Jihad movement” is composed of several elements that possess radical Islamic ideology and conduct operational activity in different regions in the world under the banner of Jihad. The dominant factor within the “Global Jihad movement” is by no doubt Al Qaeda. The purpose of this article is to focus solely on Al Qaeda and present the formal internal structure of the organization. The article argues that Al Qaeda is first and foremost, an infrastructural organization with a formal echelon, hierarchy, sub-departmental division, and duties distribution reflecting characteristics of a guerilla and terrorist organization. The article portrays the formal layout of Al Qaeda, composed of the main command apparatus, and names the different personalities who fill the more important positions within Al Qaeda's hierarchy from its days of inception until today.     

Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State Through Strategies Publicized in Jihadist Magazines

As Al Qaeda and the Islamic State vie for ascendancy in the jihad movement, policymakers grapple with distinguishing the threat posed by these groups. Proceeding from the terrorists’ view of media as a critical arena of jihad, this study applies content analysis to Al Qaeda- and Islamic State-produced magazines in order to empirically differentiate the two groups through the strategies publicized therein. Findings reveal that Al Qaeda consistently employs attrition to compel changes in the West's policy and behavior, while the Islamic State has shifted from intimidating populations to outbidding competing groups to solidify its claim to the Caliphate.     

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State's Break: Strategic Strife or Lackluster Leadership?

Employing counterfactuals to assess individual and systemic explanations for the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), this article concludes that individual leaders factor greatly into terrorist alliance outcomes. Osama bin Laden was instrumental in keeping Al Qaeda and ISIS allied as he prioritized unity and handled internal disputes more deftly than his successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although a troubled alliance, strategic differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split. Rather, the capabilities of Al Qaeda's leader determined the group's ability to prevent alliance ruptures.     

Every Kingdom Divided Against Itself Will Be Ruined: A Reflection,a Deflection,and a Qualified Reinterpretation of the Global Jihad

Much analytical commentary implies that a generic West is the principal target of jihadist activism. This study contends that this is a misconception fostered by jihadist groups like Al Qaeda in order to accentuate their stature in the Islamic world and to obscure their true aims, which are first and foremost to secure the dominance of the Salafist interpretation of Islam. The analysis situates Al Qaeda in the tradition of Islamic reform movements and shows that a violent Sufi/Salafist conflict pervades nearly all current examples of strife within the Muslim world. In these conflicts, the role of the “West” is instrumental, not central to the struggle. Consequently, this study offers a qualification to notions of a “global jihad” and suggests this has important considerations for policymakers in determining the nature of the threat posed by Islamist militancy.     

Beyond the Pale? Exploring Prospects for Negotiations with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

ABSTRACT

This article argues that prospects for negotiations with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have been undertheorized. Drawing on nearly two thousand pages of primary source material— all issues of Inspire and Dabiq magazines published at the time of writing—it examines these groups' statements about their motivations for violence, their objectives, and their views about the possibility of dialogue with the West. It finds stark differences in all three areas and suggests that assumptions that have prevented theorizing about negotiations with these groups should be revisited.     

Dhiren Barot: Was He an Al Qaeda Mastermind or Merely a Hapless Plotter?

This article profiles Dhiren Barot, a convert to Islam who was convicted in Britain in October 2006 on charges of conspiracy to commit murder for planning terrorist attacks in the United States and the United Kingdom. Upon his conviction, much of the British press, and many other observers, claimed Barot was a high-level Al Qaeda figure whose plans were on the verge of execution. Other observers, and Barot's defense attorneys, however, argued that these allegations were exaggerated. Barot, they claimed, had done nothing more than sketch vague plans for which he had no funding and was merely being used by the British government as an example in the War on Terror. This article details Barot's life and terrorist activity. It argues that he was a committed jihadi, was likely an Al Qaeda member, and did indeed represent a security threat. Nonetheless, the lack of public information available on his life suggests that certain allegations about his status within Al Qaeda and the immanency of his plans should be treated skeptically. It concludes by considering to what extent Barot fits the profile of other Islamic terrorists.     

Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future

This article considers the current state of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement and its likely future trajectory. It considers the principle assumptions both today and in the past about Al Qaeda and how they affect our understanding of the movement and the threat that it poses; Al Qaeda's current capacity for violence; and its ability to plan strategically and implement terrorist operations. The article further identifies nine key change drivers that will likely determine Al Qaeda's fate in the years to come before concluding that, even while the core Al Qaeda group may be in decline, Al Qaeda-ism, the movement's ideology, continues to resonate and attract new adherents. In sum, it argues that Al Qaeda remains an appealing brand most recently and most especially to extremist groups in North and West Africa and the Levant.     

Al Qaeda's Operations: Project Management Analysis

In recent years, Al Qaeda succeeded in perpetrating several terrorist attacks that were successfully calculated and executed. Each operation may be considered to be analyzed as a project. This article analyzes the events taken by Al Qaeda prior to their operations, focusing on planning, controlling, and decision-making processes, using common tools from the project management area. This unique approach enables an understanding of the operational aspects of Al Qaeda and the managerial processes that its leaders were focused on. It was found that Al Qaeda's greatest managerial strength lies in human resource management, which includes team members recruiting, developing a clear organizational structure, team developing and team members motivating. Al Qaeda's greatest weakness lies in time management, resulting with many operations’ schedule delays.     

Locating Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers

This article claims that the ongoing debate about the structure and dynamics of Al Qaeda has failed to appreciate the importance of an organizational layer that is situated between the top leadership and the grass-roots. Rather than being “leaderless,” it is the group's middle management that holds Al Qaeda together. In Clausewitzian terms, Al Qaeda's middle managers represent a center of gravity—a “hub of … power and movement”—that facilitates the grass-roots’ integration into the organization and provides the top leadership with the global reach it needs in order to carry out its terrorist campaign, especially in Europe and North America. They are, in other words, the connective tissue that makes Al Qaeda work. The article substantiates this hypothesis by providing a number of case studies of Al Qaeda middle managers, which illustrate the critical role they have played in integrating the grass-roots with the top leadership. The policy implications are both obvious and important. If neither the top leadership nor the grass-roots alone can provide Al Qaeda with strategic momentum, it will be essential to identify and neutralize the middle managers, and—in doing so—“cause the network to collapse on itself.”     

The Strategic Logic of Women in Jihadi Organizations

Despite the traditional restrictive views of Islamic jurisprudence on women's social activities, the level of women's incorporation into jihadi organizations is growing rapidly in both numbers and roles. This article argues that this increase reflects a strategic logic—jihadi groups integrate women to enhance organizational success. The article develops a typology of jihadi organizations: operation-based and state building and argues that the strategic logic of women in operation-based organizations lays in the tactical advantages women provide them. However, for state-building jihadi groups, the strategic logic of women is geared toward addressing the challenges facing a functioning state.     

Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network

This piece attempts to add to the discourse on violent substate political activism by underscoring certain overlooked elements in the study of groups such as Al Qaeda as it relates to organizational paradigms. Specifically, this essay sheds light on the nature of networks in the business world and the ways in which firms utilize organization as a method of creating value. This article starts with the assumption that the end of firm organization is ultimately the maximization of innovative capacity. The conclusion of this essay finds that Al Qaeda's use of networks has not created the indestructible conglomerate many students of terrorism fear, but rather that the resort by Al Qaeda to an all-channel network was the result of poor strategy and indeterminate political goals that have robbed it of much of its effectiveness. This study uses cursory examinations of several other similar organizations to underscore the difference in strategy and firm innovation between firms considered to have high added-value and Al Qaeda.‐     

Groups,Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda

Appropriately describing the properties and defining the boundaries of terrorist groups is frequently challenging. Public and policy discussion of Al Qaeda as a group, network, or broad social movement is described as an example of this problem, with an emphasis on the consequences of placing a terrorist organization in each of these different categories. To resolve the confusion that such uncertainties can introduce into discussion, an approach is described focusing on the strength of command-and-control linkages within an organization for laying out the differences between groups, networks, and movements and defining the boundaries between them.     

Organizational perspectives on the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups

Abstract

This article treats terrorist organizations as political interest groups. Starting from the assumption that terrorists are rational political actors, it follows that organizational considerations will play a role in the formation and decline of terrorist groups, just as is the case in other political organizations. The effects of several factors, including recruitment, ability to provide selective and purposive incentives, the need for entrepreneurial political leadership, competition from other organizations, the ability to attract outside support, and the ability to form coalitions with other groups, are considered.     

A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality 1

Decreasing state sponsorship for terrorism in the post-9/11 environment has pressed terrorist groups to find alternative sources of financial support. Some groups have created their own “in-house” criminal capabilities, for example FARC, the LTTE, and Al Qaeda. Several analysts have argued that this “mutation” in organizational form may lead terrorist groups to ally with organized crime, whereas others have suggested that distinct organizational and ideological differences between the two will preclude cooperation. Drawing on both accounts, it is argued in this article that the degree of a terrorist group's organizational capacity and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will engage in, while ideological (political) distinctiveness will preclude fully symbiotic cooperation between terrorists and organized crime groups.     

Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda's organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL's behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.     

Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond

After the U.S. led coalition forces attacked Al Qaeda and Taliban infrastructure in Afghanistan beginning in October 2001, the epicenter of global terrorism moved from Afghanistan to tribal Pakistan. Known as the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan, this region has emerged as the premier hunting ground for the Al Qaeda leadership. With the co-option of new groups in FATA and its adjacent North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), the Al Qaeda threat has proliferated. The threat posed by the Afghan Taliban has been compounded with the addition of a new range of actors notably the Pakistani Taliban. Working together with multiple threat groups, both foreign and Pakistani, Al Qaeda directs its global jihad campaign from FATA. Unless the terrorist enclave is cleared on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the threat to Afghanistan and mainland Pakistan will continue. This article seeks to map the evolution of Al Qaeda and its associated groups since their relocation to FATA.     

Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe

Abstract

This article investigates the importance of the invasion and occupation of Iraq as motivation for recent acts of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. It analyses the mass casualty terrorist attack attributed to a group of Islamist militants in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the killing of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam by an Al Qaeda–inspired terrorist network. The first case has been assumed to be mainly motivated by the Iraq war, whereas the other case has been perceived as an act by an individual, motivated by domestic factors in Holland. The article situates these acts of terrorism within the theory of so-called spillover effects from armed conflicts to international terrorism. It argues that the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists in both cases, but that the terrorists linked the Iraq issue with perceived injustices against Muslims in Europe and globally.